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lc NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY

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(AN EAST-WEST EDITION)

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

TORONTO

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

NEW YORK

LONDON

AFFILIATED EAST-WEST PRESS PVT. LTD.
NEW DELHI

S.C.E.R.T., West Bengal

Date 18...3...69.....

Acc. No. 2090.....

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

120 Alexander St., Princeton, New Jersey (*Principal office*)
257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, New York

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, LTD.

358, Kensington High Street, London, W.14, England

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY (Canada), LTD.
25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 16, Canada

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D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

301.37

VIN

Published simultaneously in Canada by
D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY (Canada), LTD.

Library of Congress Catalogue Card No. 59-14621

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Bureau Edn. Psy. Research
18.3.69
2090

Price in India Rs. 9.00
Rest of Asia \$ 2.30

East-West Student Edition - 1965
Affiliated East-West Press P. Ltd.

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This book has been published with the assistance of the Joint Indian-American Standard Works Programme.

Published by W. D. Ten Broeck for AFFILIATED EAST-WEST PRESS PRIVATE LTD. C 57 Defence Colony, New Delhi 3. India, and printed by S. M. Balsaver at USHA PRINTERS, National House, Tulloch Road, Bombay 1, India.

PREFACE

This book was written for a one-semester course in industrial sociology at the advanced undergraduate or graduate level. That the student has had a course in sociology or economics is assumed.

Our aim has been a penetrating description of the modern industrial situation. Achieving this end has involved making theory and analysis the core of the book and buttressing this core with data from the best of the hundreds of detailed studies that have been done in the field. We believe the student will find in these pages answers to the questions an industrial sociologist must ask. What is the character of industrial organization, including administrative structures and informal patterns of action? What is the character of industrial society, including the various kinds of inter-group relations and the nature of the normative order? What is the relation of the individual worker to his environment, including the machine, the work group, the administrative system, and the market? What are the workers' other affiliations and loyalties? What are his leisure options?

It is our feeling that this book distinguishes itself from other books in this field by its persistent emphasis on power group relations—on the roles of unions, management, and government. Other notable differences are its strong emphasis on motivation and work orientations and on the effects of automation which result in new mass leisure.

*Los Angeles, Calif.
August, 1959*

MELVIN J. VINCENT
JACKSON MAYERS

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THE PLACE OF WORK IN SOCIETY

Work is one of the most important social functions of human beings. Relatedness with others in work processes is joined to the organization of people and their work activities by supervisors. The overwhelming majority of the adult population of the society works; a very much smaller proportion supervises that labor.

Labor processes involve men both in small work groups and in large corporate organizations. Brought together in the work shop, office, and mine, men create unions; employers, managers, and supervisors establish employers' associations, personnel departments, and regulations. In the center of the interconnecting relations that arise between workers and unions and unions and management is the modern national political state. Work relations and supervisory relations, plus intergroup functioning, involve so many people and affect so much of the society that the public interest is vitally concerned with these activities.

The work function of men in social groups goes back to the dawn of man's attempts to subjugate nature to his needs and, in various places, to subjugate other men as well. In differing social circumstances and in differing ways, work has been man's way of providing for his basic needs—the human minimum of food, clothing, shelter, control over self and product and others, and some psychological satisfactions. Probably for most of man's existence on earth work has not been discernible apart from the rest of social existence.

This chapter will trace the development of a *separated work function*, split off from other social activities and performed in a place apart and usually under direction. But to reach this stage the older "fusion" of functions in nonmarket societies had to be changed. Today a man's working life and his leisure activities may be less separated than in the past, for with the reduction in hours

of work and the lightening of the work load, it is possible that once again work may be more closely linked to other social processes. While work may be coming full circle, back to a new kind of fusion on a highly industrialized base, one can grasp this development and the rise of leisure for the masses best through examining the major changes that have occurred.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SEPARATE WORK FUNCTION

Most persons who now work for a living think of work as something quite separate and apart from the rest of life. Work was not always thought of in this way. Many of the characterizations of work have made it appear that work is work regardless of time and place. Such concepts suffer from being universalized—torn out of time and place and circumstances; they become absolutes.

Work as a human function cannot be defined for all time but only in relation to specific social situations. Most pre-market societies did not possess or know of separated work activity. But in explaining how a separation occurred, one can see the possible ways of making work once more a phase of life and not an overpowering activity.

Work in Nonmarket Societies. The student who knows that he may have to work some 45 years may be surprised to learn that in some cultures there is no such thing as work. After investigating many societies, Moore complained of "the impossibility of defining 'labor' in any way that will refer to the same class of human activities in all societies."

Moore examined what man today calls "economic" activities; e.g., gathering, growing, or fabricating of food, clothing, shelter, and other valued physical objects. Different ages and sexes performed different tasks in a kind of specialization or cooperation-division of labor. A give-and-take or reciprocal process of moving articles seems to resemble "exchange" but is determined largely by kinship obligations. The various elements that go into industrial sociology today were present to an extent in earlier times but, as Moore wrote, "the very activity that involves 'production' is likely to entail aesthetic, magical, or religious elements, entails kinship elements by definition, and must entail the allocation of power and responsibility."

Moore was led to conclude, "now even if our unit were the man-hour and not the person it is difficult in these circumstances to distinguish work from non-work." The conceptual problem of locating work becomes "even more acute" when one examines services, i.e., human actions not embodied in material goods. At-

tempts to apply the term *economic* to all societies fail, as Moore shows. "In any society an economic activity or structure is only 'predominantly' so, as such activities or organization cannot be concretely separated from other functions."¹

Work has to be related both to the specific social situation and historical period. As society changed from nonliterate ways, magic and aesthetic considerations were stripped from work. Slavery produced a group of human beings who worked, unlike aristocrats who did not. They, with their new found leisure, could 'produce' other things and ideas. The use of human beings as slaves had a further effect. It degraded both them and to an extent their masters and made of work an operation performed by subordinates as a special function separate from other social activities.

Work in Ancient Times. Proceeding beyond nonliterate societies, Greek thinkers held that mechanical labor should be done by slaves, that work brutalized the mind and should be avoided by the virtuous elite. According to early Hebrew thinkers work was a fate man was condemned to. Then the kingdom to come was to be one of blessed idleness. Later work was dignified. Early Christianity saw in work a punishment for sin; but work also served other ends—it provided for charity, health of body and soul, and filled time that might otherwise be devoted to idle thoughts.

A difference developed in the group way of controlling nature in men's interests. Stratification of the leaders and the led affected work in making it more individual and yet of less significance as a way to achieve status in life. Meanwhile, governments enforced the rule of the slaveholder and the feudal lord over the workman and the work process. But work was mainly familial in agricultural societies.

Medieval View: Work as a Calling. In the small, and agrarian society of the Middle Ages, the views of the church produced an ethicoreligious concept that even the most humble labor was a manifestation of the divine plan. Work, alternated with prayer, was obligatory for monks. Ordinary people were thought to have a "calling" to fulfill appointed duties in a society characterized by a careful structuring of tasks and status by birth. Craftsmen had a favorable status, because they were thought to contribute greatly to the community.

The interlocking of roles and positions was thorough. The function of each man was held to be basic and necessary to the community. It was through participation that the individual could attain his ends and only through gaining the aid of every individual that the society could supply the "fullest life" for its members. Here

was a system of mutual obligations. To these social norms there were many exceptions. One could rise out of a fixed status by entering the military service, joining the clergy, going into politics, working as an artisan, or through invention, marriage, or fraud. Work was linked to all other human functions in an agricultural world where most men plowed and reaped while the lord of the manor provided for defense and certain common needs.

A transition to the next phase in the development of work came in the Renaissance. Work became a creative endeavor, a way of rejoicing and pleasure instead of pain and disutility. That great mind which defined the universe as infinite, Giordano Bruno, glorified work as the powerful arm against adversity and the conquering social tool. These are quite modern approaches to work.

The Protestant Reformation and Work as Salvation. In the main the early leaders of Protestantism thought of this world rather than the next. They believed that it was God's will that man should improve his lot on earth. Man could perfect himself by his own work; he could increase or improve his situation and position. For Luther work was "the base and key to life," idleness was unnatural and evil, and work was a way of serving God. It was the Swiss leader of the Reformation, John Calvin, who launched the modern form of the idea that work is punishment for sin, as well as a rational form of activity that followed God's will. Auster work, saving, and reinvestment rather than lustful use of the gains of work would ease guilt. Protestantism sought to produce men who labored methodically, who served the Creator through work. In the Calvinist doctrine there is little use in trying to achieve salvation; the best that could be done is to "prove by one's works that he is saved."²

Sanctification of work by Luther and Calvin led to making virtues of industry, thrift, and self-denial. Such men as Wesley preached that the fruits of labor were the sign of salvation. "The culmination of the Protestant Reformation was to give divine sanction to the drive to excel."³ Here is the basis for a good part of the drive for success in worldly affairs in a new kind of social goal system.

CAPITALISM AND WORK

Under capitalism, work evolved further. Mercantilism, the long-lasting state-run commercial capitalism of colonial times roughly between 1450 and 1776 utilized a good deal of compulsory labor. American history indicates how basic enforced labor was to the rising society, although work for oneself was briefly extolled in the

small-scale, agrarian economy. As factory labor spread, however, laborers were separated from the land and from ownership of tools. In the ensuing periods of unemployment, those not at work faced accusations of laziness and immorality and were ignominiously treated. The "workshop" was used as a sanction. A "work-centered" world grew up around the idea that work makes the man; later, large-scale business was to crown this entire idea by its de-humanization of the laborer.⁴

Mercantilist Compulsory Work. Mercantilist thinkers were convinced that "every man oweth to work," to use the language of an old statute. "Compellable industry," or what is today called forced or enforced labor, was a common idea. The mercantilist state decided who should be allowed to work. An artisan required state permission to market his wares and state authorization as to where to establish himself. Louis XIV in preparing to build the colonnade of the Louvre forbade all private persons to employ workmen without his permission.

In those times the real sense of economic (exchange) "value" was that which referred to the "value or worth" of a man at labor—a man's price.⁵ Sir William Petty, while not a mercantilist, expressed a vital sentiment when he declared, "Labor is the father and active principle of Wealth, as Lands are the mother." From this statement, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and others were to draw strong inferences about labor.

Labor as the Source of Wealth. Labor was the source of wealth and economic value in the eyes of Locke, Petty, and Adam Smith. Smith also held that work made the man—a sociological statement in 1776 of a "work-centered" theme still prevalent today. For Smith "productive labor" was that labor which created marketable commodities; "unproductive labor" included services. It took years to move away from this view, and economists never quite dropped the idea that nothing was work until it entered a market. However hard a woman may labor at home, economists do not yet consider her functions are work, since she is not paid for them through a market transaction. Sociologically such a view is highly questionable, but historically the idea indicates that work is only that which is separate and apart from household activities.

Modern labor was slowly brought into being by the use of pressure and compulsion—enclosures of land, inducements at home, enforced labor abroad, or its export. Work was looked down on as an activity to which no man aspired but to which he had to be driven like a beast of burden. Adam Smith held that each individual in following his own self-interest labored for the good of the com-

munity as if guided by an invisible hand. Bernard de Mandeville said that in "a free nation, where slaves are not allowed, the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laboring poor." Mercantilism in its state-making activities had spawned this version of the idea of work being performed by the poor; today the idea functions as part of the labor policy of totalitarian regimes. Puritans added the concept that a man must work to eat. Poverty was held to be a social stigma and was no longer the key to the Kingdom of Heaven.

Enforced Labor in North America. Human labor in the British colonies of North America started with strong feudal overtones. Gentlemen, it was thought, could not soil their hands with toil. Slavery was introduced in the seventeenth century, practically from the founding of the colonies. Hard put to find labor and then to hold it in a new land where a man could stake out his own farm—and be his own boss—the mercantilist state-chartered companies brought over indentured servants, convicts, children, shanghaied persons, as well as contract and forced labor. Slavery and slave relations continued until 1865. However obtained, labor was looked on as inferior and subordinate. Moreover, these attitudes were associated with in-group hatred for out-group workers with their "foreign" ways and lower standards of living.

William Penn systematized the hunt for labor. Masses of immigrants were brought over through the efforts of skilled salesmen who depicted the wonders and opportunities of life in the colonies. The immigration movement that lasted a century from 1820 and expanded this idea, affected more than 38,000,000 people, until in the 1920's Congress cut mass immigration to a trickle.

The first factory in the United States, Slater's mill of 1791, was started with the labor of nine little children. Out of a past of child labor and forced labor, the modern labor force has developed. In part because men had to be forced to labor for someone else, economists thought of work as pain or disutility so great that only payment of money could overcome the nonpleasure. Work was thereby separated, too, from creativeness, play, and other psychological satisfactions. A slight exception to this view of work was the gradual recognition that services were productive.

Work for Oneself. The possibility of being one's own boss was sufficiently great in early America that millions sought out this country for settlement. In agrarian times work for oneself was far more common than working for others especially since as much as 90 per cent of the population did farm work before 1800. Not until the 1840's was any currency given to the idea that working for someone else was not disgraceful, so detested was this social con-

dition of semiservitude. Up to that time work and property ownership—chiefly of farms—were joined in a single person and family. "There was thus a linkage of income, status, work, and property."⁶ Most adults had the combined status of owner-farmer.

After the 1840's, working for someone else slowly became acceptable; the newer view helped smooth the movement from farm to city. The rise of large-scale industry brought a change in ethical norms and the triumph of dogmas that labor was working for others in return for a reward or wage and, as the more frank writers added, out of fear of discharge. When the individual worker had to meet a better entrenched employer and make an individual bargain, self-governing relations were changed to work-supervisory ones. The industrial revolution was, in consequence, a social revolution that fundamentally altered the status, functions, attitudes, and assumptions by which social actions were guided. Most people worked for others; a few supervised. Those who had sufficient wealth could avoid work; those who were poor had no choice. Although, to keep workers and to keep them happy, employers had to cease looking on work as degrading.

In the 1820's about 80 per cent of the labor force was self-employed; by the mid-1950's only a small proportion of the working population was independent. Moreover, by that time, most small businessmen were not selling goods; they were usually selling services—a shift from skill with things to skill with persons.^{6a} The old, somewhat agrarian ideal of self-employment and being one's own boss shifted greatly, until in the mid-1950's it was the assembly-line worker who persisted in this dream, in good measure as a way to avoid the assembly line, while the young executives in the big corporations came to prefer working for someone else as "organization men."⁷

In the main the early social change was to an employer-employee (supervisory leader-led) relation. One could hire a "hand." Workers were "free," i.e., they could be hired or fired with no responsibility to them or to the society for what happened when they were jobless and separated from the land and self-employed status. Objections to this situation first arose among men of property who developed the so-called *labor ideology*. These men seriously questioned the right to tear a man from the land, bind him to the machine as its human cogwheel, and then throw him out in the street when, periodically or permanently, he was no longer needed.

"Laziness" and the Workhouse. More materialistic masters would have little truck with these unfortunates. Their unemployment was "their own fault." It was their responsibility, not that of

the society or the masters. Rising capitalism created the idea that the worker, occasionally separated from work by unemployment, was lazy and therefore immoral. Joblessness was held to be a worse disgrace than the erstwhile social-outcast position of working for others. The state herded thousands of people into barracks and forced them to labor. From the opening lines of *Oliver Twist* one learns that a central feature of every community in those days was the workhouse. The sin of poverty had to be expiated by hard labor. It was generally accepted that the workless creatures were lazy, shiftless, and degenerate, anxious only to live on a public dole. Unemployment was termed an individual crime.

More than a century ago, deep concern for these people led De Tocqueville to write, "It would seem as if the rulers of our time sought only to use men to make things great; I wish they would try a little more to make great men; that they set less value on the work; and more value on the workman." His plea did little to alter harsh views of the laborer. The economist N. Senior expressed the predominant view of employers and the state.

"Under a government which does not interfere with the direction of industry, it is impossible that a man in health and strength can be without employment, unless his vices make employment intolerable to him. Let the workman be allowed to choose the market for his labor, and you may be sure that he will find one, and more and more certainly in proportion to the wealth of the country. The complaint of want of work is the threadbare excuse of the idler who prefers relief to wages."⁸

While Senior was to alter his views, others persisted in this approach to the 1930's and some hold to it to this day. Today it is better recognized that unemployment is not the result of personal vice or preference for relief; unemployment is looked upon as a social problem.

SUMMARY

Work is part of the social reality of all people. Purposeful activity consciously performed together is distinctively human. Human beings find relatedness to each other around work, which thereby structures a society. In nonmarket societies, work is part of a fused way of life; in market societies and a few societies antecedent to them, work has been somewhat dissociated from the main activities of life. When laboring was a phase of over-all existence, there could be little looking down on work; when work was separated from the rest of the life processes and involved submitting to others, it became largely a degradation.

For some, work was a punishment for sin; for others, a way to salvation; for many, it was a way to survive. Work became entangled with the drive for worldly success; but for long years it could not be freed from compulsion. Then free labor arose, and the push away from slavery took on momentum. Work often became a calling, a vocation, a chosen pursuit. Concepts of labor as the source of wealth collided with those of enforced labor. Working for oneself became one of the ambitions of the ages, but modern capitalism required a labor force. To create the necessary force, working for others had to be made respectable and workers had to be made literate and willing to accept supervision by others without dropping back into the slave or serf type of subordination. Compulsion gave way to indirect means for getting men to work for others, but it has never quite left the work scene.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In primitive fusion work is not a separate social process. What does this mean?
2. Give early Greek, Hebrew, and Christian views of work.
3. What persons to this day view their work as a calling?
4. Relate the Protestant "ethic" to the value placed on the drive for success in this world.
5. Adam Smith had a "work-centered" view. On what basis did he establish this approach?
6. What forms of compulsion have been used in work relations through the ages?
7. Sample two dozen of your friends or students around you as to whether they wish to work for themselves or prefer to work for others. Why do they make the choices they do?
8. What has happened to the view of man as lazy?

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MODERN APPROACHES TO WORK

As modern production methods were developed, conceptions of work changed and a work-centered universe appeared. At first job-mindedness was considered a key to personality development; work was supposed to make the man. With the advent of early factory techniques, the conception of work as pain, or at least as nonpleasure, became entrenched. A parallel and rival school of thought looked on the labor of human beings as creative, or potentially so. More recently, concern about a suitable combination of work and play has expressed itself in considerations of automation and its potential release of time and energy for leisure activity.

Work has taken on a new significance. Fewer hours are devoted to it; it is less often thought of as a device for molding personality, and more often looked upon as a part-role function. In addition, efforts to humanize work have gone on steadily. In place of the old Protestant ethic there has arisen, at least for certain white collar and executive personnel, a "social ethic" which extols working for others up to a point. Such an ethic cannot be separated from aspirations for greater self-expression.

JOB-MINDEDNESS AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

Working for others has multiple significances. It involves the separation of the laborer from the land and the loss of any immediate possibilities of being one's own boss. There is a movement away from working within one's primary group. In its place have stepped new, more distant groups, which require and gain control of a man's time and energy away from home. Somehow this increasing separation of work processes and of the worker from the older and more unified primary group functioning has been accompanied by a degree of dissociation and dehumanization.

In the older, extended family unit "occupation" was part of the

family life. Kinship implied considerable occupational as well as residential immobility in an agrarian society. Modern industry has steadily separated work and worker from family life, thereby altering the older family structure and stripping it of many of its functions.¹

Does Work Make the Man? Once increasing millions had left the farm and home to enter factories, a tradition arose that work made the man by molding him during the better part of his conscious, working day. When writing of laborers who were confined to a few very simple operations, Adam Smith said, "The understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments." Such a limitation of function was bought, he pointed out, at the expense of social virtues.²

More than a century later, Alfred Marshall, the neoclassical economist, declared that work was "a necessity for the formation of character and, therefore, for progress."³ Does a man's occupation polarize all his other activities? Landis replies, "A man's whole life organization is built around the job."⁴ Bogardus also notes, "Life becomes organized habitually around or conditioned by occupational activities."⁵

When children started work at an early age and when the job lasted sixteen hours or more a day, clearly occupation had an overwhelming effect on personality. However, when the hours of labor were cut and children no longer had to go to work so early, non-job activities no doubt came to play a larger part in personality development. When life ceases to be organized around farm chores, children can be educated for greater independence both in and out of work activities.

The current trend seems to be away from a work-centered society. Work tends steadily to decrease in importance as a center of organization of people's lives.

Dehumanization Process. Work, in truth, may unmake the man. The early factory process was brutal and callous, neglecting the human needs of the laborer and treating him as an object to be manipulated by others. Men were uprooted from an agricultural way of life and cut off from ties to their families. As Polanyi explained, social organization was virtually split asunder so that "all along the line, human society had become an accessory of the economic system."⁶ "Labor" continues to be the technical term for a human being employed by and subordinate to someone else.

Men are together in industry, but not in the sense of being related to each other. Instead, they are related to a place on the assembly line, a point in a hierarchy, a number on a payroll record.

Direct and personal connections are replaced by "property-mediated" relations.⁷ People are linked by way of paper forms and orders, not through personal acquaintance. Cooley's "secondary association," in which people meet as part-functionaries and not as whole persons, is spreading.⁸ Secondary association is partial association. It is designed for special purposes which are, not in large measure, controlled by the workers, and it is maintained by impersonal communication across social barriers.

Most modern work is not satisfying in itself but is a duty and a burden which eventually leads to a near-unbearable boredom and results in the alienation of the man from his work. A man can be treated as a passive instrument until work loses much of its meaning. In such situations workers counter impersonality and dehumanization through helping one another, entering into informal—really personal and direct—relations, joining unions, complaining, quitting, and seeking to escape working for others.⁹

PAIN VERSUS CREATIVENESS

It was neither dehumanization nor boredom which led the economist or price analyst to count work as pain and thus as cost, even if he knew that some elements of work gave satisfaction or were less "painful" than others.¹⁰ Compensation through a market transaction—wage or salary payment—set off work from other labors. Many forms of human effort are excluded from "work" by the economist as well as by the United States Department of Commerce. Neither considers a housewife's efforts as work, even though they may be physically (but not socially) the same as the labor of a maid, baby sitter, laundry worker, and cook. Sociologically an alteration in point of view is needed, for housewives do contribute to wealth by making beds and meals and raising children, even if this is not measured through a market.

Pain or Play. Older views of economics and work held that society is largely the product of a pain economy in which survival was determined by "the enemies and pains to be avoided." Looking forward to the future, Patten could see the prospect of a society of abundance and pleasure instead of one marked by scarcity and pain. He was critical of viewpoints which held that men needed suffering to be kept in line. Before him, the utopian Fourier had held that work should be a pleasure and that men should be trained to be diversified in their skills.¹¹ In 1859 Samuel Smiles said, "youth must work in order to enjoy." Perhaps this was a step toward the view, that work can be enjoyed while it is being accomplished.¹² Without this attitude people will seek freedom from work instead

of using it to achieve some personal independence and control over nature.¹³

Although some work has long been a source of prestige and honor, the play element has been underemphasized.¹⁴ Still, some work and play cannot be clearly separated; much play or part of it is work-like, some work play-like. The "game-mindedness" of workers introducing a new product is an example of work-like play; so is Veblen's "idle curiosity" that leads to real industrial improvements.¹⁵

To move beyond the separated work morality and play morality of the nineteenth century was not easy. Various efforts were made, e.g., with the idea that "consumption and production are blended in the same act."¹⁶ This view points to the duality of function by the worker who is also a consumer, and is both simultaneously.

Craftsmanship. Active craftsmanship, called both play and work by Mills, is in his view, "the medium of culture"; it is life integrated and not separated, combining physical effort with reflection.^{16a} While few workers have enjoyed the status of craftsmen, the gratifications gained by craftsmen are important for clarifying major sources of satisfaction at work today.

As working for others became part of a way of life, such writers as Tolstoy, Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris came to look on it as creative. But their notion of work was preindustrial; it involved a concept of free artisans, each completing a whole product and therefore earning the right to returns on that product. Morris saw hope in the idea of pleasure in the work and the product—in work for work's sake. He thought of the producer as psychologically linked to the product, whether he owned it legally or not.

The result hinted at by Morris has since been described in social-psychological literature as the Zeigarnik effect; it is man's strong wish to complete uncompleted tasks and to remember them better than finished ones.¹⁷ Man needs some image of the completed product, some idea of what he is achieving, so as to capture the joy of consummation. By joining plan and performance as one, the craftsman masters the activity and himself in the process.^{16b} Thus work has a high non-economic and psychological value; it is essential to man's existence, because it satisfies a creative need.¹⁸ There are those who believe handwork has a remarkable effect on character. The Benedictines, for example, required some manual and some intellectual work each day so that a man would not be stinted by the employment of only a part of himself. Creativity is thought of as having a restorative function. Fromm goes so far as to say that man finds it hard to remain sane at part-tasks.¹⁹

Veblen's celebrated "instinct of workmanship"—creativity and self-expression—rested on people's possessing curiosity, desiring creativity, seeking artistic expression, i.e., being moved by the same forces that he held have propelled man's evolution from the brute to the human plane.²⁰

Work as Part of a Way of Life. Many social scientists have dealt with the separation of work from play, of work from creativity, of work from reward. Katz, in considering various gratifications of work, stresses the unity of process and result. People, he writes, enjoy the "fruits of creative activity"; they seek to integrate satisfactions of work, aesthetics, and ritual "in a single pattern." Moreover, they find in the means to a living the "goal of a satisfactory way of life in itself."²¹

Craftsmanship is more than a form of work gratification. As Mills observed, "There is no ulterior motive in work other than the product being made and the processes of its creation. The details of daily work are meaningful, because they are not detached in the worker's mind from the product of the work. The worker is free to control his own working action." The craftsman, who is able to learn from his work and use and develop his capacities and skills, has "no split of work and play, or work and culture. The craftsman's way of livelihood determines and infuses his entire mode of living."²²

Re-establishment in a modern industrial environment of the fusion of work and the rest of living would mean that one could live "the only life worth living *while* he works."²³ Some new forms of job training lead toward making the gratifications of craftsmanship available to the labor force. One of the promises of automation is that, by technological improvement, the functions of the unskilled laborer in the factory will be eliminated so that these workers can be promoted to the class of skilled laborers.

Dangers of Noncreativity. Noncreativity has its effects on personality, some of them going beyond dehumanization, the cold treatment of impersonal relations, and the stunting that can result from performing part-tasks for long years. In the Yale Technology Project study of 202 automobile workers, each with a minimum of twelve years' experience, it was found that "the intrinsic nature of the immediate job, with its conveyor-belt pacing and repetitive motions, constituted the greatest source of over-all job dissatisfaction. Only a handful of men were considered at all 'adjusted' and satisfied with the job."²⁴ Disagreeing with Friedmann's observation that most assembly-line workers eventually adjust themselves to

their jobs and lose interest in seeking more challenging tasks, Walker and Guest found serious nonadjustment at work.²⁴

A half-century earlier Veblen held that mechanical employments produced mechanical thinking. Machine-process laborers who work in impersonal job situations, he said, "are in danger of losing the point of view of sin."^{20a}

CHANGES IN THE WORK FUNCTION

The new techniques and organization of work have helped create the great material abundance of modern times. For perhaps the first time, a society of surplus has emerged. At the same time, the work of millions of people has been made less demanding of time and energy and more dignified. Most workers in the United States now spend more time away from work than inside it. Other changes have involved making much work more creative and satisfying; and the rest can, it appears, be made so by some alterations once thought impractical or impossible.

The New Social Ethic. In place of the older rugged individualist, a new organization man has arisen. Unlike the independent personality so highly extolled a generation ago, the organization man likes to work for others and in large corporations. But the organization man has strayed from the Protestant Ethic. The old view of progress through individual work has given way to a social-organizational ethic or bureaucratic morality in which professionalization is important. Now it is the group which is held to be the source of creativity, "belongingness" which is felt to be the ultimate end of the individual, and a belief in the application of science which constitutes the mythus.²⁵

Still, the old Protestant Ethic remains sufficiently powerful that some researchers lament, "We are now confronted with the problem of permitting the average American to feel moral even when he is flirting, even when he is spending, even when he is not saving, even when he is taking two vacations a year and buying a second or third car. . . . One of the basic problems of this prosperity, then, is to give people the sanction and justification to enjoy it and to demonstrate that the hedonistic approach to his life is a moral, not an immoral one."^{25a}

The organization man gains through a new social ethic the legitimization that the Protestant Ethic once reserved for hard work. But he does not quite have the same terror of belief. Moreover, the new mythus is divisive, restricted to certain layers of bureaucracy—the professionals—whereas the older Protestant Ethic was all-encompassing.

A Productive Orientation. In a world of large-scale groups, one may be discouraged from trying to build an organization by himself, especially when there is a place within some already existing fold. The organization man is increasingly finding his meaning in work for others in larger and larger organizations.

Heron, a management executive, writes, "We shall never achieve the ideals of America if we create a class of workers denied the satisfactions of significant work."²⁶ Whatever organization man finds in the large corporation, he may still lack that integral social background without which, Mayo said, man "cannot even assign a value to his work."²⁷

The organization man does not escape the problem of achieving meaningful work, even by submerging himself in gigantism. Man has to be the center of the social drama and not a mere creature of an industrial system. Fromm contends, "Man is the end, and must never be used as a means; material production is for man, not man for material production; the aim of life is the unfolding of man's creative power." He would end any separation of work activity from political activity, of work from leisure, of work from play and personal life, i.e., he would end a compartmentalization of living. A productive orientation requires more than sharing profits; it requires sharing work and sharing experience.^{10a}

SUMMARY

For many people, especially the unskilled, work is painful and to be avoided. For those who have a chance to express themselves more fully and to control their own actions at work to some degree, work is creative. The older view of work as a molder of personality has been altered by changes in production, shorter hours, and lighter work loads. One's personality has probably been fairly permanently molded by the time the work career now begins. Meanwhile, even dehumanization processes have slipped in significance, since human beings now spend the largest proportion of their time away from work.

Discussions of conceptions of work as pain and as creation have clarified the new role of laboring processes. Seeking the gratifications of craftsmanship has been extolled and, to an extent, achieved. Automation appears capable of extending this movement and may mitigate or eliminate some of the dangers of noncreativity—stunting, dehumanization, impersonality. Meanwhile, the most daring changes in the work function concern the virtual abandonment of the old Protestant Ethic of working hard and for oneself in favor of a kind of social ethic of working for the big corporations. For

the man on the assembly line, however, the dream of escape still takes the form of setting up shop for himself.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Explain the old Sanskrit proverb, "If I did not work, these worlds would perish."
2. Does work make the man?
3. What is the meaning of the dehumanization process? Illustrate.
4. Contrast the economic and sociological definitions of work.
5. Under what circumstances can you envisage someone enjoying work? Have you ever enjoyed work?
6. What are the gratifications of craftsmanship? Are they overrated?
7. State several important changes in the functions of work. Give the reasons for these changes.
8. Describe the new social ethic for young executives.
9. Is integration of work with other life functions possible? In what way?
10. Are we achieving the productive orientation described by Fromm?

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3

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK RELATIONS

Work is both a human and group need. As a distinctively human function, work is a way of achieving and maintaining contact with reality, but a contradiction exists where men must work for others who control the means for gratification. Work may bring men together, as in the factory, but not as independent men. Instead, somewhat dependent creatures are driven apart from each other, separated from their families, and from control over their selves. Work relations have to be taken out of the limits placed on them by industrial needs so that they can be treated as social-psychological problems for human beings in and out of work processes.¹

WORK AS DISTINCTLY HUMAN FUNCTIONING

Men feel or learn a need for work. Such a need arises as a way to meet bodily cravings, as a means for conquering the niggardliness of nature, and as a way to participate in society generally. "Work," writes Sol Ginsburg, "defines one's place in the society, emphasizes one's feelings of usefulness and belonging, and is a constantly renewed sign that one is not left out of the scheme of things."

The important influence of work on social character is pointed up by Pederson-Krag. She notes, "Work is perhaps the most important way of satisfying simultaneously these four mutually antagonistic drives—physical impulses, the wish to be socially acceptable, the desire to appease one's conscience, and the need to conquer reality."² Production now takes its place as a means of relating oneself to other men. More than a question of work or starvation, this is a question of human interconnections.

Interlocking Work Roles. Working together in production, an act of joint creation, separates men from animals. By living and

working together, men develop the ability to take one another's points of view.³ This involves learning a social role which interlocks with other roles. One has to learn other persons' roles, i.e., the expectations (requirements, demands) of what others desire of us, expectations we have of them, and expectations we learn to have of ourselves. These other persons are "reciprocal others."⁴

Where men work together, one can anticipate actions or have fairly stable expectations, so that one develops predictable relations to others and the future. This is Fromm's productive orientation to nature, other men, and self.⁵ Needs for intimacy and collaboration can be consummated in work. Individuality is achieved through such cooperation as is a sense of beauty not tied solely to product but to cooperative, even loving relations to other men. Some call this "functioning well with others."⁶

Integration Through Cooperation. Through cooperation in work and play, individual limitations are transcended by interactions that produce new integrations.⁷ Human labor is a leading example of the merging of social purposes and social acts. An individual can work alone; and a chimpanzee can function beside others, but not well with them. The difference is that men direct themselves purposefully and jointly to the future. Requiring specialization in joint functioning, work becomes the "formative principle of societies" and the motive force for transformations of both the material and social environment.^{7a}

Work Structures People into Teams. Human beings need both the activity and its results as well as each other and an understanding of their relations. In this interacting process tools are invented and diffused, new methods and techniques introduced, new products created and refined. Not the least of them are new forms of social organization.

Each society has its own structure of work relations. Agrarian societies had somewhat simpler interconnections. The engine and the factory introduced new ways of relating human beings until a relationship of superordinates to subordinates rose to dominate the work situation. Automation will probably make for still other changes in work relations, and may even give work more dignity than it has had in the past.

The Future Orientation. People work for others and for tomorrow and not merely for momentary satisfactions, a point often obscured in discussions of satisfaction at work. Men plan ahead in terms of fairly regular expectations as to what can come and what will be needed.^{7b} Being neither situation- nor time-bound, men have the intellectual means, so lacking in other species, to think ahead.

Since they need to explain their existence and to give their work significance, men have a strong desire to have their work outlast them. When one faces a work career extending some forty-five years into the future, the fact that one can visualize that future and seek to improve on it influences conduct.

CONTRADICTIONS IN NEED GRATIFICATION

As soon as supervision becomes a powerful force in human relatedness, a central contradiction, in social-psychological terms, arises. Adults who have emerged from the dependence of infancy need to develop further independence at work (and elsewhere) as life goes on. In the work environment, Haire writes, "the superior controls most of the means to need satisfaction, and the worker is consequently in a similar dependent position" to that of the infant.¹¹

In modern industry a peculiar situation exists. The worker needs work to orient his life, yet in most cases he has to work for others. These others make him dependent or force him to be infant-like in many respects; they prevent him from doing more of his own orienting. Although the supervisor may seek to make the dependence less crippling by permitting that amount of independent action that is consistent with the needs of the enterprise, the worker is not likely to obtain the satisfactions he requires in industry.¹² Workers and firms may impose demands on each other, but management has a monopoly on the means to achieve power satisfactions and creative gratifications.¹³

Beyond basic physical needs Cleeton finds that every worker has vital human desires which the work place may not be meeting. They are: "(1) the need to share thoughts and feelings with others; (2) the need for dominance—power in exercising control over persons and other elements in one's environment; (3) the need for self-determination—individuality and independence; (4) the need for achievement, acquisition, and possession; (5) the need for ideation—realistic, autistic, projective."¹⁴ Lack of any or most of these satisfactions can produce frustrations that become alienation. This is the Walker and Guest "man on the assembly line," who, in the majority of cases, is deeply unhappy, fails in personal and social adjustments and seeks to escape the factory.

ALIENATION PROCESSES

Alienation is a form of loss of identity arising from a loss of control over one's self. In a factory the speed of the assembly line, supervision, and the impersonal interaction all contribute to this loss of identity. One is made a mere function of the production

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process and lacks meaningful relatedness to the product. These separations tend to make one lose a grip on his identity.^{5a} In all too many cases human beings are quantified and abstracted as millions of customers, hundreds of thousands of stockholders, sixty-five million workers, and the like. They are looked on as stereotypes in number form, as homogeneous units or standardized and interchangeable parts. In the language of an economist, the question becomes what is a man worth, not what is a man.^{5b}

Estrangement from Self. Fromm writes that alienation means "a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien . . . estranged from himself."^{5c} Instead of being the center of his world, the creator and controller of his own acts, he is controlled by others whom he obeys or worships. The individual abdicates his rights and his identity. Repetition itself can impose a lack of thought that produces alienation.¹¹ Arensberg noted that, "increased scale of organization meant decreased autonomous control over one's work life, tools, and skills."¹² In place of self-control, there are planning, directives, motion and time study, and control by others.

The manager, too, suffers from alienation, even if he manages the whole and is not lost in working on a part of a process. For the manager merely employs the funds of the owner and not his own; meanwhile, the owner is in increasing cases completely separated from production. The manager functions to manipulate other human beings in a work-supervisory relation; even he deals with impersonal giant forces and is bureaucratized. Bureaucracy itself is a form of alienation, resulting from impersonal treatment and relatedness by paper symbols. Paper work furthers alienation.^{5d}

The most alienated person may well be the executive. Indeed, Whyte points out that there is a real conflict within work for the "organization man" and that the executive is often suspicious of the organization which controls him. Time was when it was the union and the "outside" agitator who was held to have this heretical view. Today it is organization man himself who is concerned, or, as Whyte writes, "If there is one thing that characterizes him, it is a fierce desire to control his own destiny and, deep down, he resents yielding that control to The Organization, no matter how velvety its grip."¹³

Advertising contributes to the alienation process by creating wants with little or no real meaning for the individual. People work to secure useless possessions, and some attempt to achieve recognition and status through these essentially meaningless possessions. Men are surrounded by the mass media devices about which they

know little or nothing and with which they are unrelated except as recipients of messages. Leisure time too is largely machine-made, mechanized, and controlled by distant forces attempting to manipulate one's tastes. "Pay the piper and swallow the product" goes the theme. Fromm calls this a receptive orientation, a form of passivity in which the social forces playing on man are anonymous and not understood.¹⁶

Impersonality's Effects. Drucker described mass production as pushing the standardized and interchangeable parts for machines to the standardized and interchangeable human beings serving the machines.¹⁴ Each machine tender is expected to react in a predictable (machinelike) or determinable way. Individual differences are de-emphasized and impersonality results. Ford's plant at River Rouge, one writer contends, proved that "a world in which production becomes an end in itself is as inhuman as the machines themselves."¹⁵ Competition is an impersonal process; there is "nothing personal"—and little that is human—in it.¹⁶

When Taylor, Gilbreth, and others spoke of a reward-punishment psychology—Taylor's "lash or plum"—in describing production, they were really discussing alienated work.¹⁷ Arensberg writes that the losses of inventiveness and creativity of the craftsmen make for a "loss for work democracy, and even work interest. . . . No one denies it."^{12a} The worker, the owner, the manager, and the customer are all likely to suffer from alienation, from the lack of confidence in skill and the lack of use of skill which is among the gravest of social wastes. So low is the level of skill in many industries that, Gilman notes, "The knowledge that the work he is doing could quite as easily be performed by almost anyone between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five—or even by a well-trained chimpanzee—is not likely to inspire confidence in the future on the basis of his estimate of his own abilities."¹⁸

Conformity in Mass Society. In a mass society of large-scale and formal organizations, where there are no adequate reciprocal actions and no understandings based on stable and readily understood expectations, the social bond becomes conformity. The larger the organization, the more impersonal the work and the treatment of employees, and the greater the use of rules, regulations, laws, and ordinances.¹⁹

Personal involvement in jobs diminishes as mass society becomes a "government of law rather than of men." Human relations are regulated by contract and are enforced by formal agencies. As the worker looks up the vast managerial pyramid he sees impersonal mystery piled on distant control. "He is aware," writes Gilman,

"that these people in the ascending scale who have more and more control over his ultimate industrial destiny have less and less knowledge of him as an individual." Within an impersonal plant and impersonal market "he has shrivelled to the status of a statistic, a unit of labor for which a certain price must be paid."^{18a}

Anomie and Routine. Routine work may be so repetitive that it permits the workman to become preoccupied with personal problems, to daydream and fall into a dangerous nonrelatedness to reality.^{18f} Durkheim described this anomie as "a restless movement, a planless self-development, an aim of living which has no criterion of value and in which happiness lies always in the future, and never in any present achievement."²⁰ He was concerned about the "futility of endless pursuit" of ambitions. Where the individual was freed from genuine social bonds and was demoralized, Durkheim feared that society would become "a disorganized dust of individuals," a phrase later borrowed by Mayo.

The worker has difficulty in maintaining a feeling of function, recognition, and status in the large formal organizations of mass society with their complex division of labor, low workers' skills, high capital investments, and managerial structures separated from the production process.^{18b} One's predictive relation to others and to the future is confused by these forces. The need to think well of oneself and to have confidence in one's ability to deal with the unknown is disrupted by forced reveries, lack of novelty, and inability to control one's own destiny. Industry fails to develop and use people's curiosity; job efficiency approaches ignore this human quality, driving men in on themselves. Jobs become dull, uninteresting, frustrating, boring, and futile.

Anonymous, invisible, and alienated authority play on alienated automatons. One may seek to escape through flight or fight or dreams of laziness, a kind of psychic regression. People dream of retiring and travel, the perfect alienation. Where much of civilization becomes humanly uninteresting, for the automatons the highest virtue is, "They do not stick their necks out." Their highest praise is, "They do not make trouble."²¹

Aggression vs. Cooperation. It may be in relation to the impersonality of mass production and alienation from meaningful activities that the psychiatrist W. C. Menninger considers that work enables people to work off their aggressions. Unlike Fromm, who stresses cooperativeness and loving relatedness, Menninger considers that man has to be hostile to something, other men or environment (or even self). For him, "work, even though pleasurable,

is always an effort to master and control the environment. It is always carried on 'against' something."

With the admission that work can be pleasurable and may indicate or produce mastery, work could just as well be "for" something, a point Menninger may imply but does not make explicit. He does, however, find that work, which he calls an "unconscious" striving which is "consciously" adapted to meet the realistic requirements of living, may be obstructed until work is unsatisfying and a disadvantage. Menninger's emphasis appears to be on unskilled, assembly-line work.²²

However, work need not be hostile or antagonistic; it may be cooperative, intimate, and highly productive of personal and group ends. Work may provide status, group participation, sociability, humor, and needed change as well.²³

OTHER-DIRECTION AND UNIONS

Working for others means being directed by them and this may be as significant a use of the term as has been suggested by Riesman. Riesman's "inner-directed personality" internalizes parent-inspired values and thinks of work in terms of "non-human objects"; he is job-minded and work-centered. The other-directed person takes on values from his peers and is said to think of work in terms of people—to be people-minded and consumption-centered.²⁴ Other-direction is strong in mass production, where millions are supervised by a minority.

Manipulation and Personality. The basic plight of the industrial worker is that he lacks command over tools, skills, and personal relations and is thus left atomized and alienated.²⁵ Compelled to labor, the worker finds that it is his personality and very being which are manipulated.

Mayo's claim that people prefer to work in congenial groups (as if this answered the problem of who directs whom) is disputed by Riesman who argues that "men want both group and individual work, both city and country work, both supervision and apprenticeship." They want power satisfactions and self-control, not merely heightened congeniality. In place of adjusting workers to a job or to a management, Riesman proposes adjusting the factory system to a sound vision of what man is really like.²⁶ He, like Kornhauser, would end the "false personalizing" of managers, as if they could improve personal relations, or provide the environment in which the employee could do his best.²⁷ The individual may be made to feel pride in brand name, product, or management, and may appear

happy, but still be treated as a passive instrument and robotized.²⁸

Union Influence on Work. Unions influence work, workers, and management. They may provide a feeling of belongingness and security and a meaningful role in a close-knit group. They may even provide some power satisfactions.²⁹ In a large union in mass society, workers may, of course, be treated impersonally and alienated, and unions may not be able to halt a further alienation. However, they can become competing centers of loyalty, the center for some power satisfactions, a vehicle for venting hostilities and for gaining some feeling of group power in relation to management.

Unions usually seek remedial action in the form of better working conditions, shorter hours of work, the end of isolation, and the building of work teams.³⁰ However, much of this does not halt alienation. A union may operate as a restraining and conservative force to slow or block the introduction of changes; it may seek to freeze technological change at a point it considers most favorable for its members, but alienation is not thereby reduced or even understood.

INTEGRATION AND CHALLENGE

Use of the whole human being and all his capacities and not some of them appears to be central to the new approach to work. Automation may end the monotony and fixity that have made the worker an "interchangeable hand" tending an "interchangeable machine" making "interchangeable parts."³¹ People can work alone or in teams, not just in series. The assembly line is frequently the antithesis of efficient group organization. Doing is not enough; the worker has to do planning as well; but none of this halts work simplification. The plea remains for a job situation that "makes sense to the workers in it," and the call stands for an industrial system that "does not create more problems than it solves."³²

SUMMARY

Work involves human relations and also, in a large-scale and mass society, supervision. While work can meet many needs of individuals and of groups, supervision may not permit the gratification of these needs. Control over self and over power satisfactions are particularly difficult in the modern work situation.

The move from dependence to interdependence is blocked, and maturity is in good measure thwarted by the nature of the work environment and its organizational system. Human beings are "placed" at work in a hierarchical arrangement that may permit them only a part-function in a limited task. Human beings feel a

need for a function in the society. Not even a society which has created an economy of plenty, can afford to lose the productive orientation of its members to each other and to nature. Owing to the way most factory work is organized today, alienation, impersonality, depersonalization, boredom, and serious frustration with its concomitant revery and fantasy are widespread. The assembly line is an unhappy situation; it is something to avoid and to escape.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Recall the story of the three men pushing wheelbarrows. Asked what they were doing, the first man said, "Hauling stones. It's a dirty job." The second replied, "Earning money. Glad to do it." The third said, "Helping to build a great cathedral." Why do men work?
2. Describe some social-psychological views of work, as depicted in leading works in the field.
3. Contrast Fromm, Marx, Mills, and Riesman on the concept of alienation.
4. Analyze anomie and relate it to the view of society as "a disorganized dust of individuals."
5. What are the effects of alienation?
6. What can be done about impersonality? Routine?
7. Compare views of aggression and cooperation at work.
8. "We never manipulate human beings." —Max Weber. Explain.
9. How does the union affect work and the work process?
10. Discuss Riesman's view of other-direction.

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4

SPECIALIZATION AND PRODUCTIVITY

Specialization at work is characteristic of group effort and means that different people do different things—that an individual does one operation or a rather limited set of operations. It is the subdivision of function to facilitate obtaining social goals, one of which is productivity or output per man-hour. Organization and supervision are necessary to coordinate the diverse functions performed by different individuals.

Work may be broken into small specialized jobs horizontally in terms of function, process, and location; vertically through a hierarchy with the decision-makers at the top; or by intra-group relations. The rise of productivity attendant on specialization has often been demonstrated. Among its disadvantages, however, is the possibility of destroying the social fabric through overspecialization.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZATION

While specialization is frequently thought of as a leading capitalistic institution, it antedates capitalism historically. In ancient times labor was companionable and cooperative, a socially unified process that had some differentiation of function. The Wilson and Kollb division of labor into *simple communal*, *complex communal*, and *associational* (i.e., mass) society clarifies the development.¹

Simple Communal Society. Redfield wrote, "There is not much division of labor in the folk society: what one person does is what another does. In the ideal folk society all the tools and ways of production are shared by everybody."² Some division of labor occurs between the sexes. Each member of a fairly separated communal society is aware of the behavior and practices of every other member. Social rules are specifically defined or tightly articulated and prescribed, leaving little leeway for deviation. Because

work is fused with other social activities, specialization of function is limited.³

Complex Communal Society. The more complex communal society has a greater division of function, more class differentiation, and better organized associations. Still, role organization here can be as inflexible as it is in the simple communal society.^{1a} Work is separated from other elements of living, a separation not keenly felt in an agricultural system.

Mass Society. By the time the stage of associational or mass society is reached, work has become so separated from other life functions that the very separation may be considered a form of specialization. Rapid social and cultural change in a highly industrialized and urban environment make for far less rigid articulation of social structure (although totalitarian societies have rigidities unknown to nonliterate groups). Some elements of what goes on in mass society arose from classical work theories which, while possessing "neither reality nor good will," had the useful role of introducing both the concept of rationalization and the practice of standardization into industrial operations.

The worker is looked on as an "efficient, automatic, standardized machine" in this new rational revolution. Probably, as Abruzzi thinks, this is the real industrial revolution—that brought on by rationalization and virtually perfected by F. W. Taylor. Specialization and dispersal of functions among departments and people reached the point where managerial and production functions could no longer operate without rationalized procedures of operation and control.⁴ Vertical specialization, a separation of decision-making from other operations, naturally followed.

Within the loosely structured mass society, specific associations and companies can be tightly organized, highly specialized, and possess close control over their members. As organizations grow large, the individuals are more and more constrained to move within organizational limits. A mutual dependence of all on each goes far beyond the specialization of earlier times. Manpower specialists observe, "Our economic system is so closely integrated and so mechanized that a cessation of production in the oil fields of four states would ultimately wreak havoc on all aspects of our economic and social life."⁵ It is possible for an entire city to become specialized.⁶

Division of Labor. The phrase "division of labor" has often been used in place of "specialization." However, Moore points out that division of labor is a "misleading term, since it implies that a given amount of labor is to be divided or subdivided."⁷ The term

gives a static impression, as if a fixed quantity of something is being done, produced, or divided. MacIver underscores this when he writes, "The division of labor in society is cooperation before it is division. For it is because people have *like* wants that they associate in the performance of unlike functions."⁷ Instead of division, specialization adds something that raises output beyond individual capacity. Effort is divided only to be integrated.

Moreover, modern specialization does more than divide; it creates many new functions and redivides and recoordinates. Instead of life becoming more complex, new simplifications can emerge. New skills are demanded, as are new organizations of old skills and diversification that is not really division.^{7a} One may well ask what is being divided where so much is integrated.

PROCESSES OF SPECIALIZATION

A simplified classification of the processes of specialization includes: (1) intragroup and horizontal processes, i.e., by work done, (2) vertical or organizational decision-making devices, or leadership, and (3) multiple-group specialization. Of course, other classifications are possible.

Horizontal Specialization. Horizontal specialization is usually thought of as the basic characteristic of organized activity. Gulick writes, "Work division is the foundation of organization; indeed, it is the reason for organization."⁸ Such division is further segregated into a number of parts.

Specialization may be *geographic*, although place cannot be separated from function and many issues that are geographic are simultaneously social and economic.¹⁰ Underlying many forms of specialization is the grouping or aggregation of people in cities and states. Some consider that specialization reaches its height in the metropolitan economy. There are one-industry towns, many-industry areas, and dormitory suburbs.¹¹ Specialization may affect intra-city arrangements by zoning them for residences, industry, commerce, government, and schools. The very massing of people, equipment, and functions requires controls and coordination.

Vocational specialization involves doing the whole job, as in a *craft*.¹² The *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* of the Bureau of the Census lists many of these trades; the 1949 edition listed 40,023 job titles and described 22,028 different jobs, many with multiple titles.

Specialization by *function*, i.e., a full job broken into parts, is common. Sometimes such a breakdown is termed specialization by stages, in which case it can be applied to whole trades—farmer, then miller, then baker, customer—or processes or tasks. By the use of

process a major advantage of specialization is secured, in the form of highly specialized technicians and in locating responsibility in a person or department.¹²

A division into *tasks* may be a part of process or separate from it, although task and process are usually allied. Each person does a small part or elementary component, and skilled occupations are frequently divided into a number of less skilled tasks. Work simplification, or the organized reduction of skill to nonskill and joining by acceptance of authority, becomes significant.¹³ Specialization may reach a stage of "vast subdivision of labor."¹⁴

The Ford works are specialized by tasks. Fully 79 per cent of the personnel could be taught a task in less than a week. Ford said of the unskilled, "They learn their jobs within a few hours or a few days. If they do not learn within that time they will never be of any use to us."¹⁵ Such division of tasks still depends on the size of the job and extent of the market.

Vertical Specialization. Often slighted in discussions of work organization, vertical specialization is a division of decision-making duties between supervisory and operative personnel. Specialization does not affect only work relations; it involves the supervision of men over time and space and the coordination of what was divided.

Vertical specialization requires, in the cool wording of the administrative theorist, that operative employees be "deprived of a portion of their autonomy in the making of decisions and subjected to the authority and influence of supervisors."¹⁶ Managements look on the coordinating of dependent parts into functioning wholes as their prerogative. The greater the specialization, the greater the need for coordination.¹⁷ Work relations and supervisory relations are joined at this point.

Vertical specialization has its own rationale. It is necessary, its advocates and analysts declare, to coordinate horizontal specialization, to permit greater skill and expertise to be developed among decision-makers, and to locate the responsibility of operative personnel in their governing body. Clearly, vertical specialization is related to authority and raises the issue of whether the governing body is responsible to the operative personnel.

Vertical specialization is also related to specialization by purpose. Purpose may seem unfunctional, but it is difficult to distinguish a single purpose; there may be a hierarchy of purposes and a difference between individual and company purposes.¹⁸ Conflict can occur over purpose.

Extragroup Specialization. Specialization may be by clientele, in line with the theory of Barnard that not only workers and managers but also customers are really part of the organization.¹⁹ What

is significant is that customers, workers, and managers may each have their own multiple group specializations and be involved with other groups, such as government.^{10c} Group specialization may be by company—e.g., a tire company, an automotive producer, and parts manufacturer in the automobile industry. But specialization may be by city, by nation, or by whole regions. It may also, within a single company, be by work teams.

Specializations may compete, purpose against process, group against group. Specialization becomes cumulative where an individual can learn only a tiny segment of the increasing knowledge in a field. The consequence is that the important differentiation of the twentieth century is not simple division, but it is the creation of social relations between persons in a vast vertical specialization. Where specialization reaches the point that almost no one can be sure what the product or service as a whole is, anomie or normlessness is likely to arise.

ADVANTAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY

The advantages of specialization are legion. It increases productivity.^{10d} Vertical specialization increases rationality and effectiveness.^{10e} Each is involved with the other but a division may be made.

Advantages of Specialization. Skill, dexterity, and judgment are acquired by specialization, the great political economist Adam Smith wrote in 1776. As dexterity developed, a vast increase in the quantity of work performed by the same number of persons occurred. Time was saved in passing from one kind of work to another. The invention of many machines facilitating and abridging labor occurred, so that one man could do the work of many.^{10f} These advantages depended on whether the cooperation of divided laborers was secured and on the extent of the market that was to absorb the many new products.

Ure went beyond Smith to show that specialization broke up older occupational skills. He said "The principle of the factory system, then, is to substitute mechanical science for hand skill, and the partition of a process into its essential constituents, for the division or graduation of labor among artisans." Ure added, "the grand object . . . is to reduce the task of the work-people to the exercise of vigilance and dexterity." Automation, the next stage, will probably bypass the worker in unskilled functions as well as the older occupational skills. In that sense, automation is a phase of specialization.

Productive Efficiency. One of management's greatest values, productivity, has to do with a combination of human and other elements to produce the largest output at the lowest effort or cost, with

some social end in view.¹⁹ Unions, too, are concerned with productivity and have in more and more cases sought and obtained a tying of wage changes to an "annual improvement factor."

Stress on Efficiency. Pure productivity or technical efficiency refers to how well man-hours of labor are used to produce specific items, while economic efficiency refers to the allocation of manpower among industrial processes.²⁰ Productivity in the United States, measured by average output per man-hour, has increased more than six times in the past century, while hours of work have fallen 40 per cent.²¹ From 1939 to 1953 productivity rose about 30 per cent, or better than two per cent a year, reaching about five per cent a year in 1954 and 1955.²²

A continuation of an 18 per cent increase in productivity per decade is expected.²³ By 1960 inanimate or machine power is expected to supply 96 per cent of the energy used in production, human and animal power only 4 per cent, practically the reverse of the situation existing in 1850.²⁴ The next big move is automation.

Social Gains. Without discussing leisure and economic abundance, one may observe that living standards in terms of real purchasing power have gone up five times in the past century. At this rate, a 50 per cent increase in income in a single generation to come appears possible.²⁵ From 1850 to 1940 the working force increased by six and a half times, machine power by 250 times. The net output of goods and services in 1950 was 25 times that of 1850, while the work force was but eight times larger. Today's worker produces the same output in 40 hours that took 210 hours in 1850; shortly he will produce the same amount in a seven-hour day.²⁶ Added mechanical energy did more than replace (and free) human and animal energy; it created entirely new possibilities of harnessing nature. No amount of horses or men could fly a plane or match a modern Diesel engine or turbine.

The promise of productivity is "man's final emancipation from the drudgery of repetitive tasks."²⁷ A broadening of choice results from additional leisure time that is made possible by the increases in productivity.²⁸ The real revolution of productivity lies in raising living standards and widening the range of choice. It reduces the time spent at work and under supervision by others. It opens up new prospects for human relatedness outside work, giving people the time and opportunity for greater control and improvement of themselves. Then, once again, the economic element of living can become subordinate to other phases of social existence, but these gains and prospects should not blind one to the serious disadvantages of specialization.

REACTIONS TO SPECIALIZATION

The significant criticisms of specialization in effect parallel the points made in discussing its advantages. There are forces in specialization that thwart a person's move toward further personal independence. Some serious theoretical contradictions are also at issue.

Human Effects. "Our industrial society is so specialized," write leading manpower specialists, "that a man may spend his entire working life cutting other people's hair, cleaning other people's teeth, drilling holes in crankshafts for other people's cars, making cleaners for other people's pipes, raising curtains on other people's entertainment, or teaching the division of labor to other people's children."⁵ People engage in part-roles or segmented relations not for themselves but for others, a process that often produces serious personal disturbances.

Long ago Adam Smith complained of people being confined "to a few very simple operations." He was convinced that "the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employment."^{18a} Greater production may be gained but at the cost of treatment that is less human. The first division of labor is the division of the laborer himself so that, as De Tocqueville observed, "the art advances, and the artisan recedes."²⁷

Marx wrote that specialization converted the worker "into a crippled monstrosity."²⁸ Ruskin went further to say, "It is not the labor that is divided, but the men—divided into mere segments of men, broken into small fragments and crumbs of life." Specialization created the repetitive and dull job for fully half the work force.²⁹ In line with the "machine theory of organization" that holds people to be like interchangeable parts, most jobs are standardized or simplified.

The consequences, Katz finds, are that regardless of educational level, human beings "suffer genuine deprivation from a work existence which reduces their personal involvement to a single set of routinized movements."³⁰ Unless the workers themselves seek out differences, and introduce variety into routine jobs they are forced into fantasy. Motion study can reduce a person to an atom.³¹ Fully 98 per cent of the young people doing simple jobs in cannery factories and textile mills hated their work.³² The higher the skill, the more the job is liked: 90 per cent of 500 teachers said that they liked their work.³³

Walker found that few of the men on the assembly line in a five-year-old plant really belonged where they were or liked their

work.³⁴ Plants are so organized that people may be blocked from deriving important satisfaction in expression of skill, in interesting and challenging work, and in "the sense of accomplishment from successful performance."^{35a}

There are satisfied employees—where jobs have variety and there is a chance to make decisions, but few decisions of any consequence are allowed workers. Many managers, even those with decision-making powers, may suffer serious frustrations. Moreover, a company with considerable specialization may itself be blocked by having so many levels of command that red tape hampers the workings of the organization.^{10e} This is the disease of gigantism. As companies grow larger they can become more oligarchic. Making decisions may not produce satisfaction, however; top decision-makers may have their own dissatisfactions.

It is overspecialization that is a danger, for it can break social solidarity and thus produce a central dilemma for the society.³⁵

Durkheim's Dilemma. A half century ago Durkheim posed the problem of how dependent the worker became upon partial interests and limited loyalties when he did not have some integration around common values and beliefs. Since interdependence in specialization did not guarantee integration, Durkheim sought the forces that unified society and those that disorganized it.

He found that one form of social solidarity or integration was based on likeness and common values, the other on specialization and interdependence. The second type, he wrote, could be non-integrated or lacking in solidarity, i.e., be anomie or rulelessness. Erich Fromm calls part of this condition alienation. Some trace it to the separation of ownership from control; of work from decision making, the product, and life generally; and the separation of worker from worker. "The psychological tie between worker and product is tenuous enough to be almost meaningless," even for skilled workers.³⁶

Vertical specialization and interdependence in industry do not provide for social integration, for they are not based on "beliefs and sentiments held in common"; they rest on minor interests or partial loyalties.³⁷ The dilemma is accentuated by the decline of family, neighborhood, and other local groups before vast secondary associations.³⁸ Durkheim proposed ways out of the dilemma, such as participation in the broader institutional framework and freeing the individual from being closed in by single functions.³⁹

Humanizing Specialization. Efforts to humanize specialization have not halted, the very rise of industrial sociology may be part of this attempt. The marvels of coordination may not solve the prob-

lem, but government is becoming a new and more unifying force in economic life. Unions are a factor in reorganizing the disorganized and in gaining some humanization. Education and the rise of literacy have been coupled with vocational training to raise up millions of people.^{18b} Kropotkin's ideal of a society with "integrated, combined labor" has not been achieved; nor have manual, intellectual, field, and workshop tasks been integrated, although gains have been registered.²⁰

Color, music, and variety, along with regular rest periods, vacations, and coffee breaks, have been instituted in more and more companies. Job switching has aroused much interest, and job enlargement has been pushed. Instead of International Business Machines' personnel waiting for setup men, workers are taught to set their own machines and even to inspect finished parts. As these workers were given an improved chance of influencing their work, the range of operations, rhythm of functioning, output, and quality rose.²⁰ Ford once noted that "an ability to work at a wide variety of tasks with an understanding of what he is doing is a necessary characteristic of the new kind of general workman that modern industry needs."^{16a} Automation also appears to require Ford's "general workman."

A summation of various "human engineering" proposals illustrates how far humanization has gone. One proposal is to vary the work pace, since workers intensely dislike jobs that require a fixed pace.³¹ Variation may be gained from rest periods or by "bank building"—accomplishing more than is set by the conveyor on four or five units and then waiting for the conveyor to catch up to them. It always does. Informal teamwork may also provide for greater control through the consensus of informal groups.

A second proposal is to reduce "surface attention" requirements—eliminate those automatic jobs that require just a little attention, viz., watching a mechanical saw or punch press. Automation can do this.

In addition, creating subgoals may act to keep interest high. More distant goals can be created to give work meaning over time, tying specialization by process to specialization by purpose. However, none of these proposals considers the link to social goals, which was Durkheim's central interest.

A fourth attack is the rotating of tasks. Job enlargement or combining two or more separate jobs into one is still another device for overcoming the effects of specialization. Fitting the job into an effective human organization may also counteract overspecialization.

There are, however, some studies which indicate that these improvements do not increase efficiency and may lessen workers' satisfaction.¹¹ Worse still, Durkheim's proposals seem impossible within the plant or office; only a shift in the nature of mass society would produce a new integration.

CONTRADICTIONS IN SPECIALIZATION

A central administrative principle is that efficiency is increased by specialization, but not every increase in specialization will increase efficiency.^{10c} Specialization is not even a condition for efficient administration, being merely a characteristic of all group effort, whether efficient or inefficient. Moreover, the various kinds of specialization—horizontal, vertical, and intergroup—collide with one another. One is favored at the expense of blocking or halting another. The various specializations provide competing bases for choice.^{10d}

Although specialization may seem to hold communities together, its terrible divisive effects, in the Durkheim sense, should not be ignored.^{12a} Greater productivity may be at the expense of individual and social losses. The fact that one is performing a specialized function at work and is therefore "integrated" into an endeavor may mean that one's life in general is disorganized and that social existence is disintegrating. The person specialized in one function or activity may be cut off from other necessary life functions. What has to be clarified is how activities in a function are independent of other activities of an organization. We must know more about the indirect effects of an activity, and about disseminating sufficient knowledge for the functions to be successfully executed.^{10e}

SUMMARY

Work is a collaborative function, in good measure reciprocal and mutually dependent but also cooperative and consensual. Specialization of all kinds is very old as a form of heightened collaboration. It is simple in communal societies, complex in mass society, and eventually reaches the formation of vast combinations of specialized groups. Division of labor, however, seems a poor name for this specialization, since it neglects, among other things, the coordination or decision-making element of vertical specialization. The classifications horizontal, vertical, and intergroup specialization overlap. There may be competing bases for specialization within any one of these types.

Specialization may increase productivity and efficiency as well

as rationality and effectiveness. It may, however, produce economic gains at the expense of social and individual losses and deprivations. None of the suggestions for overcoming the effects of specialization achieve the integration sought by Durkheim or adequately equate the economic specialization and the social problems it creates elsewhere in the society. Perhaps the most important single addition to specialization in recent years has been automation.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Compare specialization in simple communal, complex communal, and mass society.
2. What specialization occurs in your own family?
3. Division of labor explains specialization poorly. Why?
4. Give various kinds of horizontal specialization.
5. What is vertical specialization?
6. From a work dealing with the human community, find examples of specialization by place or area.
7. When do you think overspecialization is reached?
8. Illustrate with recent examples the advantages and disadvantages of specialization.
9. What specialization are you studying?
10. Is Durkheim's dilemma a real one?
11. How would you remove the contradictions of specialization?
12. Cite three recent cases in which efforts at humanization of specialization have been made.

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AUTOMATION AND WORK PROCESSES

Automation is a further specialization of work processes that eliminates human labor and detailed human control. It is thus of central interest to industrial sociology and is essential for an understanding of further departures from the work-centered world of the past. Now work tasks can be performed by integrated power-driven mechanisms without any direct application of human control or energy.

For some, automation is the "absolute answer" of total mechanization and an end to direct production workers.¹ The absolute answer may never occur; yet the number of direct-production workers can be reduced, skilled labor can be increased, the status of machine controllers can be raised, and a new work morality in which out-of-plant life is far more central can be realized.

THE NATURE OF AUTOMATION

In 1955 more than 1000 companies were manufacturing automation equipment with an aggregate output of more than three billion dollars.² Some 15 per cent of the capital improvements in oil processing in 1955, 18 per cent of the metalworkers' equipment orders in 1956, 20 per cent of the capital invested in equipment in aircraft in 1956, and one-third of the automakers' 1956-57 equipment orders were for automation.³

Now that fully 65 per cent of the companies having 1000 or more employees use automatic controls, careful attention to the new concept of work is needed. By 1957, some 19 per cent of the metalworking companies, employing 79 per cent of the workers in the field, used some automation. Automation has been accepted in 46 per cent of the office and store machines industry and 34 per cent of the electrical equipment industry. Moreover, 99 per cent of the workers in motor vehicles and parts companies, 98 per cent in office

and store machines, and so on, down to 46 per cent of the workers in special industry machinery are confronted with some automation.⁴

Extension of Specialization. Modern industrial production originated in specialization according to skill, i.e., departmentalization, work simplification, and the machine in place of human and animal energy. Going beyond earlier specialization, automation is a new integrating principle of continuous functioning with neither beginning nor end.⁵ John Diebold noted, "automation requires us to view the production processes as an integrated system and not as a series of individual steps divided according to the most economic distribution of human skills—or even of individual machines.⁶ Previously the efficient use of machines had had little connection with the "efficient" use of human skills; the two were not well integrated.

Man is an inefficient machine, poorly equipped to perform mechanical and repetitive processes. The dream of eliminating direct human labor from production—which led to the conception of the robot factory—led to a new view of integration. In 1948, a Ford Motor Company engineer said automation is above all "a new concept, a philosophy, of manufacturing."⁷ When he said, "What we need is more automation," he meant there should be more automatic handling of parts between successive production operations. From the production standpoint in 1948, his view of automation as advanced technology, sometimes called Detroit automation, was valid. At the 1955 Congressional Hearings on Automation, Ralph J. Cordiner, president of General Electric Company, defined automation as "continuous automatic production."⁸

Automation as Feedback Control. Advanced mechanization may be contrasted with the principle of feedback control or self-regulating process, i.e., self-correction.⁹ Exemplified by the thermostat, automatic feedback control is self-regulation by the data computer; it extends mechanization by feedback to the job shop, substituting for the self-awareness and self-control of human beings until the "push buttons push themselves."¹⁰ Feedback added the self-corrective device to mechanization, continuous process, and rationalization.¹¹

Once numerical control devices are used, automation attaches the machines to the controls, practically reversing the Detroit integration of machines with one another in a continuous process. Data processing helps make machine tools accessories of computers, the element in automation second only to the computers themselves.

Machines Substitute for Direct Human Control. Earlier economic revolutions came with new sources of energy; the revolution of automation is in having machines replace human mental power

at certain levels. As Aronson wrote, "Automation is the substitution of mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic, electric, and electronic devices for human organs of decision and effort." Continuous-flow automation means that machines run machines without human energy being used—that machine power substitutes for manpower. Now the machine performs operations previously performed mentally. A sharp contrast can be made: where there is some human intervention, mechanization is involved; where machines perform whole steps of power-generating and mind-generating duties, automation is present.

Efforts to combine continuous flow automation and business automation into a single computer-run system are being completed. The automatic factory will then become the end product and not the beginning of automation, as materials handling, routine judgment, machine setting, and data processing will be accomplished by machine.^{5b}

AUTOMATION AS THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Mass production was the revolution of the first half of the twentieth century; automation can well be the technological revolution of the second half of the century.^{5c} J. P. Mitchell and other observers herald automation as the third industrial revolution and not merely another "technological change."^{5d} David Rubinfien of the Arinour Research Foundation noted that "automation is the promise of a second or third or even final industrial revolution—a Robot Age of unmanned production. It represents the desire and the methodology of taking people out of all phases of the production process."^{5e}

First Industrial Revolution: Machine Industry. The first stage of the industrial revolution was marked by the development of machine industry to replace handcraft. In this stage power machinery helped transform an agricultural society and replace human energy at the same time that factory organization drew millions of persons off farms and into plants and mills. Industrial cities developed. Continuous processing followed when, in the 1750's, Oliver Evans of Philadelphia designed a grist mill that contained a combination of belt conveyers, screw conveyers, and endless-chain buckets. Standardized parts were pioneered by Eli Whitney and others.

Second Industrial Revolution: Mass Production. Mass production, which was made possible by new sources of power from oil and electricity and the development of huge national and international markets produced the Second Industrial Revolution. Large-

scale production spread the use of moving conveyers, automatic machinery, standardization, work simplification, and the specialization of processes, products, and personnel.¹⁰

Reduction of work to part-tasks (meaningless in themselves—i.e., functionally but not substantively rational) made mass production techniques possible and gave to industrial processes the flow that smoothed the way for automation. At the same time, the communications and transport revolutions helped to make "bigness" possible and to produce mass society, with its huge secondary groups, their part-contacts, and segmentalized roles.

Stage III: True Automation. The Romans used a hydraulic float valve to regulate the water level in their storage tanks. The Dutch used such devices to keep windmills facing into the wind. Oliver Evans produced continuous-processing techniques, and Jacquard's automatic loom performed mechanical machine setting a century and a half ago.^{5d} Feedback was present in James Watt's flyball governor which made its own compensations by built-in adjustments. In 1920 the A. O. Smith Corporation began to produce automobile frames in an automatic factory. Shortly afterwards, the Budd Wheel Company built an automatic factory for car wheels. In 1929, the Graham-Paige Motors Corporation used automatic devices in its cylinder department. All these processes and steps anticipated electronic data processing, integrated materials handling, and feedback control. The new shift was not merely to remove human hands from production but also to make the factory become just another operator, requiring information and energy.^{6a}

The new electronic and mechanical devices have affected all processes.

1. In continuous flow or automatic handling operations as in oil refineries or engine-casting plants, the worker is a "dial adjuster, maintenance man, or skilled repairman."

2. In the data-processing systems which use electronic brains, workers merely feed relevant information into the machines.

3. Those who work with self-correcting control devices "instruct" machines through punched tapes, not unlike those in the old piano players. After the workers code and punch the tapes the control mechanisms take over. Arma Corporation has developed an automatic lathe controlled by punched-tape instructions machining to tolerances of 0.0003 of an inch. Not only does this lathe do a task which formerly took a skilled machinist with drawing 30 minutes, but it does it to much closer tolerances, paving the way to far finer products, still greater controls, and far speedier and more voluminous production. Likewise, the Cleveland Builders Supply

Company has a concrete-mixing plant using 1500 different mixing formulas.

4. Where a worker once took a full day to assemble electronic units in the automatic-assembly type of operation, General Mills has a machine called Autofab which can do the same work in one minute. Admiral Corporation and some others have machines which spit out completely assembled radios. Some consider that such plants are not under full automation because they are frozen in one design or have single-purpose machinery; however, it appears possible to design multipurpose machinery rather than have a machine for each product.¹¹

Just as previous industrial revolutions emerged along with new forms of energy, so automation has come into being with the development of atomic energy. Some linguistically oriented engineer has probably already thought of describing this as a period of "atomation." Instead of Henry Ford's mechanistic approach to mass production, automation is a far more organic philosophy of diversity of patterns, of continuous and interlocked processes, of systematic synthesis.¹²

Acceptance of the Third Industrial Revolution. The Third Industrial Revolution appears to be more easily acceptable than the first. Where the First Industrial Revolution brought millions of people into the factories, the third is expected to expel millions from them. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the initial machine inventions came upon a predominantly agricultural and rural society. The changes of machine production involved alterations of world-shaking magnitude. Industrialized and urbanized societies were formed at the expense of the patriarchal family.

Today technology, specialization, further industrialization, and larger-scale organization are not being fought as such. In the main the controversy is over the speed of change, the rate of application of automation, and devices for lessening potential short run damage. Society is more used to accepting rapid economic and social change, especially in critical social situations such as depression and massive, world-shaking wars. Unions and managements agree that technological advances help advance the standard of living and the interests of both workers and managers.¹² Above all, automation offers the worker abundance in place of scarcity, leisure in place of the assembly line, escape from the factory in place of subjection to repetitive and deadening processes.

The high cost of labor and the potential shortage of skilled labor caused by the low birth rate of the 1930's contribute to the ready acceptance of automation. The unanticipated economic expansion

of World War II led to enlarging the size of the market and the size of plant, placing a huge new demand on industry for increased fixed capital investment. Cost reduction, a "cold-blooded process" in the words of a leading business magazine, led inexorably to supermechanization.^{10a}

EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR

By 1960 or before, automation or electronic control of business operations is expected to come of age.^{7a} It is likely to have an even greater impact on society than atomic energy. In less than two decades the electronic-computer industry is expected to be equal to the automotive industry.

The relation of automation to employment can now be examined, but the effects on labor-management relations will have to be clarified later. Possible short-run technological unemployment, changes in the amount and kind of skill required, a revolution in the concept of labor, and a change in the status of the laborer are all problems with which the industrial sociologist must deal. In addition, automation is inexorably forcing a change in work morality as it promises to drive millions out of unskilled assembly-line work.

Short-Run Impact on Employment. The fear that automation will in the short run displace labor is the greatest single obstacle to automation.^{7b} Workers look on automation as an immediate job threat.¹³ For that matter a Senate-House subcommittee expressed concern that automation may produce hardships, at least for a short time and in some sectors of industry, that "may well surpass the limits of modern imagination."¹⁴

As a cost-cutting device, automation is expected to produce a given output with fewer workers. Managements contend that, due to an expanding economy, more jobs will be created outside automated industry, that the replacement of workers normally leaving industry will be cut down, and that an impending labor shortage will handle the other potential pockets of unemployment.

Automation is expected to affect first the hiring rate for new personnel.¹⁵ Older personnel will be replaced by automation rather than by new employees. Where the voluntary rate of departure from industry is two per cent a month, reallocation of individuals will occur by "attrition along," according to the National Association of Manufacturers.¹⁶ But what of the new employment rate, i.e., the hiring of some one million young people who are added to the labor force each year? Clearly the economy will have to expand to allow for new entrants into the labor market.

The population is expected to rise by 20 per cent over the next

decade, the labor force by only six per cent.¹⁶ A leading management journal contends that, on a 40-hour week basis, at least 20,000,000 more workers will be needed by 1975 merely to retain present living standards. The labor force will not expand by half that much.¹⁷ The difference will have to be made up by automated production.¹⁸ However, the rising birth rate since 1939 is already making an impression on the labor market, and the rate is showing signs of accelerating.¹⁹

Over the long pull, the International Labor Organization observed, there is no reason to believe that technological innovations decrease total employment, although there are declines in some areas and other industries entirely disappear. Automation is likely to stimulate the tendencies for young workers to enter employment later, for older workers to retire earlier, and for more women to join the labor force.²⁰

The Skill- Non-Skill Ratio. Although earlier specialization of mass production resulted in a loss of skills for millions, automation appears likely to increase skill. In chemicals, there were as many as three production workers to one nonproduction worker in 1947; the ratio was two to one by 1954.²¹ Changes in skills and technical knowledge are telescoping into a few short years developments that used to take decades. In 1890 industry had one engineer for every 290 production workers; by 1953 there was one engineer for every 60 production workers. In aircraft and communications the ratio is already one engineer to 25 employees. The ratio of engineers and scientists to production workers is one to 15 in petroleum and one to 12 in the chemicals.²²

Unskilled workers fell from 45 per cent of the labor force in 1910 to 20 per cent in 1950. In 1900 professional and technical workers numbered just over one million and made up 4.5 per cent of the labor force; by 1950 the group had reached 5 million and constituted 7.5 per cent of the working force.²³ The mass-production revolution produced the unskilled worker in massed millions; the automation revolution can eliminate just about all unskilled work and require millions of highly skilled workers.²⁴ A shift from production to information processing jobs is being accelerated. In automobiles, where production workers declined by 3.5 per cent from 1947 to 1958, the number of those processing information rose by 24.3 per cent.²⁵ A revolution is occurring in the office, where a whole new field of jobs as production controllers is opening up.

New Skill Requirements. The automated workers will be ex-

ternal to the production activity, and, according to Abruzzi, its masters. They will become distinguished production controllers in place of undistinguished producers. The systematic work component will be performed by the machines; human beings will be reserved for reasoning and feeding information to the instruments.^{11a} Human beings will have to make the value judgments, but fast and uniform rote tasks can be better performed by mechanical devices.

The floor of a push-button factory may have no workers on it, as there are practically none today in a power-generating station or oil refinery.^{5t} Large numbers of highly trained machine builders, machine installers, repairmen, controllers of machinery, and programmers will, however, be needed. Workers will have to think of the plant as a whole, since a shift of attention from machine to plant is required by the continuous-flow process. The factory and not the machine or the individual worker will become the unit of production.²⁵ A reversal of the specialization of function and trivialization of work and the worker is coming, it would appear, leaving the highly creative functions available for more persons to reach or achieve.²³ An enormous amount of simplification and standardization—an extreme reduction of skill—is required before the fully automated machine can take over.

Labor, which has always been a "current cost" that fluctuated with the volume of production, is about to become a "fixed asset" and a "capital charge." Because of the vast fixed capital investment and the resulting need for continuous production labor will have to be constantly employed. Economically "under automation, depreciation rather than labor becomes the major cost." The composition of the labor force is being altered from a wage-earning group to a "salarariat" in place of a proletariat.

Liberation of Status. The more skilled the worker and the less time he spends at work the greater is his gain in social status. Through automation, the heavy, dirty, and low-status jobs can be reduced; the worst and filthiest to go into history's scrapheap. This will end much of work's degradation of human beings, giving people more power over self, and providing a world in which men "can grow to their full stature."²⁶ Increasing professionalization will be a gain in status. If all statuses are thereby improved, it is possible that many of the wide status separations will disappear. When Walter Reuther was visiting the automatic Ford plant in Cleveland an official reportedly asked him, "How are you going to collect union dues from those guys?" Reuther's purported reply was: "How are you going to get them to buy Fords?"

CHANGES IN WORK MORALITY

If automation achieves a small measure of its promise it will no longer be true that "the principal activity of man is to make a living."²⁷ Men will be driven out of the factory; they will be liberated from the assembly line.

People have long envisioned liberation from slavery when, according to Aristotle, looms will weave by themselves and musical instruments play themselves and no helpers or slaves will be needed. Automation is realizing this long-cherished hope. Where rationalization sought to make work desirable, automation may make leisure the center of human attention. There is, however, the powerful dangers that workmen will do little more than feed machines and stand outside the work processes, being tinier cogs in larger wheels and having muscular fatigue replaced by mental tension. Perhaps the greatest advance will come in the education of people to staff the automated world and to live decent, constructive lives outside work processes. Perhaps, too, building creative human relations will replace work as the chief force binding men to reality and organizing their lives.

Keynes thought man was not made for money-making, but for higher aesthetic and moral values when he wrote that he hoped and believed "that the day is not far off when the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied or re-occupied, by our real problems—the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."²⁸

SUMMARY

Automation is a continuation of specialization that may constitute one of the most epochal social mutations of the ages. It will probably transform work relations more than have all previous phases of the continuing industrial revolution. The most important effects are likely to be the freeing of man from routine and allowing him more time away from the job. It has taken roughly two centuries of the continuous industrial revolution to get men into and now out of the factory, to proceed from a work-centered to a leisure-centered world. Man seems to be approaching the liberation of those energies that make him a creator and self-controller, as the machines release his physical and mental energies from routine processes.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In what ways is automation a form of specialization?
2. State three concepts of automation.
3. Contrast the three industrial revolutions.
4. From a current journal, select for discussion an article on the new role of feedback controls.
5. State the main factors in smoothing the acceptance of automation.
6. Is it possible to regard automation as a social mutation?
7. There is an automation industry. What is its size and influence?
8. What are possible short-term effects of automation? Long-term ones?
9. Will the skill requirements of automation end the concept of a labor force?
10. Enter an automated plant in your area. What is its organization of work, energy from machines, situation of labor?

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INCENTIVES AND MOTIVATION FOR WORK

In nonliterate society, where making a living is a way of life, there is no separation between economic and social existence and, consequently, no need for a separate set of incentives and motives for work. However, since work in modern, industrial society is not closely integrated with the rest of man's existence, it is generally assumed that he has to be externally motivated for it.

Long before social psychology and sociology had become full-scale sciences, economists and political scientists began to concern themselves with the problems of motivating men for work. To understand the relations between work and motivation, it will be necessary to review many of the theories which have been spun by these social scientists in their efforts to explain why men work. Four chapters are devoted to the essentials of this task of clarification. The present chapter is concerned with the theory that is called "rationality" which, by a peculiarity of language, does not mean rational in any ordinary sense but rational in terms of making money, or what will later be found to be part of functional rationality. A classification of incentives is also presented. Chapter 7 moves on to show the limits of material rewards as motivating factors in human behavior in groups and to question what is ordinarily called economic motivation. While work may appear to satisfy many needs of workers and managers, Chapter 8 will indicate that needs can be and often are seriously frustrated by work and its supervisory processes. Chapter 9 deals with the relations of so-called individual incentives and groups, especially working groups. It also relates these work groups to the larger environment so as to establish the impact of nonplant and nonoffice influences on the work situation.

A CLASSIFICATION OF INCENTIVES

Work in modern society has been considered of sufficient disutility to require either force (fear, inducement, pressure) external to the person that drives him to work or as a lure (money, and now status and prestige) that draws him on to work. Many have assumed that the worker, like the donkey, can be moved only by a carrot or a stick, by external social controls thought of as separate from any self-direction and, unfortunately, as separate from group influences inside and outside the work situation. Such a conception has a long history in a work-centered world where the young are taught early that their fate in life is to work for someone else.

Basic Needs of the Person. While any separation of individual from group needs may be seriously imprecise, each can be presented without doing violence to the other. Motivation as ordinarily conceived concerns energy mobilization within each individual so as to satisfy certain basic needs.¹ Physical, social, and egoistic needs may be distinguished.

Physical needs include tissue needs or minimum requirements for maintaining biological existence. Social needs involve relations with other people—the need for affiliation, association with others, a satisfaction in associations, morale or being part of a work (or other) group that arouses it, the giving and receiving of affection, as well as caring and being cared for (welfare, comfort, safety). Egoistic needs are oriented around a particular view of one's self or ego (called "power drive" in this work). Although egoistic needs are not primarily oriented around relations with other people, their satisfaction involves dominance of other persons.²

Of course, none of these needs is discrete; physical, social and egoistic needs are inseparable.³ The need for achievement is held to be an egoistic need, as are the needs for acquisition and autonomy. Various other classifications of needs are available; but, however organized, they fit well into this pattern and, indeed, indicate how difficult it is to make any separations. Food and physical welfare needs are easily located. Personal development as a need is both social and egoistic, as are desires for activity, variety, and novelty. Equally joined under the social category are such needs as those for release from emotional tension, for security of status, for worthy group membership, for a sense of participation, and possibly for a sense of personal worth.⁴ A point of considerable importance for labor-management relations is that both groups share all of these basic needs.

The Range of Needs. Needs range from limited-personal to unlimited-group-participation. Thus "exogenous" incentives are here held to involve rewards primarily desired because of wants outside the economic activities concerned. Such wants outside work processes include "rewards" of food and shelter, some rewards of acquisitiveness (in our society), and even the semimaterial elements of prestige, vanity, pride, relations to family, or magical and political motives.⁵

The economist Abbe Lerner has commented that it is strange that people engage in economic functions for purposes other than economic ones—that they separate the reward at the end of a process from the gains of achievement during the process. One can take pride in and like one's work, clearly. But one may satisfy needs in the process of working and also perform work functions for purposes dissociated from economic activity.

Positive economic incentives stimulate hard and efficient work by the use of piece rates, team bonuses (a group and not individual motivational device), and promotion. Negative economic incentives take the form of fines that cut earnings; suspension from the payroll; and, most important of all, fear or "the threat of dismissal."⁶ Most modern economies use both types extensively.

The uses of fear have a history as long as that of the human race. Such uses rest on Hobbes' old view that the "mechanical, despotic state was devised for a mechanical, fear-driven humanity." Some elements of fear have been reduced, but the psychological strength of the threat of discharge is hardly less effective than it was in the past. The presence of this force is a factor favoring the workers' turning to unions and the government for protection. Moreover, new fears have arisen. A psychological problem not encountered in societies characterized by agriculture and small-scale industry is the feeling of weakness and insignificance before powerful machinery and unknown industrial processes that may actually assume the form of feeling "an enemy's presence." Much historical hatred for the machine, e.g., in the era of the machine wreckers, may have stemmed from such feeling. "A worker," noted Pederson-Krag, "may be belittled by the output of his apparatus—an automatic machine that spawns tiny parts with . . . ruthless fecundity."⁷ The automation of parts of entire industries has aroused other fears, which unions, governments, and many managements have sought to lessen.⁸ Managers have their own fears as well, viz., of failure, of not being promoted, of losing control.

Negative and positive incentives are used jointly and concur-

rently. In a long-lasting war economy, social pressures on management and labor may affect their acting in the interests of national glory or military victory; these pressures may require continuous production, wage freezes, price controls, excess-profits taxes. While many believe that negative incentives have been reduced, others think that they may have been increased in the form of such refinements as concentration camps, secret-police terror, thought control, and the newer hidden persuasion or invisible "sell" in advertising and communication.⁹

Control of the Means of Satisfaction. For long years the discussion of motivation for work was not related to the control by capitalists (and latterly by managers) of the means of satisfaction of human needs. Instead, it was tacitly understood that people should, in the "master-servant" relation that for so long marked interaction between the two, obey their "superiors." A common view was that of Alexander Hamilton who looked on the people as a great mob, unlettered, stupid, a prey to demagogues, and postulated that only an elite could rule "the great beast." Employers tended to look down on people who worked for others as inferior until it was discovered that recruiting and retaining a labor force was difficult unless prospective workers could be convinced that working for someone else was not degrading.

Nevertheless, as late as 1868 the agent of a leading factory in Massachusetts, when asked whether manufacturers did anything for the physical, intellectual, and moral welfare of their workers, equated men with machines in these words: "We never do. As for myself, I regard my work people just as I regard my machinery. So long as they can do my work for what I choose to pay them, I keep them, getting out of them all I can. . . . When my machines get old and useless, I reject them and get new, and these people are part of my machinery."¹⁰ This was the long-time view of "free" labor—free to work or to starve. Control by owners over that labor was thought to be the "divine right of capital," ordained by the social Darwinism of the turn of the twentieth century. A Rockefeller could once say, "I believe the power to make money is a gift from God." George F. Baer, a coal leader and a J. P. Morgan partner at the turn of the century, declared that God had given control of property interests and guidance for rights and interests of the laboring men to the capitalists.¹¹ A reverend added, "Business is religion, and religion is business."¹²

Such a deification of business rule collided with the needs of workers, and eventually a kind of two value system affecting workers was elaborated. Management quickly substituted technical

values based on scientific logic and economic costs for the older appeal to divine sanction for their right to direct the work process. Steadily managements recognized that relationships of people were significant factors in production and that some workable or acceptable balance of technical and human values had to be made to keep the workshop going.

THE RISE OF RATIONALITY AT WORK

What lay behind the older views can now be examined. A pleasure-pain theory of psychological hedonism was present, and it used a reward-punishment approach to the individual, sometimes termed the carrot-and-stick analogy. F. W. Taylor, the founder of scientific management, employed the phrase, "plum or whip." Positive monetary incentives for workers consisted of "holding a plum for them to climb after," negative or repressive measures constituted "cracking the whip over them, with an occasional touch of the lash."¹³ No worker could be self-activating; only an elite could (and as Taylor wrote would) teach, guide, and help the ignorant mass.

The Assumption of Laziness. The donkey-man was simply assumed to suffer from depraved laziness.¹⁴ Mercantilist theory in the days of the state-run, commercial capitalism from 1450 to 1776 held that most workers were "incorrigibly lazy" and had to be forced or induced to work by external stimuli, never by self-stimulation or self-direction. Those were the times of enclosures, indentures, contract labor, child and slave labor, and shanghaied labor. The natural lower limit to wages was thought to be the lowest possible standard of living, a view which led to the theory of minimum subsistence or the "iron law of wages" in the nineteenth century.¹⁵ Labor was held to follow a hunger incentive—to be driven by fear of the empty belly. While the link to the soil and agricultural pursuits was still strong, laborers were not yet recognized as "economic men" who followed rules of rational acquisitiveness.

Economic Man Emerges. The application of the natural rights doctrine to economic affairs by Adam Smith in 1776 produced, in conjunction with other forces and thinkers, the idea that man rationally calculated his moves and acts, as if all life were subordinated to an economic calculating device. An "invisible hand"—really the old deity concealed in natural law and natural (in place of heavenly) harmony—supposedly led each economically motivated person in following his self-interest to perform in the common interest, i.e., to produce a natural harmony of interests. In a time when agricultural pursuits and small-scale industry were prevalent, there was

some foundation for such a belief. But the times were to change, and large-scale industry and industrialized agriculture were to be led by quite visible hands.

Meanwhile, arational and alogical—noneconomic or nonmarket and non-price-oriented—conduct was excluded from the theory.¹⁶ A view of “eternal harmonies” or economic harmonies were espoused for the master and servant in perpetuity. In brief, classical economic theory from 1776 on held that money motivated the laborer to overcome his laziness and the pain of work. Such astute political economists as Ricardo recognized that wages could not fall below a traditional or customary standard, instead of remaining at a minimum subsistence level. Adam Smith also recognized the importance of psychological likes and dislikes—his explanation of how people looked down on the occupation of the butcher as bloody—but these elements of motivation were regularly ignored for years.

Marginal Utility's Calculus. In the later nineteenth century, a marginal utility theory of motivation emphasized the individual calculating between work and nonwork. Each supposedly offered utilities which could be rationally weighed against disutilities.¹⁷ Utility theory sought to reduce all worker motivation to a single standard of rational, calculating “maximization” through prices and market transactions. More crudely, utility theory compared the utility of money to the disutility of labor. Although money as such has no utility; its command over goods and services gives it social power.

Utility theory was applied to everyone and everything. It was assumed that business firms rationally maximized profits, that households maximized utility, laborers maximized wages, and governments maximized power or staying in office. A leading exponent of the theory, von Mises, insisted that economics was limited to measurable, money or market, transactions, all of which were rational or could be monetized. All else was irrational, i.e., non-market-, non-price-oriented, and noneconomic, and therefore outside consideration of maximization.¹⁸

Popular versions of such views are well known. Henry Ford reportedly said, “All men want is to be told what to do and get paid for doing it,” a neat combining of wage maximization with management control of means of satisfaction at work.¹⁹ F. W. Taylor assumed that what workers most wanted was high wages, which he thought were a reward for efficiency or higher productivity. Scientific management attempted to get “hearty cooperation” by using wages and other means. Even so astute an observer of the industrial scene as William F. Whyte wrote as recently as 1955 that man re-

sponds as an isolated individual to rewards of more money or punishments of less money, yet Whyte has also held that group influences are important.²⁰ In general, all these views look on the workman as passive or as responding to external stimuli, not as active and self-directing. Utility wage theory has merged with predominant management views, although significant amendments have been made.

CURRENT RATIONALITY DOCTRINE

The simplified assumption of profit- or wage-maximization is quite frequently held to be the most vital indicator of private capitalism. On this basis and that of diminishing utility and diminishing returns, as Rostow noted, "economists have been able to build . . . a remarkable body of scientific thought." The theory, which is widely used to this day, usually takes on a more elegant form than it had in the past. A theory of intended and bounded rationality is based on maximization of advantages or gains and minimization of disadvantages or losses, so as to obtain a least-cost base for operations.

Functional and Substantial Rationality. Efforts to break out of the "money" nexus of rationality have been made. Simon held that rational behavior "refers to rationality when that behavior is evaluated in terms of the objectives of the larger organization." Individual aims and differences are, for the larger organization, "just one of those elements of nonrationality."²¹

Whatever the organization's objective may be, it is rational. Thus, in a sense, it is always the other fellow—the nonorganization man—who is irrational. Simon goes so far as to write, "It is impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality." Because of his lack of information, inability to evaluate and explore possible alternatives, and subjection to "givens" or premises (received doctrines) within which the individual can only be adaptive, the individual cannot be self-controlling or original. Only through organization does the individual even approach "objective rationality."^{21a}

Mannheim a decade and a half earlier had destroyed the basis for this conception when he distinguished "functional" from "substantial" rationality, a distinction Simon does not note.²² By functional rationalization Mannheim refers to people being tied to the objectives of plant, mine, or mill. Thus the worker who tightens bolts on an assembly line as part of an operation which management organizes and which makes sense or is rational to management in terms of its purposes is not making any particular sense (even if

wages are paid) in terms of the worker's needs. He may even be brutalized and degraded and be unable to follow his own purposes. In substantial rationality one is able to perform life functions that have a fuller meaning for one's own life goals and not merely those of an organization directing part of one's life. Bolt tightening may be rational for management, but it cannot be so for workers who need intelligent insight into problems, i.e., require substantial rationality.

Weaknesses of the Rationality Doctrine. Men are, according to psychoanalytic doctrine, not fully or wholly rational; the irrational in human affairs looms much larger today than it did in Marx's time. He assumed, rather naively, that workers would follow their rational interests and be united against employers; employers would unify against workers; and governments would rationally support employers. The rational revolution has collapsed.

Simon admits that organizational rationality is but an "idealized picture," since there is incompleteness of knowledge, consequences are not too clear, and not all possible alternatives come to the mind of the rational calculator. He adds the important proviso that human rationality is extra-organizational when he writes that such rationality "gets its higher goals and integrations from the institutional setting," or that administrative organization and the rest of the institutional setting are interdependent. He concludes that "science cannot tell whether we *ought* to maximize profit. It can merely tell us under what conditions this maximization will occur, and what the consequences of maximization will be."^{21b}

Moore does not believe science can do even that. He says, "It is impossible by this approach to determine before the event which satisfactions are going to be maximized."^{17c} In 1910 the political economist Wicksteed noted the central flaw in rationality when he urged economists to abandon attempts to limit the human being to activation by "only a few simple motives." Instead, Wicksteed proposed, "We are to take him as we find him, and are to examine the nature of those relations into which he enters, under the stress of all his complicated impulses and desires—whether selfish or unselfish, material or spiritual." He denied that there was any one "economic motive," rational or otherwise.

Others have also urged that analyses of motivation cannot be universalized for all time but have to be related to historical epochs, ideological developments, institutional contexts,^{17d} group pressures, the whole range of motives, and the fundamental irrationality of many aspects of human behavior.^{17e} Just what is being maximized has to be shown and specified, not assumed and generalized for eternity.

Moreover, the presence of rationality has not been established in many work functions. Whether Simon's version of organizational rationality is an improvement over economic man is questionable. Even within his administrative theory, some individual has to do the rationalizing. Organizations, however well administered, do not rationalize anything; individuals do. What Simon may be saying, stripped of qualifications, is that, as Alexander Hamilton said before him, the administrator is better able to rationalize than the worker; he sees farther, more clearly.

Utility and rationality explanations of motivation can mean something only if a real choice between working and nonworking exists and is perceived. Such a choice would have to rest on a level of real income, basic security, and individual awareness and group feeling that may not be present in most circumstances. No real comparison (calculation, rational weighing, maximizing of gains and minimizing of losses) of utilities and expression of preferences will occur when, in actuality, many persons lack such choice. People are still forced to work by dire necessity. The limit of material rewards as motivation is the subject of the next chapter.

SUMMARY

Primitive man might not concern himself with any motivation for living, but modern man, who is in a situation where economic life is somewhat separated from and for a time was superordinate to much of the rest of social existence, has had economic motives and incentives attributed to him. Most of these incentives have been conceived of as individual and distinct and, however classified, appear to contain some version of a pain-pleasure calculus. Physical, social, and egoistic needs have been fitted by various thinkers into a mold entitled at various times economic man, rationality, and today, administrative man. The strangest consequence of this instilling of economic motivation into the human psyche may well be that people have been conceived of as working for something other than the work process, i.e., means and ends were sundered.

Human needs do exist at work; a considerable range and variety of such needs may be delineated, but they should be carefully related to group life. Men may have to learn to move from exogenous to endogenous incentives. Positive and negative economic incentives have been important in the past, but self incentive may be more important in the future. Fear and force may lessen as the silent yet felt social situation surrounding work processes. A steady move away from one-sided control of the means of satisfaction at work will be explored in later sections of this work.

The limits of rationality at work should not blind one to the use of rational (and irrational) means of administrative control. It may take much more time to silence the laziness doctrine and a still longer period to eliminate the quaint concept that a human being has a calculating apparatus in his head and functions in some totally rational and solitary way. The contrast between functional and substantial rationality is necessary to establish the profound weakness of manipulative doctrines in work situations. Thereby, too, such views are related to the dire consequences of overspecialization. That the calculating machine economic and rational man was supposed to be has broken down is no sign that the theory has disappeared. So gratuitous a compliment to the human race by rationality theorists is not likely to be surrendered or given up in the face of facts to the contrary. The durability of this dogma may be like that of prejudice which one writer described as more difficult to smash than the atom. One can only assume the scientific attitude of doubt that an all-embracing theory really covers all the cases attributed to it.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In the light of the jobs you have held and left, what was your motivation for going to work, for taking one job rather than another, for working harder or slower, for quitting?
2. What is an alternative classification of incentives available in a social psychology text?
3. Find the motivation a Trobriand Islander or Samoan needs for working.
4. How has use of "the plum or the lash" worked in practice in American industry in the half-century since Taylor formulated the idea?
5. Contrast exogenous and endogenous incentives.
6. A columnist says that even if people enjoy their work, they enjoy it less than playing bridge, fishing, or golfing. How does this view relate to the laziness doctrine?
7. What real access has worker or manager to need satisfaction within the work place?
8. Do you find a difference between economic man and organization man?
9. How does von Mises compare to Mannheim on the issue of rationality?
10. If the theory of rationality worked or were operative, how would you go about maximizing your gains and minimizing your losses at work?

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MATERIAL REWARDS AND MOTIVATION

The power of material rewards to influence output by workers or managers in a mass society may be less than has been supposed. Material incentives, even if they appealed to completely rational creatures, could still motivate them no further than the labor force's physiological and mental capacity to produce. The carrot has limitations of a social-psychological nature.

Profits can stimulate people, but few of today's businessmen would say that profits were the main motivating force. The relation of higher payment to morale and productivity has now been plumbed, and the findings are at variance with popular assumptions about the power of rewards.

It was not until the 1930's that most managers began to think of their workers as human beings. However, all but simultaneously, managers also found or were led to believe that the worker was irrational and nonrational. If this new doctrine wrecked old rationality, it gave business leaders new bases for considering that they at least were rational and in charge of a somewhat irrational labor force. Virtually an entire revolution in thought is contained in the new emphasis on irrationality, attributed in the main to the nonmanagerial components of working crews. One may pause to wonder whether there are any economic incentives at all.

DEFICIENCIES OF WAGES AND PROFITS

Sociologists have found that there are serious limitations to wages and profits as motivating forces. Neither appears to work well for reasons that have little to do with complaints that a worker or a manager is irrational. The collapse of the doctrine of material rewards has come through the study of morale and output.

Wages and Incentives. Wages and an incentive cannot be ignored. Workers are concerned about adjustments and changes in wage rates; they are to an extent forced to seek out incentive earnings; unions demand higher wages; and managements complain of the "wage push" on costs. Whatever weaknesses have been found in the economic and social-psychological theory of wages as incentives, their use has by no means disappeared from economic policy.

The Hawthorne studies from 1927 to 1933 helped set in motion a quasi-critique of wages as incentives. Barnard wrote that beyond minimum necessities the power of material incentives "is exceedingly limited as to most men; wage incentives are weak if used alone."¹ Whyte pointed out that money performs two important social functions other than acting as an incentive for work. Money influences relations within the work group, and it affects and is affected by intergroup relations.² Pay "places" people in the status structure of the work place; it also situates them in an intergroup world. In so doing, wages move out of the sphere of individual incentives leaving many a management handicapped by acceptance of "an over-simplified theory of human motivation."³ By the age of five, children in a competitive society may be stimulated to surpass others, but once they become workers, even changes in wages do not lessen their preference not to compete among themselves.⁴ Individual incentives may be taught, but the teaching does not last. The importance of wages as a stimulus depends on how workers relate wages to competitive status within the group and to boredom.⁵

Haire contends that as a plant grows and business is more technically organized, differences in productivity between workers on the same job tend to fall. Everyone works in step or series. On the developed automobile production line there is less than a ten per cent difference between the best and poorest workers. Contracts tend to fix promotions and changes of classification by seniority rather than by merit alone, a process that reduces the use of more pay to gain more output.⁶

In one study almost half of a group of workers who were asked whether they would take wage increases of specified amounts or guarantees of steady work, preferred the steady work under all circumstances. Another quarter would be willing to forego guarantees of steady work only for wage increases as high as from 25 to 100 per cent. The external stimulus of incentives may not correlate with underlying desires for job security, approval of one's fellows, and the wish to participate with a group in controlling the work pace.

Moves toward equalization of pay within work groups have a

long history and are part of the basis for unionization. Equal treatment is not unrelated to a sense of injustice at differential pay for the same work. Bavelas, in introducing "pacing cards" to a group of girls working on piece rates, found that when the girls were allowed to make genuine group decisions as to how much they should work and earn, an increase in performance was agreed on. This was a group decision well within the context of over-all management control of decisions. Autonomy which resulted from participation in decision-making provided some egoistic satisfactions which seemed stronger than the individual incentives held out to the girls.⁶

In individual wage theory the single motive of gain has been so overemphasized as to make it monistic and to leave outside its conceptual framework most of the worker's life. All values and behavior were assumed to be expressible in money, and choices could be made between utility and disutility on a single pain-pleasure scale. A confusion of the ultimate goals of economic activity with returns to labor, capital, banks, and the like existed. The social context of motivation was neglected. Once the first flush of industrialization encountered the need for social responsibility to the laborer, social legislation took root, and subsistence wages as a means of forcing the worker into the plant on pain of starvation were bypassed.⁷

At or near full employment, workers are in such great demand that they can very well say, "If you don't want to employ me, there are plenty of others who will." A seller's market in labor upsets the buyer's market approach, and the possibility of real choice arises for many millions of workers. For a good half-century the worker has had his choice of more leisure or more work. Adam Smith's noted carpenter and Karl Marx's blacksmith, would have shortened their lives by working harder each day if a little more pay had been offered them. The modern worker prefers added leisure to added work. Just as the worker is no longer chained to his work sixteen hours a day, so he is no longer concerned about the workplace alone. He has his anchorage points or aspirations in groups outside the work process.

The Decline of Profits as Incentives. Profits appear to have followed the fortunes of the small owner in a descending curve toward insignificance. To the small businessman who was both owner and manager, net profit was pay. Profit as motive had force in a society of small organizations and combined owner-managers. Once ownership was removed from most large-scale management, profits became "one of the fictions" of our time.⁸ Urwick has found that owners or stockholders have "a decaying function" as obligations and

powers of ownership decline progressively.¹⁰ The upshot of the development of the modern large corporation is that such an organization "with its thousands of unorganized stockholders and its management responsible only to itself can hardly be regarded as dominated by a very strong profit motive."¹¹

What has happened to the idea that maximizing profits is the basic objective of the business firm? Joel Dean says, "In recent years 'profit maximization' has been extensively qualified by theorists to refer to the long run; to refer to management's rather than to owners' income; to include nonfinancial income such as increased leisure for high-strung executives and more congenial relations between executive levels within the firm; and to make allowance for special considerations such as restraining competition, maintaining management control, warding off wage demands, and forestalling anti-trust suits." For Dean this means, "the concept has become so general and hazy that it seems to encompass most of men's aims in life." He concludes: "This trend reflects a growing realization by theorists that many firms, and particularly the big ones, do not operate on the principle of profit maximizing in terms of marginal costs and revenues."¹² A celebrated supporter of marginal net value product curve theory, Fritz Machlup, has agreed that the curves must be "imagined" by the entrepreneur and have "no objective significance."

Boulding explained that "as the businessman cannot know the data on which to maximize profits, the very principle of maximizing profits is a false one."¹³ The assumption of profit maximization has been scientifically invalidated.¹⁴ Government and schools, hospitals and military organizations, the Red Cross, and churches operate quite well without any such "motive."¹⁵

Accounting Profits. For the larger corporations profits remain a standard of accomplishment or a yardstick of efficiency, not a reason for achieving, although corporations do not ordinarily refuse profits that accrue. Barnard looks on profits as an accounting device to measure excess over costs and to help in avoiding loss. If one succeeds, one achieves higher esteem, a clever relating of accounting to social position *outside* the enterprise.¹⁶ Goode, too, finds that profits are merely a yardstick of endeavor, an accounting result;¹⁷ Drucker refers to profit as a self-regulatory device or built-in yardstick, used as much in Russia as in America.¹⁸

Administrative theory has shifted to a concern with efficiency, i.e., a slightly altered rationality that produces "good" administration and results that attain ends with the least use of scarce means. "Administrative man" takes his place alongside "economic man."¹⁹

However, the so-called principle of efficiency is more a definition than a principle, since it states what is desirable or correct administration and not how to achieve such results. Nevertheless, criteria of efficiency are said to be at the bottom of decision-making premises.¹⁷ The god of efficiency assumes the place of the cast-off god of rationality. While "balance sheet" efficiency may involve maximization of profit and minimization of loss, activities of many parts of an organization, e.g., the personnel department, cannot always be evaluated in monetary terms of the here and now variety. At this pace, administrative man or organization man, while scarcely more than a child of theory, may not live to the ripe old age of economic man, the Methuselah of fictional models of perfect human behavior in choice and decision making.

Contradictory Effects of Monetary Increases. It is still possible to find those who believe that an increase in wages or salaries stimulates one to greater production in a sort of economic determinism that ignores social realities.¹⁸ Whyte thinks that "systems of financial incentives in industry today probably yield a net gain in productivity" although but a "small fraction" of what they could release.¹⁹ Erich Fromm believes that "satisfied, 'happy' men work more productively and provide for that smooth operation which is a necessity for big enterprises."²⁰

However, Rensis Likert told a management audience: "On the basis of a study I did in 1937 I believed that morale and production were positively related; that the higher the morale the higher the production. Substantial research findings since then have shown that this relationship is much too simple." A wide variety of relationships has been found in different studies: "Some units have low morale and low production; other units have fairly good morale and low production; still others have fairly good production but low morale; other units have both high morale and high production."²¹

Higher payments may produce lower satisfactions. Likert and Seashore observed: "It is clear that high pay does not in itself produce satisfaction with the organization as a place to work or with the amount of pay itself."²² Much depends on people's expectations concerning pay. Joy in the job is no aid to output; a factory of unhappy workers may produce more than one in which employee morale seems high. Employee attitude studies "unfortunately . . . don't prove anything at all in respect to employee performance."²³

While good payments sometimes produce the desired result, Smith wrote, "probably just as frequently, they are unsuccessful" as incentives. Techniques of job evaluation, merit rating, and incentive systems have had wide application for decades and have

worked for some companies. However, "In many companies these techniques have failed to increase productivity. In some, they have actually decreased it."²³

The very idea of manipulating attitudes and trying to heighten morale and therefore output by various inducements is questioned by Moore. He has shown that it is a mistake for management to assume that workers are mechanistic units who "must be induced to perform at somewhere near their maximum capacity."²⁴ Three decades ago D. H. Robertson came to the same conclusions when he wrote, "A high wage will not elicit effective work from those who feel themselves outcasts and slaves, nor a low wage preclude it from those who feel themselves an integral part of a community of free men."²⁵ Robertson has skillfully set payments within a social framework. The idea that productive workers are happy and loyal to the company is scored by Argyris who found that happy workers may be unproductive and productive workers may be unhappy and disloyal. Young and low-paid engineers and nurses are often found to be productive but unhappy.²⁶ Davis also noted that "Low morale does not necessarily cause low productivity, nor does high morale guarantee high productivity."²⁷

IRRATIONALITY VERSUS RATIONALITY

The rational revolution reached a peak in the Marxian view that a fully rational human being could be produced as well as a thoroughly rational and planned world. But no sooner was this view firmly stated than the power of irrational forces erupted. With the rise of mass society, there came an assumption of the essential irrationality of workers. A central contradiction of the new view, one assiduously avoided by the "human relations" schools of today, is that management pictured workers as irrational but managers as rational, as if they had fundamentally contrary psychologies.

Climax of Rationality. In line with the rationalism of the nineteenth century Marxian socialism postulated that there would be a mass rationalism arising from training in factory discipline, that rational masses would be in trade unions and socialist political parties. These masses, appropriately led, would act in their own best interests.²⁸

But vast forces shifted the mass in different directions or onto different rails. Instead of being "good" and filled with the best of humanitarian intentions, it turned out that masses could be led to be rough and murderous. They could be led to follow power group interests and to work against whatever one imagined the mass's own interests were.²⁹ This latter possibility rested on the "rationaliza-

tion of the masses" which arose from "the extreme loneliness of urban man."^{27a}

Mass Society and Irrationality. There are at least three versions of what happened to weaken and destroy the old doctrine of rationality. Le Bon, Freud, and Pareto all contributed to a picture of the new mass society which no Marxian or other nineteenth-century theorist envisaged.

One of the achievements of Le Bon and his school was to emphasize, in stark contrast to the Marxists, except possibly Lenin, the irrational behavior of the masses. Even if Le Bon went too far in identifying the masses with the highly emotional and unstable mob, his emphasis on the appeal to the irrational and the power of political groups to influence the mass had a strong influence on clarifying the features of the new mass society.²⁹ Freud, too, thought of man as fundamentally irrational and expressed the hope that "where Id was there Ego shall be," i.e., that rational forces can master or control the irrational. Freud held that the submission to irrational authority, e.g., Victorian mores, led to repression of thoughts and feelings and to the production of neurotic symptoms. Vilfredo Pareto followed with a theory that human beings had alogical and arational aims and were subject to sentiments.³⁰ Somewhat later Mayo translated this to mean that the worker was ruled by sentiments, was illogical and nonrational.³¹ Many others have expressed much the same view.

Psychologist-economist George Katona declared, "People act impulsively instead of rationally, according to momentary whims, or suggestions and emotions."³² Economist Viner held that human behavior "is the product of an unstable and irrational complex of reflex actions, impulses, instincts, habits, customs, fashions, and mob hysteria."³³ Personnel writers Calhoon and Kirkpatrick consider workers "self-centered, confused, and irrational."³⁴ Still another writer observed, "We human beings are not nearly as rational as we think we are."³⁵ Knox, a follower of Pareto and Mayo, held that human action is largely nonrational and not efficiently planned to obtain defined goals.³⁶

Most of the theorists who conceived of workers as irrational, considered managers rational. They held that it was right and proper for management to control the sentiment-guided and irrational working force. It is fitting that mass society worships rationality³⁷ and that it is crowd-minded and rests on emotional reactions and irrationality.³⁸ Mass society is, in fact, both rational and irrational; the first seeks to use and control the second.

Rational or Irrational Authority. Mass society produces irrationalities that may not have existed before. Individuals are required to subordinate themselves and their private interests to "the larger social units," the functional rationality of which may not be substantively rational to the individual. E. H. Carr has written of this development, the spectacle of an efficient elite maintaining its authority and asserting its will over the mass by the rationally calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most disturbing nightmare of mass democracy."³⁹

Who is to guarantee that the manager is rational, that he possesses a psychology fundamentally different from that of the worker? The view that workers are passive and irrational remains, as Moore once described it, a "mechanistic fallacy." It considers human beings capable of moving only when subjected to external stimuli, an approach that leaves out individual thought processes, underestimates the power of worker organizations, and tends to project into workers' minds the new cardinal sin of irrationality that then "demands" leadership by "rational" management.⁴⁰

THE FICTION OF ECONOMIC MOTIVATION

Outstanding economists, social psychologists, and sociologists who have investigated the issue of motivation tend to agree that economic motivation is a fiction. They suggest that the entire approach is fundamentally unsound.

The Pathology of Incentives. Many economists are wont to speak of "noneconomic" elements, i.e., nonprice- and nonmarket-oriented aspects of existence. But is there really any such thing as an economic motive? Depending on the historical situation, Polanyi wrote, "human beings will labor for a large variety of reasons."⁴¹ Since men do things in relation to social values of the group and the historical situation of the group, Miller and Form wrote, "there are probably no 'individual' incentives."⁴²

Lester found that a "single objective, such as profit maximization" is not meaningful any longer and that long lists of incentives cannot be measured.⁴³ Polanyi noted that "this new world of economic motives" was based on a fallacy. Intrinsically, hunger and gain are no more "economic" than love or hate, pride or prejudice. "No human motive is *per se* economic." Nor is there an economic experience *per se* in the sense that there is a religious, aesthetic, or sexual experience: "The economic factor, which underlies all social life, no more gives rise to definite incentives than the equally universal law of gravitation." True, man has to eat to live, "yet the

pangs of hunger are not automatically translated into an incentive to produce. Production is not an individual, but a collective affair."⁴³

While the main goals of both managers and workers appear economic, close study reveals important noneconomic goals more amenable to a psychological analysis than an economic one. Where the economist deals with impersonal market forces, the psychologist deals with "specific, identifiable persons." Where the economist talks of a change in the labor market, the psychologist observes John Jones "out of work and looking unsuccessfully for a job." Social stimulus situations such as work processes have "motivational relevance" but are not merely given as part of an inert (or manipulated) environment to a passive mass so much as people selectively seek out goals related to their broader nonwork purposes.⁴⁴

The upshot of the critique of economic motivation is that Moore found that the usual "organizational assumptions of management" about the motives of workers are "generally false or inadequate."^{7c} Machlup, the economist, agreed that marginal-utility curves must be "imagined" and have "no objective significance." Polanyi calls economic man a "thoroughly effective fiction" resting on the three "fictitious commodities" of money, land, and labor. Goode decried the "false and insidious myth" of profits as "one of the great misconceptions" and "one of the fictions" of our time.^{9a} Moore went even farther, stating that self-interest could very well be antisocial and even pathological if strictly pursued, which is quite the opposite of rational.^{7d}

Situating the Economic in the Social Environment. In a public economic order where politics and economics are virtually fused and the economy does not lead a separate and dominant existence, a separation or delineation of economic motives from social goals is not only unrealistic, it is impossible.

For long years the views of Adam Smith that people earned "psychic income" and of Marshall that there were "psychological advantages" that were not price-oriented were ignored. When in difficulty, economists would refer to nonprice elements as non-economic and irrational forces and read them out of consideration in economic analysis. The state was long considered outside the data of economic theory as were population and natural resources, technology and techniques of production. All these were dubbed "autonomous" (outside the price system) and were considered non-income-induced. Are any of these forces really autonomous? Is economics a separate sphere of life?

When it comes to studying industrial relations, economics may

encompass but 20 per cent of the problem, the various behavioral and other sciences the rest."¹⁷ An oil industrialist, O. A. Ohmann, found that the problem of motivation is a search for real meaning in life and not just at work. He suggested that merely raising wages or profits no more influenced people than raising the price of prostitution would make it the equivalent of love.¹⁸

The economist Marshall's emphasis on the "restraining role of business ethics" and psychological advantages would be excluded from strict price analysis.¹⁹ The price theorist Stigler has said:

"The maintenance and expansion of the economic system cannot be explained exclusively, or perhaps even primarily in terms of the price system . . . Technological improvements are only partially due to economic incentives. Pasteur did not develop his method of sterilizing milk in order to gain wealth for himself. Again, the explanation of population size no longer runs in the simple biological and economic terms of Malthus' theory. A full explanation of economic progress involves a study of the society's entire culture."²⁰

Industry's most important product is to contribute to "making well-balanced individuals" and not stunted persons whose social faculties are "atrophied" or perverted.²¹

Economics has to be submerged in social relations. The great welfare economist Pigou held that economics is but a part of a larger science of human welfare and that market and money moves were really only aspects of broader human relations. Ayres held that the structure of society allocates community resources; prices merely serve like the policeman to direct traffic and reveal the existence of underlying forces.

SUMMARY

The quest for motivation has led to searchlights being played on the powers claimed for material rewards. Results of the observations and theories that have developed are catastrophic for older views of motivation at work. These may remain as prejudices; they have not been established scientifically.

Both wages and profits have been found to be deficient as incentives. They have an effect, but it is far less than had been supposed and less significant than social norms and group standards which may make for equalization and noncompetition. Beyond certain physical limits no human being can be stimulated by any reward; nor does he work or live alone. Profit maximization has dimmed as the right light of incentive theory, until accounting profits have emerged, not without their own internal contradictions. The contradictory effects of monetary increases in pay on morale

and productivity make it clear that one-phase theories of morale varying with money directly are oversimplifications.

An irrational revolution has replaced the rational uprising of the past. But it is a curious revolution in which paradoxes abound. The irrational of Le Bon, Freud, and Pareto may be sounder than the rational inevitability of Marx; but they have been converted into instruments for establishing that some directional forces can be rational and can manipulate the sentiment-ridden, irrational herd below. This view is one of the main fruits of the budding mass society, although the evidence that irrational authority of the nineteenth century has become the rational authority of the twentieth is sadly lacking, if, indeed, managers and workers could have such fundamentally different psyches.

For some persons it may come as a shock to learn that leading writers agree that there is no such thing as an economic motivation, which is called a fiction, a fraud, a lie, a figment of the imagination, and unkindest terms. As the public economy of mass society expands, the submerging of the economic in the social environment has led to the recognition that polities and economics are fused, that economic life and analysis is but a phase of social existence. Nevertheless, there remains the problem of finding what makes men work and other men supervise, an issue to whose resolution the next chapter is directed.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What have Adam Smith and Albert Marshall to say of psychic income and psychological advantages?
2. In the light of this chapter, what is the meaning of the saying, "Man does not live by bread alone"?
3. Give five reasons why workers on the job seek equalization of pay scales.
4. What is the new role of accounting profits in American industry? In Russian industry?
5. Assemble three or four pieces of evidence to show that heightened payments increase morale and contrary materials to indicate that an opposite effect is also possible. Why the difference in each case?
6. What is the thoroughly rational world of Karl Marx?
7. Contrast the irrational in Le Bon, Freud, and Pareto.
8. Reply, citing evidence, to the question: "Is authority rational or irrational?"
9. State the case for the view that economic motivation is a fiction.
10. How is it possible to situate the economic in the social environment?

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NEEDS AND FRUSTRATIONS AT WORK

What can we learn about motivation for work if we look beyond wages and profits? Human relations specialists, economists, sociologists, and industrial and social psychologists have probed this problem for years and have produced some answers that are revealing, some based on erroneous assumptions, and some that are full of contradictions. This chapter deals with the results concerning human needs; human relations, especially as they are related to the drive for power and control, the drive for creativity and self-direction, and with levels of aspiration. The role that groups play in human motivation will be considered in the next chapters.

HUMAN FUNDAMENTALS

The positions taken by the experts on human motivation at work are particularly significant for the basic similarities they show. Although the emphases differ, the similarities are stronger than the differences.

Overview of the Psychology of Motivation. Most of the newer psychology of motivation conforms to Stagner's thesis that the motivations of executives and workers are more similar than different.¹

1. People have desires for status or position, social recognition or prestige, human dignity and personal integrity, personal freedom and independence, praise for skill and knowledge, promotion and salary gains.² Where the executive is drawn to favoring courses of action that offer upward mobility, prestige, and status, the worker's experience and circumstances push him into favoring security on the job, which management has more of and therefore does not need.¹

2. People desire self-determination, self-expression, effective participation in making their own life decisions, carrying on their own activities³ and working at their own pace.⁴ Beyond wages and profits all workers desire some security, some opportunity for self-

expression, including an opportunity to advance and gain greater knowledge and skill, and some desirable working conditions.³

3. There are conflicting desires, incompatible objectives, "goal values that are not shared by the two groups" or, for that matter, within either group.^{3a} Where labor and management wish the same things, a struggle may ensue as it sometimes does over power and its distribution as well as income and its allocation. But competition and conflict need not be destructive; both have their constructive side.

4. There are also needs related to the "character of participation in society" both in and out of the work environment—desires which embrace requirements of status differentiation, differentiation of function, life goals²—as well as desires for independence and the transfer of aspirations to one's children.⁴ Participation may be co-operative or antagonistic, permitted or controlled, and it may include sanctions of varying degrees of severity, usually directed by management but also affecting some levels of management.

All of these elements are relevant to human motivations in work and supervisory situations, even if there is no economic motive as such. Human motivations are unified or integrated; this breakdown merely serves to introduce the issue in some comprehensible way.

When dealing with motivation, Elmo Roper found it difficult to segregate incentives and merely listed an order of preference or importance, viz., security, advancement, human dignity, feeling of usefulness. Eugene Holman, of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, also wrote "Ways must be found to give the individual worker at every rank a sense of accomplishment, a feeling of personal worth, a realization of the true importance of his efforts for the broad scheme. The individual employee wants not only fair play and reasonable security but just dealings, respect, and a feeling of accomplishment. He wants, too, the opportunity to advance in his chosen career and to build a fuller life for his family."⁶

The Sense of Security. The first item on Roper's list of worker wants was "a sense of security." Besides food, clothing, housing, and the other necessities for survival, human beings have historically determined standards of living and aspirations. Their demand for security is related to these and to their orientation toward the future.⁷ For workers the sense of security includes stable employment, an opportunity for self-improvement, and training to achieve higher skills.⁸

For top management, security takes different forms; it is composed of recognition of achievement, dignity of position, autonomy of management, and more leisure. Money was not even mentioned

in one leading survey.¹⁰ A critic could say that since top management has enough money, comparatively speaking, its aspirations would of necessity lie elsewhere. The point is that, in light of the nonexistence of economic motives as such, aspirations lie outside the framework of economic life, e.g., in leisure. For both groups security is related to full employment, which comprises both high employment and high income, acceptable wages and conditions of employment, respect for employee rights by government, management, and other workers, restriction on and control of child labor, and protection of persons with low bargaining power.¹¹ These are essentially non-pecuniary and non-economic elements of security that are related to employment and life generally.

Human Dignity. Human dignity, one of the core values of the American culture, is sought at work. It involves being respected as a person who possesses both rights and duties.¹² A Roper poll shows that the average American wants "to be treated like a human being rather than as a number on the payroll" and desires "a sense of human dignity that comes from feeling that his work is useful to society as a whole."¹³

While such respect for the individual is now more generally accepted, the worker wants better treatment from the society generally and not merely in the work situation. The work environment does not often enhance self-esteem and feelings of personal security.¹⁴

Belongingness. The desire to be needed, to belong, to be accepted, approved, and recognized has a long history.¹⁵ People have to feel that they are accepted for what they are, not merely for what they contribute to a minor phase of a huge work process. Their worst discouragement is to learn that they are just part of an impersonal machine—that they are just making a living. Thus, men resent a strictly economic calculus. More than to make money they want to gain recognition for their accomplishments and to be part of a group that gives meaning to their lives. Employers too need such social acceptance both within and outside the firm.

In three studies—of a bank, a plant, and a hospital—Argyris found that while 95 per cent of the employees said that they liked their work, 92 per cent of this group liked it because people left them alone. "I've found cohesive groups," he wrote, "but most of them are against management. In companies where there is good morale, they want to be left alone."¹⁶ This is, obviously, not a management-directed belongingness.

Wartime studies of the morale of flyers have little relevance for morale at work, which is but part of a way of behaving, and is becoming less important or central in people's lives. The individual

in an ordinary work situation does not identify himself so closely with the work group as a member at a wartime squadron would, for instance. He is closer to his family, to his friends, union, and other groups outside the work process.

Identification. People seek a feeling of identification with something good, useful, creative—with "significant work."¹³ Real co-operation rests on identification with the purposes of an organization.¹⁴ Whyte's organization man lives for the organization, belongs to it more than to his own wife and family, and is subordinate to it. Such identification makes him a corporation man, a General Motors man, a General Electric man.¹⁵ Moreover, the more the higher executive identifies with the company, the less he likes work with and identification with the community.

Some psychologists hold that one can identify oneself in a positive way with the company and product by developing a feeling of sharing in operations.¹⁶ However, in the study of Norristown, Pennsylvania, Palmer found that the saddest feature of human relations was the lack of a meaningful index of attachments to present work.¹⁷ Argyris said, "No scientific study I know of has proven that workers necessarily feel more pride when they are shown a finished product they have contributed to." He cited an assembly line worker in an auto plant who, when told his job was important, said; "Look, Doc, don't rub it in. How would you like to be reminded that the most important thing you do is put bolts in the rear of a car?"¹⁸ Actually, unions are important as a means of identification, for they become a part of the self-picture.¹⁹ Belonging and identification are not directed toward the plant but toward the community, union, and family.

The Desire for Participation. A management analyst wrote, "Employees want a chance to participate in management planning and decisions which concern them." Calling this an extension of the principle of democracy to the work place, Goode noted that employees wanted to participate in technical planning as well as in decisions involving their immediate work.²⁰

Human relations programs have been weakest in this area. Hiller observed, "Although large sums are paid out in order to patch up the deficiencies of the system, this still does not satisfy the worker's desire to count as a respected agent with a voice in the policies of the firm to which he contributes more than a capital investment of an absentee shareholder."²¹ But employers rarely permit or tolerate genuine participation, except where power is fairly equal or the employer has to give ground before superior force. Most views of participation err in assuming that there is an underlying "com-

munity of goals" between employer and employees. There may be short run conflict between work arrangements that are physiologically efficient and those that produce satisfactions. What worker participation occurs is as part of a captive audience, not as free individuals or as members of an organization separate from management.¹⁹

POWER AND CONTROL OF WORK RELATIONS

While workers seek to be adult and independent, modern industry is so organized that management seeks to continue the old master-servant relation of somewhat childlike dependency.¹² The workshop places a premium on having the worker dependent and can seriously frustrate the individual personality.²⁰

Drive for Independence. The powerful demand for self-employment is related to the desire for independence. The drive to work at one's own pace is just as important a manifestation of the desire for independence and self-control and of opposition to imposed direction by others. Control of output by work groups is also a kind of economic security that gives the individual worker some feeling of independence. Executives can be as frustrated by company policy and structure and as dependent as workers.¹³ Managers also have egoistic motives and needs and require their satisfaction. Yet, Haire pointed out, "there are still industries in America where a junior executive must ask permission to marry."^{20a}

Management's Control Over Motivation. Since management has control of the pay check, promotion, praise, and prestige, it is thought to have control of motivation. Indeed, management believes that through these devices it creates and maintains the workers' desire to achieve organization's goals.²¹ The science of administration itself is used to provide a new foundation for the "moral authority" of management.²² Self-control or self-management is excluded from consideration.

Dean Donald K. David of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration believes, "business leaders must assume the responsibility for increasing all the human satisfactions of groups with which they are associated."^{23a} Managers are the active, workers the passive agent. Drucker divides management's responsibilities into three parts: "managing a business, managing managers and managing worker and work." He does not mention self-management, but always refers to some external force in the person of management which directs the satisfactions of other persons in a dependency relation.

Management's control over motivation sets out to do nothing

less than "to change a person's behavior" by changing his knowledge, skills, and attitudes.^{21a} Argyris found that management's control over motivation frequently created tension and hostility; management's monopoly over power satisfactions is resented.¹² In the international Harvester program, worker reactions to the foremen who had received training in human relations techniques were slightly more negative after than before the program. Some even contend that aptitude testing is designed to select persons who seem to fit into the company "profile of success" with little chance left to others.

The Authoritarian Element in Motivation. Most formal organization is large-scale, authoritarian, or centrally directed with little participation or control by members. Managers have been roundly scored for using "authoritarian tactics" and thus allowing workers in organized groups to feel they have a moral struggle against injustice and inequality, in line with the democratic tradition.^{8c} The idea of ending injustice, that a few should not enjoy all the good things of life is, as Russell wrote, a revolutionary idea that has become widely diffused.

Management has sought to elicit the voluntary acquiescence of the worker to control by management over motivation at work. Many managements have moved away from authoritarian practices without recognizing the worker's right to control over his own personality and group membership. Worker and manager have many different ends even at work, and control of one side by the other has not ended. Fromm contended that realization of submissive or domineering passions can never lead to satisfaction but only to defeat, dependence on others, lack of development of one's own individual being, and destruction of one's sense of integrity. True relatedness to others requires unification with somebody or something outside oneself, based on a "productive orientation" of loving others actively, i.e., a brotherly love which, like all important group norms, would carry with it the sense of obligation (i.e., be moral).²⁴

CREATIVITY AND SELF-DIRECTION

Management's assumption that workers are "passive agents" is slipping before views that men participate selectively in their environment, that man is a creator.²⁵ Dreams of self-employment may rest in good measure on the presumed capacity of small businessmen to control most of their own destiny and conduct.²⁶ Much passivity may exist, and assuredly many external stimuli are used

to prod workers. But workers seek knowledge and activity and wish to meet challenges.²⁷

Seeking Creativity. Modern industrial techniques hardly encourage creativity for most persons at work. Their egoistic satisfactions are lessened by deskilling processes which destroy an important basis for security.^{28b} Both management and labor seek self-expression or creativity, pride of workmanship or accomplishment, following a "quest for excellence,"²⁸ but only a few unions and a few managements encourage creativity at work.²⁹

Few power groups permit creativity to function alone. One study shows that the greater the success and material rewards of scientists, the greater the diminution of their creativity, as the need to conform to the success pattern develops strong pressure on scientists.³⁰ Still, men crave opportunities for self-expression and activity which may be expressed in craftsmanship or workmanship.

Workmanship and Activity. Workmanship may not be an instinct, as Veblen once thought, but interest in useful work, in voluntary and spontaneous attention, in self-expression and activity are strong.³¹ Veblen, like the psychiatrists who hold that work is the main bond to reality, felt that workmanship was the constructive element in human life.³² Workmanship is self-sustaining. The responsibility of craftsmanship is closely akin to the older responsibility of ownership.^{31a} Skill saves the glory of work through the use of imagination; advanced specialization and mechanization make for "the loss of socially recognized skills."³³

Allport wrote, "A good workman feels compelled to do clean-cut jobs even though his security, or the praise of others, no longer depends upon high standards."³⁴ Once master of a craft, a man has become master of himself in a simultaneous process of achieving. "The craftsman emerged from the Middle Ages with a newfound respect in himself," for he had unified theory and practice and ennobled work and self.³⁵ Such functioning makes one a useful member of society and its groups; it adjusts job to worker and not worker to machine in the manner of what Bell termed "cow sociology."^{22a}

The Zeigarnik Effect. Allport's remark about a good workman feeling "compelled" to do the best job of which he is capable is well illustrated by the Zeigarnik effect, a problem in human desires to complete tasks, to do one's best, to avoid the half-fulfilled.³⁶ Otherwise, there is monotony and alienation from self. Workers resist these.

Zeigarnik observed that people remembered things left unfinished better than they remembered completed tasks and would

seek to complete them. This view applies with surprising force to the part-jobs of highly specialized industry. Occupation with a task creates a need for its completion. If completion is not permitted, the worker is left with meaningless bits of tasks and is, consequently, under permanent tension.

The Zeigarnik effect may cause a worker to resist being shifted from one task to another or from one job to another, since he may prefer to finish the job he has begun, so that it makes sense to him. In a way, the worker is striving to find substantive rationality in work processes, while management is seeking to bend the whole man into a part-role dictated by management's functional rationality. Thus, even if he wishes, a worker may be prevented from doing a fine job, from having pride in his work, and be frustrated by the part-task organization of industry. Resentment at this situation may take the form of gripes, slowdowns, and antagonism toward management, for the worker is made into an incomplete person.³⁷

Self-Expression. The worker, like the manager, needs opportunities for self-direction if his life is to be full. Externally imposed fear may force one into being responsible, but it will not provide the satisfaction of "an internal self-motivation for performance."³⁸ Even responsibility can function well only if it is self-generated and not imposed. After all, the only real discipline is "organized self-control"; the rest is punishment.

Mannheim's theory of self-regulation is a view of man as possessing spontaneous creative powers,^{39a} akin to Bentham's *sponete acta*.³⁹ Moore has emphasized that work circumstances may be so satisfactory that little if any incentive is needed.^{39a} The task at hand may have its own interests so that one does not labor only for reasons external to the process.

The need for self-assertion "is the self satisfaction which Spinoza has told us is the highest thing for which we can hope, 'for no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of any end.'"³⁹ Because men strive to be self-starters in place of followers, they have risen out of servitude to become creators, capable of self-actualization and a productive orientation.^{24a}

ASPIRATION LEVELS

Men in groups develop aspirations that have a future orientation. They hope to live on in their children or their achievements and still maintain hope of finding some happiness at work.

The Happiness Motif. The old dream of scientific management was that dissatisfaction would be replaced by "overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony." There are those who consider that in-

dustrial-relations research has the purpose of increasing workers' happiness and thereby productivity as well, a view which has little to support it. These chapters on motivation have indicated that "happiness" does not lead to more work or output; management remains in fairly full charge of someone else's happiness or means of satisfaction; and possibly the most unhappy people modern production has produced are the men on the assembly line, not to mention frustrated managers.

Mills thinks that "harmony is a euphemism for cheerful willingness to comply with management directives." One training manual states clearly that human relations is "the art of dealing with people in such a manner that they will want to conduct themselves in a desired fashion."⁴⁰

There is, assuredly, some happiness at work. However, need-satisfactions may be pitted against each other and be in conflict. Many workers at an automobile assembly plant detested assembly-line work and preferred their previous jobs, but could not leave because the pay on the line was higher. About half the industrial labor force was found to be dissatisfied or unhappy with the job.⁴¹

Money as the Price of Submission. The overconcern with human relations and happy, congenial work groups was scored by Bell when he wrote that workmen are by no means disinterested in making money: "Why else would people submit themselves to such a work environment?"^{22b} Money is measured by the tyranny of the clock. Moreover, workers expect pay in accordance with achievement and feel discrimination in pay keenly. There is a demand for justice in the slogan of "equal pay for equal work" that in good measure seeks to eliminate the worst features of competition.

However, while working for others may be linked to making some gain toward personal goals, once the person starts his work career he discovers that money rewards are insufficient as a basis for participation in an organization. Workmen's emphases on wages may conceal quite real but "unverbalized" or unseen yearnings for gaining self-respect and dignity and may also conceal vague hostilities toward the employer, the machine, and the entire industrial "discipline."³¹ Men cannot yet write union contracts that include clauses providing for psychological satisfaction of the needs for status, prestige, and the enjoyment of associates.⁴² Whatever the original power of wages or salary payments, even if raised regularly, employees require the satisfaction of non-monetary needs.

Possibilities for Advancement. Personal achievement, the chance to get ahead, and the opportunity to hope or look forward to something better are closely related to status feelings and striv-

ings. "An opportunity to advance" is held by Roper to be the second most important desire of the average American.⁴⁶ American life may overemphasize the drive for success (and conformity) through waging the battle of economic achievement. Salvation may be sought through such success, now in no small measure wrapped around the concept of "security."^{26a}

But the industrial system that has aroused dreams of advancement often dashes them to the ground and frustrates their realization. The concept of success for Norristown workers was quite modest; it had been reduced to sufficient security of income or savings and a generally happy and comfortable home, i.e., enough not to worry.^{4b} For some, climbing can become an almost universal mania and occupational neuroses may occur. Social and egoistic need satisfactions are pitted against each other when men prefer staying with their work groups and preserving social relations with them than to advancing to foreman with higher prestige and more pay.^{20c} Promotion of one person over another may, nevertheless, arouse tension that can assume the form of aggression and withdrawal and not merely frustration.

One of the saddest days at work is the day when one learns that advancement is cut off. Under such circumstances men do not lose hope; they transfer that hope to their children, as the Norristown study indicates. Opportunities to advance at work are tied to the desire to build a fuller life for one's family.

Status Considerations. In a competitive society status is more than mere social climbing; it is directly associated with power drives.⁴⁸ Workers seek to achieve community (and not just in-plant) status and to become a part of a great organization. "The standard of living," wrote Bell, "has become a built-in automatic device" that chains the worker to his own learned desire for goods and display, a separate home for himself, and immediate gratifications.^{22e} Having lost satisfaction in work, men now seek it in material possessions. The candied carrot constitutes acceptance by workers of leisure-class standards and visible status symbols.

SUMMARY

Managers and employees have similar motivations, although the managers control the means of achieving need satisfactions at work. Each man seeks self-development, to go as far as possible on his ability, and to improve his family's status. Hope is boundless among human beings; it has not lent itself to theories of maximization. However, at every juncture there are obstacles and frustrations, conflicting desires, different definitions of the situation, and

impediments to fuller participation in a vast sphere of human life.

The truly significant feature of the activity of human relations functions over the past three decades is that they have found a whole man with in- and out-plant needs and desires, desirous of both status in groups and self-determination or proaction, in conflict with self and others, but needing fuller participation in the society. Motivation at work has become multiple, has not been disengaged from the whole man who also lives outside work and lives on in his children. The broad fundamentals of human needs, the issues of control or power over self and others, the need to be creative and self-directing, and the vast powers of aspirations to engage men's egos all indicate the multiple nature of motivation and its grounding in group relations. The next chapter takes up the group situation of motivation.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Find a list of desires at work in a social psychology text. How are the various desires interrelated?
2. How can conflict be productive?
3. State half a dozen views of the nature of security.
4. Draw a distinction between belongingness and identification.
5. Can power drives be maximized in any measurable way?
6. What is meant by independence-dependence relations?
7. A popular psychologist writes, "There are no 'creative jobs,' only creative people who have learned to give something of themselves to whatever jobs they perform." Explain.
8. State the case for and against authoritarian control of motivation in work and supervisory processes.
9. How is the craftsman an equalitarian?
10. Aside from the weakness of the idea of instinct, what do you think of the "instinct of workmanship"?
11. What is the "candied carrot"? How far can it go toward controlling motivation at work?

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GROUP AND MULTIPLE MOTIVATION

The rediscovery of the human group by human-relations practitioners necessitates a reordering of materials on incentives and motivation. Social norms, which are learned by group members as participants in the whole society and its subgroups, do not permit an isolated or separable individual motivation to operate. Just as economic life is not separate from social existence and no economic motivation exists, so one finds meanings in life in various groups and spheres, not alone at work. In recent years the sphere of work has actually been reduced as the center of life functions. With this de-emphasis, views of economic man and of isolated individuals who rationally calculate all moves have suffered a decline.

Group ends and incentives are internalized by individuals as norms. Rules make order out of what would otherwise be anarchy, for there is a predictable relation to the future implicit in group norms. One gets one's norms from the group, although one may vary from the norm greatly. Joint action in the society by members of overlapping groups that have diverse aims and goals rests on some joint sharing of meanings, a consensus on approach and end results. This does not rule out individual motivation and individual action; it merely situates both within the framework of group living.

Government has a role in group influences, not only because it is an influential group but also because each of the other groups is something of a government and rules its members through normative devices. Men are not only in work groups; they are also in families, clubs, and the society generally, all of which have a growing influence on the individual. Motivation, then, instead of being economic or isolated or single is multiple and overlapping. An enormous range of multiple motivation is so thoroughly noneconomic and non-work-oriented as to merit inclusion in any discussion of incentives.

THE GROUP IS THE UNIT

The now several centuries long concentration on the individual has failed the individual and his groups. The group was ignored by theorists of economic man, marginal utility, and maximization. It was possibly the disintegration of the small community that led men in industry to view persons at work only as individuals instead of group members. As soon as large-scale organization arose it sought to have the work place assume the position formerly held by the small closely-knit community.

Organization Man Emerges. However much managements may have regarded workers as isolated individuals, they have thought of them as organization men rather than as separate economic men.¹ Cooperative working in groups was soon found to be superior to working in isolated situations.² More and more, men have become members of vast organizations which are central to the structures of mass society.

Still, it is not the plant but the nation which has become the worker's and employer's economic unit.³ Whatever their differences, workers and managers share in most of the nation's predominant culture. They live in a community outside the plant, office, or mill and the predominant culture has managed to dominate, to an increasing extent, both plant and community. The old concentration on the individual as the unit of human organization has weakened. Workers can hardly be thought of as individually responding to incentive programs when they work in groups. Individual appeals (even to management) do not always stimulate production and have less effect than group appeals.⁴ Upon examination, even the individualistic view of scientific management—the "right man in the right place"—is found to depend on relations with fellow workers and foremen.⁵ The goals influencing the worker's orientation to job functions are, increasingly, the group goals of "security, pleasant working relations, and status in a competitive society."⁶ Meaningful ties develop in work groups that set their own norms—a compelling feature of all subgroups—and do not merely follow management's external incentive symbols.⁷

Group Sharing of Goals. Pleasant working relations are a function of the way workers form their own groups and thus provide "appropriate means for satisfactory social relations" at work tasks.⁸ Group sharing, especially of goals, becomes so obligatory as to be a moral act.⁹ The groups act as arbiters and censors of morals and as vehicles for achieving self-expression and satisfaction.¹⁰ The welfare of the group is placed above that of the individual who realizes

himself through the group. For a long time incentive rates remained a "technical" engineering problem. Once these devices were found not to work, management sought to use insurance plans, employee recreation, plant libraries, music, vitamin pills, and posters. "None of them," Whyte commented, "touches the heart of the problem: the relations of the individuals to one another in the social system."⁵ A "social approval hypothesis" was elaborated to take advantage of the work-group setting of norms, and teamwork became the equivalent of older versions of motivation.¹⁰

After teamwork devices had been used for decades, Whyte found that "most of them fail to release more than a small fraction of the energy and intelligence workers have to give to their jobs."⁵ "One thing of which most wage workers are deprived is any chance to extend themselves, to go all-out, save in the ultimately self-defeating ingenuity of quota-restriction."¹¹ Organizations continue to control the instruments of motivation in what is euphemistically called a benevolent way—though that way is often looked on as deception through amiability and good will. What workers in groups think of management practices is apparently more important than management's views.¹² They sense what plans are for purposes of manipulation and do not constitute an improvement of status.

The Congenial Team. The view that human beings seek to "stand well with their fellows" has led to ideas that people like to work within congenial teams in friendly surroundings. Because being part of a team is thought to help provide an "anchorage in reality," many managements, formerly suspicious of any group that they had not formed and did not control, have gone a long way toward accepting informal work teams.

Congeniality may be overdone, as Wilensky pointed out in describing work groups which have great frequency of interaction and yet have members who dislike one another. Others, like scientists or close friends may have high morale while not interacting frequently. Paradoxically, the informal work group may produce high morale in opposing personnel practices of management even though the members dislike each other. Members of such a group may develop a conformity to group norms simply because they are arrayed against management's norms and directives.¹³ Work-group members, however, have multiple-group affiliations and identifications which may force deviation from a congenial team's norms or for that matter from an uncongenial team's standards.

NEW SYSTEMS OF BELIEF AT WORK

To illustrate some of the changing attitudes of management Stuart Chase tells a story of how the first boss a man worked for

made all the big decisions, knew all the answers, gave all the orders. The second president was an autocrat but would ask for advice occasionally, did not claim to know all the answers, and could be talked to on occasion. The third company head retains ultimate power but, since he does not think of himself as an autocrat, uses open communication, group decision, decentralization of authority, opinion polls of workers, and industrial psychologists.¹⁴ The big change is that organization has become so monstrous in size that authoritarian measures can neither motivate individuals nor handle the powerful work groups and informal associations at work.

Contrasting Beliefs. Management no longer has the confidence that what it says truly represents the views of all the people. As Chase wrote, the incredible thing about modern production is that "people do not believe in what they are in fact doing."¹⁵ Both unions and management have opposed federal aid to the unemployed, and the people have denounced social responsibility by businessmen as leading to ruin.¹⁶ The vital fact is that men work without believing the reasons for work that are given them. Managers work for reasons that appear different from those of workers.

On entering the work environment the child who is schooled in doctrines of democracy and equality learns that his dreams of equal treatment are to be frustrated, his hopes of climbing are to be severely limited, and that he can be required to accept the functional rationality of the workshop. For one who is, by ordinary standards of education, trained to become mobile and seek status, conflict can disrupt personal existence. Knuckling under to authoritarian control, acceptance of conformity, and silence do not mean that conflict is resolved. Even the ideology of celebrated rugged individualism did not permit most people to be really different, especially at work where conformity was extolled.¹⁷

No central truth has pervaded the work situation so that all can move with the same motivations toward the same ends. Instead, different persons and groups continue to interpret their roles in production processes differently. There is, however, a lawfulness and order about group relations, and there are powerful desires for some form of secure and predictable relations to the future. The sense of injustice is associated with the view that each has rights that have to be met day in and day out in order to have moral relations at work.¹⁸

Power Relations. The need for some expression of power drives can now be related to motivation in groups. Power, the command over services and actions of other men, is group power. Where management is viewed as the government of the plant, as Kuhn put it, "management does not and cannot govern primarily in the interests

of its 'subjects.'" "As viewed by employees, management is a dictatorship in the sense that power comes from above and employees have no power to replace the managers." *¹⁸

Businessmen are the administrators of power systems which now carry with them some obligations to employees. There is no apparent limit to this power, no known maximization, except for counterpressures by government, unions, and other groups. The old line boss is now the "leader of the team" and John L. Lewis is the "spokesman for the boys."¹⁹

PUBLIC POWER

An important and relatively new element in work relations is government or public power, which dominates both plant and community to a surprising degree today. Government sets prices and taxes income, regulates and contracts, controls and provides subsidies, rules and tries cases, and bargains and arbitrates. It has taken over much of the responsibility for providing jobs and aiding the unemployed.

Government and Motivation. In the depression of the 1930's and in World War II, the government basically altered the constants of motivation in work relations. Financial control moved from private lenders to the federal treasury. When ordinary market incentives proved useless in obtaining production for war, the government had to use law, war powers, and cost-plus appeals to ensure the necessary production. Prices, which had long been administered by businessmen, were publicly fixed. Government became active in checking on and effecting consumer and producer expectations as to prices and profits.²⁰ Private motivation was not allowed to operate alone or at least was not trusted to bring the desired results.

The businessman who decries government actions accepts a tariff, a form of hidden subsidy. The farmer who speaks of farming as a way of life accepts a parity formula which constitutes an open subsidy. But government does more than fill those gaps that private activities and motivations fail to encompass. It sets limits on how far a plant or business can go. It affects motivation by setting minimum standards of wages and hours in line with considerations of justice and human dignity. Above all, it espouses a doctrine, quite alien to profit maximization, that men shall be ruled by the force of law and not the law of force, that this is a society of law and

* This power-control device applies to management as well. In the caption to a cartoon of a board meeting, the head of a company says, "Of course, it's only a suggestion, gentlemen, but let's not forget who's making it" [Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 9, 1957, 104].

not merely of men, that the problem is to apply to ever-changing conditions the "never-changing principles of freedom." Such an approach rests on a universal ideal of justice and not on an authoritarian position for some and a submissive position for others.^{17a} Indeed, the American constitutional system places the fundamental law above the will of government itself, not to mention a private plant or individual.

Consensus and Its New Role. Mass society has its deep divisive features and requires some means of reaching the minimum social agreement known as consensus.²¹ Much of consensus is reached through mass media that suggest and persuade, propagandize and use other influences.²² Where things are too large to be perceived at once and directly in a large world of large groups, temporally extended experiences are provided by mass media.²³ In the past three decades more important changes have occurred in the means for spreading ideas than had occurred in all man's previous history, yet fewer people control those means for reaching the minds of millions.²⁴

Business has considerable control over the mass media and through them is able to present its views. In the process, most persons are viewed as alike, as mass men. Mass production is extended to include mass consumption and in place of the rugged individual there is the collective, undifferentiated consumer buying mass products. The achievement of consensus is not unrelated to the possibility of social control by powerful interest groups.²⁵

Within the work environment much agreement is imposed. Where there are deep differences between groups, however, consensus has to be sought. In general, public power groups seek to gain a consensus favoring their maintaining power.

MULTIPLE MOTIVATION

Longtime emphases on individual incentives have clouded the reality of multiple motivations from which an economic incentive cannot be separated. Achievement within the work environment means seeking goals there and in broader social spheres. Indeed, stressing some single incentive may evoke more energy, but it will be at the price of increasing tension and forcing a person to seek escape from the company or other enterprise.²⁶

Motivational Complexity. In place of any separation of monetary and nonmonetary incentives, there is a multiplicity of ends and incentives. Some values may be monetized to a degree, but wages have to be set in the broad framework of alternative means of achieving social valuation outside the work sphere.^{26b}

No standard motivation excites all the members of a group in the same way. Cross pressures from the conflicting values and demands of various groups make motivation difficult to analyze.²⁷ Multiple-group membership makes for ambivalent and multiple motivations. Everyone is subject to the conflicting norms and requirements of groups outside work processes, so that it is difficult to state where the effects of the work organization stop and those of the social environment begin.^{28a}

Contradictions of Multiple Motivation. Multiple-group membership arouses conflicting values and contrary aspirations. One is drawn by equality and success, sociality and competition, long-standing ideals and remorseless and swift change.^{28a} Gaining of a union or management objective may not be an end or a new equilibrium but a stage from which to make still further gains.²⁸ In the world of competing multiple groups, social equilibrium falls victim to pressures for "more."

The managers and human-relations specialists who find that workers resist change often forget that management resists a change in ideas from work-centeredness to leisure-centeredness, from individual to group motivation, from single to multiple motivation. Argyris found that in an unhappy plant, workers welcomed change if it would get management into trouble.²⁹ Or workers welcomed change which they interpreted as an improvement for workers, not for management. Motivation theory becomes uprooted from that work environment in which the classical economic theory planted it in its effort to subjugate the society to the economy.

The Whole Man in the Whole Society. Much of modern industry tries to separate work from group, familial, communal, and even ordinary social ties. Yet an effective motivational pattern requires an integration of the work and nonwork groups and attention to the "whole man," who is a social and not just an enterprise being.³⁰ While jobs are limited to part-roles in highly specialized industry, men seek integrated growth.³⁰

Without some integration of occupational and other social roles, the individual is disorganized. To achieve personality integration, he requires opportunities for achieving self-respect, recognition as an individual, some pleasure in work and affection within a group —what Fromm calls a productive orientation.³¹ Yet desires for affec-

²⁷ A business executive put the well-known truism "The goals of a group are seen the goals of a competing work group" in a different light when he said, "It must be put to work. The goal of a free market is the creation of wealth for the nation, profit and better living conditions for the people." See E. F. Schuman, "A P. H. Gray Remembrance," *Industrial Relations*, Standard Statistics, Inc., New York, 1954, p. 9.

tion, some feeling of importance, and some assuaging of psychological hungers are only partly met at work.³² The psychiatrist Ginsburg observed that a normal person should not expect his job to become either a "sacred task" or a "curse." He found "substantial evidence that for most industrial workers, work and the work setting are not central life interests."³³ With workers spending a much larger proportion of each day away from work, a vast change in sheer location of opportunities for satisfaction has occurred. Moreover, the norms of the work environment are increasingly subject to the pressure of general social and cultural factors.^{14b}

THE MORE AND MORE THESIS

When asked what labor's goal was, the old-time AFL leader Samuel Gompers replied, "more and more." Recently George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, recalled Gompers' statement and amended it in the light of vast changes since the 1920's. He said, "If by a better standard of living we mean not only more money but more leisure and a richer cultural life, the answer remains, 'More.'" ^{17b} A not surprising condition is that management too desires "More."

The "more" of the 1950's differs from the older concentration on wages and profits. Today there is a desire for more mobility, more status, more prestige, both in and away from the plant and by both managers and workers. Both seek more leisure and less work, although by a quirk of history it is the managers who put in the long hours. The workers have elected to take their higher standard of living in the form of shorter hours. Such a reversal would have baffled Marxians who thought that a principal way of making profit was by forcing workers to put in longer hours. However, managers too are increasingly casting their votes in favor of more leisure.

Future of Motivation at Work. What is the future of human motivation at work as seen by social psychologists? The variety and complexity of wants is expected to expand, to be redefined steadily, to shift in intensity as social conditions change outside the plant, and therefore to "give rise to new conflicts." The most important change, Kornhauser noted, is toward effective participation in decision making and in sharing responsibility at work. This is reinforced by the man's greater participation in public affairs and nonwork groups.^{22a}

The desire for the candied carrot of visible status possessions is not lessening. Every group offers its members the hope that they can have a larger share of the good things of life, increasingly interpreted as involving more leisure time, less and lighter work, and

more possessions. Impressed by what he called "divine discontent," Henry Luce held that "no conceivable utopia on earth will satisfy man," so powerful is his hope and imagination.^{17c}

SUMMARY

There is every reason for bewilderment at what has happened to motivation theory. The development has been epochal: the emphasis has moved from individual to group motivation, from functional to substantive rationality, from authoritarianism toward worker participation in decision-making, from economic man to the multiple-group member, from a small-scale world to large-scale mass society; from an economy subjugated society to a society in which government is the dominant social institution. The fiction of separate economic motives has been established. Steadily the old work-centered world has shifted to a leisure-centered planet.

Of course not all the old rules have been weakened, and not all the new group norms and standards have been established. Motivation theory is, however, rapidly altering and is increasingly moving toward a theory of power-group interrelations. For a fuller understanding of modern society, consideration has to be given to its mass character and to the rise of government, of management and labor, and of large-scale organizations as power formations.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. An economist wrote, "From a sociological or culture-historical standpoint, the individual is not the basic reality. . . . The family is the real unit in what is called individualistic society, and many communities fill in between the family, and the state and world order." Why is the individual not the unit of motivation?
2. In motivational terms, describe organization man.
3. What are some weaknesses of the "congenial team" view of motivation?
4. How is it possible for men at work to believe in what they are doing?
5. Is there any apparent limit to power for groups?
6. In what ways has government affected "private" motivation?
7. State the nature of multiple motivation.
8. Describe the whole man in the whole society.
9. Show how the "more and more" thesis has shifted its content from Gompers' time to Meany's.
10. In place of work, what can be the organizing principle of life?

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THE MASS SOCIETY FRAMEWORK

Workers and managers, unions and enterprise, political parties and government today operate within the framework of a mass society. Unlike past social settings, this society has witnessed the emergence of huge masses mobilized by various power groups inside and outside production processes. The presence of a mass-production system, of a powerful industrial base and rapidly changing technology, of abundance in place of scarcity, of a high level of urbanization, of bureaucratic organization and formal relations and of treatment of millions of people as mass consumers is a major shift from a production-oriented to a consumption-oriented and more publicly controlled society.

Most older approaches to "labor-management" relations fail to situate their materials within the social framework of our time. Possibly the emergence of the mass society is too recent; it appeared roughly in this century. But it is time to ground analysis of so vital a relationship as that between labor, management, and government around the really definitive characteristic of the society of today, i.e., the complex interpersonal and intergroup relations maintained within it and by means of it.¹

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW SOCIETY

Where past societies had sympathetic identification—i.e., taking the role of others in closer, more personal relations—mass society has produced a one-sided communication. People formerly entered audiences, publics, or crowds infrequently, today one is virtually a continuous audience member and a shifting member of various publics. Crowds may well have been the heralds of the mass society. But other views of the new mass society are significant for industrial sociology.

General Views of Mass Society. Mass society is more than the emergence of Marx's version of the proletariat. It is also something more than a large group engaging in the same cultural practices.² Sheer size of population is an element in—but not the main characteristic of—mass society; China has had a large population for centuries but a mass society only recently. Rose held that mass society arises only where people are formed into audiences and where communication is one-way—from a leader or propagandist. In such a large-scale and impersonal society, there is little interaction among audience members, but the mass media have considerable influence.³

A creation of the twentieth century, mass society rests on extensive division of labor, on mass communication, on the revolution in transportation, and on the rise of new forms of consensus.⁴ Mass society stemmed from the revolution which produced both industrialization and urbanization on an industrial basis. It is closely associated with war, war production, and wartime planning.⁵ The most diverse and antagonistic forces have helped create the mass character of modern society. Certainly religion has contributed with its emphasis on conformity and its stress on faith without too much reason.⁶ Marxism and trade unionism have, for different reasons, both fostered the growth of masses—Marxism by trying to turn unorganized crowds into controllable masses⁷ and unionism by forcing business to deal with groups rather than with individuals.⁸ Government power, elaborated in most spheres of social control under the compelling necessities of war and depression, has produced mass types of rule.⁹

Business in its drive for expansion and power has used functional rationality (tying workmen to objectives of the firm and the economy); deprived many individuals of thought, insight, and responsibility; and dealt with them as marginal units, each exactly like the others.¹⁰ The fascist myth joined the Marxian myth in turning all groups into apathetic and inarticulate crowds under a leader—Lederer's "state of the masses."¹¹ Political parties diverted the gains of universal suffrage and equalization of rights into rule from afar, into a monopoly of power for guiding the mass, ending any "primacy of the individual." The armed forces, too, contributed to producing the idea of the "nation in arms, mass mobilization, mass production for war, and wartime economic planning."¹² Scientific management sought to reduce economic man further to an economic atom, to control all physical movements at work.¹³ Even social and national economic planning looked on men as parts of masses, to be controlled by public means.¹⁴

The Contrast with Folk Society. The sociological model of a folk society in which work is not separated from the rest of living is useful for clarifying the framework mass society constitutes for modern work and supervisory relations. The contrast is of community and urbanization, agricultural and industrial ways, small, spontaneous structures and vast, impersonal, and formal organization.¹³

A vital difference is the use of rules and regulations, of codes of conduct in formal organization, very much in line with Mayo's view that "cooperation cannot be left to chance." Human interrelationships are ordered in the mass society, a situation unlike that existing in folk society. While mass societies permit both more choice and more means of exercising it, they exert more social controls over the choices made. An essential distinction made by some writers is not the size or density of population but the relative complexity and heterogeneity of relations between people.¹⁴ However, one should qualify this to indicate that the mass media encourage a trend toward a "smooth blend" that is remarkably homogeneous; uniformity of attitudes, customs, and beliefs is encouraged. In place of the intimate bond of folk society, the larger society erects the bond of conformity, especially in work and supervisory relations. Sympathetic identification or taking the role of the other is no longer a way of achieving social integration and joint social action.¹⁵

Rules are imposed on the mass, so as to give predictability to those operating the levers of control. Relations become detached and impersonal in place of being intimate and direct. Order, regulation, and unified action are achieved by controls and are used to organize the formal relations that make mass society. Orders are put in writing, rules are written down to minimize misunderstanding and gain swift agreement:¹⁶ no one is very distant from control through cards, tickets, and other pieces of paper.¹⁷

Mass society is a highly secular affair. It is rational, worldly, non-reverential, given to exceptionally speedy change and logical justifications. It formally worships science, and is particularly characterized by planning and organizing so that nothing is improvised and nothing left to chance. A mania for order emerges, expressed in lining up in queues and in quantification. Consensus is sought and gained through mass communication media. Change occupies a central position—mass production makes for sweeping shifts and alterations; great mobility, cross cultural diffusion on a world scale, and teaching of the acceptability of change.¹⁸

* One wit observed that the stapling machine and Scotch tape are what hold mass society together, with the rubber stamp functioning as the seal of the deity.

FOUNDATIONS OF MASS SOCIETY

At the roots of mass society lies a different kind of human relation than was present in the past. People are placed in what may well be the greatest stratification system of the ages. Besides a high rate of industrialization and extensive urbanization mass society is also characterized by vastly increased mechanization, by commercialization (especially of high and folk culture) through mass communication, and by bureaucratic or formal organization to handle human relations in large units. No one of these elements operates alone or is separate from the others; but they can be discussed in turn, and all of them can be related to the new situation of abundance that is a product of mass society.

The Nature of Industrialism. The special concept of mass society rests on mass industrialization as the active principle of organization of economic affairs, now closely intertwined with political and social functioning.¹⁶ Meadows refers to industrialism as a "cultural system" in its own right, organized around machine production (technique stage), technology (knowledge and use of tools and machines), and formal organization (the pattern of relations).¹⁷ When so used, the term *industrialism* or *industrial institutions* applies not merely to manufacturing but also to transportation, production of raw materials, and disposal of manufactured goods—all of which are central to the mode of production.¹⁸ Surely industrialization has been the basis for the widespread or mass culture.

Industrialism is mass-production industry; its factory system has a developed and rapidly changing technology. Its labor force has been withdrawn from the land and even from the family as there has arisen a mobile population free from ties to land or ownership.^{19a} The old town-and-country division of society was disrupted as the mass was forced into industry. Now the worker has to depend on industrial employment for a livelihood. The population at work is mainly composed of employees who are largely propertyless.¹⁹

The division of labor is complex, leaving the worker an essentially passive role as tender of the machine. At the heart of the most powerful production machine on earth are powerless human beings, insecure and unhappy, themselves a creation of industrialism.²⁰ Co-ordination of the work and acquisition of capital investment requires a superstructure of managers to direct the labor force. As he succeeds, the manager becomes more important and rules more men.

There is a standardization of parts and processes, tasks and products, and, some aver, even of the workmen. Steadily the capital investment needed to operate rises. The corporation becomes the

dominant form of enterprise, and big business seeks to determine and pattern the character of the society.²¹ *

Ownership is widely diffused, and managers usually have little ownership interest in the enterprises they manage. Control of production is concentrated. Even though some efforts at operational decentralization have gone forward, these efforts are subordinate to vast systems of intercorporate coordination and to control through interlocking directorates and trade and business associations.²² Indeed, large enterprises tend toward monopolistic competition (competition among the few), administered prices, efforts at political influence, and even entry into governmental leadership. Whether this results in a society dominated by "managers" is a serious issue. It certainly means that business is in politics and politics is in business. This has become overt and significant.^{18b}

Large-scale unions and an organized labor movement have arisen in one of the most profound changes in social organization of the past century. Unions are preeminently a phenomenon of industrialism and bespeak the need it arouses for formation of new groups in a world of powerful pressures where the individual is powerless.^{19c} Unions also reflect the reliance of the worker on the larger society for satisfactions and security he cannot gain from industry.^{1c} Discharge, sanctions, deskilling, economic depression, loss of prestige and status, inability to own and control one's own tools and other instrumentalities of production lay the worker open to cyclical up-and down-swings of the industrial system and leave him confused, powerless, and alone.

The worker and the manager become part of a complex and interdependent system of money and credit, exchange and government regulation, controls and parity, subsidies and tariffs. Caught in a near-permanent war situation on a global scale, the industrialism of the United States turns to larger and larger scale operations to produce for war. Government contracts for munitions and armaments become the mainstay of the economic structure.^{18d} Most decisive orders come from the military; real direction of the main levers of economic life stems from national military needs. Government becomes an economic leader, an industrial force, the main buyer and seller, and the chief contractor. Instead of merely intervening, government is intertwined with all vital economic activities.^{23a} Interdependence transcends national borders and makes

* The validity of Drucker's idea that the corporation has emerged as "the representative and determining socio-economic institution" is limited; the corporation is not so determining, but it is true that big unions and big government are similarly organized.

the industrial system also subject to repercussions from international pressures and incidents.

Change Is Accelerated. One may see this in relation to property rights, against which the powers of taxation are arrayed, along with those of managers who do the on-the-spot industrial ruling and the political leaders who lead in public affairs. Technological innovation becomes a necessity on an expanding scale if a nation is to stay in the international race for supremacy in military might and in outer space. These technological developments make for swifter communication and transportation and new revolutions that reduce the size of the earth, in a sense, while increasing the ability of organizations to become even larger and to control larger components of the culture.

Mass society and its industrialism has produced a new form of energy from the atom, and may be on its way to harnessing the power of the sun and to creating new forms of social (and industrial) organization that will establish new forms of power in human relations. Above all, mass production has created the condition of production abundance, an increase of material wealth that has weakened older views that ours was a scarcity economy. Just as the so-called laissez-faire economy has given way to government direction, control, regulation, and contracting in a social situation of near-permanent war, so industry has by its own internal creativeness produced a condition where most workers are outside manufacturing and in trades and services. This transformation, now being pushed further by automation, has important consequences for mass society.

Urbanism as a Base of Mass Society. The twin of industrialism in mass society is urbanism. Urbanism, the transformation of rural areas into city areas,²³ is also an organization that provides the social milieu for the mass society.²⁴ Mass society is urban—primary human relations fall subordinate to secondary relations, and formal organizations become more important than familial ones. The traditional social solidarity of the neighborhood is replaced by conformity to the rules and regulations of the vast cities.²⁵

Massing of population is central to urbanism. Sheer size of the population aggregates makes for secondary social relations.²⁶ Arising as the center of freedom and toleration, of progress and invention, of science and rationality,²⁷ the city has become a setting in which huge masses may be manipulated.²⁸ Those whom Wirth thought of as socially heterogeneous individuals have become much more homogeneous under the impact of large-scale organization and the mass media.

The inability of huge masses of people to meet each other as full persons makes for superficiality and anonymity, just as the power of large organizations deepens an alienation based on a relation of "rational" utility to each other rather than on human reciprocity. In brief, while physical contacts are close, social contacts are distant. Society becomes contractual; formal controls regulate relations between people.²⁵ The extraordinary mobility of city life aids this process, accentuating rapid turnover in group membership and employment. A complication is that people in urban relations are members of multiple groups, each with differing loyalties and requirements.

Urbanism Is Spreading. American agriculture has been becoming increasingly mechanized since the beginning of the industrial revolution. More than 90 per cent of the population earned its living from the soil in 1790, 12.5 per cent earned its living this way in 1957. By 1960 this figure may fall to 9 per cent, leaving 91 per cent nonfarmers, an exact reversal of the situation in 1790. Moreover, agriculture received but 6 per cent of the national income in the mid-1950's or less than half it might have received in terms of its numerical strength.²⁷ The millions remaining on farms are mostly machine hands and follow urbanized ways. Part of this change has produced a decline in the number of small communities, a lessening of their isolation, and a spread of the power of the metropolis over suburbs and fringe areas even when central city areas tend to decline in population. A further spread of urbanization may make for a "total" urbanization of the country within a few years.

The System of Organization. Where a folk society achieves social order, social integration, and joint social action through sympathetic identification, the mass society gains such predictability through conformity to objectively defined roles.¹⁴ At least two groups become separated, managers and workers, and their relations are mediated by organization. Each has a different conception of his role and place in the organization at work, and each is involved in several nonwork groups.^{10a}

Organization is itself a division of labor, i.e., of ruling and following, a kind of social differentiation based on authority and the rank of some persons in positions higher than others.^{10b} Structure, the older spontaneous way of relating persons, is replaced by organization: a more conscious placing of persons in relations.

Highly organized from centralized points, mass society produces bureaucracy. The individual is treated as an undifferentiated part of a mass, little is left to spontaneous action: some human beings administer others and place and relate them to industrial processes

and each other, particularly to an abstract organization, activity, and process they cannot control.^{20a} Standardization, specialization, and interchangeability produce routinization, in line with the functional rationality of the rulers of organization, leaving little for private life.^{10e}

Within the system of organization the power forces are not separate, but multiple and overlapping. The government, enterprise, unions, and political parties are, in a sense, governments, because they administer and rule men. Most of them are run by elites who have their own methods of selection and techniques of control, many of them private, hidden, or secret. The organizational system of mass society may be democratic or liberal in its governing order; but in either case it is elitist. Much depends on the power of the multiple groups; where they have strength, a pluralist democracy can prevail. Where the groups are weak, totalitarianism is the common result.

The Abundance Base of Mass Society. Each social setting has its organizational level of human relatedness; and this system of relations is ensconced in a certain level of creature comfort and psychological achievements. Abundance is basic to urbanism; without some surplus in foodstuffs, cities can hardly arise. Cities require a social organization whereby the rulers of the cities gain control of the surpluses and of their distribution.²⁸ Abundance has replaced scarcity in the United States, at least in foodstuffs. No previous society has witnessed such material wealth. Because this wealth is far more equally distributed than it ever was before, the working classes have gained. Compared with older theories of scarcity economics and the bread-and-sweat equation of the Bible, men today have material comforts and enormously expanded leisure.

The critical features of abundance for a theory of work and supervisory relations in mass society are these:

1. Abundance was achieved by pre-atomic means.²⁹

2. Atomic energy promises to become the new mechanical energy form of abundance. (Apparently all new social forms develop new physical and social means of energizing people, things, and social relations.) Shortly electricity is expected to be so cheap as to be free and to go unmetered.³⁰

3. Scarcity theory in economics and the old bread and sweat equation of Genesis do not explain the expansion of the seven fat years to eight, nine, and more years, i.e., no major depression since 1935 or for two decades. A new theory is indicated.

4. Where one farmer can feed fourteen other people, compared with three farmers feeding four persons in colonial times, and where

photosynthesis promises to duplicate natural processes of food growing, "an era of unlimited abundance" opens up.³²

5. Abundance has led to higher living standards, a change in taste, more leisure and less work, and a shift in the concept of what is a luxury and what a necessity, i.e., to a changing social morality of work.

6. The expectations of inevitable class struggle arose in an era of relative scarcity; but unions and management in America have been able to avoid any final conflict since there has been enough for all. Democracy was able to tolerate vast groups and, indeed, rest on them, because there was growing material abundance and even leisure.

7. The spread of abundance has ended the old concentration on man's function as producer and shifted the orientation to one of consumption.

8. Conflict does not end with abundance of material goods. There is no abundance of status. While the utopias of the past have been largely achieved, millions still seek satisfaction of their power and prestige drives.

9. Psychological satisfactions have often been blocked even in abundance. Man does not live by material things alone. He needs psychological achievements and human relatedness.³³

10. The achievement of abundance has definitely reduced work-centeredness as the organizing principle of society, the reality principle of Freud and Veblen. This has brought the old gyroscope of work morality to a stop and left men between the Calvinist work-imperative and the Von Neumann "free power" condition, i.e., free of economic determinism. A new approach to abundance is needed, possibly in the form of a more unified community with organizing principles other than work processes.³⁴

SUMMARY

In sharp contrast to folk society, the mass society is huge in size, highly industrialized, mainly urban, and tends toward total urbanization. While there is considerable heterogeneity, homogenization processes are furthered by the advances in the media of mass communication. Mass society rests as much on the communications revolution as on any other base. The system of organization of mass society uses placing and conformity to secure predictability of its human components.

At the same time mass society rests in good measure on an era of abundance and the development of new forms of consensus. A condition of abundance makes for a change from the production

emphasis of the nineteenth century to a new consumption orientation. People are increasingly treated as parts of a mass, nearly undifferentiated, however, both as producers and as consumers.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How have various forces "collaborated" to produce mass society?
2. Contrast mass and folk society.
3. In what key ways does mass society differ from folk society?
4. What is Meadows' view of industrialism?
5. Compare the views of Bergel, Wirth, and this work on urbanism.
6. Cite the means mass society utilizes to secure predictable behavior.
7. Describe the abundance element in mass society.
8. State the function of consensus.
9. Explain the shift from a production to a consumption orientation.

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MULTIPLE POWER GROUPS

There has been a proliferation of groups possessing much power of a truly public and governmental sort. Each group seeks to convert part of the mass into its very own "public," and tries to extend its controlling influence.¹ There is a simultaneity of a sort about group membership; a person is at one and the same time a member of a city, a state, and a nation; a union and a company; a club, a church, and a team. And yet he is not usually very deeply immersed in any group, spending but a fraction of his time and giving but one phase of his personality and attention to the demands and pressures of each of the multiple groups.

Here an approach is made to clarify the concept of multiple groups as part of the foundation of industrial sociology and to lay a basis for parataxic considerations of groups in interaction. Once the power that groups exercise over their shared, common membership is analyzed, intergroup relations can be discussed.

THE APPROACH TO MULTIPLE GROUPS

Instead of beginning with an individual workman, individual supervisor, the local plant, or local union, the present work considers individuals in groups and groups related to groups as part of interlocking subsystems in a mass society. The individual may then be located within the various groups.

Nonpower Views. Not many people recognize the part power groups play in an economic system. Caplow came close when he wrote, "The functions of unions, employer associations, and government agencies restricting the free play of economic forces have expanded steadily and continue to do so."² That this so-called free play of forces may be expanded rather than restricted he did not consider.

In his work on industrial relations Knox explicitly disclaimed any

interest in power analysis.³ His book is studded with materials concerning power relations, which are nowhere dealt with explicitly. McConnell has argued that the so-called institutional or interdisciplinary approach to labor-management problems is inferior to the orthodox economic approach. He contended that it is wrong to assume that conscious human and organizational decisions have largely displaced "impersonal" market forces or that the policy decisions of unions, employers, and government have altered the influence of supply and demand.⁴ Like many an earlier economist, but not all of them by any means, McConnell prefers to consider these conscious and policy-making forces outside the domain of economic theory, as if economics were a separate and self-operating sphere of life distinct from the social system.

John M. Clark complained of such views that "the important process of economic bargaining and negotiation is something that traditional economic analysis pushes off stage."⁵ He grants that the market has its nominating machinery, its balloting with dollars, but immediately shows that far from being individual dickering this involves the corporation, union, and government, each with its internal political organization and each influencing the other. Moreover, Clark finds that all the power groups, as opposed to individuals, interpenetrate, have a quasi-political character, and have in effect reversed the classical relation between so-called economic law and political action until economics is by no means the effective, determining force many once conceived it to be. Clark wrote:

Now, on the whole, it may be nearer the very complex truth to say that there are large areas within which agencies of government, plus nominally private agencies of an essentially governmental character, determine what actually happens and are able within fairly wide margins to disregard or neutralize the forces of "supply and demand."^{5a}

No longer is the economists' brand of economic law all-pervasive and automatically effective. Walton Hamilton also holds that instead of the market ruling or being overlord of the economy, it has had to share power with vast groups.⁶ Market forces continue; but they are subject to powerful group pressure in a single social system of which economies is but a part. Having become huge, the power groups are public, at least quasi-governmental, known and visible, and demonstrable centers of price, wage, and market control.⁷

The One-Group Explanation. Nonsystem analysis views the world as a single group or on occasion to view groups in isolation. The point is that a citizen of the United States can work for a specific business, be a union member and simultaneously be in still other groups. He has to be considered in all his part-role relations,

just as groups have to be treated in their interrelations. Explanations of contemporary enterprise in terms of the logic of size, the logic of metric time, and the logic of hierarchy, each of them a product of engineering rationality, i.e., measurement and external control of human beings, also suffer from lack of appreciation of the groups outside the factory.⁸

Fascist power formations seek to transform social groups into appendages of the totalitarian mass state and end any independent existence for nonstate groups. The Marxian aim has been to pulverize autonomous (really interdependent) groups. Yet groups persist in Russia as in wartime political economies. Subsystems manage to go on. Multiple power groups came into being quite gradually, almost unnoticed by most people. The union and management associations arose virtually together, altering the system relations for each other, forcing a sharing of the former absolute authority in the workshop. No single-group rule has succeeded in American industry, instead, each group has some power to rule parts of people's lives even while they are functioning within other groups.

Effects of Multiple Membership. The individual in mass society plays but a part-role in virtually all groups—the family, the enterprise, union, and government. Nowhere is he fully at home. When William James wrote in 1890 of people possessing as many selves as there are groups to which they belonged and were important to them, he laid a basis for the development of the part-role theory of mass society.⁹ There is a vast proliferation of groups none of which can embrace all of a person's life, but all of which keep the individual in a limited status, a part-role, and a condition of but partial knowledge of underlying processes, with severe consequences for personality development and need satisfaction.¹⁰ "What a man belongs to constitutes most of his life career and all of his obituary," wrote R. E. Park.¹⁰

Plural Group Ties. The subsystem approach to group ties is onion-like; i.e., one may be within many groups, partly in and partly out or overlapping, and groups themselves may overlap in many ways. Just as the loose federations of ancient Greece, the Holy Roman Empire, and the United States of America produced interlocking hierarchies, so mass society has spawned obligations to multiple groups.¹¹

The individual is part of groups that function within still other groups, but may also function outside, e.g., unions in relation to companies.¹² So-called single groups, as unions have been described, may be economic or reform in purpose; but they are also political, fraternal, social, and part of a labor movement. A long-time illusion

was that government was separate from economic life; actually political power never was so separate, as is well demonstrated in the works of Adam Smith and the Handlins. Management is by no means an economic force alone; it is simultaneously a political power and a quasi-government, and many of its leaders are in government. The important linking element is the multibounding or joined purposes described by Sorokin.¹³ Groups penetrate each other's boundaries, disturbing social homeostasis.

The groups are increasingly dependent on the broader community for essential governmental services and have modified their functions to assume new and more visible positions in public affairs.¹⁴ A business is really a focus for many groups: capital investors, diverse and usually unorganized; managers, organized and highly conscious; workmen, a force within in informal structure and outside the plant in unions and as citizen-voters and members of other groups. Consumers are another force, one which breaches the older definition of group boundaries.

The Consumer and the Mass as Group. Groups may become so huge as to approximate masses, and masses may be so worked over by powerful organizations as to approximate groups.¹⁵ This is especially true of consumers. Labor, managers, even unions and companies are also consumers. Two decades ago Barnard saw that the customers are a part of the system of organization activity and included the behavior of consumers in his analysis of organization.¹⁶ One may, of course, be a customer of the organization he works for. The customer contributes to the organization by buying its goods and services, by listening to its entreaties and blandishments, and by being intertwined with it.

"The businessman must thus reckon with the consumer, the price-and-quality conscious beneficiary for whom the whole productive process is carried forward."¹⁷ This is not unlike Ortega y Gasset's view of the rise of the masses to power, i.e., at least power over some phases of the decisions as to what is produced, although producers have marked influence over consumers.¹⁸ The businessman also has to include "considerations of employees," considerations of ethics, and of supervisors and government: "Thus, economic administration in the United States, as elsewhere, is implicated with the whole social process."^{17a} The system is circular.

POWER OVER MEMBERS

All of these groups have some power over their members, much of it external and quasi-governmental, some of it internalized by members as norms. How these powers operate may be seen in terms

of the size of groups, their affiliations, their loyalties and conflicting pressures, and the increasing politicalization of all the groups. These elements of social control work in a combined way.

The Logic of Size. Most modern groups are huge despite their comparative youth. The communications and transportation revolution aided, of course, in creating the mass society. Railroading, the first billion dollar industry of the country, emerged less than a century ago; with it came the first national unions, a national market, and a national government with really central powers. The larger the group the more it took over control of the life functions of its members during their working time.

Large groups can have advantages of creativity; they can also hold back certain techniques and improvements. They can mobilize millions, have new public roles, and be publicly identifiable. Of more than nine million business enterprises in the United States, only some 2000 corporations and 1500 trade associations are significant power centers. Of 500,000 corporations active in manufacturing in 1950, ten per cent of the establishments employed 75 per cent of the workers.¹⁹ *

Unions have some power over 25 per cent of the total labor force of over 65 million. They control about 35 per cent of the organizable force, and up to 100 per cent of the manufacturing force. The results are that the "individual employee and the individual owner are overshadowed by big unions and big corporations."²⁰ The nation's 5,400,000 agriculturalists are organized in the farm bloc, a powerful lobby, although it is now quite dependent on the machinery of the national political state.²¹ Government power, too, is extensive. It is becoming more so as society continues its trend toward total urbanization.

Small groups now function more and more within national and international organizations, viz., the local union, the local plant of a multiplant corporation. These group-within-organization arrangements have altered the constants of the labor-management problem. Such an extension of size has also made the society more easily disrupted than the agrarian societies.²² Errors, for example, can have enormous consequences.

Nominal Affiliation. In this "overorganized world," to use Schweitzer's trenchant phrase, the individual is under strong pressure to join various organizations. This is in the main a part-role

* From producing 65 per cent of manufacturing output in 1900, large corporations (with more than 100 employees) raised their share of the total to 90 per cent by 1950 (*Monthly Labor Review* (July 1950) 8). Seventy-five per cent of the companies employ less than four persons each and 98 per cent have less than 50 employees each.

relation involving nominal joining by people who become "paper members." If there are too many groups or too many demands, the reaction may be one of apathy and alienation, failure to involve the interest and emotions of people who are allowed to function only in part-roles.²³ Stockholder and union-member interest is so low as to create a problem in boundary maintenance. People may not know to which organization to offer most of their allegiance, and, even if one should seek to offer allegiance, only a part-role may be permitted. Merton asked, "When do individuals orient themselves to others in their occupational group, or in their congeniality groups, or in their religious groups? How can we characterize the *structure of the social situation* which leads to one rather than another of these several group affiliations being taken as the significant context?"²⁴ This question is exceptionally important for the entire question of membership, activities, and loyalties, and the nature of voluntary associations.²⁵

Loyalties to Multiple Groups. Multiple groups arise in "overlapping situations."²⁶ The idea is taken from Lewin who recognized that most persons belong to many groups and are placed in the position of having to be loyal to each group. Organizational loyalties arise from tendencies of persons to identify with the groups of which they are members. Evaluation of alternative courses of action is made in terms of such loyalty, i.e., the groups become anchorage points to which one may refer one's behavior, in the manner of reference groups.²⁷

There is, however, conflict over loyalty arising from membership in different or multiple groups, even within the same organization, and also from lack of understanding of the needs and requirements of any one organization.^{14a} Difficulties do not arise or are small if membership in one group does not contradict membership in another. But they may be contradictory. Barker finds that a foreman who has to be with the management group and the workers' group may be in an overlapping situation of antagonism.²⁷ There may be overlapping and consonance or cooperation to a degree: a person may work for a company and play on its baseball team; one may go to lunch and visit business friends, combining several activities.²⁸ Two behaviors may, however, be overlapping and antagonistic. Some even speak of antagonistic consonance, not unlike Sumner's antagonistic cooperation.

Karen Horney has complained at length about the conflicting pressures of multiple groups which put persons under pressure to conform to their several standards.²⁹ "Which social structure is the most significant context for the member?" Merton asked. The rela-

tive power of the group to obtain obedience to its decisions is a problem whose analysis is barely beginning.^{24a} Johnson found that no basic conflict between a worker's loyalty to a company and to a union exists, a finding disputed by Barkin among others. Johnson admitted that, while he believed that multiple demands on loyalty can be "adjusted by common sense" (whatever that can mean in a multiple-group or overlapping situation), "the experience of anyone living realistically in his job environment is that these multiple loyalty demands result in tensions which frequently become unbearable."²⁵ The extraordinary extent to which such tensions and virtual swallowing up of persons in a consuming network of organizations can go is criticized by Asch. He decries the way industrial, political, and recreational groups "make ruthless and impersonal claims" upon people who are frequently caught up in happenings that no one seems to control and to which everyone must submit.²⁶ The issue of foremen joining unions is a problem in loyalty that has been hotly disputed by management.

Belonging to groups, then, does not produce the sense of solidarity and security desired by many people. Many voluntary associations are either not voluntary enough to do the job of providing the much-sought security or they offer only a part-position and part-role relation which is unsatisfactory.²⁷ Even unions, which many once thought could provide the security workers desired, can be only one of several organizations to which a man is committed.

Wilensky observed about groups that "if a member deviates, here again you have to look for a social referent—the multiple identifications of the actor, his adherence to the conflicting norms of some other *outside* group or groups." He situated the conflict of polar loyalties in the social system, not just the subsystem. One may be caught in the crossfire of competing claims until the conceptual problem of drawing boundaries as to where organization stops and broader social environment begins becomes most serious.^{28a} The inference is that motivation is multiple, not linear or one-phase; motivation is beyond economic groups. Once again one has to take recourse in Moore's social-system view of "motivational complexity."²⁹

Politicalization of Groups. In a mass society where each group seeks greater control over its shared mass membership, the groups are more political than they were in the past, they are more consciously organized and more public in character. The occupational associations seek to become the basic political units of an industrial society, although the society is industrial-political.³⁰ Unions and corporations, for many years considered economic units, are really

quite political; both exhibit governmental qualities in their structure and in their political activities.²⁵

A new politico-economic power situation has arisen, restructuring the world in the image of bigness as "new groups" have emerged "in positions of great power within the nation."²⁶ Critical situations of mass deprivation, mass insecurity, and mass frustration may make for extending the sway of power groups.^{26a} Some of these groups have greater influence than thousands of subgroups. The decisions of government, for instance, tend to dominate in a situation of near-permanent war.

INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Few phenomena are as complex and baffling as intergroup relations. In a multi-group society, there is constant interaction of the conflicting and reciprocal influences of diverse groups on their various interlocking memberships. These groups do, however, arrive at consensus and produce a pluralistic democracy.

Consensus Among Groups. Each group has its own norms which it seeks to impose on others in order to retain or improve its position in the larger social system. The groups expand against each other until they exert pressure on each other.

While various social and cultural organizations become more loosely structured with this pressure, the giant corporation, the large labor union, and the massive political state are likely to become more hierarchical and bureaucratic. Each participant offers the threat of bigness and of backing its pressures with at least quasi-governmental powers.

Groups do however often reach consensus. The technical annihilation of distance and time and the cross-influencing of shared membership have brought increasing interdependence.²⁷ A good union member, for example, is in the same public with management on the tariff question. Although consensus may often be but partial agreements on narrow points, it tends to spread on critical or strongly felt issues.²⁸ There is, for instance, broad consensus in America on property rights.

Pluralist Democracy. Different and unintegrated groups place different demands on the individual whose membership is shared.²⁹ Within any one group members may lack a democratic voice and oligarchy may prevail: most power groups do not begin as democracies and descend, according to some iron law, into oligarchy; they are oligarchies to begin with. However, if one looks at them as subsystems interacting with each other, one finds an area of democracy between them. Interstitial democracy or pluralism remains a lead-

ing characteristic of multiple groups; this is one reason totalitarian regimes seek to subordinate all rival centers of power. Durkheim wrote in 1893, "A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life." His intercalated (multiple) view is actually in advance of Kerr's version of the open society. Kerr wrote of "a democratic, capitalistic, industrialized society within which the state, the employers, and the union are separate and largely independent entities."^{32a} In fact members are shared in overlapping and interpenetrating groups.

Through laws and commissions, contracts and government-run installations, power is no longer dispersed but centralized.^{34b} Government is at the heart of labor-management relations of all kinds —wages, hours, working conditions, union elections, selection of bargaining representatives, wage and price controlling. At the same time, unions and managements take on governmental features, enter and influence government as officeholders, as individuals, and as members of organizations which assume some features of government.

Industry has been among the strongest influences on individuals, the society, and government in American history.³³ By and large industry was not internally democratic.³⁴ Trade unions, whatever their internal democracy or authoritarianism, arose as a challenge to business rule of a person's work and nonwork life. They exist as fairly autonomous organizations only in a free society.

Both business and industry steadily take on governmental features, especially as they become large-scale organizations.^{5d} What was private becomes a public organization, so that a kind of tripartite government of unions, business, and formal government may have emerged. Both unions and managements have achieved a greater measure of social responsibility, have competed in political and social spheres and have found new roles for themselves in the wider political world. Together they have created an interrelated system of power in which they have an indeterminate range of action in a kind of "oligarchic uncertainty" or maneuverability based on awareness of each other's power.^{5e}

SUMMARY

Mass society is preeminently, in the United States, a social system of multiple groups, crisscrossed, sharing a mutual membership, exercising public powers, losing their old anonymity and, in acting

on each other producing a kind of pluralistic democracy among the groups. Instead of one group arising to control the society, multiple groups interact.

Plural group ties are common in a mass society. The consumer has to be treated as part of the group involved in labor-management interrelations. Groups have considerable power over members, arouse their loyalties, and put members under pressure to go along with varying group needs. Yet much affiliation is nominal, loyalties are limited in a part-role arrangement, and one-group's pressures are blocked by those of other groups. As groups become more political, the subsystems they constitute become clearer.

A study of intergroup relations reveals an interlocking subsystem and devices for achieving consensus among contrasting groups. By permitting various groups to exist side by side, mass society has been able to produce a pluralist democracy that shows considerable signs of strength.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. State the characteristics of multiple power groups.
2. Give McConnell's nonpower view.
3. What is the one-group explanation of social processes?
4. Present several multiple membership effects on members.
5. Why is the consumer considered part of the organization?
6. What is the meaning of the logic of size?
7. "In this overorganized world there is nominal affiliation." Explain.
8. Out of your own experiences, illustrate conflicting pressures and contrasting loyalties you have felt.

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GOVERNMENT OF LABOR- MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Today the main power group in labor-management relations is the national political state. In a situation of near-permanent war, there is a great demand for governmental participation in the economy. Such activity has created a public economy that is, in many respects, different from the private capitalism of the United States in pre-1933 days.

The multiple functions of government in economic affairs operate as very strong social controls over the work process and contribute to a trinity of labor, management, and government, interlocked with each other in the governing of men at work and at leisure.

GOVERNMENT'S NEW ROLE

In a unified political economy or in public capitalism, government is not external to and intervening in the economy, but plays an integral part in it. The demands on government to become even more of an economic agent are steady and increasing.

Non-government Views. Non-power analysis of labor-management relations has declined. Discussions of government's role, however separately treated, abound in labor-management works. A few analysts, like Golden, distinguish only two principal elements in industrial relations—employer and employee—and consider the state one of the "external forces" beyond control of either party.¹

Clark Kerr, who recognizes the enormous role of government, holds that among the aggregate of external forces affecting collective bargaining and outside either labor or management's influence are such elements as (1) the industrial environment (size of company, production pattern, technological advance, nature of the job, cost, market, and location factors); (2) the community environment

(work force, plant and labor, local wage levels, and industrial climate of union- or open-shop town); (3) political environment; and (4) time—Kerr looks on government as an external force.^{1a} Economists who make an organizational division of the economy into households, businesses, firms, and government may even leave unions unmentioned or not consider government as internal to labor-management processes.²

A weakness of Bendix's approach to work and authority in industry is that he almost entirely leaves out the authority of the United States government in industry. Entrepreneurial groups are thereby dissociated from their role as governments of men; groups are not situated in the war economy. Industrial managers shift in relation to unions and general pressures, not specific government actions; their own influence on that government and on unions through government, viz., labor legislation, is also underestimated. Strangely, Bendix does not omit the role of government in his discussions of British, East German, and Russian industry.³

Public Economy. The American political economy, once described as dominated by laissez-faire conceptions and frequently called a mixed public-private economy, is probably best classified as public capitalism or a public economy in view of the power of the national state in economic affairs.⁴ This role of the state, especially in labor-management relations, is neither new nor a product of industrialism. From the period of mercantilism (1450-1776) to the present, the state has influenced economic life in general and labor matters in particular.

Hacker makes a case for three great turning points in American history, each occurring as a result of "positive action by government." The first was the Hamiltonian program of 1791-95 with its tariff supports for business, assumption of state debts, stock purchasing of national bank issues, and general backing of business. The second was the Republican party program of 1861-65 which produced a strong central government, resting on a national economy and fully national home market. The last was the New Deal program of 1933-39. "In every instance," wrote Hacker, "responsibilities assumed by government toward business—in directing, supporting, even subsidizing—gave a new direction to enterprise and started it off on hitherto unexplored paths."⁵ One may postulate a fourth stage, the World War II backing of the economy by government followed by the rise of a near-permanent war economy. The result of these stages of development was the change from a production orientation to a consumption-war orientation. The cold war and the solution of the old economic problem of production

came together; the United States shifted from a low-employment to a high-employment economy.^{4a} The problem of the twentieth century became one of making economics serve the interests of and be subordinate to politics.⁶ Acceptance of government responsibility for economic life became widespread.^{5a}

Such governmental control can be traced to the market regulations of medieval towns, wage regulation in the 1800's in England, and mercantilist labor policy.⁷ The great heyday of private capitalism lasted until World War I when the first real national economic planning began in Germany under Rathenau and in the United States under Baruch. Despite some lessening of government action in economic life in the 1920's, a major change ensued during the depression of the 1930's.^{4b} The market economy failed to function, forcing government to act if capitalism were to be saved. A government-controlled economy was set up under the National Industrial Recovery Act that established near-cartels, with business writing its own codes but granting bargaining rights to unions and allowing government to function as guarantor of the new relations.

The New Deal put government into business. Government became an enterpriser, heading its own public corporations. With its deficit financing and its assumption of responsibility for the security and welfare of the working population and for the stability of the economy as a whole, government became the chief economic weapon.^{5b} An administered economy was created to climax what economist Means called a century-long shift from market to administrative coordination of economic activity.

The demands of war and depression forced government from the periphery to the center of economic life and subordinated economics to politics. Between the depression and World War II, the federal government developed into "the overlord to industry," a position which has scarcely lessened since.

According to Sorokin, we live in a period "of the totalitarian and semi-totalitarian state-leviathans decisively dominating practically all the other groups into which the western and in part the eastern populations are differentiated."⁹ The Constitution itself was interpreted to provide more room for strong action by a central government. A great body of law indicated the incapacity of the industrial system to operate without government action.¹⁰ Public power and public policy became the fulcrum for economic direction.¹⁰

Instead of central government intervening in the economy or overlapping considerably with it, a stream of public judgments had to be made by public authority. No purely economic phenomena

could then be distinguished.¹¹ Public coordination of education, work, family life did away with autonomy for these spheres of life.¹² The nation is the economic and the political units simultaneously.¹³

Demands for Government Action. Individuals and groups are demanding government action in ever widening spheres of social existence. These demands arose from needs created by mass production and its division of labor—forces which have destroyed the old self-sufficiency of the family and small community and raised acute and widespread problems.^{13a} The individual turns to groups for help after he learns that the larger society can assist him and guarantee the rights that the firm cannot or will not grant. He seeks protection against an arbitrary and unsympathetic management and finds it in the union, community, and state.¹⁴ Since, for years, industry did not develop a broad program to protect workers from the risks and problems of industrial life, workers learned to look to government for help in meeting issues.¹⁵ Moreover, workmen feel that government is the body most able to keep an eye on business.¹⁶

Since the founding of the republic, businesses have sought government support in the form of tariffs, subsidies, parity, orders and codes, contracts and subventions, favorable legislation, and political posts. The more security-minded businessmen of modern mass society welcome the central direction of monetary and fiscal affairs.¹⁷ For years unions opposed government provision of social security and thought that they could accomplish such gains by themselves, but during the depression a profound change of policy resulted in their turning to government for help. Unions looked to government to alleviate the distress that accompanies technological change.¹⁸

The demands on government by such diverse groups led to a fundamental shift in group relations. As great aggregates of power—Katz's "plurality of compelling groups"—arose they sought to affect the machinery of government so as to gain and enforce settlements.¹⁹ This organized influence was quite unlike the unorganized pressure of millions of unemployed during depression days. Both unions and enterprises worked to get government to act in their favor. Such efforts helped strengthen the functioning of the state in wider spheres of economic and social life.^{19a} In a sense, the state became the beneficiary of individual and group weaknesses in mass society.²⁰

INITIAL POLICY- AND FINAL DECISION-MAKING

Government's spreading influence is a combined politico-economic force. It is a controlling influence which has, unlike govern-

ments of the past, become singularly effective in achieving social ends.

Ultimate Monopoly of Coercion. As the ultimate holder of social power, government is the final decision-maker in increasingly widening spheres of activity.²¹ Of this monopoly element in government Woodrow Wilson said, "The business of government is to see that no other organization is as strong as itself, to see that no group of men, no matter what their private business is, may come into competition with the authority of society."²¹ Government may, however, permit private monopolies to exist and share power. The difference between the absolute governments of the past and the ultimate powers of government in mass society can be seen in the scale of their operations and in the public's conscious pressure for public policy and purpose in place of private polity. Men look to government to control the structure and functioning of the society.²²

Types of Government. Mass societies involve vast concentrations of power, authority, and complicated administrative machinery. As the older spontaneous and customary types of social controls break down, the state assumes far more power than private groups have.²³ Such power is without any limits that might operate within what is called the bounds of maximization; the state may remain democratic, or it may become openly totalitarian.

Although bureaucracy becomes powerful, the pressure of multiple groups makes for a pluralistic structure in a democratic type of mass society. The average person is extolled, mass suffrage is extended, and a "powerful mechanized democracy" arises.²⁴ Cultural life, however, remains ruled mainly by laws peculiar to an unregulated society.^{12a} Even though the consent of the governed is sought, bureaucratism spreads, massification becomes extensive, and government powers weaken older private capitalism.²⁵

Totalitarian mass society offers tempting powers to various groups and individuals. Government in war situations tends to overshadow private groups and the dispersal of power is lessened.²⁶ The possession of modern means of communication and transportation also make centralized control more effective. Treating people as masses or as averages makes for the isolation and alienation of individuals.^{12b} According to Fromm, they then attempt to escape from freedom into statism.²⁷ Tyrannies, clothing themselves in the garb of democracy, promise security and stability.^{6a}

Totalitarianism destroys or subordinates independent groups and autonomous opinion, striving for a one-group world to complete the process of massification.²⁸ Where possible, people are reduced to an audience to be manipulated by political party leaders.^{6b} But

the army can be a separate center of power, struggles between rulers can occur, and absolutist regimes can break down.

Planning Powers. Much of government's control of economic and social affairs is in the form of national economic planning, although that degree of organization may not have occurred. Nevertheless, conscious organization on a national scale is sought, rational social control is in better repute than before, and planlessness is recognized as chaos. Planning becomes an imperative if large-scale plans are to be formulated and carried out. Some planning is manipulation; but it is possible for a democratic mass society to have responsible social and economic planning.^{12c}

MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

Elaboration of social controls by government in the past half century has been enormous in every sphere. Government has come to play the roles of economic manager, producer, military contractor, regulator of the economy and of the internal structure of industrialism. It is active in welfare, employment, monetary and fiscal policy, research initiating protective legislation, and in the regulation of labor-management relations.²⁹ Even those who do not discuss power and power groups directly say that "more and more in recent decades, the federal government has extended control over industry and has maintained that this development is in the public interest."³⁰ Government-guided enterprise has replaced free enterprise.

In the 1950's "government was a greater factor in the economy than business itself."³¹ Government is the largest single employer, the principal buyer, the leading seller, the effective regulator, chief capital investor and borrower. It also maintains control of labor-management relations through laws, courts, precedents, and through its status as an employer and expediter of war and public production needs and goals. Government can no longer be said to intervene or interfere; it is internal to the economy. As an active participant it grants charters and contracts which it then supports.

Government as Manager. Where private investment is difficult as in flood control, education, and highways, and where initial costs may be heavy and returns long deferred and uncertain, as in railroads, harbor, and power developments, national state action is indicated.³² Industrialism, by provoking situations beyond the reach of individual enterprise, cannot live without political action. As private business falters before the fuller social responsibilities that mass society demands of large units, government extends its social responsibilities.^{18b} Government has become the trail blazer

in atomic energy, in research, and in war economy, in countercyclical actions, and the provision of social security.²³

If one adds up planning power, military and war powers, contracting and regulatory powers, welfare and security controls, then national state power is huge, while not total. There emerges a polarity in a system of private management, government management, and a lessening area between, for now government management intertwines with private. Schneider remarked quite correctly that government is "a part of the wider bureaucratic competition."^{23a} Moreover, it controls a good deal of what goes on in the competing bureaucracies.^{15a} The real managerial revolution may have come with government officials holding the policy- and decision-making powers in politico-economic affairs.

Government Production and Military Demand. In 1872 Burckhardt said, "The military state must become a big industrialist." Today, government has TVA, an Atomic Energy Commission, and almost ten billion dollars in military facilities and equipment. It has also invested upwards of 40 billion dollars in more than one hundred types of businesses.²⁴ Government is the main operator of a mobilized economy. A government war production machine is so far removed from the older "intervention" view of state action as to constitute a vast social change.

The mere size of government spending increases government control over industry.^{22b} Government can, for instance, demand elimination of discrimination in hiring. When ordinary market "incentives" proved useless during the war, the War Production Board decided what was to be produced.^{13b} Government became the principal consumer of mass production items then, and its activity led to an expansion of the large firms, which were the "prime" or direct contractors. It supplied the market that had been missing in depression days.

Regulator of the Economy as a Whole. Government is now involved in patent and license control, corporate regulation, labor-management controls, and fiscal and monetary powers.⁸ Regulation of the economy as a whole has become singularly effective. Public statecraft is called in whenever private initiative falters.

Although regulation of the internal structure of industry is part of traditional antimonopoly legislation and practice, government is the force that often permits and encourages monopolies, especially in war production. The military, in favoring contracts for larger firms, has "probably done more to promote the concentration of economic wealth and power than can be undone by the vigilant campaigns of a half dozen Antitrust Divisions."^{8b} The regulations

are "more often than not for the benefit of the business enterprise," viz., taxation policy in the form of write-offs, amortization, depletion allowances, tariffs, subsidies, and subventions. All this creates a new kind of intermingling and fusion of government and business, since businessmen now set out to influence the administrative commissions that are supposed to regulate them.

Full Employment and Welfare. The high-employment policy of government has produced what is sometimes called the "welfare state." Implicit in such a state is the use of built-in stabilizers such as the progressive income tax, social security payments, and farm support payments. While government is a "colossal purchaser," it is private enterprise that does the job; then government seeks to redistribute some income. Public investment is also used to encourage or stimulate private investment.

It is through government action that adequate aggregate demand is maintained, via government expenditures, government borrowing, government guarantees and lending operations, and government policies in social security, agricultural, power, rural electrification, and securities regulation. The Employment Act of 1946 is viewed by Hansen as the Magna Carta of government planning for full employment, i.e., federal responsibility for production and employment through encouragement of private enterprise.^{4c}

Washington, D. C. has become the financial center of the country. The older system of finance was outgrown in World War II. Before that time, according to Ruml, financing had to come from the whole community and not from private lenders.^{13c} Government became the safest borrower, guaranteeing that there would be no default on the public.^{12a} The Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board entered into a sort of "informal cartel arrangement."^{4d} Government has central authority in much of highway construction, in farm production and non-production, and in continuing efforts to stabilize living costs. Of \$253-billion spent for research and development in the United States from 1941 to 1952, more than half was done by or for the government, whose share rose from about 40 to 60 per cent during that period.^{4e}

Regulation of and Participation in Labor-Management. Government as manager and producer, as regulator and administrator, has had considerable and rising influence over unions and management. It has also increased its own regulation of and participation in manpower management, gaining a central role in labor relations.

Part of this interest arises from a sense of justice—the powerful desire as Hammurabi once said to "hold back the strong from oppressing the weak." The major shift has been to recognize the col-

lective or joint rights of subgroup organizations—not simply to provide for personal security. As Daniel Bell wrote, in giving unions these powers, the law was recognizing a set of *group* rights over and above any individual rights.^{36a} The protective legislation of the federal and state governments has been so extensive as to virtually revolutionize work relationships.

Government has acted in the internal affairs of unions, to control the reporting of finances, to ensure democratic elections, and to enforce arbitration. It even controls wages and conditions of employment in major crises. Regulation of membership rights is increasing; eighteen states passed "right-to-work" laws between 1944 and 1958. Anti-discrimination or fair employment practices acts are in effect in eight states and on all government-contracted jobs.^{36b}

Government is a greater influence on and competitor for so-called management prerogatives than unions; yet it has no national labor policy. Although the rise of government power ended the company town dominance, government has set up its own company towns, as at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Hanford. There is internal conflict within the law proper, but government power has steadily risen compared to that of unions and managements.

A FUSION OF POWER THEORY

Despite many predictions that a single party would take over all other groups and hold sole power over the economy, many groups have persisted and developed new relationships. Each group vies for a better position in group-to-group power relations, becoming in the process more governmental. This process produces a new setting of fairly visible and open power relations.

Fusion Theory. A theory of fusion of political and economic forces may best explain mass society's labor-management-governmental relations. Fusion theory can explain important ramifications of group conduct, where groups wield public power as unions, managements, and governments. While most groups are more powerful than ever before, they are also interdependent and multiple; each strives to advance its new public position.³⁷

Government has entered into every level of relations between unions and management.^{38a} Political economy has become a "branch of the science of the statesman or legislator."^{38b}

Since the days of Adam Smith state power has grown enormously. In 1950 Keirstead declared, "no divorce of economics from policy can ever be complete or permanent, and, if it could, it would be unhealthy." A virtual fusion of private and public control occurs,

in agriculture, in war production, and in the provision of security. The so-called voluntary and compulsory elements of the society are in a virtually "seamless fusion."^{38c} Instead of there being a "managerial revolution" to make managers rulers of society, the state has become the general manager. The fusion of political, business, and military rulers has reached a peak rarely approached in the past.

Government power was restrained by constitutionalism or the rationality of responsibility to the electors; its controls still rest on sanctioned power. Compromise exists in a democracy of pluralist groups, and government power operates under the "principle of visibility," a new version of responsibility.^{38c} The state is run by men who are acted upon by power groups.

Business in Government and Government in Business. Managers of government have to share power with the managers of unions and of businesses. Political bargaining is a procedure whereby each group seeks to have governmental power exercised on its behalf and attempts to penetrate government to ensure such action.³⁹ Business leaders enter government and government officials lead business. The bureaucracies are technically separate but there is a virtual "interpenetration of managerial elites" with common backgrounds in education, occupation, and outlook.⁴⁰ Interlocking directorships are simply raised to the next level of influencing governmental commissions or assuming leadership of the regulating bodies in a public economy. A Rockefeller becomes a key public official, not a private robber baron.

When business leaders enter government proper and government officials lead businesses, what is called countervailing power is really prevailing power—fusion at the top. Fusion does not mean that by law a state can order society as it pleases, but it does mean that the various groups seeking to extend their own power must do so in and through governmental structures and processes. Hamilton has written that rather than compete with or fight government and its administrative commissions business leaders sought to capture control of the commissions so as to have them represent the attitude of the managerial group.⁴¹ Unions and other groups also seek to penetrate and influence government, although their success is far more limited.

In contending that the older private, liberal capitalism is "played out," the economist Knight said "We are . . . in the course of one of the world's great economic and political revolutions."⁴² The political theorist Dunock held that "today society is in the midst of a second industrial revolution" or heightened concentration of economic power.⁴³ John M. Clark looks on the developments as con-

stituting two momentous revolutions, one in economic thinking, the other in the economic functions of government as symbolized by planning.⁴³ Even more specifically, Slichter has noted, "The greatest single change in our economic institutions during the past half-century has been the expansion of the economic activities of the government."⁴⁴ A regulated, public capitalism has arisen.

Business and unions proper take on governmental powers and a quasi-governmental character. The old view of a bilateral government of labor and management in industrial jurisprudence has given way to a trilateral one in which the third and powerful party is government.

An autonomous exchange economy is now understood to be only a theoretical model, and the use of power in all its forms "is just as much a part of human economy as the presumed dominance of individual economic motives."⁴⁵ Chamberlain found that ideas of maximization fail before power drives which have no known limits.^{39a} "For the first time in American history, men in authority are talking about an 'emergency' without a foreseeable end." A permanent war economy has arisen with governmental and military hierarchies larger and more powerful than in the past, and all of them affecting labor-management relations.^{10b} Of course, the large groups become visible and more public; in losing their anonymity the power groups operate in ways that can be traced, although efforts at secrecy continue.^{10d}

SUMMARY

Government is the most powerful organization in, as well as the weightiest component of, the framework of mass society and its ways and techniques for governing men at work and in their non-work life. As such, government has a new role as a directive agency deep within the public economy which is so different from the private capitalism of the past but quite similar to mercantilism. Non-government views of the social process of today are contradictory; their proponents admit wide spheres of government activity without accepting government as an integral part of the economy. They somehow see economic life as distinct from political and social life. Meanwhile the public demands for security and minimum wages during periods of war and depression have made for government a central place in the social system.

Government has become the ultimate monopoly of coercion. Coercion may be little used, depending on whether the mass society is democratic or totalitarian, but planning powers and war powers of enormous significance may be unleashed. Government has de-

veloped multiple functions. Today it is a major manager; it is a major producer and buyer; through military contracts it has control over the larger war industries; it is the regulator of the economy as a whole and, to a considerable extent, of the internal structure both of industry and of unions. Moreover, it is a direct participant in labor-management relations.

The greatest change in government's position is in the fusion of political and economic functions, the growing together of top political and economic personnel, now more frequently the same personnel. Business has entered government and become more governmental; government leaders have entered business. A revolution in government power has occurred; the near-permanent war emergency goes on without visible termination; becomes stronger but, paradoxically, more visible and, consequently, more responsible.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In what way is government internal to the economy?
2. Why does the non-government approach persist today?
3. Contrast public and private capitalism.
4. How do public demands make for even more government action?
5. Analyze "ultimate monopoly of coercion."
6. Government has multiple functions. Explain.
7. How strong does the current government production and military demand compare with that of a century ago?
8. Government is the regulator of the economy as a whole. But businessmen seek to influence that government. Explain.
9. How has government assumed responsibility for full employment since 1946?
10. Describe government's role as a participant in labor-management relations.
11. What is the fusion theory?
12. State a legitimate case for a power theory of labor-management-government interrelationships.

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LABOR AS A FORCE

The primary resource of the social economy is human beings, for all organizations and machinery are run by people and all goods and services are produced by people for people. Many are both producers and consumers, and all are consumers.

The concept of a labor force arises only in a society where most persons are "directed or 'bossed' in their productive activities."¹ Such an arrangement is very different from the older system in which the family served as a joint production-consumption unit. In mass society, the family loses most if not all its production functions; its members work under the direction of strangers away from home. Understanding the shift to such an employee-employer polarity requires some knowledge of the nature of the labor force, its growth in size, its occupational distribution, and its basic changes over the years.

NATURE OF THE LABOR FORCE

In 1957 the Department of Labor attempted to define the various elements of the labor force before beginning its regular survey of the labor market. Employed persons were found to be either (a) at work for pay or profit or without pay for 15 hours or more on a family farm or business; or (b) those with a job but not at work, i.e., those temporarily absent because of vacation, illness, industrial dispute, bad weather, taking time off for other reasons, plus persons on layoff with definite instructions to return to work within 30 days of layoff and persons waiting to report to new jobs within 30 days. Money or its equivalent must be paid for the latter services for them to be included in this category. Since most family work is unpaid, it is not included as employment although it may add greatly to the wealth of the nation.

Unemployed persons were defined as part of the labor force;

the category included those who did not work at all during the weeks in which the Department of Labor conducted its regular surveys but who were looking for work. It included persons who were waiting to be called back to jobs from which they had been laid off, those waiting to report to new jobs within 30 days, and those who would have been looking for work if they had not been temporarily ill or had not believed no work was available either in their lines or in their communities.

Civilians 14 years of age and over who did not fall into either the employed or the unemployed category were classified as *not in the labor force*. Those engaged in housework, in school, unable to work because of long-term illness, and others such as the retired, aged, voluntarily idle, and seasonal workers were, then, not counted as part of the labor force. Working full time means 35 hours or more in a survey week; part time runs from 1 to 34 hours.

Occupation, Industry, and Class of Worker. The job held during a governmental survey period counts the most here. In case two jobs are held, the one in which the greater number of hours are worked is counted. Class of worker is determined by whether the individuals receive wages or salaries; this is subdivided further into private and government, self-employed and unpaid family workers. These occupational categories are not static; new jobs arise, old ones are incorporated in others or are eliminated. Type of job is related to product structure (physical goods produced), degree of industrialization, participation of women, and other elements.

Since defining labor so as to refer to the same type of activity in all societies was found impossible, analysts have had to take recourse in "the market test" of wage payment.² The same test is used by the Bureau of the Census and Department of Labor. That view of work which considers market and non-market divisions of the world puts housewives outside of work processes. Such an approach is a kind of bias in favor of labor as a directed function.

In a war economy, the term "labor force" might well be replaced by "manpower." Manpower is held to be the ultimate limiting resource of any economy; it can be greatly expanded by drawing on those "not in the labor force" as was done in World War II.

SIZE OF THE LABOR FORCE

In the United States, only about 42 per cent of 69,100,000 out of the total population of 172,000,000 and 58 per cent or 119,000,000 of those 14 years of age and over are in the labor force. About 30 per cent of the population are either too young or are in school, 22 per cent are housewives, and six per cent are disqualified for physi-

cal or mental reasons or because of retirement. Actually the size of the labor force can never be very accurately measured. The figures fluctuate with the rather irregular entry and withdrawal of housewives, adolescents, and casuals. The peak figure was reached in July 1956 when those in the labor force numbered 72,325,000.

Growth in the Work Force. Both the size and the proportion of the population at work have greatly increased. In 1870 but 32 per cent of the population was in the work force; now it is 42 per cent. For the population 14 years of age and over, the proportion went up from 56.2 per cent in 1929 to a peak of 62.4 per cent in 1944. That figure was 58 per cent in 1956.⁴ These figures are called the labor force participation rates. The rates may be deceptive because the force is so elastic and because the figures for the early years are not too reliable. For a time, for instance, the work force figures included persons 10 years of age and over, so they are not really comparable to today's statistics.⁵ The growth of the labor force has come from the population increase and from the expanding industry's rising demands for labor. Fully 750,000 persons reaching the age of 18 or 19 enter the labor force each year. The shortened work week also acts to create more jobs.

As Slichter wrote, "the work force is not a fixed group of people. Indeed, there is constant movement into and out of the work force. Usually there are three or four million more job seekers in July than in January. In a year there are usually about ten million persons who have been in the work force only part of the year." While there were 69,138,000 persons in the labor force in 1957, as many as 79,000,000 were involved in labor during the year. The seeming stability of employment at 42 per cent of population and 58 per cent of persons 14 years of age and over conceals to an extent that each month there is movement of as many as 5,500,000 persons into and out of work positions.^{1a}

About 3 million persons entered the civilian labor force between January and February, 1957, while two and a half million withdrew. A turnover rate may be derived from these moves by averaging the number of entries and withdrawals (in this case 2.75 million) and expressing it as a percentage of the civilian labor force. (This would come to four per cent of the total labor force of 69.1 million.) In 1957 female turnover was about eight per cent, four times the men's rate of about two per cent.⁷ New people enter on work careers; older ones retire; people get ill and are laid off. Perhaps three stages may be found, psychologically, on any specific job: In the "induction crisis" or roughly first six months the new worker decides whether to continue working. If the decision is positive, the worker

may enter a stage of "differential transit" which is transitional to a third phase of "settled connection."⁵ However, little is settled, as unemployment figures indicate. Turnover is important in bringing in new personnel, and in making for changes in industry by attrition and accretion.

Persons who remain in the labor force somewhat steadily from initial entrance to retirement are said to constitute the primary labor force. Those who move in and out of the force are thought of as composing the secondary labor force.⁶ Their important contribution is to provide a highly flexible element in labor supply, especially in the short run.

There are also part-year and full-year workers. Of the 75 million persons who worked at any time during 1955, 28 million or 37.4 per cent were part-year workers (putting in less than 50 weeks at work). Women from 20 to 64 years comprised about 40 per cent of this category, youngsters under 20 just under 20 per cent, older men four per cent, and older women two per cent. Part-year women workers were concentrated in a few industries and occupations, more than half in trades and service industries alone.⁷ Some 47 million of 75 million persons were full-year workers in 1955, i.e., had primary responsibility for breadwinning and were under great social and economic pressure to work this long. Married men living with families were the largest section of this classification, but, increasingly, women are becoming full-year workers.

Of course, some people put in more than a full year's work by holding more than one job, a phenomenon called moonlighting by some.⁸ A teacher may hold a Christmas job, really consecutive or successive jobs.^{9a} True moonlighting is holding two jobs at the same time. A recent survey of the National Federation of Post Office Clerks showed that more than 50 per cent of the 115,000 members have second jobs "not by choice but by dire necessity."⁹ A July, 1957 survey by the Bureau of the Census showed that one out of every 20 employed workers or 3,500,000 persons supplemented their regular incomes by holding down two or more jobs. A survey of a year earlier showed about the same number were in this situation.

Most such people had two jobs, while about 100,000 reported three or more such jobs during the survey week. Married men were found to be more likely than single men to hold double jobs. Some had full-time jobs and did part-time work; many combined part-time jobs to make the equivalent of one job; others shifted jobs during the week. A large majority worked at two entirely different occupations. The shortened work week and easier working conditions

apparently make it possible for persons to hold two jobs, the pressure of higher living costs and status aspirations may also force people into seeking additional jobs. Unions ordinarily inveigh against double jobholding on the grounds that unions are weakened when union members take non-union jobs as extra work. Moreover, unions hold, moonlighting prevents other workers from obtaining employment.

Unemployment. Seasonal influences may alter the unemployment totals by as much as 40% within a single calendar year, going to 20% above the annual average in February and 20% below in October. At any given time, unemployment is higher among women than among men, in the last quarter of 1955 about 4.1% of the women and 3.1% of the men were registered as unemployed.

Each year, because of technological changes, almost 1,000,000 jobs go out of existence; because of population advances approximately 750,000 new workers enter the labor market. Fully 1,750,000 new jobs have to be created each year in the United States. The minimum cost of this job creation is about \$10,000, for a total of \$17.5-billion in investments a year.¹⁰ This is about half the new capital investment totals.

CLASSIFICATION INTO NOMINAL GROUPINGS

Workers are generally grouped by job title, age, sex, job content, skill, geographic area, industrial breakdowns, and hours worked. If the limitations of such classifications are known, they provide fruitful cross sectional views of vast and otherwise unseen changes in the industrial world. Productive potential and real groups require a different, sociological analysis.

Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles for 1949 lists 17,500 separate jobs under more than 12,000 names.¹¹ Census publications list 221 distinct occupations; in the industry subdivision categories alone an additional 230 job titles are shown, and among services rendered 1530 industrial subdivisions are listed.

A first step at approaching such voluminous materials has been taken by separating civilian and non-civilian labor. All noninstitutional labor is divided into employed and unemployed, and further breakdowns are made within each grouping. One may use such categories as agricultural and non-agricultural, goods and services, government and private. Except for some special purposes such as critiques of the size of the public payroll, government workers are not listed as "public employees" but as civilian labor. One out of every nine civilian workers is a government employee, more than half

of them in local government.¹² The point at which the nominal grouping approach increases clarity is in illustrating, for example, how changes in sex and age composition have altered the nature of the labor force.¹³

Skills in jobs refer to a worker's knowledge and abilities arising through training and experience. Despite talk of "marginal" or perfectly homogeneous labor units, vast differences and contrasts in skill and attitude persist. There is great variety to labor services grouped around skills and special statuses. Differences in skill are based on natural gifts, interest, education, training, and experience. Skills and occupations are differentially rated in most societies.

While the work day has been cut in half in little more than a century, people live longer and spend some ten additional years in their work careers of 45-46 years; moreover, labor produces much more in shorter hours. With more people working, more hours are put in by a much larger population than in the past; although, on the average, no one worker puts in as many hours of work as an average worker of a century ago. With 1891-1900 as an index base of 100, total man-hours of labor rose to 180.5 in 1941-1950. Meanwhile output per man-hour rose from a base of 100 in the earlier decade to 281.3 in the 1941-1950 period. Much of this increase in productivity rested on the even faster growth of capital investment.¹⁴

Age Groupings. The work career of most persons now starts at age 19, a year later than in the 1930's, and continues for 46 years to age 65. Generally, the work career has been extended from about 32 years in 1900 to 42 years in 1950, they start later and last longer. A life sequence involves a non-work career up to 18 or 19, a work career from then to 65, and retirement thereafter. Children and the aged have largely been removed from work processes. The median age of the labor force has gone up from 33.3 years in 1890 to 38.5 years for men and from 24.3 to 35.9 years for women.¹⁵ The low birth rate of the 1930's, which is now reflected in a smaller available labor supply, is rapidly being counterbalanced by the high birth rate of the 1940's which should make labor more plentiful in the 1960's. A far older working force is in prospect. Where persons 25-64 years of age accounted for 63.7 per cent of the labor force in 1890 in 1955 they comprised 78.9 per cent, and the trend is continuing.¹⁶

The Growth in the Female Labor Force. In 1870 men in the labor force numbered eleven million or 85.2 per cent and women numbered 1.9 million or 14.8 per cent. By 1955 men numbered 45.1 million or 69.8 per cent while the figure for women had gone up

to 20.8 million or 30.2 per cent. There are now over 22 million women in the labor force—32 per cent of the total.¹⁴ Over an 87-year period women have more than doubled their percentage share of the labor force. The increasing millions of women working outside their homes, especially married women, constitutes a major socio-economic change.¹⁵ Women enter what used to be thought of as "man's work" in larger and larger numbers; they provided the greatest single source of new labor for war production.

Industrial Groupings of Labor. Over the years labor has tended to move away from agriculture into industry and, with the great spread of industrialization, out of factory and into service and trade functions. Manufacturing in the 1950's employs but 26.6 per cent of the labor force, a relative position barely changed from its 27.1 per cent in 1920. Meanwhile, trade has increased from 11.9 per cent to 17.5 per cent of the labor force and finance and service from 8.5 per cent to 12.9 per cent. Together they exceed industry in people employed. The changes are presented in a table:

TABLE 1
INDUSTRY-TYPE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR *

	1920	1954
Agriculture	29.4%	14.1%
Manufacturing	27.1	26.6
Mining	3.1	1.3
Contract construction	2.3	4.2
Transportation and public utilities	10.3	6.7
Trade	11.9	17.5
Finance and service	8.5	12.9
Government	6.7	11.2
Military	1.0	5.5

* National Industrial Conference Board, 1953; pp. 418-9 and *The Economic Almanac*, 1956, 358-9.

The table indicates how agriculture's share of labor has been halved over three decades and at the same time how tertiary industries in services and trades have grown greatly. Over the years the very content of what is an industry has altered. Paradoxically, labor in manufacturing has grown more slowly than non-plant, urban-work functions.

CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

The increase in size of the labor force and various alterations in age and sex and industrial composition may be related to the emergence of entirely new occupations, the decline of old ones, the

shifting of importance of some sectors of economic life as in the fall of farm employment, and an enlarged proportion of skilled workers. The decline of production workers has been matched by the rise of white collar personnel and vast changes in status.

The Rise in Skill. Over the past half century the most significant alteration in job distribution and content is toward higher skill and status, a move away from farm and unskilled occupations, and an improvement in socio-economic status.

TABLE 2
TREND AWAY FROM UNSKILLED WORK

Professional and semi-professional	4.4%	8.7%
Proprietors, managers and officials	23.0	16.2
Farmers and farm managers	16.5	5.9
Others	6.5	10.3
Clerical and kindred workers and sales	10.2	18.9
Skilled workers and foremen	11.7	14.9
Semiskilled workers	14.7	20.9
Unskilled workers	36.0	21.4
Farm laborers	14.5	3.8
Laborers, except farm and mine	14.7	6.2
Domestic service	6.8	3.0
Service workers, except domestic	—	8.4

Source: *Comparative Occupation Statistics, 1940*, 187; *Current Population Reports*, P-20, No. 19, 4; Series P-50, No. 40, 4; and Dewhurst, 1955, 730-1.

The labor force has been upgraded in skill as a result of technological advances, entry of women into gainful employment, and the spread of education.⁴⁴ The servant group has declined greatly. Professional and semi-professional personnel have almost doubled their relative position, going from 4.5 per cent to 8.7 per cent in 43 years. Non-farm proprietors, managers, and others have risen from 6.5 per cent to 10.3 per cent. The professional and technical worker categories contained just over one million in 1900 and five million in 1950. Farmers and farm managers fell from 16.5 per cent to 5.9 per cent of the labor force.

Clerical and sales workers have risen from 10.2 per cent to 18.9 per cent. Combined with professionals their joint rise was from 14.6 per cent to 27.6 per cent in 43 years and, today, constitute a proportion greater than that for all manufacturing labor. As of 1956

white-collar occupations had reached 20.7 million persons. From 1910 when the total was 7.9 million the gain is 162 per cent; other nonfarm manual workers rose but 73 per cent in that period.¹⁶

The two greatest declines were for unskilled workers and farm laborers; their joint fall was from 36 per cent to 21.4 per cent of the labor force. Farming fell to about 7.8 per cent of the labor force in 1957 while non-agricultural industries had 87.5 per cent and about 4.7 per cent was unemployed. Skilled workers and foremen rose from 11.7 per cent to 14.9 per cent of the labor force. At present there is an acute shortage of skilled labor which was at 8,500,000 persons in 1951 and the same number in 1956.

Education Changes. There has been a great shift from Alexander Hamilton's view of workmen as an illiterate mob and F. W. Taylor's "stupid and phlegmatic" oxlike creature.¹⁷ High school attendance, for instance, rose from 203,000 in 1890 to 7,700,000 in 1952 or from 3.8 per cent of the eligible age group to 65.3 per cent.

In 1900 less than five per cent of college age persons went to college, making a total of 230,000 students. By 1950 the proportion had gone to 30 per cent and the number to 2,500,000; by 1957 it had risen to 3,300,000. Opportunities for millions to take advantage of their abilities and develop themselves have increased greatly. Median years of school completed by labor force members went up from 9 to 11 years between 1940 and 1950.¹⁸

Decline of Production Workers. Contrary to the Marxian prediction that industrial workers would become steadily more numerous, capitalism at first increased and then reduced the size of the industrial labor force. Greater capital investment per worker and the spread of education has brought this change about. Production workers fell from 51 per cent of the labor force in 1940 to 44 per cent in 1957, while service workers rose from 49 per cent to 56 per cent during that period.

In that period as the labor force increased by 12.4 million persons, the service industries grew from 27 million to 38.3 million workers. Production workers barely increased, from 28.5 million to 29.6 million. Of the total gain, service labor's increase made up 83.3 per cent. Although factory jobs went from nearly 13 million people in 1940 to 18.7 million in 1957, a 45 per cent gain, other production fields, such as mining, fell greatly, from 1.2 million in 1940 to 679,000 in 1957, a 45 per cent drop.¹⁹ Railroad union leaders say that 1,000,000 railroad worker jobs have been lost over the last decade and the expectation is for another 200,000 to be displaced within the next five years. One of the significant effects of automation is to extend this process very markedly.

White-Collar Grouping. In 1956, for the first time the white-collar segment of the labor force became the largest single working group when 25,400,000 white-collar job holders were counted as compared to 24,900,000 blue-collar workers. Where in 1940 ten of every 100 employees were office workers, in 1957 16 in every 100 were in this category.²⁰ Even within the factory the proportion of non-production workers rose from 19.4 per cent to 22 per cent or from 2,039,000 in 1919 to 3,719,000 in 1956. Automation is expected to continue the trend toward more administrative and clerical personnel.²¹ A veritable "office machine age" has opened.

FUTURE OF THE LABOR FORCE

Vast changes are appearing in the size of the labor force, in the growth of leisure time, in the time and energy involved in direct production activity, in the role of women and white-collar workers, and in socio-economic status. The population 14 years and over may reach 126,317,000 by 1960; of that number, 72,500,000 may be in the large force, ten per cent over the World War II peak of 65.9 million and some five per cent over the 1957 total of 69.1 million. By 1975 the labor force may reach 93.4 million or 58-59 per cent of the 14 and up age group.²² The increase for the 1950's should be 12 per cent, where in the 1940's it was 15 per cent; this figure reflects the lower birth rate of the depression years; the large crop of "war babies" should alter this growth rate upward in the 1960's.

The work week was shortened by about three hours every decade between 1850 and 1950. The average work week in nonfarm pursuits can drop to 36.5 in 1960, and 27.5 by the year 2000.²³ In 1850 people put in about 70 hours a week. The full work week of 1957 is generally about 35 hours. Work ceases to be the central or integrating feature of most of life; people increase their non-work activities.^{15a}

Working backward to 1870 and forward to 1970 and beyond, Dewhurst and Associates found, "there is certainly no reason to believe that the long downtrend in working time will not continue with further gains in productivity."⁴ Between 1850 to 1950 output per man-hour multiplied almost six times. The average rate of increase—18.4 per cent a decade—has been accelerating slowly. Long-term trends indicate a probable rise of about 25 per cent during the decade of the 1950's (2.5 per cent a year). Many industries exceed this average gain.

Continuation of a major war emergency could produce great expansion of the labor force. The labor force is expected to add

some ten million persons in the next ten years; women will probably make up at least half of the rise.²³ By 1975 professional personnel could constitute a third more than their present proportion of the labor force, accounting for one out of every eight workers.

SUMMARY

Labor is becoming a larger and larger part of the population; but it puts in fewer hours than were formerly required. While the number of hours of work has been reduced, the length of the work career has risen by an average of 10 years per person since 1870. Movement in and out of the labor force affects many millions of persons, so that the final totals fluctuate as much as ten million persons a year.

The labor force in America is growing older. Industrial laborers are becoming a smaller proportion of the labor force and the number of service workers is expanding. Over the years there has been considerable upgrading in skill, although specialization also works to reduce skill at different points. Education has been a major force in this status improvement. A major decline of production workers has set in, and is accompanied by a corresponding expansion of white-collar personnel. In the future the labor force will probably become still larger and be composed of even more white-collar and fewer blue-collar workers.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In what way is labor more than a factor of production?
2. Sociologically (and not economically) speaking, is a housewife unemployed?
3. How does the labor force grow throughout the year, over a century, as a result of attrition and accretion?
4. Relate turnover to mobility.
5. Examine cases of moonlighting in your community. Why do people hold down two or more jobs simultaneously?
6. Unemployment is a personal tragedy. Explain.
7. One can be at work but making less than full use of one's capacities, viz., in extreme cases of specialization. Discuss this under-employment of human beings?
8. What is a job?
9. State Hicks' productivity measure.
10. Given the current trends in industrial labor, what is the future prospect for factory employment?
11. How has increased education altered the labor force?
12. What major trends will affect the future of the labor force? How do these compare to the discussion of automation in Chapter 5?

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SOURCES OF LABOR SUPPLY

Industrialized societies have to recruit labor and, as the demands of industrialization rise, to educate and train it as well. Manpower has to be moved from pools or reserves of labor into places of greatest need. In the process older labor groups, such as the family, are disrupted, women are drawn into industrial life while children and the aged are pushed out of the labor force.

Obtaining labor supply is a multiple and constant problem involving recruitment, induction into work, and separation from employment. In between are training processes and role-learning in groups. Much of the process is structural and concerns manpower management. Government affects labor markets via job placement, job training, laws on working conditions, discharge, retirement, and the like.¹ Wartime mobilization involves labor market "administration," in good measure by government; peacetime markets are also affected by government in various degrees.²

INCREASING MANPOWER

The main way to increase manpower in an expanding economy is to draw women out of the home into the labor market. The use of the aged and housewives during the war emergency from 1939 to 1944 increased manpower by 10.3 million. The normal increase in a nonwar situation would have been but two million. Simple population increase is pouring about 750,000 new workers into the labor market a year. Although some of it was temporary, 10 million persons entered the labor force between 1940 and 1950.

Lengthening Hours of Work. With the same labor supply one can increase the amount of production by lengthening hours of work and by additional training. During World War II both methods were used.

There are, of course, limits to how much the work week can be

lengthened without impairing efficiency. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, an 8-hour day and 40-hour week are best in terms of efficiency and keeping absenteeism low. Each hour of overtime added to the manufacturing work week may be a production gain equivalent to adding 350,000 new workers. Because there are limits to the workers' endurance and interest, this could obviously hold true for only the first few hours. The additional wages (after taxes) may not compensate the worker for what is lost in leisure time.

Meanwhile the longtime trend is for working time to be shortened. Dewhurst estimates that the work week will be cut to 37.5 hours by 1960 and to 27.5 hours by 2000.³ The full work week is now 35 hours which is considerably shorter than the 70-hour week of a century ago.

Child Labor. It is perhaps to the everlasting ignominy of factory production that Slater's mill of 1791, one of the first factories in the United States, opened with nine little children as its work force. From 1800 to 1860 fully 40 to 60 per cent of the factory workers in the United States were children. Although union efforts to secure a child labor amendment to the Constitution failed, all of the fifty states now have laws limiting the employment of children. Twenty-three of them specify 16 years as the minimum hiring age; the others have a lower minimum. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the activities of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor have helped.

In 1940 1 out of every 11 children between 14 and 15 years old was at work; in 1950 the figure was 1 in 23. Even in 1950 there were 1,299,867 children between the ages of 14 to 17 at work. About a third were in agriculture, about one-fourth were in wholesale and retail trade, and about one-sixth were in manufacturing. In 1952 more than 2 million children of school age had either full or part-time employment, especially in agriculture. Most of this work was illegal.⁴

Child labor is most common in urban centers where young people are engaged in selling in the street, delivering, domestic service, and odd jobs. Some hold that such child labor hinders education, increases opportunities for delinquent behavior, makes for more industrial accidents, contributes to poor health, depresses adult wages, and even lowers family income. It is, however, true that the United States was the first social system to have pushed most children out of the labor market. Because persons 16 to 18 who drop out of school are subject to early military conscription, they may not be sought

as workers and may be left with no useful function to perform. Delinquency and other disruptive activities may be consequences of these young people having nothing to do.

Employment of the Aged. Older people are increasingly neglected as a source of labor except in war emergencies. As man's length of life has increased from 48 years in 1900 to more than 68 years by the mid-1950's, a new post-work period has developed. Because they are in better condition than the middle aged of 1900, the aged of the 1950's can perform many useful productive functions, even if only for shorter lengths of time and at lighter tasks. Their attendance, production, and accident record are superior to those of many younger persons.

The old-age insurance program, legislated in 1937, has not fulfilled its promise to end the aged's need for relief. One out of every five persons 65 years old or over, or 2,700,000 of the aged, need financial help.⁵ More than 30 per cent of such persons have no money income. Of the remainder, 60 per cent receive an income of less than \$1,000 a year; only 20 per cent receive \$3,000 or more. Few if any aged persons can live on the Social Security benefits of \$47 for a retired worker, or \$77 for a retired worker and his wife. At the beginning of 1950 about one-third of those 65 years old and over had to earn money to survive. Automation and the re-engineering of jobs can further reduce the physical strength needed in work so as to make more room for older workers.

Farm Labor Reserves. The farm population which reached a peak of 32,000,000 in 1916 has fallen to 22,000,000 as of 1957. The farm population was 95 per cent of the total population in the 1790's; it is now down to about 12.5 per cent; and by 1960 may fall to 9 per cent. The decline of the farm population has been matched by the fall of farm labor; as many as 350,000 persons a year move from farms into industry. Since 1950 total farms have fallen from slightly in excess of 6 million to 4.8 million and are steadily decreasing in numbers. As a source of labor and population farms are becoming less significant. Those remaining on farms have changed the nature of their work; they are highly industrialized, machine hands, living a far more urban existence in a mass society.

Alien and Prison Labor. The American tradition of using immigrant labor continues. Some 200,000 contract laborers (mainly from Mexico) enter the country each year. A total of 4,741,971 aliens were used in non-restricted war work in World War II. Although the laws of the 1920's were designed to cut the flow of immigrants into the country, the labor shortage of the 1950's brought

new flexibility to the interpretation of the laws. As American farm labor steadily moves to the city, foreign contract labor has to be resorted to.

For years unions opposed immigration as a wage-cutting and union-busting move, but as immigrants rapidly became Americanized unions sought to organize them, as they seek to organize foreign contract labor today.⁶ Prison labor, used in certain limited functions, is not of great importance in the United States.

WOMANPOWER

Women have always made up a very large part of the labor force of the country but, because of the economists' way of calculating labor as a market-mediated phenomenon, have been consistently underrated in their work efforts. Even from the strictly economic point of view the largest single source of additional labor supply in the country has been found among women. Of course, this situation can change considerably once a high plateau in the employment of women is reached. As yet none is in sight. The movement of millions of women out of the home into the labor market has had far-reaching effects on the socio-economic life of the country.^{1a} The mere presence of women in the war economy altered older views of the labor force and introduced considerable elasticity or expandability.

Labor Pressures on Women. Urbanization and industrialization lead to a vast increase in female employment. But this is only a general explanation for a shift in family organization and the acceptance of women in non-home activities. War demands made it feasible to break down prejudices against women working and, as living standards rose, the demands for still higher living standards became operative.

Technological changes, an altered conception of what women can do, and the lightening of the work load have facilitated the employment of women in what used to be considered "man's work." In addition, women seek more interesting lives than can be found at home. Young women who get a taste of handling their own funds and being independent before marriage may not wish to surrender to the older view that woman's place is in the home. The older view of woman's place has also suffered as a result of the changing ratio of men to women. Since 1950, the United States has had a larger female than male population.

While all these forces contribute to the increased number of women in the labor market, "most women work out of economic necessity. The Bureau of the Census has held that the rise in the

number of working wives from about 5,000,000 in April 1947 to 10,500,000 in March 1956 is related to the low incomes of the job-holders. During that same period the number of single women at work fell from 6,200,000 to slightly over 5,000,000. However, the presence of a larger number of women in the labor force may be far from a sign of material poverty; it may simply indicate a desire for more earthly goods.

As of March 1956 about 10,500,000 out of a total of 38,300,000 married couples or 27.5 per cent were working couples. The increase over the 6,500,000 working couples of 1947 is a proportional gain of 62 per cent.⁵ Older women in particular have increased their participation in the labor force. In 1947 there were 1,900,000 working women between the ages of 45 and 64; in 1956 there were 3,800,000.

Size of Female Labor Contingent. According to the National Manpower Council, at the turn of the century about half the adult women never entered paid employment. "Now at least nine out of every ten women are likely to work outside the home in the course of their lives."⁶ Between 1940 and 1957 the female labor contingent grew from 14,000,000 to 22,000,000 or by 57 per cent.

Moreover, the work life expectancy or working career of females rose from 12.1 years in 1940 to 15.4 years in 1950, a gain of 27 per cent. Female life span increased only eight per cent during that period. In 1950 a female child could be expected to spend 22 per cent of her lifetime in the labor force compared to 18 per cent in 1940.⁷ Women workers made up 25 per cent of the work force in 1947 and composed 32 per cent of it in 1957.

The figures are even more compelling when one remembers that back in 1870 men represented 85.2 per cent of the labor force, and women made up 14.8 per cent. Today the figures are about 47 million men against 22 million women and 68 per cent men against 32 per cent women. Where in 1870 there were 5.8 men at work for each woman at work, today the figure is just over 2.1. The participation rate for women varies by area, being much higher in urban centers that offer trade, service, and other occupations that appeal to women.¹⁹

Kinds of Jobs. Most women are still in clerical work, but factory work is claiming many. The National Manpower Council found that "although there are few strongholds left that men hold exclusively, the occupational structure is still divided into jobs that are primarily 'men's' and others that are primarily 'women's.'"^{8a} When the need for labor is high, women enter "man's work" and make it into woman's work. Although some believe that these jobs will re-

vert to men as conditions change, this may not happen. A check by the government of a sample list of 445 occupations formerly exclusively held by men revealed that women had entered all but one of them.¹¹

Future Possibilities. Many women go through a two-phase working life (a double life): after leaving school or college they go to work; their work careers are interrupted by marriage and children; and they resume work later. Increasingly they are doubly employed: they do housework and labor outside the home.

The ages of women in the labor force have steadily climbed. In 1890 the average age of women workers was 8.4 years less than that of men; in 1950 it was but 2.6 years less. The return of mothers to the labor force may account for much of the change. The median age of working women is now the highest in history, having risen from 26.2 years in 1900 to 31.9 years in 1940, 37.2 years in 1952,¹² and possibly 38 years today.¹¹ In particular the group 45 years of age and over has risen greatly.

Women are expected to be able to make up at least half of the expected increase of 10 million persons in the labor force from 1955 to 1965. They may reach 26 million out of a labor force of about 70 million or 37 per cent.⁸ The use of women to offset shortages resulting from the low birth rates of depression days and the demands of a war economy has become accepted. By 1975 the female contingent in the labor force may total 33,600,000.

Recruitment. In a society where unions are fairly strong and contractual agreements make it necessary to keep individuals once they have been hired, the old "arbitrary and whimsical" hiring techniques disappear.¹³ Workers remain on jobs longer than they did in the past and are even rewarded for returning to a given company and job. Employer-employee contracts are less unilaterally determined.

Resourceful companies do not wait for "job hunting" to occur; they set up their own interviewing programs right in colleges and in employment service offices especially when they are looking for management recruits. Psychological techniques of testing and interviewing are increasingly used in job placement.

A new IBM classification system which matches worker to job by punch cards has been instituted by the United States Employment Service (USES) so as to fill jobs where a worker's experience is not exactly what is required but is close. Each worker is "profiled" by education, aptitudes, temperaments, interests, physical capacities, and working conditions. The profile is geared to the requirements of 4000 jobs. The system, which is now in effect in 1700

USES offices, represents a shift in approach from thinking of experience as the critical item in job placement to thinking of the worker's personality and interests as more crucial. The system may be used to locate workers who can move up to more responsible jobs, who can be retrained readily, and who have been neglected or poorly placed.

The profiling system fails to emphasize the group factors in work and the role expectations of employer and employee.^{17a} Some have held that job profiling may be a step from a class to a "classified" society, in a new triumph of formal organization which could further the placing of everyone in a tight little niche and possibly help keep him there.¹⁴ Others have complained that job profiling is really far less effective than its sponsors assume. Unions have taken the stand that job profiling can be used negatively to weed out persons management does not want before they can even get on the job.

The Floundering Period. Youngsters at an early age are encouraged to determine what they will be when they grow up. In a fast-changing, mass society where occupations are often made obsolete in a matter of a few years, a child may not be able to follow in his parents' footsteps. Young people are not often prepared for specific occupations and may be forced to go through a "floundering period" before they find places in the work world. Ordinarily the greater the educational attainment the better the job planning. The Oakland labor mobility study showed that 78 per cent of persons with an eighth-grade education had no job plans while 47 per cent of the high school graduates and 13 per cent of the college graduates had none. The results may be inaccurate, relying as they do on what adults remembered concerning plans they had while in school. But they suggest the power of education on job plans.

Most people's job plans crystallize in the later years of high school and at college. The more educated persons usually receive more advice from parents and job guidance from teachers and job counselors. Much depends on family background and parents' educational level, for job aspirations are closely related to the educational and vocational levels of families. Of course, in a society of upward mobility, persons may be stimulated and encouraged to climb higher on the occupational ladder than their predecessors had.

Equality of opportunity has by no means meant equal educational and job opportunities for different income and ethnic persons. Even finding out about demand for jobs depends greatly on family status and education. While the number of college graduates has risen from 9,371 in 1870 to 432,058 in 1950, college attendance is unequally distributed. In one southern town 72 per cent of the upper-

class persons who had graduated from high school attended college, but 58 per cent of the middle class, 16 per cent of the lower-middle class, and none of the lower class went to college. Youngsters from an above average socio-economic status in one Pennsylvania school system had 56.8 per cent of their number attending college, while but 12.9 per cent from below average socio-economic groups received a higher education.¹⁵

A key change in urban society, unlike past rural situations, is that induction into work activities that once began when one could walk is now put off to the age of 19 in most cases. Training for work is delayed longer, is completed later, and parental authority continues for a somewhat longer period.

When a youngster starts a specific job, his floundering period is at an intra-company or on-the-job stage. An "induction crisis" may take six months, during which time the new entrant can gain that view of job, employer, and self which will enable him to decide whether or not to continue working at the specific job. Should the worker stay, he enters on a stage of "differential transit." Finally, he moves on to a third stage of "settled connection."^{16b} The worker becomes more and more involved in the company and may pay considerable allegiance to it, even if he is laid off by it.

Unions and Apprentices. Unions enter into training processes through their own schools, participation in public training of apprentices, and various other relations with employers concerning training. In this way unions affect the allocation of human resources, the rate of introduction of technological change, and some of the conditions of action in labor markets.¹⁶ In addition, unions gain some control over entry into labor markets, and enter a sphere formerly controlled by business.¹⁷ Government's entry is as swift and probably more far-reaching. It has been this way at least since the days of the Elizabethan Statute of Apprentices. While unions run some hiring halls, managements operate personnel departments, and governments run public employment services.

Much apprentice training is concentrated in craft unions. Unions hold that some employers look on apprentices as cheap labor and provide them with little real training. Unions frequently allow only a limited number of apprentices per journeyman (one-fifth in the building and printing trades), which employers contend that this limits the labor market and keeps employment and wages artificially high for journeymen.

In recent years apprentices have been allowed to start at very late ages in what is really a form of retraining. In 1957 the UAW concluded an agreement with the Ford Motor Co. to waive the

upper age limit for a stated number of seniority employees who wished to become apprentices. Such an arrangement may pave the way for retraining required by automation.

LABOR IN WAR ECONOMY

Labor is more directed from central sources in a war economy than in any other situation outside a prison. During World War II there was no national labor market, but there were a vast series of individual markets in cities, districts, and regions, some with labor surpluses and others with severe shortages.

Labor Draft. Although large numbers were drafted into the armed forces, because of the presence of fairly adequate labor supplies (there were 9,000,000 unemployed in July, 1940), the United States was the only major nation which went through World War II without a general labor draft. Nevertheless, if full employment had existed before the war, sanctions would probably have been necessary to move labor into occupations with greater priority. Up to now both union and employer organizations have opposed such moves, preferring indirect pressures to direct controls.

Some of government's powers over the labor supply during the war included: (1) a requirement that workers leaving jobs in essential industry obtain a "certificate of availability" from the employer to be eligible for hiring in other essential industry, (2) certain labor categories had to seek work only through the public employment service which used priority ratings to refer workers to the most essential war jobs, first, (3) "employment ceilings" were placed on employers in nonessential industries. The burden of reduced output fell mainly on civilian consumption items, although both guns and butter were produced.

Employment Services. War production stimulated the greatest use of employment services. The war experience demonstrated that the most important institution for mobilizing labor is an effective public employment service.⁶ In addition to matching jobs and men, the United States Employment Service surveyed and classified more than five million unemployed men and women by trade and skill. Central hiring halls were set up for whole industrial areas. All state employment service facilities were transferred to federal jurisdiction in January, 1942, creating the first really national employment service and national labor market. On November 16, 1946 the facilities were returned to state or local control.

In 1948 the federal and state employment service system comprised some 1800 full-time and 2700 part-time local offices. These offer placement service; employment counseling; aid to employers

in selecting, assigning, and transferring workers; provision of information about the labor market; and assistance to communities in setting up job programs. The important change has been in the governmentalization of employment service. Manpower and military recruitment bodies are unified in some countries. Future emergencies may stimulate unification of employment services with a War Labor Board, a War Manpower Commission, and with military recruitment agencies. Separate agencies can hardly balance needs for wage stabilization with dispute settlement and guidance of manpower flow.¹⁸

The War Manpower Commission, set up on April 18, 1942 and quite capable of being revived, had extraordinary powers over the labor market. All the measures were aimed at increasing or expanding labor supply to meet emergency demands. The power of government was extended and deepened, and a true national labor market was brought into being to meet a national and international crisis situation.

SUMMARY

The concept of a labor force or manpower is related to the social situation of demands for expansion of that force to meet critical national needs. All of the leading sources of additional labor are called on when needed. Women with new roles in production appear to be heading toward new heights. Sex differentiation in occupations may be on its way out.

Persons enter work processes, are trained in jobs, gain some skills that may be transferable, move about between jobs, are re-trained, are affected by union requirements and pressures from the government and management. Much of the process appears voluntary, although historically involuntary means of gaining and training labor have been common. A major social change has been for the war production system to require considerable governmental activity in creating a truly national labor market and a more directed one. There has been some slackening of direct controls in recent years but not of governmental activity as a basic technique in labor markets. The emphasis on such public power is significant, bearing as it does on hiring and firing, collective bargaining, wage setting, and union organization. Moving between all these pressures and forces are individuals who retain considerable mobility in the mass society and groups which seek to improve their statuses.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In what ways is obtaining labor supply a multiple problem?
2. Describe the new worker increments of the 1940's, 1950's. How is this expected to change in the 1960's?
3. Locate materials on how far one can go in lengthening hours of work. **In shortening hours.**
4. What is the present status of child labor in America?
5. State the case for finding productive functions for the aged.
6. How far can employment of women go?
7. Contrast the views that poverty or desire for more material possessions drives women to work. Why do they work?
8. Find a half dozen examples of inducements and of sanctions in obtaining labor supply in recent years in this country.
9. How do employment services affect labor recruiting?
10. Why is training of personnel so significant today?
11. How do unions affect labor supply?
12. In what ways did government increase its labor controls in a war production economy?

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MOBILITY AND THE THREE LADDERS

Horizontal and vertical mobility, the first a change in function at the same level and the second a movement to a different rank or status, are forms of opportunity that arise in a climbing society.

HORIZONTAL MOBILITY

According to the Department of Labor, "Mobility always has been a major characteristic of the American labor force. Changes from one occupation to another have been accompanied by extensive geographical shifts and appear to form a common pattern in the working lives of substantial numbers of people."¹ There are two kinds of horizontal mobility—a change from place to place within a status and a change in jobs.

Census estimates show that from 18 to 20 per cent of the population move from one house to another each year; many of them move across county and state lines.² For industrial sociology these moves have significance even if they do not involve job changes, but such migration may also be largely "work-connected." If the figures for 1950—which tend to show that almost 12,000,000 of 62,000,000, or about one-fifth, of the labor force members lived in houses different from those of the preceding year—are typical, the average worker may change residence some eight times during his work career.³ It is held that one of the strengths of the American economy is this internal flexibility resting on voluntary mobility between occupations, industries, and regions.

Labor's horizontal mobility may be described as "willingness or propensity to move" between jobs.^{3a} A few small movements may make for considerable labor market changes. In one six-city study of occupational mobility, based on the 1950 census occupation codes, it was found that employers initiated about 25 per cent of the job shifts through layoffs, while voluntary shifts accounted for 70 per

cent of the job changes. More than half of the job shifts were of the complex or multiple horizontal mobility type; they involved changes that concerned employer, occupations, and industry—not merely changes in location. About one-fifth of job shifts were between employers only and involved no shift in occupation or industry. Another 73 per cent of all shifts of employers also involved moves between industries, while 58 per cent involved movement between occupations. In general it appears that geographical mobility is lower than either industrial or occupational mobility within the horizontal mobility type.^{3b}

Movement between occupations has its peculiarities. At San Francisco, professional and technical groups were relatively "closed" or had little movement between them and other occupational groups; even the female clerical group was closed to a lesser extent. Much more shifting was found between managerial groups and craftsmen-foremen and operative categories, and of operatives into the craftsmen-foremen group. Geographic mobility is measurable by immigration data. At Los Angeles approximately half the 1950 male work force came from in-migrants, at San Francisco 35 per cent, at New Haven 16 per cent, and at Philadelphia 13 per cent.^{3c} Most moves were short, but long moves of more than 500 miles did occur. The typical move from 1941 to 1945 by war workers was less than 100 miles. Younger workers were most mobile.

Economists are still arguing whether workers on one job are looking for other jobs or are sufficiently aware of them to be mobile—to move to the higher paying job, in line with marginal productivity theory. Rottenberg held that workers do make wage comparisons and are to some extent aware of possibilities elsewhere.⁴ What is perhaps more significant is that horizontal mobility is associated with vertical mobility; it is part of some kind of improving process where one has a choice. Where choice is small, a possible worsening can result, but the possibility that many important moves are made in the hope of achieving vertical mobility should not be excluded.

VERTICAL MOBILITY

With a strong union and legal limits on discharge, mobility may be lessened by institutional forces. Such limitations may affect vertical as well as horizontal mobility. Abstractly one may consider labor mobility a function of higher income or rising prestige or movement up or down that represents a gain or loss in social rank.⁵ In practice movement may not be easy or possible. Taking a job is in itself a commitment that prevents mobility, although you can

move in some jobs. Even a highly mobile job such as a trainman is a commitment not to move to another function while in this one (moonlighting aside). Moonlighting in this context may be one way the gypsy spirit of some persons manifests itself while they are tied to particular jobs. Even in ordinary horizontal mobility, workers may be convinced that they are improving their lot so that this merges with vertical mobility.

THE LADDERS OF MOBILITY

There is considerable disagreement as to whether opportunities for vertical mobility are increasing or decreasing in American society. The theory of ladders developed here holds that there are several ladders of advancement, possibly as many as five (six if one counts general social climbing through non-work positional means), that movement on any one ladder may be extensive, but that movement from one ladder to the other may be minimal or non-existent.

In 1937 the Lynds wrote, "What appears increasingly in Middle-town industries is not one unbroken ladder but two: the one becoming shorter, harder to climb, and leading nowhere in particular; the other a long and repaying one but beginning a long jump above the plant floor."⁶ Where or at what point one starts is critical. To the Lynds' idea several subdivisions or additional ladders have been added and a further separation of the points or breaches at which jumps to different ladders may be made. Bell, too, in writing of the old steps of promotion within plants, observed, "that ladder has vanished" at least for the automotive industry.⁷

The Ladder Effect on Life Chances. The industrialist A. P. Sloan once described the corporation as a "pyramid of opportunities from the bottom toward the top with thousands of chances for advancement." He was referring to the organizational man's view of the opportunity for rising within a vast hierarchy and not becoming one's own boss, which is quite a change from the older American dream of upward mobility.⁸ One's chances for acquiring desirable features of social existence are influenced by economic position, income, opinion of job and company by others.⁹

The ladder effect was traced for a "cohort" of men aged 15 to 24 years in 1930 to ascertain their achievements by 1950. Over two decades, a pattern of higher skills was achieved, as the table indicates.

Over the 20 years of the study there was considerable movement upward from the less-skilled jobs into the higher-skilled and professional ones.

TABLE 1
UPGRADING OVER 20 YEARS *

Type Job	Distribution	
	1930	1950
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	2.9%	6.8%
Farmers and farm managers	5.2	12.6
Managers, officials, and proprietors (nonfarm)	2.5	11.0
Clerical and kindred workers	8.9	5.5.
Sales workers	5.8	6.1
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	10.4	18.4
Operatives and kindred workers	19.6	18.2
Service workers	3.8	6.2
Farm laborers and foremen	24.7	4.3
Laborers except farm and mine	16.2	10.9

* A. J. Jaffe and R. O. Carleton. *Occupational Mobility in the United States, 1930-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

People in the labor force have an average work life of 46 years. Most upward movement occurs during the first 20-30 years and the highest positions are usually reached by age 50. Four out of every five workers who begin in white-collar positions remain in that category of work; two-thirds of those who start as manual laborers stay in that field.¹⁰

Factors influencing upward mobility include a normal upward movement from apprentice to craftsman in occupations that depend upon achievement or learning and experience. Availability of jobs is a factor, viz. upward movement in a vastly expanded labor market in a growing economy, i.e., simple job opportunity. Upgrading is easier in upward phases of the business cycle. Formal education is an important factor.

Entrance into the Labor Market. For many people chance, convenience, and pay affect the selection of early jobs more than either interests or abilities. This is probably particularly true at the lower-level employees, although some selection, especially succession into parental jobs, also operates here. It is, however, certainly true that fewer new workers follow in their parents' footsteps as technological changes eliminate jobs and downgrade skills and as whole industries vanish.¹¹

Most people move into several jobs quite early in their work lives and then become fairly stable occupationally. Mobility is greatest among new job entrants, young people, old people, the less skilled, non-whites, and those in casual industries where seniority does not play a part. Workers who enter the labor market at the lowest rung of the occupational ladder "do not move quite as far

upward as those who begin at about the center," but a larger proportion of them experience at least some vertical mobility.^{10a}

The Break in Skill. In one national study it was discovered that one-fourth of the workers who had been unskilled or semi-skilled at the age of 25 had become skilled by 55. However, the earning differentials between levels of skill have narrowed—the spread being halved over four decades.¹³ Union activities have had some effect; increases in skill, even for farmers, have had as much or more impact.

By 1940, the Temporary National Economic Committee said, "substantial opportunity does not exist for a large proportion of workers in either small or large corporations. Most of them, therefore, must look forward to remaining more or less at the same levels, despite the havoc this might visit upon the tradition of 'getting ahead.'"¹⁴ Warner wrote, "there is strong proof now that the American worker, as well as others, can no longer expect to achieve success with anything like the same probability as did his father and grandfather." Built-in advancement is proposed by some to avoid serious employee frustration. To avoid this feeling of frustration, many workers shift their mobility aspirations to their children.¹⁵

The White-Collar Dream. Escaping manual labor by moving into white-collar status has been a longtime dream of many workers. As long as the white-collar opportunities continue to expand, manual laborers will be able to move in this direction, but there are those who question whether such movement is really "rising." The same formal relations of production continue, sale of labor occurs in either case, and there is the same discipline, although the white-collar worker may think he has higher status.¹⁶ White-collar workers make less money than blue-collar men, and the status difference may be exaggerated. Moreover, the blue-collar force will probably decline both absolutely and relatively with increasing technological improvements.

The Foreman's Position. Lynd once estimated that one would have to live about 400 years in Middletown for everyone to have a chance to be a foreman. In spite of such enormous odds, aspirations to advance to this function are very persistent. The aspiration continues despite a decline of the foreman's function. The traditional image of foremanship, as the "escape hatch" from the factory floor and assembly line, is changing.

In most plants "the position of foreman is as high as a worker without a college education can hope to go."¹⁷ Among automobile workers Chinoy found that for most assembly line workers "the foreman job is today the ceiling" and "no one had any goal in the plant

above the first level of supervision." "Holdovers" in management who had risen from the "floor" (or the line) no longer served as models of how high one could rise. One union official commented, "if you're any good you can't get promoted because if you do a good job they just keep you on the job. They're afraid they might not get anybody as good as that."^{15a} More than forty years ago Hoxie made the same point: "the employer is loath to take a worker from a task where he is making a high efficiency record."

Self-employment. The longtime dream of independence, of being one's own boss, and of escaping entrapment by machine and factory is still very strong in American industry, but because the possibilities are so limited workers now have to look to the broader community for satisfaction of their aspirations. The middle class, which formerly sought its satisfactions in individual enterprise has shifted attention to gaining upper white-collar and professional status.¹⁷

BREAKS IN THE SKILL HIERARCHY

The well known "break in the skill hierarchy" occurs at every juncture point or stress point between levels of status in occupation. Here there is no equality, only rank, and the only issue is: how much opportunity for rising exists? The Breach points, use of education to consummate a break from past statuses, and the move to professional ladders illustrate important phases of the unfolding of job opportunity.

Ladder-to-Ladder Movement. Workers may hold 3.1 permanent jobs (jobs held three years or longer) according to one count or 4.8 jobs over a 25-year work history, but there may be little movement upward out of one kind of ladder. This goes beyond the view of Miller and Form that "once started on an occupational level, a worker tends to remain at that level."¹⁸

Bendix and Lipset point out that although workers change jobs, "between those who work with their hands and those who do not, there is . . . relatively little shifting." Bell noted, "This is perhaps the most fundamental cleavage in American society. All those who work with their hands have spent 80 per cent of their working lives in manual occupations; all who do not work with their hands have spent 75 per cent of their working lives in the non-manual occupations."^{15a} Moving off the factory floor is difficult and bridging the "gap between the managerial hierarchy and manual work in the factory" is a serious problem^{15b} Advances in methods of production may merely accentuate the social cleavage between workmen and executives and sharpen social stratification of industry. Merton

noted that there is progressive closure of opportunities for moving up.¹⁹ Opportunity to move diminishes as one moves toward the top of each ladder and requires extraordinary efforts, accidents of birth, luck, or unusual ability.

One of the central status contradictions of the structure of industry arises at this juncture. Arensberg wrote, "at the top of the ladder of positions movement must be slow, open to only a few, or not possible at all for most."²⁰ Yet people are taught that one rises on the basis of one's abilities without being told that the avenues to the top may, for all practical purposes, be cut off. Knox indicated that this can become a terrible burden for workers and suggested that opportunities for advancement within a corporation must be kept open if serious internal conflicts are not to result. Efforts to professionalize work go on so as to make positions increasingly honorable affairs.^{21b}

Education is the most effective rung on both the skilled and professional ladders, although it is less important for attaining managerial posts. Much depends on where one begins, i.e., on family background and vocational level. It is clear that in most cases, "Those who plan on a professional career come from families which may be able to facilitate the additional years in school which are necessary.

While more than 80 per cent of the workers can learn their jobs in three months, there is atop this mass a highly skilled stratum of jobs requiring both more general and more specialized training. A high school diploma is the minimum prerequisite for these jobs. One must invest time and money in a long-term self-improvement program and then have a shorter work career.²¹

However, a college education "pays off" in perhaps \$100,000 added income during the working career, minus \$9,000 for the education expenses. In the early 1940's college graduates earned one-third more pay than the average worker, but by the early 1950's they earned only 10 per cent more.²² As college education becomes more widespread, graduates may find it more difficult to get top-flight jobs. Once again, the society may frustrate the very ambitions it has aroused.

Harris estimates that within 20 years there will be from 10 to 14 million college graduates, not the three million of 1930, and that the professions will have to absorb from 8 to 11 million of them, even though less than two million professionals were added to the force between 1910 and 1940. Tootle finds that educated youth are being brought into business much faster than "job satisfactions" can be developed for them and they may have to accept jobs that at

present do not satisfy a high school graduate. Automation may reduce but hardly reverse these tendencies to produce "surplus graduates" who can well become "embittered by frustration" and loss of social solidarity because of the impossibility of attaining unavailable professional and managerial positions.^{22a} With all the education in an increasingly stratified society, as Merton wrote, "managers come increasingly to be drawn from social strata remote from those of workers."¹⁹

The Professional Level. Nevertheless, thousands make it to the professional level which increased from about one million in 1900 to five million in 1950. During that same period college enrollment increased by ten times or at twice the rate of increase of professional occupations.

However he arrives, the professional faces serious problems. His function is steadily being broken into minor parts and turned over to less skilled persons. He may find himself doing a minor part of a function and not the whole job. It is no wonder that three out of ten professionals in response to queries indicated that, if they could resume their working careers at the age of 18, they would choose different occupations.²³ The professional faces a major psychological problem of feeling that his training and work are wasted. He may consider himself a victim of technology as his function is subdivided. Countermeasures have taken the form of professionals organizing to obtain improved (really "exclusive") status, developing a code of ethics, and even altering their occupational designations.^{21a} For some there is a chance to move up the managerial ladder, but this number is usually far smaller than the thousands who harbor the hope of rising.

MANAGEMENT: THE TOPMOST LADDER

Except for union leaders, top management is viewed by many as the highest rung on the industrial ladder of achievement. Since managers are mortal and elite groups fail to replace themselves, there is much mobility in and out of top management.

Entry into the Elite. Entry into the business elite is possible but restricted. The Horatio Alger message of opportunity to rise has little validity in history and possibly even less usefulness than the "safety-valve" of the frontier as an outlet for ambitious and dissatisfied urban workers. What some may view as a decline of opportunity to rise, Chinoy explained, "may be merely a progressive awakening from an illusion created by the nation's extraordinary growth."^{18c}

A generation ago Taussig and Joslyn found that some 10 per

cent of the population had produced 72 per cent of the top business leaders. They predicted that "by the middle of the century more than two-thirds of the successful businessmen in the United States will be recruited from the sons of business owners (large or small) and business executives (major or minor)."²⁴ At mid-century Warner and Abegglen found that 52 per cent were recruited from sons of businessmen: 14 per cent came from professional fathers, 8 per cent from white-collar families, 9 per cent from farm parents, 15 per cent from laboring parents, and 2 per cent from all others.^{11a}

These studies are concerned with mobility over generations. Within single working careers, "those who begin near the top of the occupational order tend to remain there."^{10b} One may work one's way up from the lower rungs of the occupational ladder—"but only part way up." The opportunities for movement become considerably narrowed above the level of skilled labor. Warner and Abegglen noted that only a small percentage climb from the bottom to the top, although this percentage has almost doubled since 1928.^{11b}

Elite Selection and Mobility. Lineage remains important in rising to the top in business.²⁵ Ascribed status is still crucial, "Men born to the top are more likely to succeed and have more advantages than those born further down."^{11c} The additional college graduates have to come from lower social groups whose entire status has been raised and who represent the great reservoir of new talent. Some expansion of top and second rung positions has come in the generation since 1929. Since the elites fail to reproduce themselves, top-caliber personnel has to be recruited from other, lower occupational groups. However, nepotism is hard to buck for one confronts what Taussig and Joslyn called a "castelike group" on top. Although a few high prizes exist, there are not many for a working force of 69 million. Horizontal and downward mobility are quite common, too, a point not well shown in studies of business leadership which have, ironically enough, a kind of built-in upward bias, as if movement were one way.

UNION ALTERNATIVE TO MANAGEMENT STATUS

Union advancement is an alternative and new avenue of vertical mobility which is open mainly to factory workers. Watson commented, "another important contribution of the labor movement is the provision of a new ladder by which the average boy or girl can rise to a position of influence."²⁶ Mills called the labor leader route, America's latest version of the self-made man, although unions are not this individual and machine politics is important.

Choosing the Union Career. When good leaders go un-promoted in plants, they may choose the union for further career activity. If strong power and leadership drives are not recognized or permitted expression through management, such aspirations can burst forth in union organization. Managers may look on such persons as disgruntled malcontents; yet they may make excellent leaders.

Unions open up a parallel ladder of mobility and protect workers from downward mobility by the use of seniority and other provisions in contracts. Unions may, however, slow certain changes and may make for lessened mobility for the individual worker who is treated as a roughly equal member of a single group.^{16a}

Limits to the Union Ladder. The union ladder of advancement is generally slow, narrow, and short, although much depends on the general status of unions. One may start by being a shop steward and gain enough seniority to achieve some recognition, additional prestige, and intraplant mobility. One may become a business agent or other official, although this is not easy. Even a major union, like the UAW, has but one salaried official for every 1,250 workers.

Union leadership is a limited alternative. As Chinoy wrote, "it is not, in ideological or cultural terms, equivalent to foremanship or a successful small business as a way of getting ahead." Even top union leaders do not feel that they are really "successful" in gaining status.^{15d} Despite all the talk of a labor economy, union leaders cannot rise much in the general society.²⁷ Many union leaders get very low pay.

Desire for Advancement. Values of American society rank high the desire for advancement or wanting more than one has. Margaret Mead once asked, "has the American scene shifted so that we still demand of every child a measure of success which is actually less and less possible for him to attain?"

Older moves upward rested, she felt, on the existence of a frontier and an expanding economy; others regarded mobility as a possibility only because of an economy of abundance. Equality was a climbing device: "The bourgeois found in the concept of equality a ladder to climb on." Equality in climbing meant equality in competition.

As movement from farms to city expanded, intensive climbing led to vast mobility and "acceleration" or moving upward and onward faster. So many rungs and ladders of advance existed that for a long time an illusion of no strata persisted.

Steadily inter-class mobility lessened and rigidities and sepa-

rations into classes have come. It became increasingly difficult to move off the bottom of the "social heap."²⁸ What had happened was that a very large section of the working class was not mobile in class terms although movement up one ladder, say from unskilled to skilled was possible. Intra-class mobility was also sufficiently strong to permit continuation of an impression of wide open class structure and some movement into the white-collar classes did operate. Perhaps it has been fortunate that climbing mania does not affect everyone; aspirations are limited; not everyone has to be foreman or president. Only some people are "mobiles" or climbers.

Many begin with limited aspirations and surrender them with the passage of time and defeats in bids for advancement.

Discrimination. As a form of categorically unequal treatment, i.e., applied generally to another grouping, discrimination is a force making for rigidities and lack of opportunity for mobility for those discriminated against. Of course, constitutional and other declarations aside, no persons are truly equal to others in ability, intelligence, character, influence, or possessions. What has happened in America is the dilemma of the creed of equality and the practice of discrimination which has reduced opportunity for many. While discrimination may not be motivated, by objective considerations, it is a means of cutting down opportunity for mobility in a sometimes subtle and sometimes brutal way. Discrimination is reflected in lower earnings and more menial jobs for certain ethnic groups.

Mobility Over Generations. There is a kind of mobility which involves occupational changes over generations instead of within the work life of an individual. Thus the ladder can extend across long stretches of time and two varieties of mobility may be distinguished occupationally and in a time sense. The San Jose study indicated that 58.3 per cent of the children moved away from their fathers' occupations.²⁹ An Indiana study indicated that 70 per cent of the workers were in occupations other than those of their fathers between 1910 and 1940.³⁰

One might correlate rise in skill and rise in occupational level within the individual's work career and over generations. They should be very close, for surely they are functionally interdependent. Empey, for example, found that occupational status aspirations of male high school seniors in various classes differed over the generations. Lower-class seniors preferred and anticipated having significantly higher occupational statuses than their fathers. He indicated that an anticipation of movement within the social level of the fathers was one kind of mobility, an anticipation of a better occupation or movement to a higher level was a second one. From

his findings it is evident that lower-class youth by no means limit their occupational (and other) aspirations to occupations and achievements generally associated with the lower-class. Many of them have the same relatively high occupational aspirations as the youth of upper and middle classes.

At work persons may be stripped of the possibility of realizing these aspirations until they remain only as the dreams of youth. Workers shift to thinking of advancing in and through their children, finding opportunities for them to go beyond their parents who have been blocked from moving up. Thereby status is built right into child rearing, encouraging children to surpass their parents. Some of the child's newfound status—if they succeed in rising—may permit parents to bask in reflected glory. A victorious ascent may, on the other hand, deepen a conflict between generations. In status climbing there is no surcease from conflict. The rest of this matter concerns status in the society generally, of which position in enterprise is but a part.

SUMMARY

There are at least three ladders in America's enterprises plus the union ladder, a general social status, and a mobility ladder stretched over generations. Each is shaped pyramidally and offers much room on the bottom, little on top. Movement within any one ladder exists; between ladders, movement is minimal. Much horizontal mobility merges with vertical, especially if the person thinks that movement has helped this situation. Over the years it is a question if mobility is less, for perfect mobility has hardly ever existed. Movement for the less skilled may be "at least partially closed." Skills are not easy to come by. Warner and Low found that "the 'ladder to the stars' was gone and with it much of the fabric of the 'American dream'" and as a result could state, "we seem to be witnessing the emergence of an industrial working class."

Continued occupational mobility is held to be important for peaceful development of a society at least as a safety valve. Blocked from moving ahead at work, employees may seek to escape working for others, or find their aspirations in their children's successes, i.e., be oriented toward the future. It may be that there is no security in status in a climbing society; conflict between generations is as significant as frustration of dreams of rising.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How does horizontal become vertical mobility?
2. What is a climbing society?

3. What is the theory of ladders of mobility?
4. Is opportunity to rise declining within any one ladder? Between ladders?
5. What forces assist in climbing? Deter from climbing?
6. What does Warner mean by an "industrial proletariat" as a phenomenon of closed mobility?
7. Analyze Toynbee's "internal proletariat."
8. How can we extend the possibilities of rising in industry?
9. Explain how much real mobility there is into top management's ranks; into union leadership.
10. How does the rigid placing of men within formal organization jibe with the traditional American dream of rising and becoming self-employed?

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STATUS IN SOCIETY AND ENTERPRISE

People operate in specific functions (roles) in positions (statuses) at work and in society generally. Industrial sociology is concerned with status-to-status relations of workers, managers, organizations, and governing forces.

Statuses have led to considerable stratification and class structuring. The industrial working class is, however, smaller, though not less significant, than predicted and than the groups of non-industrial and white-collar employees. Status takes on highly specific colorations in plants and offices where it acts as a strong motivating force. Whether earned or inherited, status is by no means secure. Anxiety over position is a serious condition in mass society and is rooted in the consumption orientation which is so different from the older production orientation of the days of economic scarcity.

INTERACTING CHARACTER OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

This status-hunting society is extraordinarily complex. Hughes noted, "it is doubtful whether any society ever had so great a variety of statuses or organized such a large number of status-determining characteristics as does ours." Mass society may well turn out to be the greatest "placing" system of the ages.

Status and Hierarchy. Each position has its defined rights, limitations on rights, and duties. Elements that go to make up status include occupation, social class, income, education, attitudes that accompany the statuses, and even status personality to an extent. Socio-economic status limits and defines the social contacts an individual will have and influences his attitudes, interests, values, and habits.¹ Family background, called "ascribed" status, affects choice of occupation, training for functioning in a status, and career advancement.

Status is also a ranking device that helps explain work-super-

visory situations within enterprise and social stratification outside it. Sherif wrote that "formally or informally organized groups of any kind are necessarily hierarchical—within their peculiar *status* and prestige scales."² He viewed status as "a standardized position in the group" just as Benoit-Smullyan called status a "relative position within a hierarchy."³ Status is really a container of social power, regulating social relations and assigning "functions which imply and require reciprocity between certain positions." Supervisory structure is basically a system of status—of deference, prestige recognition, and authority. Status terms abound in organizations: superior and subordinate; top and bottom management (foremen); the chain of command (over others); line and staff; communication up and down the line.⁴ Hierarchy is built into the mobility range of the occupational structure: apprentice, journeyman, master; probationary, permanent tenure; semi-skilled, skilled in a succession of statuses, status types, and status interrelations.⁵

Functions of Status. Whether ascribed (having little control over) or achieved (capable of being earned) or assumed (taken on or donned), status is a social ranking of persons by formal means. Formal status ordinarily relates superiors and subordinates along some chain of command. Informal status is the social rank others accord a person because of their feelings toward him and on the basis of his abilities. Barnard found that status has three functions in organizations. First, status facilitates communication and co-operation; it establishes legitimacy and develops joint and specialized meanings. Second, status can be used as a form of incentive and motivation; people, taught to desire and seek higher status. Third, status imposes and fixes responsibility by formal, positional means.⁶ Barnard's functional or informal status depends on a high prestige ranking or relative position of deference. Scalar status corresponds to the structure of authority, i.e., relations of superordination and subordination. Boss and worker relations, for example, involve more than rank; they involve the right to give orders and the duty to obey them, a powerful feature of supervisory subsystems.^{4a} Although some authority rests on power or force, as much or more rests on knowledge and understanding; one can earn authority.

Multiple Status in an Employee Society. In the time of George Washington when more than 90 per cent of the free adult males were self-employed (nearly all on farms), status was fairly integral. An individual's economic, political, and social statuses were virtually one. Today status at work may be quite different from status in the home, in the church, in a club, and in society generally. Status becomes dual, triple, or multiple. A status, like janitor, is related

to landlord, tenants, and other janitors. Besides being a janitor, though, the individual is simultaneously a husband, a customer, a client, a patient, etc. The statuses are interrelated, and each person requires some integrating means to keep his personality on an even keel.

Those employed by others constitute an economically directed group.⁶ Where a few lead and the many follow, the many have inferior status. Although some persons remain "independent," are their own bosses, they are often in lesser statuses than are those attached to giant industries. Because of governmental and other external controls, one must question the amount of independence retained by farm, technical and professional workers.

From Bureau of the Census data it is possible to estimate the "independent" groups, rather broadly conceived, as composing as much as 24.5 per cent of the labor force. These figures suggest that about three-fourths of the labor force is thwarted in its drive for adult independence.⁷ Work satisfaction decreases and alienation rises for persons working for others.⁸ Such superordinate-subordinate relations are, however, shaped as much by technology as by the hierarchy and group affiliations.⁹ The logic of size makes for subordination of the individual to engineering rationality.

ROLE: THE DYNAMIC ELEMENT IN STATUS

A role is a bundle of expectations associated with a status and resting on the internalized requirements of those around us. Work roles, like most others, are usually severely truncated or segmented and take up but part of life. An individual thus plays several roles, often simultaneously.

The Worker's Role. Where managers tend to deal primarily with persons, physical and technical considerations put most workers in the position of being more concerned with inanimate matter or things. A very low dignity is associated with the role of the worker. The low level of skills of many millions of persons has tended to keep roles inconsequential even for themselves, and that has been a blow to self-esteem. The worker's role becomes so narrowed that he is incapable of improving his social status. Once a job loses its significance, the worker feels that neither he nor what he does is important. This and the lack of opportunity to develop one's talents is a strong basis for boredom, monotony, and dislike of work. One may be driven to Mayo's "pessimistic revery" by a role emptied of human content. In addition the job may be incomprehensible to even the worker.

In mass society one is placed in various statuses and has to learn

the accompanying role. Choices are minimal or non-existent. Although some achieved status is possible, mobility is limited and the top possibility does not often match the aspiration level. A non-literate in a sacred society usually has no choice about role, but he may be able to play the role in his own way. A workman in mass society has some choice of jobs but little or no choice in how he plays the role, for management usually prescribes the one best way.

Because of the differences in education, background, status, and language the worker "finds it difficult in the first place to assume the managerial point of view even in a general sort of way."¹⁹ There is much more general and closer agreement in a sacred society.

Divided Roles. William James once held that a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry images of him in their minds, but he did not seem to see that in a complex society one may have diametrically opposed roles in contrasting statuses. Since each role in mass society is accompanied by opinions, attitudes, norms, and values, flagrant contradictions may accompany identification with various reference groups. Not all roles conflict; some overlap and harmonize. When they don't people tend to compartmentalize their reactions to conflicting role demands.

Status and role may be a unity (Linton's combined status personality), but this is usually brought about through the informal structures created as a means of living with one's self despite contradictory roles. A worker may then find himself in a companionable labor situation of primary cooperation despite role conflicts. Some group roles arise where one identifies with a company, thinks of himself as a Shell Oil man or a member of the United Steel Workers. To an extent one becomes a representative of the group.

STATUS IN PLANT OR OFFICE

Status in plant or office is only of status in society at large. Nevertheless, the individual is fitted or placed in an organizational structure which has some power over him. Within industry, a stratification system more far-reaching and effective than that of the Middle Ages has emerged. Everyone is put in his place; the relations of human beings are prescribed by organization master charts.

Visible Status Symbols. Heavy emphasis on visible status symbols has obscured the real social controls that are invisible, silent, and little known. Barnard described communication systems and visible status symbols that distinguish or relate people as "overt patterns of behavior" using designations, titles, appellations, and insignia that represent or stand for but are not the real human re-

lations. The real elements of status are not that visible that make up a complex code "thoroughly understood by the initiated and fairly easily sensed by the outside observer."¹¹

As Whyte showed, "the American office is a veritable temple of status."¹² The memo pad "from the desk of . . ." serves a useful purpose; so does the routing slip. Yet status problems arise even here: shall the slip be alphabetical, by seniority, by importance? One company uses a circular list so that no one is at the top or the bottom. Who sits with whom or eats with whom is part of this kind of status. Some types are rooted in propriety, viz., nicknames only certain persons may use, smoking by only certain ranks, private versus public rest rooms, carpet or linoleum on the floor. All these status symbols communicate. The organization master chart or blueprint itself is a symbol of status.

However, none of these visible elements or symbols makes clear the silent protocol of real human relations they supposedly represent. Some of these status elements, Whyte concluded, are "almost imperceptible." Barnard submitted that the complex codes of relations "are among the most subtle elements of status systems."¹³ One has to learn the real meaning of the visible symbols by close psychological interaction, not just study of overt symbols.

Executives have been known to become deeply disturbed if their desks do not appear long enough, or if they have linoleum instead of a rug on the floor.¹⁴ In an Eastern steel firm, the Chairman of the Board of a company had a Cadillac and the President had a Buick. Accordingly upper bracket steel personnel could not buy more than a Buick. Frequently businessmen probe each other to see who "ranks" higher; their wives do likewise and, indeed, one commonly hears, "My husband is in . . ." and "What is yours in?" Some professors may enjoy a partial advantage in being above or outside status. One professor of industrial relations said, "They know we don't make much money, but, by God, they can't *place us*."

The outer symbols of equality—the office party, the open door policy, using first names—are not quite what they seem. The partitions may seem to be down or absent, the physical layout conspicuously democratic, the plant "just one big happy family." That's the theory. But Whyte observed, "It can be put down as an axiom, in fact, that the more uniform the trappings of office, the more important the differences between them."¹⁵ A practical compromise is made to enable the business elite to enjoy the benefits of status symbols while at the same time luxuriating in the warm glow of egalitarianism. This playing down of the older type of conspicuous consumption by inconspicuous consumption may be a form of

counter-snobbery or inverse exhibitionism.¹⁴ However, Riesman has suggested that it may simply mean the money is being put back into the concerns to make them even more powerful.¹

Although status systems are usually thought to facilitate communication, lack of status may block communication. Whyte observed, "The less established the status of a person, the more his dependence on jargon."^{12b} The presence of status symbols indicates that management is far from being one big happy family; families do not have rank as ordinarily conceived.

The Candied Carrot and Status. The new hungers taught in mass society's motivational schools are not so much physical as psychological. The desire for status through possessions or goods may have replaced the old carrot and stick. Advertising and installment buying are powerful social inventions joined to the standard of living. Buying on time is a built-in device for gaining the pleasures of life without waiting. The worker's new chains are not so much to production as to his desire for goods and display, and for the prestige he thinks they confer in actually concealing his worker's status and making him appear middle class. Bell believes that workers seek the satisfaction they no longer find in work in material possessions. The satisfaction of prestige by workers is an important factor in the conspicuous use of automobiles, homes, and even wives, in a unique reversal of Veblen's old view of the leisure class being the group that engaged in such display of pecuniary power.

Samuel Butler once wrote, "All progress is based upon a universal innate desire on the part of every organism to live beyond its income." Since not everyone does this, one can hardly call this innate, but it is certainly more widespread now than it was in the past. Katona contends that there is no saturation point in buying. When people have enough cars, they buy new cars, or send their children to college, or improve their homes or neighborhoods. He says, "We give up aspirations when we have failed, not when we have succeeded."¹⁵ In brief, there is no maximization and no satisfaction in status; the ladder stretches into infinity—workers adopt leisure-class standards of consumption.¹⁶ In mass society one does not hear Lassalle's old complaint about "the damned wantlessness of the poor"—Marx's increasing misery in material goods.

TRADE UNIONS AND STATUS

Trade unions play an important relation in the struggle for status. They represent a group that steadily fights for more wages, better working conditions, improved recognition of unions and workers,

and status generally. Unions seek a twofold status improvement, within the plant (and for some workers within a single union) and within the society outside the plant.

Workers, largely through the activities of unions, gain added standing at work and in the community at large without achieving a union-run or laboristic society.¹⁷ Gitlow pointed out, "it seems doubtful whether unionism has played a significant part in altering the structure of the working class as a whole," although it has battered workers' positions and raised them steadily toward a middle-class position.¹⁸ It would be an exaggeration to write as Drucker did that "labor is making a final assault on the last barrier to status equality, an assault on management prerogatives," i.e., on "the making of important decisions."¹⁹ Even in situations where unions and their political parties have run entire governments, the unions have been relatively powerless and have lacked the ability to attain status equality.

Paradoxically, workers achieve "improved status" mainly through recognition of the unions' collective bargaining contracts. Instead of moving from status to contract as Sir Henry Maine and Tonnies and others believed was true of society generally, the workers have in fact moved from contract to status! The workers' desire for status leads to further union organization. What workers have lost in control over the job and movement at work they have sought to replace in the form of freedom and rights to be self- (really group-) determining through unions. Even though the workers may gain little voice in policy, they feel in a much stronger position.

STRATIFICATION AND CLASS

For years class lines were hardly drawn in the United States. The country was then characterized by the frontiers to be conquered. As the factory system has spread, increasing proportions of the population have been forced to work for others, and problems have developed over the distribution not merely of ownership and possessions but of political power, of income, and of consumption goods. Formal social relationships came to govern employment.

Stratification and Its Measurement. Industry has deeply influenced the stratification system of the community and nation. Certain owners, managers, and key technicians belong to the upper strata of society. A good number of technicians, white collar workers and foremen are in the middle group. A third division includes the mass of factory workers and the lower levels of all occupations. "The opportunity to acquire the desirable things of life is different for each of these groups.

There has been a change in the analysis of strata and class. Older Marxian versions stressed the relation to ownership and control of the means of production. Max Weber introduced elements of power over possessions, over political affairs, and over positions of social honor. This was a transition to political power views giving a new emphasis to status. Thorstein Veblen emphasized consumption criteria which, along with social honor, has become important in characterizing the stratification issue.

There are various ways to measure stratification. Self-ratings, "reputation" and objective standards have all been used. A status grouping is ordinarily considered a subjective ranking affair.¹⁹ Income is a consideration, but style of life does not rest on income alone; education and attitudes affect it. White- and blue-collar workers have similar incomes but different modes of living.²⁰ It is little wonder that no absolute demarcations of social class have emerged; in a fluid situation each view of class has "melted in our hands."

Persons who identify themselves as middle class may be thinking in terms of reference groups instead of membership. Lynd who considered that "the fact of objective class membership (is) based squarely on occupation and resulting wealth" felt that Centers had bypassed "the objective power relations of class" and saw class struggle "as a cloud as yet little larger than a man's hand."²¹ Others have held that there is no really clear demarcation of classes but a continuum of prestige and power.

The Emerging Class Situation. While no single or grouped measures for class have been perfected, interest in this activity suggests that class divisions are important. Some persons and groups have considerable power; others have little or none. A generation ago Lynd found: "It is after all this division into working class and business class that constitutes the outstanding cleavage in Middle-town."²² Two decades later Warner was to find that an industrial proletariat was in the process of formation.

One can distinguish agricultural classes, working classes, property owners, and enterprisers; but these classifications overlook many distinctions. Tenants and sharecroppers are widely divergent, as are farm owners. Managers and owners are not usually the same persons, where they are, they are still disunited. Workers are skilled and unskilled, union and non-union; there are considerable differences even among union workers. The idea of unified classes in a class struggle has not worked out well. There is much intra-class and inter-class mobility. Unions, for example, have not separated themselves from "capitalist" ideology.^{23a} Along pay scales it is pos-

sible, but only to a minor extent, to distinguish classes. Hierarchical relations are another possible scale.

Benoit-Smulyan has contended that, although many elements go to make up one's status, economic position is the determining element.⁵ Since Benoit-Smulyan wrote, however, a closer coincidence of status and class has occurred. Workers are a fairly distinct class with a rather low status; but the demarcations of the other groups are not so clear. Lynes has found that the newer fashion is to define classes along criteria of consumption. Warner also uses consumption styles, sociability, and participation in activities. Lineage has become an important criterion in some areas.

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM OF STATUS

Status remains a central social problem. Society has neither eliminated drives for status nor found sufficient statuses to meet aspirations. As a consequence, status anxiety afflicts many in the ranks and at the top.

Scarcity in Status. Although material abundance has tended to raise the possibility of people appearing better off, have not been eliminated; they may actually be more marked and narrow. The drives for prestige, recognition, power, and control over self are not realizable through material abundance alone. Overt physical differentials, but not psychological ones, are reduced by material abundance. The top executive and the lowliest office worker may wear somewhat similar clothes, but they hold considerably different social positions.

Automation may well help the worker enhance his status; it may push production workers off the factory floor and end the assembly line, but it shows no promise whatever of meeting the needs for more status. Degradation at work may be ending, it is even conceivable that the worker role will disappear altogether. But people will still contend for position and place, for prestige and social honor.

Status Anxiety. The actual effect of the status arrangement is to deny any assured status to all except some of those at the very top. The possibility of anyone's moving into the relatively few topmost positions is held out, yet such a promise of opportunity for all can hardly be fulfilled.⁶ Although the real prizes are social power rather than material abundance, Potter believes democracy can succeed only by having an economic surplus, i.e., more material prizes and a leveling up economically. Democracy is an attitude, however, and simple abundance does not create it. If it did, those with more economic goods would tend to be democratic.

Despite all the material abundance, status anxiety and much personal unhappiness afflicts most ranks of people. Where openings at the top are few, many persons are bound to be disappointed with possibilities for advancement.²³ This may be the worst scarcity in American society. While the culture encourages persons to climb and go beyond their parents, the top positions are too few to permit the entry of more than a small number. The excellent opportunity for downsliding is, however, ever present; that road down is all too easy and too fast.

Status considerations make for several different ranks, each equal only within its own level.²⁴ If one gets too "good" for one level, he can sometimes move into a higher league—or he may enter a structure which is built around equality, viz., informal association. Chances for advancement may be cut off; one's work may have very low social prestige or be eliminated by the accidents of history and by technology. The larger the organization, the less security one probably feels in any position. The need for social recognition is not tied to a single plant status and hierarchy or all of them; status is a broadly social arrangement which has to be made available to individual members and groups if the society is to function at all well.

SUMMARY

Status or position exists in plant and non-plant situations and is accompanied by role or function in each of the multiple groups a person enters. Most status is hierarchical; it is a rank order. It is dual and multiple in an employee society where the family is no longer the production unit. The worker's role in status is that of a person directed by others; roles are divided, truncated, and even conflicting. Status in plant is not sufficiently stable or personality-forming to exist separate from social status.

Although visible status symbols abound, the invisible elements in status are probably far more important. Status, after all, is a compound of attitudes and behavior. The candied carrot of material possessions may be taught people so as to encourage them to seek higher status. Unions are a principal status-achieving device and are a counterpart or competitor to managerial types of status. Stratification in the United States has probably reached the level that makes classes distinguishable. Directive-supervisorial relations have grown in number and social controls have become increasingly centralized. There are breaches between the class levels, but the new measures of class rest on consumption criteria more than on power or production functions. Material abundance fails to reduce status climbing whose real prizes are psychological not physical.

There is little or no tendency toward classlessness, and much evidence that the lack of sufficient statuses to meet most aspirations produces status anxiety in a highly mobile world.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is the nature of status?
2. How is a status-to-status relation hierarchical?
3. What are the functions of status?
4. In what ways does an employee society affect status?
5. How can role be the dynamic element in status? Is status not dynamic in itself?
6. What is the worker's role? The foreman's? The manager's?
7. What are divided roles? Unified roles?
8. Why is there no such thing as plant status?
9. Give a dozen examples of visible status symbols. Of invisible elements of status.
10. Relate the candied carrot to visible status symbols.
11. In what ways do unions provide status?
12. Give the arguments for and against the view that America is a class society.
13. How are status scarcity, status anxiety, and material abundance bound together?

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FORMAL ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY: INTERNAL PHASE

To say that mass society is bureaucratic is to say that it is formally organized and controlled from a few centralized points. Bureaucracy, a particular type of institutional framework, is clearly related to ownership and management, to state power and written regulations. It is one of the most significant inventions for social control of large-scale activities that require rational and impersonal rules to order the complex division of labor, to direct heavy capital investments, to maximize the use of specialized skills, and to provide highly differentiated managerial structures.

Modern bureaucracy has developed in the past three-quarters of a century with the rise of large-scale formal organizations. The revolution in communications and transportation has made it possible to control millions of people from a single source. Literally millions of people—6,000,000 in government and the military, over 12,000,000 in the manufacturing firms that have more than 100 employees—have become tiny cogs in complex machinery.

Underlying Capitalist Conditions. A money economy favors the rise of bureaucracy.¹ The long-range planning so necessary for large enterprises requires predictability and the control of human beings and machines. Horizontal specialization in industry is accompanied by a vertical specialization of a managerial superstructure to co-ordinate labor in a productive arrangement.²

Bureaucratic procedures become entrenched by what Schneider calls management's "creating and maintaining a continuous and rigid discipline over its personnel at all levels" and what Blau refers to as "gaining control over the operations in the plant." Even unions, socialist parties, and Russia, whose leaders call her a socialist state, use bureaucracy. Although bureaucracy is introduced for the sake

of efficiency, it encourages further large-scale combinations among workers and in the government. Bureaucracy is a function of the size of the industrial, governmental, and union structures. There were 8,000 federal civil servants in 1820 and a quarter of a million at the turn of the century; today there are more than 2,500,000 and fully 6,000,000 if the armed forces are included. That means that ten per cent of the American labor force is on the federal payroll.^{1*} State and local government employees swell this figure by millions more. Approximately 2,000 large corporations employ most of manufacturing labor. Medium- and large-sized plants, those having 500 or more workers, employed 47.6 per cent of all workers in manufacturing in 1948.²

Growth in all these areas increased the administrative tasks and consequently extended the development of bureaucracies as the mechanisms for executing large-scale administration. Large industry has found its principal means of social organization in bureaucracy.³ Its efficiency and speed in turn contribute to even more industrial growth.

The Conscious Control Process. A consequence of aggregation into larger-sized units is the substitution of formal organizations for informal arrangements and of conscious and deliberate regulatory and controlling mechanisms for spontaneous and voluntary coordination of human interrelations.⁵ Although informal relations persist deep within and alongside formal ones, at work most employees are part of a highly directed group. An entire social fabric grows around the formal coordination of tasks.⁶ The "conscious fulfilling of formally defined offices distinguishes institutions from elementary collective behavior."⁷ Organization becomes deliberate, planned in advance, designed around the predictable conduct of human beings and the stable expectations of machines.⁸

Control techniques are extraordinarily extensive. They affect policies, organization, personnel, wages, and salaries, costs, methods, and manpower. Foreign operations, and external relations are also controlled, for no bureaucracy is isolated from the rest of the social system. The control is lodged in a few centers that are organized and directed by a few top leaders. The rank and file have little or no voice in such control systems. Management coordinates others in formal organization.

NATURE OF INTERNAL BUREAUCRACY

Goals and Their Reconciliation. The aim of a formal organization is essentially independent of but understood by each member. In some fairly compatible way the end is consciously and deliber-

ately defined.⁹ Organization becomes a means to an end to which relations with employees, the public, and other organizations can be subordinated.¹⁰ Establishing the functional relevance of a task is often difficult, for the functional rationality of a firm may collide with the substantive rationality of the individual. It may, therefore, be a mistake to assume an underlying "community of goals" between employer and employees.¹¹

While more an accounting or measuring device than a goal, striving for the highest degree of efficiency is held to indicate the technical superiority of bureaucracy.^{9a} Organizational efficiency and not merely individual achievement is maximized. Still the problem of reconciling the goal of the organization with the interests of its members is serious. A key to the solution of this problem is professionalization, which is conceived of as a way of having individuals' incorporate the goals and, by self-discipline, gain a balance between conformity to the organization's rules and initiative on behalf of its goals. Organizations strive to ensure the reconciliation by conscious means.

One central contradiction is that "the possibilities for achieving power, status, authority, security, *within the industrial organization*, are realistic goals only for the hierarchy. For the laity, on the other hand, the most realistic goal, within the formal organization of the plant, is the pecuniary one."^{2a} Non-economic goals are not totally excluded for the laity or working staffs, but in most instances they simply have to be achieved outside the formal organization.

Office. In Weber's ideal-typical case of bureaucracy, "the regular activities required for the purposes of the organization are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."⁹ The concept of office is that it exists and operates over time regardless of the individual who fills the post at any particular moment. Offices are sets of tasks allocated by the organization; the individual must fill the office by performing prescribed and functional activities that will achieve the organization's goals. The duties are inherent in the position. The officeholder must have the necessary specialized knowledge and must accept the responsibility for task performance.

Professionalization and the Career. Professionalization, a reconciliation of the individual's interests with the organization's goals, is made possible by the provision of careers in bureaucratic service. The laity's position is quite different from an expert position, the latter being more education and skill bound. A career requires regular possibilities of promotion by seniority or achievement or both. It also involves the encouragement of loyalty to the organization so that members think of themselves as organization members

first and citizens second.^{11b} Organization man emerges, dedicated to the career, the goals supplied him, and the organization. But promotion and tenure are mainly for the managerial hierarchy and not by and large, for the employee laity.^{12a} This differentiation makes for elitist selection and far less loyalty to the organization on the part of the laity.

THE HIERARCHY RELATIONS

Since formal organization involves planning both the division of work and the allocation of authority over others, it is a kind of vertical specialization for the control and direction of human beings, defining of their status and role, and laying out the content of their work.¹² Vertical specialization concentrates decision-making in a few hands. As Weber wrote, "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one." All these interrelationships constitute the structure of an organization.

Organization Master Chart. The relations between all human parts of the formal organization in an ascending hierarchical arrangement are usually depicted on an organization master chart. This blueprint indicates the governing relations; it shows who has authority over whom and who has responsibility.

The status implications of organization master charts create untold difficulties. Executives often object to being placed below others on charts, or to being put either to the right or to the left. Shifting the chart, however, does not change the status relations; if the latter are a problem, it is they which have to be changed and not simply the chart. Resentment can be aroused if employees feel that the charts are tricking them into believing that rank and status differences do not exist or have been changed when this is not the case.¹³

Business is perhaps the most fruitful field for research into the principles of government, for a business "to conduct its affairs is to govern" men.¹⁴ Formal organizations have government-type power; they have real sovereignty over persons and are able to coerce agreement.¹⁵ These are politicized social controls. Such organizations are characterized by a ruling control network that has implications for the democratic process both within and outside the particular structures.

Formal Relations of Production. Mechanization deeply affects work relations, depersonalizing them and further separating the enterpriser from the worker and eventually even separating the capitalist from the manager. Formal, prescribed, and usually re-

mote relations are substituted for the intimate, direct, and personal arrangements of the past. Authority becomes largely anonymous and distant. Conflicts in goal conceptions become more frequent and more serious as the worker moves from primary to secondary work relations and as the directing and led groups become more separated.¹⁶

People are tied to functioning teams through organization master charts, formal job specifications, status systems, hierarchical communications, and rather rigid systems of rewards and penalties. A remarkable new stage of social control from a distance is reached. The worker in highly industrialized society must make his adjustments to the machine processes over which he has no control rather than to his fellow workers and his supervisors. Workers do, however, form certain primary relations within secondary organizations. Teamwork may lead to informal, warm human relations.

COMMUNICATION—THE SOCIAL MATRIX

Communication is the social matrix of interaction between persons in production processes. While understanding and sharing meanings is the essence of communication, there are those like Boulding who hold that the necessity of hierarchy "seems to lie mainly in the nature of a communications system." Bureaucracy's technical superiority as an organizational device rests in no small measure on its files and records and on the speed of transmission of ideas and orders.¹⁷ It is the revolution in communications in recent years that has paved the way for conscious organization.¹⁸

In work-supervisory relations, communication is mainly a management-directed activity. It is the way the superior informs the subordinate how the work is to be done.

Authoritative Nature of Communication. In work relations communication is by formal orders, written records, commands, and corrections; informal, verbal, and personal communication is secondary to formal types. Its primary objective is to keep management in control. As the speed of communication is increased and as computers and electronic data processing take over, communication will probably be both more complex and more in the hands of a section of the hierarchy.¹⁹ Communication extends the sway of large organizations and the executive's span of control. "Without the communications revolution," Biesman noted, "modern operations, including war, would be quite impossible."²⁰

Communication is worthless unless it carries the stamp of authority. Business has great influence on the mass media outside its direct domain, but its control on the inside is far higher, and

may be termed one-way communication. The flow of orders is authoritarian; it is from the top down.²⁰

Companies attempt to mold and modify employee attitudes by supplying information in magazines, on bulletin boards, by pamphlet and brochure, at meetings, through education programs, newspaper advertising and other media, not to mention the public relations programs that are designed as much to influence employees as the general public. They try to affect "negative motivation" by using interviewers and counselors, surveys and questionnaires, attitude scales, and suggestion systems. There has been a shift from the use of labor spies and private detectives to counseling programs run by psychologists. The authority element is, however, present in both techniques. So much attention may be paid employees that they develop new attitudes, as shown in the Hawthorne studies, although such changes cannot be duplicated on a full-plant scale.²¹ Training, too, is a form of communication.^{12a}

Public Relations. Presenting an enterprise in a favorable light is the purpose of some communication programs. This involves speaking favorably of company products, services, and prices as well as striving to satisfy and not merely inform people. The problem of consensus in mass society is involved. The experts recognize that "all the folderol we might use may not work unless there is a kind of *basic trust and understanding* between management and employees and between employee and employee as well as between the company and the community." Although broad minimum agreement on certain social ends exists between unions and management, and between employees and employers, there are conflicted relations and wide areas in which agreement is tenuous. A war for men's minds goes on, with different enterprises competing for the same consumer market. Both unions and managements try to gain the support and loyalty of their membership and the community.

Two-Way Communication. Under criticism for authoritative-ness in communication, various managements have sought to evolve two-way communication systems. There are many who believe that industrial problems are defects of communication. Communication upward from employee to superior is "one of the current fads of personnel philosophies."²² Bendix warned that the Hawthorne experiment did not really indicate that there was two-way communication in the plant. There was no self-regulating communication system with built-in feedback.²³ In an industrial situation, it is simply not possible for all ranks, groups, and persons to talk to one another freely and openly.

Bell contends that the employee newsletters and chain of com-

mand conferences do not constitute two-way communication, but merely reflect a change in outlook "from authority to manipulation as a means of exercising dominion."²⁵ Communication continues to rest on decision-making premises and on who controls the networks.^{12b}

Whether one-way, two-way, or multiple, communication has to be understood and this requires the recipients' participation in the communication process. Employee interpretations of situations differ from those of executives, moreover, communication is altered as it moves down the line. Where the will to cooperate is reduced, greater communication may actually increase friction.²⁶

One of the greatest illusions is that someone is listening when business may be talking to itself or reaching only middle-class groups instead of the working class ones. Union reports may, of course, be just as confusing and ineffective.

Paper Relations. Paper has insinuated itself into every aspect of culture today and has become a substitute for personal relations in formal organization. Most communication is on paper; to reduce possible misinterpretation orders are "in written form whenever possible." Paper becomes the main linking bond to employees.

Most decisions are now made on the basis of reports from various departments. Written policy statements imply or even force agreement on policy-makers. Most important of all, nothing is left to chance, and each member is related to other members by the master chart.²⁷ "Put it in writing" becomes the central slogan of formal organization.

One study showed that 99 per cent of companies investigated use bulletin boards while 44 per cent use meetings. Employee handbooks are utilized by 28 per cent, employee magazines by 20 per cent. Some 19 per cent produce safety manuals, 16 per cent put out special booklets, 16 per cent publish an employee newspaper, and 16 per cent issue financial reports. Another 16 per cent use films and 12 per cent public address systems.²⁸ Many managements also have powerful influence on the external media of communication; they affect magazines, newspapers, television, and radio.

What is most significant about the rise of paper is that its further use may block communication rather than improve it. Reports may be unread if not unreadable. As intimacy evaporates, understanding is usually eliminated. Even suggestion systems constitute a "depersonalized operation" whose very writing requirements "serve as a barrier to communication."²⁹ Information may be withheld, be kept secret, be released only when it makes management look "good,"

or it may be deliberately used to block understanding. Moreover, red tape and delay abound.

RULES, RATIONALIZATION, AND MEASUREMENT

Weber's "consistent system of abstract rules" governs operations which "consist of the application of these rules to particular cases" to secure uniformity regardless of the number of persons ruled or their personal interests. Rules are used to deal with people impersonally and in line with functional rationality. They can be impersonal and yet binding, as the written word becomes an intermediary but authoritative device for governing formal relations of production.

Rules and Depersonalization. There is a method in industry's depersonalization. Barnard explained, "a major function of 'rules and regulations' in any social organization is that of ensuring predictability of behavior within the organization" by reducing interactions to recognized and routinized ways.³⁰ Job specifications make no allowance for the person filling the job and for his relations to the persons with whom he works. Differences between persons are largely ruled out, leaving only explicitly defined and regulated statuses. A majority of employees "never even see their employers" or union leaders but are represented by some functionary.³¹ Brennan had rules in mind when he wrote that "the impersonalized monster of a master requires only impersonalized minutiae of men."³² Turnover lessens personal knowledge and managements rely on position-to-position relations rather than on personal interaction.

Rules deal with a model of man and in a way without people at all. Each person becomes marginal, identical, homogeneous and interchangeable—the ideal of scientific management, marginal economic theory and, latterly, of formal organization. A most peculiar kind of pure equality is reached, where massification or abstraction of personal qualities results in all being treated alike. Instead of being related to each other in some human way, men are related by rules to an abstract organization, activity, and process they can neither control nor understand.

Rules may be used in the remote control of lower echelons, no matter what the official decentralization. They have a punishment legitimating function involving the application of sanctions for violations. Impersonal checks smooth management's path.

Contradictions in rules are legion. Several varieties of difficulty are visible. Bureaucrats may hold to the letter of the rule in a "ritualistic orientation" of defense, apathy, and resistance to

change. On the other hand, passive performance of routine and the carrying out of rules can disrupt the functioning of the higher-level executive. If the rules become ends in themselves, leadership may collapse. Marwick wrote that the executive "must display a willingness to depart from old rules, choose between rules, establish new rules" in line with some knowledge of the priority of organizational goals or he cannot function at all well.

Rationalization of Modern Life. Functional rationalization, the arrangement whereby various individual's actions are linked to management-defined goals, subordinates the substantive rationality of the individual to the goals of the organization. This is not so much a reconciliation as a form of submission to organization; for, as Mannheim noted, functional rationalization can "deprive the average individual of thought, insight, and responsibility" and "transfer these capacities to the individuals who direct the process of rationalization."³³ The price of rationalization becomes a loss of the enchantment of life and a stunting of personal growth as specialization reaches limits beyond and beneath human understanding.^{1e}

Routinization is a central feature of bureaucratic rationality; it extends alienation by repressing awareness of the basic problems of human existence so as to get the task done regardless of individual thinking and needs. A kind of equalization of mass man, made into interchangeable parts, occurs through the conformity of calm and dictated routine. There is constant conflict between routine and the attempt to be oriented toward reality.³⁴

In brief, the contemporary enterprise is set up to obey the logic of size, the logic of metric time, and the logic of hierarchy, each of them a product of engineering rationality, i.e., the measurement and external control of human beings. A new science of administration has arisen to give moral authority to management. It is as if the authority were external to management and was contained in the clock, the stop watch, and in engineering rationality.^{25a}

Measurement and Speed. Efficiency is attained in good part by accurate measurement.²⁶ The measurement and control at timing, or the speed of operations, is one of the central functions of the manager.³⁵ When transportation becomes as rapid as communication, a further revolution will occur in extending managers' control. John von Neumann held that the industrial revolution, cheaper energy, and better communications have "increased the speed of performing large-scale operations—industrial, mercantile, political, and migratory."³⁶ The important thing is that increased speed has not so much shortened the time requirements that are fixed by hu-

man reaction time, habits, and other factors as it has tended "to enlarge the size of units" of all kinds. Instead of performing the same operations in less time, "now larger-scale operations were performed in the same time."

THE IMPERSONALITY PRINCIPLE

Weber held that "the ideal official conducts his office . . . in a spirit of formalistic impersonality," lacking hatred and passion, affection and enthusiasm. Functional rationality and sheer size make for specialization, lack of knowledge, loss of relation to end products, and alienation. There is but part-use of human capacities. Interactions with others are through part-role relations with little real sharing of meanings and values in a mass society.³⁷

Taylor suggested confining performance to "a single leading function," but this has led to overspecialization.³⁸ One may wind up with a function within a function, like a rat in a maze, too far away from identifiable processes to grasp them and, on the assembly line, actually disconnected from any work team.^{22b}

SUMMARY

The foundations of bureaucracy in mass society are huge size, vast communication networks, and the controlling of huge masses of people from a few central sources of power. For the sake of efficiency, there is extreme specialization by office, professionalization, and the establishment of careers as organization men. Functional activities are prescribed for each office; roles are laid down for each position into which one is formally placed. A hierarchy, pyramidal in form, depends on management control of positions of authority and a centralization of that control, now usually from a distance. A good deal of this is elitist. The controls are organized in the formal relations of supervision and, in most cases, an authoritarian (from the top down) climate of rule.

Record-keeping and files develop to impersonalize the control process. Communication is in writing, in stark contrast to the older and more customary ways of relating to others. Functional rationality and measurement logic govern work processes and relations. The impersonality principle is built into bureaucracy, making an individual secondary to placement in status and a carefully prescribed role. Little is left to chance. Like other human instruments, however, bureaucracy is quite imperfect; it has failed to reduce man to a machine, although it has alienated him.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Describe the foundations of bureaucracy.
2. What is the logic of size?
3. Why is there a problem in reconciliation to goals?
4. Describe Weber's idea of office.
5. In what sense is the professional an organization man?
6. What are hierarchical relations?
7. Compare formal relations of production, work relations, external relations, informal relations.
8. Communication has an authoritative nature. Explain.
9. Is anybody listening? Contrast one-way and two-way communication.
10. Why put it in writing?
11. What is the impersonality principle?

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EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

Most discussions of bureaucracy and for that matter of formal organization concentrate on the internal features of structure. They tend to play down or ignore bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy competition, multiple groups within bureaucracies, the overlapping of bureaucracies, the levels within and between bureaucracies where counter-bureaucratic elements can take root, informal groupings which are non-bureaucratic, and other non-bureaucratic elements. To understand bureaucracy it must be viewed in the social milieu of mass society.

Government and union bureaucracies have a powerful impact on industrial bureaucracy, and even the consumer, while technically outside the organization, affects its activities in many ways. Inter-organizational relations also play a large part in shaping the structures and help preserve a democratic character for much of mass society outside business enterprise. One must be aware of these extra-business power groups, while not underestimating the power of business bureaucracies to use mass media to homogenize the masses outside the bureaucracies. Although some countries seem to provide fertile fields for superbureaucracy to grow and overpower the pluralistic ones, non-bureaucratic elements are likely to persist and grow in most areas.

BUREAUCRACY IN A MULTIPLE GROUP WORLD

It may well be that the discussion of bureaucracy as a one group system is misconceived when not even the hierarchy can achieve its life goals within bureaucracy. The functional rationality of industrial bureaucracy is the source of very deep and real frustrations of individual goals. The important step in understanding even the

internal features of bureaucracy is to see them in the light of the external relations that involve the bureaucracy with the general public, industry, government, and unions.

Weakness of the One-Group Approach. It is not a little surprising to find a kind of monopolistic bureaucracy espoused by the very persons who claim their faith in competition. One has to go beyond views that bureaucracy is an industrial affair, when it is also a governmental and union matter.¹ If, as Bendix indicated, bureaucracy is a universal tendency, counter-bureaucracy and non-bureaucracy are universal too.² It appears more meaningful to suggest that bureaucracy is one of many social forces among multiple power groups and is not a final form of social rule.

Formal organizations are built around specific interests; no one can live out his whole life within the plant or office. The organizations are not the society.³ The organizations around a bureaucracy constitute much of its social situation, for the practical bureaucratic workings of an organization are quite localist in nature.

Blumer strongly objected to resting the analysis of worker-manager relations "on the proposition that industrial relations are in the nature of organized practices and customary routines," i.e., formal organization. In fact, he declared, such relations are "intrinsically tense, mobile and unstable—not settled, regulated and set" as in a medieval guild or primitive tribe.⁴ He was trying to point out that the formal organization is not the community or society and was seeking to situate formal organization within the social milieu.

Linkage to Community. Industrial bureaucracy has extraorganizational influence. It is a part of the more inclusive units of the society, that "wider system from which it receives raw materials and services and to which it returns goods and services."⁵ From the community, too, formal organization draws its customers and its personnel, its legal basis for being and, frequently, its entire base for operating socially. Bureaucracies have to come to terms with the community.

Any sound management recognizes its position in the community and has some functioning public relations program to affect that community.⁶ The successful manager has a policy of "community participation" outside the plant proper and shows a genuine concern for community and employee welfare. The chief statistician for Eastman Kodak once said, "We recognize that the internal affairs of the company are influenced by very dynamic external factors. These external factors change in ways which importantly affect the company."

Relations to Government Bureaucracy. Government, the vastest of power formations in a multiple group world, offers industrial bureaucracy real competition. Here are what Schneider terms "two vast, competitive bureaucratic systems," with interrelationships between them.⁷ Management has to take account of the interests of government, its laws and its powers, and accept responsibility to that government,⁸ and in a near-permanent war economy almost inevitably there is no point at which government bureaucratic competition ceases, until a possible super-bureaucracy arises. Since the depression days of the 1930's, "industrial bureaucracy has steadily lost power and initiative to the government," a process accelerated under the New Deal and World War II and not appreciably halted thereafter.⁹

Although industry has great influence on government, even to seeking to control regulatory commissions, the trend is toward increases in government control over the affairs of modern corporative bureaucracy. There are those who hold that every modern enterprise requires a department of government relations.

Workers and Informal Groups. Within the enterprise but outside its formal controlling apparatus stand the workers, the laity as contrasted to the hierarchy. In their informal associations they act as non-bureaucratic competition for bureaucracy. The formal organizations cannot provide security on the job and status gratifications as can informal apparatuses, which sets up their own counter-value systems. The workers also affect the organization in their roles as citizens, as union members, and as clients.

Workers affirm and reaffirm their independence of management's bureaucracy by instituting their own controls over production, setting up their own status relations, and entering their own controlling groups.¹⁰ Workers struggle for independent control over their own work, and turn to other bureaucracies and groups for aid. Free enterprise fosters unions, but "strange as it may seem the free enterprise system fosters the development of bureaucracy in the government, in private companies, and in unions."¹¹

The Customer-Client. The consumer is in an important sense both a part of the formal organization and an external force.¹² All the groups—labor, management, even a company or industry as such, and government—are also consumers and must be taken into account by industrial bureaucracy. Carroll's "invisible conveyor belt" runs not only through the plant but right into civilian life.¹³ After all, "the businessman must thus reckon with the consumer, the price- and quality-conscious beneficiary for whom the whole productive process is carried forward."¹⁴

Barnard has insisted that the customer is a part of the system of organization activity. His inclusion of the behavior of customers in the analysis of organization was a daring step of considerable importance for extending multiple group approaches to industrial sociology.¹³ Managers and workers are customers, even clients, of the very organizations of which they are members.¹⁴

Peculiarities of multiple motivation abound in such overlapping situations. For the manager the company may provide profit and power, for the worker income and some satisfactions, for the consumer products or services. A subtle metamorphosis may be observed: As consumer the worker has satisfactions from the products he has himself created and purchased from the company. He is, more properly speaking, in a consumer-producer relationship, having a double impact on enterprise and a multiple group status and role. Many an enterprise and even entire professions, as E. C. Hughes put it so well, may develop ambivalent feelings toward these and other clients, needing and hating them simultaneously, ruling them and yet catering to them, feeling and fearing the constraint of their pressure and demands.¹⁵

For a long time economists have been baffled by this ambivalent in-and-out relationship. Some have spoken of consumer sovereignty, others of producer sovereignty.¹⁶ But no strong enterprise waits for the consumer; it tries to anticipate him if possible. Here is the concern for mass buying power which has distinguished mass society and actually places in the hands of the consumer a powerful element of authority deriving from industry's need to win his consent.¹⁷ A Ford executive once said that planning for the automobile market requires careful estimation of the consumer. As Ford Chairman Ernest Breech said, "We are acutely aware also of many external, social, and political forces which condition the environment of business and will affect our planning."¹⁸ The entire planning base of bureaucracy is entwined with the client and non-enterprise group pressures and forces.

Wives of Management. A powerful yet little understood internal-external factor in the bureaucracy of enterprise is made up of the wives of management. Sometimes called a "semi-company group," they may actually be interviewed and screened when their husbands seek executive employment to ascertain whether the wives' style of life fits the company's executive "profile."

Unions and Bureaucracy. Although unions are voluntary associations, they develop their own bureaucracies in part as counter-bureaucracies to those of management.¹⁹ Unions are ultimately accountable to the membership in a way management is not, but man-

agements are increasingly accountable to unions, government, and clients. The presence of a union within an enterprise is another case of one organization operating both inside and outside another, frequently overlapping several bureaucracies and the government. Unions make for at least two-way communication between the workers and a single management or those of a whole industry.

Managements have to listen to unions, which—because of their special relations with government, other unions, and other enterprises—are able to communicate a kind of criticism that managements may get from no other source. In brief, unions have forced business to share power with them; they have appealed to governmental bureaucracy to legitimize this arrangement.

The corporate bureaucrat has to consider employees, wives, supervisors, government, and unions in planning for his organization. As Selekman wrote, "economic administration in the United States, as elsewhere, is implicated with the whole social process."^{12a} Here is the heart of the multiple group approach to the study of bureaucracy.

PLURALIST BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS

Since plant and office bureaucracies must operate within the community and the social system, a pluralist bureaucratic relationship exists. In inter-organizational maneuvers, each organization forces changes on the other and, indeed, calls forth counterparts of its own structure. Between the organizations lies an area of pluralist democracy.

Multiple Group Bureaucracy. Shartle wrote, "An organization which is not a part of another organization, or which is not formally affiliated with other organizations, is rare."¹³ Even when they appear separate, organizations share common and overlapping memberships, many goals, and are in other ways interdependent. One may well speak of intermediate organization, of informal groups within and without formal organization and even of countervailing power where conscious use is made of multiple and interlocking structures.

In both unions and industry the seat of power has shifted away from the local to the national or international officers.²⁰ The local organization is constantly interacting with and being permeated by local and distant power centers. The more specialized the formal organization and the more centralization spreads, the larger is the job of mediating between and coordinating, or tangential organizations. Bigness begets politicalization of groups and their interrelations.

The Mirror Effect. The corporation, union, and government are frequently cited as the typical organizations of the time, and it is asserted that other groups imitate or mirror these typical social formations. It is true that most social organizations in a given milieu have important similarities—the same general membership, general power goals, and governmental-supervisory relations. Economic organizations become political and political ones take on economic functions. The question becomes: Who is mirroring whom? Which came first? Which fused later?

Lens referred to the mirror effect when he wrote, "Centralization of union authority was certainly inevitable in a world based on monopolies, cartels, gigantic insurance companies and banks." Actually unions were centralized before the rise of gigantism in business in many cases. Conspiracy and injunction cases and other measures forced centralization into being; later management pressures and the internal development of union bureaucracy extended centralization. The growth in centralization seems to have developed as a response to social needs rather than as a result of copying earlier formations.

An expression of the mirror effect ran: "Management as a general principle gets the kind of union leadership it deserves. A tough management begets tough union leaders, while a patient, friendly, cooperative management begets a like type of union leadership."²¹ In truth the nature of the industry may be more significant for making peaceful relations than the so-called nature of management.²² Such statements do not indicate how management becomes tough or friendly in the first place, and they miss the role of the government. At times managements follow union attitudes; at times they follow one another, or no one.²³

The administrative function in most large-scale organization has become pretty much the same in any event. When General Lucius D. Clay moved from head of the occupation forces in Germany to chairman of the Continental Can Co., he said, "The art of administration is very much the same wherever you are, even in government. There is no basic difference in any field."²⁴ Drucker found, too, that, like the business executive, "the leader of a big union similarly exercises managerial functions," somewhat akin to Mills' view of union leaders as "managers of discontent," and Schlesinger's version of the "politicalized labor leader." Put in business situations, Starr showed, union leaders "are constrained to act as businessmen. They become aware of their position as head of a supervisory hierarchy," while remaining fraternal chieftains, political leaders, and generals.²⁵ One group or leader can hardly be the mirror of the

other, since all rest on and reflect broad needs of groups in the society, even if they reflect them badly.²⁶

The Counterpart Theory. In their interactions organizations force competing bureaucracies to use not the same but even better tactics and strategy. Blau said, "Strange as it may seem the free-enterprise system fosters the development of bureaucracy in the government, in private companies, and in unions."⁹ His view has the virtue of indicating that it is the nature of the society which produces a similar effect in its major power groups. Then the groups develop beyond this somewhat passive stage and alter the society. They do not rest at any countervailing stage of checks and balances but constantly break up equilibria, although the power of government may enter to function as a superauthority in given social conditions. An outstanding case of a counterpart aroused by formal organization is informal association.

Pluralist Democracy. Blau has shown that bureaucracy follows a criterion of efficiency, democracy a criterion of freedom of dissent. In concentrating power in a few hands, bureaucracy curtails individual freedom that is so essential for democracy; yet democratic objectives would be impossible to gain unless bureaucratic organization were present to implement them. Having only a few individuals in charge of bureaucratic machinery violates democratic principles and can be offset only by vast democratic participation.^{9b} The problem is that bureaucracy tends towards centralization, democracy towards chaos.^{17a}

On a one-group, single bureaucracy basis, the problem is indeed insoluble. Once it is recognized that people are involved in "interstitial social zones," in multiple and overlapping groups, bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy relations can be treated in a democratic mass society and different conclusions drawn. Hierarchical relations exist but not merely within bureaucracy, to which it is unacceptable to constrict the field of study of industrial sociology, for rival power is present.²⁷ If as Montesquieu and Lord Acton believed, liberty depends on division of power, freedom lies in the interstices of authority and not merely within a single organizational framework.²⁸ Such freedom can exist if one group is not dominant over the others. One may ask, in a condition of rising state power, where the rival power is to come from?

Centrality of sovereignty does not lead logically to centralization of administration, but with the communications revolution policy is centralized even if some operational administration is decentralized or delegated. A premium on centralization is made only if the sole criterion is technical efficiency, as Mannheim showed so well.²⁹ So

long as a single group does not dominate the others, interstitial democracy continues its precarious existence. Many experts believe that the presence of unions makes for democracy in industry.

SUPERAUTHORITY PROSPECTS

Massive, ubiquitous, highly impersonal and at the same time highly politicalized and governmentalized, the bureaucracies of our time are by no means separate from governmental power. Major moves of the giants and their inter-organization relations develop political power problems. Yet most authority is organizationally limited. Outside a union the topmost union leader has little authority and less status. This is less true for businessmen, especially those who seek to capture government posts and commissions, but a kind of super-authority may be steadily rising in the form of government.

Totalitarianism, as Blau showed, is simply the polar case of bureaucratic concentration of power that destroys democratic organizations, although political boss rule does the job as effectively.²⁹ American mass society has produced a virtual coalescence of military and political leaders at the level of policy-making and at the operational-production level as well, with opportunities for a super-authority and super-elite to emerge.³⁰ While some may ask whether government shall violate the separate existence of management and unions to hold both within the bounds of democratic conduct, government bodies are already making key decisions for both. Hundreds of administrative bureaus affect every level of business and labor activity. Government bureaucracy is, however, not unitary; whatever its power, it is not a monolith.

Still, government can go much further toward regulating and controlling the internal affairs of unions and management and their interrelationships as well. Since the 1930's industrial bureaucracy lost ground and initiative to government—"the encroachment of government on industry has, in many areas, reached no logical stopping point."³¹ This is as true of food and drug inspection as it is of National Labor Relations Board activity. Samuel Lubell says, "the overriding issue is the new necessity for what might be called a 'national state'—for a government strong enough to define and enforce the national interest in a world in which atomic war constantly threatens."³² Lubell is referring to a type of majority government that can have great control over the private bureaucracies; the war powers and structural means for achieving this control already exist.

One may go further, as Appleby did, to indicate that "the governmental bureaucracy is the one special organizational structure whose forms and capacities are oriented to general comprehensive

integration. Its sovereign position is that of the one wholly conscious and intended, fully systematic bureaucracy at the service of the society at large. There is no principle that properly limits its capacity. Only the procedures necessary to its actions and the general judgment of society set limits, and these limits are variable." Much depends on government reactions to demands, to crises, to dealings with other governments. But the awesome power to move into a super-elite phase of mass society is not to be ignored.

NONBUREAUCRATIC FORCES

Far from achieving its cherished goal of technical efficiency, bureaucracy may be accounted a failure in this regard. Its greatest lapse has been in personal relations where the impersonality principle has aroused counter-bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has by no means triumphed, especially in smaller industries and in kinds of functioning that do not demand a high degree of specialization and professionalization. Nonbureaucratic tendencies arise in the form of groups that favor the bureaucracy but act personally, groups that function outside it, and groups which oppose it. Informal groups are quite commonly conceived as opposing bureaucracy; together with other non- and anti-bureaucracy elements they constitute a formidable power.⁷⁴

In addition, there are anti-bureaucratic elements in the society at large. There is the competition of other bureaucracies. There is the merciless pressure of public indignation at bureaucratic treatment in its delaying and ritualistic form. The tradition of the society remains quite antibureaucratic. There is an absence in society generally of the rigid scheme of organization, even at headquarters levels of many organizations. Government generally lacks a static career officialdom, although one has arisen in the foreign service, armed forces, and police. The tradition of a thorough housecleaning of personnel once a new party takes power is by no means weakened, although civil service regulations have slowed this turnover. Simple turnover is, however, an important factor in keeping most bureaucracies in a state of upheaval. Sometimes turnover of public and other employees is so high as to disrupt and prevent the establishment of bureaucratic routine.⁷⁵

Some sections of industry and trade do not work well under bureaucratic procedures. A research laboratory, for example, operates better when a colleague arrangement is used. Leadership develops informally and is based on ability. Greater freedom for communication and exchange of ideas is present than in a hierarchy. It may

well be that as research and development become more important for industry, treatment of research personnel may alter.³²

Bureaucracy cannot be thought of as a final phase of social organization, just as hierarchy is hardly conceivable as the final relationship into which human beings must enter and remain for life. One may hold that organization man in a hierarchy is a transitory phenomenon. Mass production remains the greatest force for change in our time, striking down older ways of producing and of ruling personnel and altering entire old patterns of life. Where there are bureaucracies, there are informal associations and counter-bureaucracies and formidable anti-bureaucratic forces moving for personal and direct human relations. So long as pluralist democracy flourishes and no super-authority arises, bureaucracy does not have to become monolithic. Even the super-monolithic organizations have flaws and weaknesses; throughout history they have collapsed and given way to other social forms.

SUMMARY

Every bureaucracy exists in a multiple group world; no one-group bureaucracy has ever arisen. There is bureaucratic competition. No bureaucracy can ignore the company stockholders, its workers and their informal groups, and the power of the customer-client. Unions, too, offer counter-bureaucratic power that helps produce a pluralistic bureaucratic relation. One organization may call forth counterpart groups which can then go beyond it in many bureaucratic respects; for bureaucracy does not stand still, impelled as it is by the fundamental upheavals of mass production and competition.

A superauthority of government over other bureaucracies has been posed as a possibility. This would be a totalitarian mass society, but it probably would not last. Non-, anti-, and counter-bureaucratic forces are constantly being bred. The drive for independence and control of one's own conduct and for direct personal relations cannot be stilled. A compelling feature of bureaucracy is informal association which is the quintessence of non- and anti-bureaucratic functioning in mass society.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Compare the one group and multiple group approaches to bureaucracy.
2. In what way is bureaucracy linked to community?
3. Describe the relations of bureaucracy to government.

4. Why is the customer-client partly within and partly outside the bureaucracy?
5. In what connections is a union a bureaucracy? A counter-bureaucracy?
6. State the main features of pluralistic bureaucratic relations.
7. Analyze the mirror effect.
8. Does counterpart theory explain the external relations of bureaucracy and how it is changed by its own dynamics?
9. What are the chances for preserving pluralist democracy?
10. How can superauthority be avoided? Weakened? Opposed?
11. State the case for non-bureaucracy in mass society.

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INFORMAL ASSOCIATION: THE POLAR OPPOSITE

No bureaucracy is complete or perfect; within it and without it stand other organizations, some of them polar opposites to formal organization and some types of personal patterning called structure that are of exceptional importance. Application of parataxic logic to bureaucracy and so-called informal organization within it reveals that, while informal organization is perhaps the distinctly American contribution to the study of organizations, in fact there is no such thing. Arrangement of persons within the highly conscious organization in a personal, human, and direct way is really a form of structure and counter-patterning. Where there is formal organization there is its polar opposite, structure; where there is bureaucracy there is informal association within (and without), and there are bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy relations.

Although the word "informal" somehow suggests that the relationships are secondary, unimportant, and outside the framework of organization and its objectives, they are actually positive, personal, and in many respects far more significant in the lives of workmen and managers than formal organization. Although one could drop the term in favor of something like "personal relatedness," using "informal structure" may be a good compromise in view of present emphases.

Informal associations within formal organizations present the picture of multiple loyalties on a spontaneous and personal basis. The emphasis is on people and not on position, on authority attached to the person and not on status. Memberships overlap and sometimes call for diametrically opposed conduct and aims although parallel conduct is possible. Such relations cannot generally be eliminated or abolished by formal organization. The Weber version of

an ideal-typical model of bureaucracy fails in practice. An extension of the theory of bureaucracy beyond its external phases is a prerequisite for a complete organization theory.

THE BREACHES IN FORMAL ORGANIZATION

The gaps and weaknesses of formal organization make for breaches in the human interconnections and provide the place and occasion for informal association. These critical flaws occur at every juncture of bureaucratic organization.

Polar Incompleteness of Formal Groups. "No association," as Bierstedt remarked, "is wholly formal, not even the most rigidly organized." The most it can do is to make possible "orderly social intercourse of people who do not know each other." Once together, these people relate themselves to each other not as unknowing, part-role performers, but as real human beings.¹ Barnard has commented that "informal organizations are necessary to the operations of formal organizations,"² just as Simon has shown that the formal scheme "will always differ from the organization as it actually operates in several important respects."³

Some analysts believe bureaucracy suffers from "strains" in operation that make for disruptions in the form of conflicting tendencies. Contradictory movements may produce dysfunctional consequences as well as carry out the functional requirements of the group. Unfortunately Weber's approach to bureaucracy implied that the ideal type was efficient and that deviations from it were enemies of efficiency, when in truth official relations may be inefficient while "unofficial practices often contribute to efficient operations." Thus the bureaucracy in operation is quite different from that shown on the organization master chart; people act in human and not dehumanized ways and in so doing may collide with formal requirements.⁴ There is weakness in the idea that bureaucracy is a kind of equilibrium which would work well if there were no strain. In fact, disequilibrium is built into bureaucracy. Contradictions are compelling: dehumanization meets its match in the personal relatedness of informal structures.

Ignoring Bureaucracy's Prescriptions. What some call non-bureaucratic elements and counter- and anti-bureaucratic features of formal organization, it turns out, marks the failure of bureaucracy to command relations in the work situation and the society at large. People may be irrational, but then bureaucracy itself lacks the rationality accorded it by Weber and others. The issue of rationality is crucial. In the first place, there is the irrationality of rationalistic administration especially in getting efficient procedures accepted by

workmen.⁵ The so-called rational bureaucracy has repeatedly failed to allow for human relatedness and major changes both within and external to bureaucracy. Routinization is frequently carried too far; anxiety arises out of the specialization and separateness (alienation) engendered by this "rational" system.⁶

What is rational for management, functionally rational, is by no means rational for workers. The functional rationality of the bureaucracy can be and frequently is diametrically opposed to the substantial rationality a human being requires in order to remain in healthy interaction with others. One may question Pareto's view, especially the assumption that rationality (however defined) is superior to irrationality. To be nonlogical in relation to management's functional rationality may be quite logical in relation to one's own substantive rationality.⁷ The workers' struggle to gain "independent control over their own work" cannot be explained simply by dubbing it nonlogical, irrational, or informal. All of these negative characterizations miss the positive action taken against the disciplinarian measures of bureaucracy and the power arrangements workers themselves develop.^{4a}

The Goal Problem. Formal functional rationality rests on previously defined goals so arranged as to maximize efficiency, yet the obstacles to efficient operations can hardly be removed by the bureaucracy's own system of rigid procedures. This would require a self-adjustment pattern that is not generally available.^{4b} Once established, rules and regulations develop a life of their own, become difficult to change, and call out for still more rules and regulations, Brecht's "multipliers" of bureaucracy.⁸

Modern administration has not solved the problem of reconciling the interests of its members and that of bureaucracy. The presumed "spontaneous cooperation" of Mayo and others collapses before the spread of non-bureaucratic elements. Executives must violate some rules and produce new ones for organizations to grow and develop. Goals may be overorganized, producing an overconformity and sterility that is a menace to management-employee relations just as overcentralized administration is a hazard for democracy and freedom. Overcentralization is very common in bureaucracy and reflects many weaknesses. It may take the form of overextension, lack of good connections between bureaus, too many demands on members for participation, and too close dictation of every move.

Rules for reaching goals are limited since no formal organization can specify all conduct or prescribe in detail each action to be taken. Although such thorough control and direction is attempted through vertical specialization, opposition to aims and rules grows.^{2a} Anti-

organizational moves and groups arise; rule evasion becomes institutionalized. Rigidity of structure runs into internal and external changes that upset formal relations and formal rules. Bureaucracy cannot maintain a state of equilibrium; it is not a stable system.⁹

Authority and Democracy. Max Weber has complained of the "iron cage" of modern industrialism and bureaucracy, its over-rationality and control, a position quite close to Pareto's circulation of the elite and to Michels' iron law of oligarchy. The anti-democratic tendencies of bureaucracy are major problems for mass society. Executives may assume command without responsibility to the governed and, sometimes, to the organization. The selection of business leaders may be so much from one class that a kind of industrial ruling class is created.^{8a} Lester Pearson once said, "Surely we are not going to escape total state control in order to seek security in the 'big organization' type of social and economic conformity."¹⁰

Meanwhile, within bureaucracy there stands a sturdy rival, a powerful competitor, and a thoroughly non-bureaucratic group. Like the public at large, the informal association within the bureaucracy is the hope of continuing mass society in a democratic form. It is the human protest against the impersonality principle and the last refuge of privacy within the juggernaut. Moreover, by operating through the various large organizations in which individuals participate, as in their producer-consumer roles, they may directly and indirectly influence the community and the bureaucracies.^{4c}

THE NATURE OF INFORMAL STRUCTURE

The fairly regular rediscovery of the A, B, C's of sociology in the form of finding the informal groups should not dim for anyone the fact that "informal association is rather obviously a condition which necessarily precedes formal organization."^{2a} While historically this is the case, informal association also arises within formal organization. Informal association continuously emerges.

Personal Relatedness. Real personal relations are never completely formal. Without informal groups, formal organization would be a thorough autocracy, virtually unyielding and changing but slowly.¹¹ It is the informal association which is far better at meeting those real human needs that are hardly being satisfied by formal means.¹²

While formally organized, human beings find that they can be personally disorganized; informal association is a means of resisting the throttling of desires and halting of satisfactions. Even Whyte's organization man fights the bureaucracy. If one knuckles under, one is destroyed by organization, or, as Whyte wrote, "the fault is

not in organization, in short, it is in our worship of it."¹³ The perfect formal organization is Michels' perfect oligarchy; informal association both humanizes and democratizes such structures outside the formal blueprint.

Variations on Formality. The formal scheme "will always differ from the organization as it actually operates in several important respects." Many omissions occur, since interpersonal relations cannot be specified in detail, although mass society has made immense strides towards specifying virtually all important (and much unimportant) conduct in writing. Interpersonal relations may contradict specifications as may interorganizational disagreements. Living relations either may not be in the paper scheme or be inconsistent with it, or both.¹⁴

Official rules may be ignored, or honored mainly in the breach. Instead of following the impersonality principle or the machine theory of organization, people will behave in human ways. When an order is incorrect or incapable of fulfillment, a solution is often found informally. Moreover, people come together in on-the-job-groupings based on similarities and differences, and do so as well because of the off-the-job problems and conditions they face together.¹⁵ Although the informal groups usually lack the conscious awareness of the formal organization, they constitute a basic reaction of workers to the social and physical environment of production and to formal organization.¹⁶

Dalton's study showed that, in terms of an efficient and impersonally functioning hierarchy, American managerial theory was in most cases similar to Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy, "while actual relations in industry are seldom covered by such theory." He explained, "our changing society, our lack of an administrative tradition, and our emphasis on individual success combine to prevent impersonal relations in this area."¹⁷ What is significant is that human interaction knows no social vacuum, where formal theory and organization do not cover social relations, informal ones do.

Management Opposition. Worthy has held that a measure of the effectiveness of a firm is the extent to which the aims of the informal group correspond with those of the formal organization.¹⁸ Many managements frown on informal association as competitors, as "subversive of the purpose of formal organization." Management may feel that informal groups "come into being in order effectively to oppose demands coming from higher authority and work counter to the purposes set by management." While such rivalry may occur, informal associations may also play a highly productive role.¹⁹ Some managements have attempted to set up semi-informal associations

in the hope that they may be controlled. Mayo has proposed that industry organize well-knit human groups under management control.¹⁹

There is a school of thought which holds that management has to formalize the informal. Others, perhaps more wisely, hold that informal association cannot be abolished by any order of management. Informal associations are not a transitory phenomenon; they were not created by formal organization and cannot be done away with by management. Indeed, it is necessary to add the important proviso that management itself is not unitary but has many informal associations. Many of these are concerned with secrecy, elite selection, and close personal relations.

It is impossible to formalize all human actions even in the tightly controlled work environment. It is also true that non-bureaucratic relationships may not be in opposition to management; they may be parallel to it and in part supportive of it.^{16a} Management dreams of one-team, with high spirit behind its "war" effort, but such an arrangement might actually have a disintegrative effect on the very group structure it extols.^{17a}

FUNCTIONS OF THE INFORMAL

The general function of informal association is to provide alternative outlets for workers' and managers' aspirations, outside the formal blueprint.^{15b} It extends the range of choice in work relations and in so doing provides that pluralism of multiple groups which makes for democracy. Informal association helps meet the needs and desires of members, by making it possible to perpetuate their own "culture," which is somewhat different from that of managers, by providing a communication system, setting up its own social controls, giving status to persons outside the hierarchy and deep within the laity of industry, and permitting them to develop their own authority on a personal rather than a positional basis.

Subculture of Informality. Informal associations do more than protect workers against impersonal treatment and orders from above; they provide a subcultural setting that gives workers the security and satisfaction of belonging to a stable group. The subculture has its own language, its own norms, its own rules, and its own group standards.

Communication Media. Formal communication is by delegated authority, responsibility, and procedure, and is usually in writing. This network is supplemented by informal, spontaneous, and verbal communication.²⁰

Administrators are often urged to watch gossip, rumor, and scuttlebutt as barometers of public opinion" within the organization—a peculiarly apt comparison of informal association within formal organization to the public within the democratic mass society.^{3c} The informal group has the freedom to dissent in a democratic way that bureaucracy does not.⁴ The grapevine permits employees to express themselves, helps spread useful information, and gets management orders across. Of course, it may also spread rumor and untruth.^{14a}

Managers use informal means of communication among themselves and with various levels of workers, but they also study the grapevine in order to guide and control the dissemination of information. They often try to offset certain rumors with counter-rumors or facts and sometimes seek union assistance in getting orders across and in combating common talk.²⁰

Among informal associations communication is very free; dissent is common; and management efforts to control the grapevine are suspect. When managers approach, conversations may be halted or shifted. A leading group norm inveighs against informing on an associate to a supervisor or manager. Even if one learns the content of the informal discussions, no full understanding of the group may be achieved, for the group sentiments and values usually differ considerably from those of management.²¹ Such discussions may produce primary relationships and ways of advancing personal and group aims.^{2d}

Informal Uses of Communication Channels. In the largely vertical structure of formal organization, communication horizontally is not stressed but it breaks out constantly as human communicative needs assert themselves. Crossing channels may develop practical working relations and even problem-solving techniques instead of waiting for settlements from on high by those not familiar with problems of the industrial laity. Actually communication operates in good measure through informal groups, for communication rests on compatibility of personnel. Barnard said, "The chief functions of this informal organization are expansion of the means of communication with reduction in the necessity for formal decisions, the minimizing of undesirable influences, and the promotion of desirable influences concordant with the scheme of formal responsibilities."²² The reduction in the necessity of formal decisions means a rise in informal decisions. For conveying certain information, management has to use the informal network.^{14b}

Managements are aware that powerful forces make for deviation

from orders, viz., inertia, addiction to routine, some ranks' desire to be let alone, and some supervisors' wishes to retain the good will of lower ranks. Moreover, intelligent executives rarely issue orders broadcast. They learn not to press subordinates too far in view of "institutionalized evasions of institutional rules."²³ Some executives recognize that informal associations are a limit to their authority, and that it is better to leave that authority untested than to press for showdowns. Others feel that difficulties in industry represent breakdowns in communication, as if beautiful communication systems produce harmony.

Communication from the top down may turn into two-way flows, with information traveling up from the workers to the administrators. Informal communication networks make for three-dimensional communication, a sharing in leadership and not merely a way leaders get action. Unions have an exceptional role in communication, helping convey and explain orders, offering counter-proposals, providing for cross- and extra-company communication that makes for the much more democratic flow of ideas.^{14c}

Group Controls: Norm Setting. . Informal groups exercise control over their members' standards of performance, keeping them from working either too fast or too slowly. Managements have been practicing such controls for years, as have other groups. Such actions reaffirm the solidarity of the member with his work group.

Many people believe that rate-setting is productive if done by management but is restrictive if done by work groups. Veblen once referred to management reduction of production as social sabotage. The empire builders are more concerned with extending their sphere of control than they are with added production or output. Since business sometimes believes that its best interests are served by controlling production and income, unions and informal groups can hardly be blamed for thinking that they should also have some control as well.

Work norms constitute values held by each member of informal groups. Such norms have considerable force in getting members not to do too much work and not to do too little, not to tell a supervisor anything that will injure the informal group or its members, and not to be socially near inspectors and other officials. Too slow work is as much condemned as too fast; it is not all one way and, indeed, "the fact that an unofficial practice directly conflicts with official regulations does not necessarily signify that it is detrimental to operating efficiency."^{4d} Work restrictions prevent management from utilizing individual differences, play down intra-group

competition, and avoid having slower workers penalized or older ones pushed out.^{17b} From its own point of view the informal group which sets its own norms is keeping life and human dignity up, not keeping production down.

Pace-Setters Are Feared. A safe or desirable level of output is found and held to. There seems to be a preference for some constancy of performance over sharp fluctuations. Fear of wage cuts if work is speeded play a role, especially where piece wages are paid. Norms are a form of group control over its own functioning and speed against management authority to direct every facet of one's life at work. Workmen "tend in time to form a society" at work. The society assigns status, roles, some security, and degree of function to each by producing a solidarity somewhat like feedback, i.e., a self-regulating capacity for individuals to perform within the range of limits of the small work group.²⁴ As a consequence some groups may have poor production records and others have outstanding ones, depending on many factors in work situations.

There is the employee who had the choice of "restricting her production to a low level and having many friends, on the one hand, and doing what management would call a good day's work and becoming a social isolate on the other."

The "rate buster" on the other hand does not, typically, accept the small work group as his reference group, preferring to climb rapidly in society generally and work particularly. Individuals who regulate their output in line with group norms and use sanctions against deviates, have taken the work group as their reference group, although this does not eliminate conflicting loyalties.

Before a shop is unionized, assembly line speeds are in good measure set by the company and modified by the informal work groups. One of the first activities of a union is to seek joint determination of assembly line speeds. In the textile industries, unions seek control over the size of work assignments. In automation, they seek joint determination of the speed of introduction of technological change. Unions often assist management in eliminating practices that limit output; however, Mathewson found, that output restriction antedates union organization.

There are positive, productive elements in the control of output by informal groups. Groups in favorable positions in plans may hold to high levels of production to maintain their status. Likert and Seashore found that "group standards can also operate to increase productivity."²⁵ Taft once wrote, "A labor force capable of producing with the aid of other factors the enormous quantities of goods and services annually produced by the American economy cannot

be regarded as recalcitrant or inefficient. On the contrary, the level of performance of American labor and industry is the envy of most of the world."²⁰

Status Gains. Informal association is the main instrument through which workers achieve status on any secure basis. Equality of status is what workers seek, although most status is conceived hierarchically in a money economy.²¹ Status in informal groups rests on strength, intelligence, willingness to maintain group standards, and personality and not the formal position.^{15e}

Democratic Authority. Just as status in informal groups is the most equalitarian in all industry, its authority is the most democratic. Informal leadership is quite distinct from bureaucratic authority, since it rests mainly on achievement of a personal type rather than on formal placing,¹⁴ and pointing the way along with increases in education and training generally for even more democratic organizational behavior outside informal association. Because they are thoroughly non-bureaucratic and equalitarian in status, informal associations, like the public at large, are a major force in retaining a democratic form in mass society.

Productive Role. Emphasis on restrictionism has obscured the productive role of informal associations. Frequently they are more important in increasing output than formal organization.²² Barnard has held that informal organizations are necessary for the operations of the formal, as well as that they reduce formal decisions and improve production.²³ Dubin found that rate-setting by informal relations improves production and operations. "In general," he said, "we can say that the informal way of doing things serves to make operations more efficient." By doing things their own way, "the end result may be more or better output for the organization," he explained.^{18a} Shartle indicated that even executive violations of formal organization promote efficiency. Blau, too, believes that "informal relations and unofficial practices often contribute to efficient operations."^{4a}

Informal association acts to fill in gaps in formal orders, Simon's supplementing function. Informal association may force managers to plan and act more carefully.^{14b} In theory, informal relations are secondary to formal, but it is the informal group that gets the formal administrative hierarchy's work done.²⁷

One of the most productive features of informal association is its promotion of change, of deviation from fixed standards, of finding new ways to meet challenges and needs. Resistance to change occurs on the part of management or sections of it as much as on the part of workmen. Bureaucracy's rigid structure is changed by

informal relations that evolve new forms and make the organization sensitive to alterations in external conditions.¹⁸

AREAS OF INFORMALITY

One may view informal groups as friendship-kinship, cliques, and subcliques, but all the human and direct relations occur in such arrangements. Primary relations can arise in companionable labor formations, various small work groups, and in management formations. Most sociograms may fail to indicate the presence of such groups, and especially fail to show that they exist as much among managers as among workers. One should not conclude that all informal relations are friendly; they may be harsh and bitter as well, but they are always personal.

Cliques may assume the form of car pools, union groups, religious or political affiliates, social or national origin groupings, educational interest groups, and status arrangements. The individual has to be accepted by the group which sets up its own social practices and standards.¹⁴⁴ An important variety of informal group is the latent or secret one—elitists among managers and private apparatuses such as that of the Communist Party among workers. Formal organizations sometimes use sub rosa persons and organizations, as do unions in their organization stage. Companies employ expediters, special leadmen, and special questioning and investigation systems that are not publicly announced or included on the master chart.

Companionable Labor. The closest formal organization has come to creating companionable and cooperative word relations is in its attempts to increase morale. The assembly line is at the opposite end of the continuum, where wrote Blau, "hardly any jobs on the assembly line require cooperation between workers" so that "work groups do not seem to exist on the assembly line."²⁸ Formal group separatism is imposed on workers, and free cooperation is not permitted.²⁹ Informal associations arise within formal organizations even though they are not visible at first. They make their presence known in many ways.

Primary Relations. Some analysts have called informal associations primary groups in industry. Katz and Lazarsfeld have, however, held that the rediscovery of the primary group is really a rediscovery of latent functions, within the persons involved.³⁰ Although primary relations can develop in informal structure, they do not involve the full role-playing associated with primary groups. Work groups have but part-roles and far less ego involvement. Nevertheless, under pressures of working in one place and on one

task and in relation to a management, workmen are brought into simple togetherness and mutual dependence, and can form a common front. Friendships arise and last over time, although turnover may prevent the development of many long-lasting relations. The bond between members may not be so intimate, but it is personal.

Unions and Informality. For relatively inactive members, a union may appear to be a formal institution; for active members it may be an informal and social group.³¹ But union informality, so conceived, is a spontaneous social relationship outside formal organization. One should not, however, consider unions a way of life. They are but a part of the larger social system. Surely, large unions are quite formal, although they are voluntary associations to an extent that no enterprise bureaucracy can be.

Informal Management Association. Informal associations exist as much if not more in management than at other levels of bureaucracy. One may well distinguish three phases of these informal relations: First, close personal relations exist among the members of the leadership, and these produce real informal social organizations not at all subject to bureaucracy's rules.^{32a} Bendix even stated that "bureaucracy" refers to the informal relations, without which the formal administrative hierarchy could not get its work done." These relations are "informal" in the sense that "we are unable to stipulate rules which would effectively govern these relations."

Supervisors and foremen frequently "play ball" with subordinates and do not enforce rules strictly but let them "get away with" many infractions of rules.⁴¹ In ten companies studied, executives had many relations with persons other than their immediate superiors and subordinates. Such "violations" of the organizational blueprint are common and up to a point even promote efficiency. The success of these relations depends upon centrality of one's position, associated activities, personality, wife's behavior, and social status in the community at large.³²

Even management and union leaders may develop unprescribed relations, especially after unions are recognized. These may take the form of racketeering and collusion; but unions and managements may quite legitimately jointly sponsor laws, tariffs, and pension funds. A study of three plants shows "frequent departures from provisions of the negotiated contract."¹⁶

Non-separability of Formal and Informal. "An organization which is not a part of another organization, or which is not formally affiliated with other organizations, is rare."^{11a} The very fact that memberships are shared by informal and formal groups makes for

their permeability. Bakke went further when he said, "as factors influencing human behavior, the formal and informal systems are not separable."²³ Whyte, too, held that to make an objective differentiation between blueprinted interactions and actual relations is frequently impossible. Blumer noted that both are part and parcel of the third "organization," society. Although informal groups may have blurred boundaries, nevertheless persist in a human way.^{12b}

In the interaction of the two, Schneider wrote, "it is possible that the overwhelming strength of bureaucracy has been overestimated." He added, "in fact, it is possible that the larger and more extensive bureaucracy becomes, the more these non-bureaucratic elements tend to appear. This raises the possibility that industry will evolve in the future not in the direction of more bureaucracy but in that of less."^{15d} Barnard, too, has considered that "the chief functions of this informal organization," which he calls primary to formal organization, "are expansion of the means of communication with reduction in the necessity for formal decisions, the minimizing of undesirable influences, and the promotion of desirable influences concordant with the scheme of formal responsibilities."²²

SUMMARY

Informal organization is a contrasting and overlapping phase of bureaucracy, the goals of which are personal expression, personality integration and a rounded work function on some human basis. The substantive rationality of the member requires humanization of the work process, not merely his subordination (sometimes called reconciliation) with the functional rationality of bureaucracy. This holds true as much for management personnel as for those on the lower levels. Informal association has a kind of influence on policy, but it is not hierarchical so much as it is democratic and non-bureaucratic. The relations are personal and direct in a democratic subculture.

Status is substantially equalitarian and rests on personal achievement, not primarily on position. Paper relations are secondary to human relations, and rules are fitted to cases. Instead of work being rationalized, it is humanized in various ways. The personality principle replaces the impersonality principle, and the stress is on spontaneity and creativity. This is a structure that is responsible to participants; it is local, small in size, and big in influence. Informal associations are productive and creative relations that can cross various union and management lines but that are hardly separable from organization or at least the "organizational structure."

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. In what way is informal association the polar opposite of formal organization?
2. Describe major breaches in bureaucracy that prevent it from being a closed system.
3. Contrast the rational and irrational, functional rationality and substantive rationality.
4. How does informal association make authority democratic?
5. What are the main features of informal structure?
6. Why does management oppose informal structure?
7. Analyze the main functions of informal association.
8. How can norm setting raise, lower, or keep production on an even keel?
9. What is the productive role of informal association?
10. Describe informal association among management levels.
11. What is the future of bureaucracy?

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THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE

The executive functions at various levels within the organization and has an even wider social role in the broader community. He sometimes has little responsibility to those he rules. There are no detailed specifications for the functions of the executive; the specifications change with the individual, the group, and over time.¹ In a hierarchical society, however, his basic function is to govern men.

POLICY- AND DECISION-MAKING

A hierarchy of command operates well if the main functions to be performed are specific and well known. Directing a labor force requires no inconsiderable skill and a superstructure of supervisory, administrative, and executive personnel.² Top executives make policy, and lower ones make decisions.

Main Functions. While governing men is central to management's functions, actual administration takes several forms. Planning involves "determination of what is to be done, how and where it is to be done, and who shall be responsible."³ The objectives are both near- and long-term.

The executive has to assemble resources of capital and facilities, and arrange for all levels of personnel. Organizing, too, involves creating and maintaining the requisite conditions for effective and economic activity. Control thereupon becomes the regulation of activities of the organization and the securing of essential services.

Policy-Making. Policy-making, central to the management function, requires almost constant judgments on what to do next, how to do it, and when. Major policy for the society is being made more publicly today than in the past, in good measure the decisions are made by top government officials, sometimes in coalition with business leaders. Union chiefs also make policy—a primary instrument of co-ordination and control.

Basic policies are long-range and concern such things as investment, product changes, distribution, and compensation for employees. General policies are shorter range and are more directly concerned with operations. Compliance with neither is automatic; it has to be checked. Policy constitutes relating human and technical demands to major goals; it is a fairly settled course combining goals and means.

Policy rests on consensus—on agreements concerning private ownership, government regulation, union recognition, and the rights of employers and employees.¹ Alternatives are noted, and policy is chosen so as to lay down fairly stable expectations for the future in what is sometimes termed a compromise with solutions. One may also distinguish principles as ways of governing action—dealing fairly with people, paying comparable wages. Programming is often referred to as a plan of action for carrying out policy on some schedule. Practice includes activities for applying programs, viz., promotion from within the firm. Procedure lays down the method to performing a task or duty.

Policy is hierarchical, being made at the top. Any level of command may suggest a policy, but only the top has authority to turn a proposal into a policy. Management ordinarily has "centralized and absolute control at the top levels over its own policy formation," unlike union leaders who are accountable to their membership.² Management is "the directing agency in this teamwork" of production, even though government, unions, and other forces affect its policy-making.

A contradiction exists in policy-making. Heron wonders whether American business can remain healthy if it is composed of separate units dubbed workers and thinkers, the latter telling the former what to do and terming the process teamwork.³ Others are concerned about administrators who fail to see "the larger policy framework,"⁴ or demonstrate a deterioration of policy-making capacity.⁵ Decisions by a few policy-makers can affect millions and have consequences stretching into the remote future, yet popular control and responsibility may be lacking.

Decision-Making. Isolated decisions are rare, most are composite. One official may make the final negotiations or sign a contract but be performing a merely ministerial function already well prepared by a board or group. These are strategic and sometimes tactical decisions, not policy ones.

As a unit of analysis for organization Simon has taken the "decision premise," grounded on a consideration of the level of concrete behavior in specific situations, the specific organization prac-

tice, and the decision unit. Decisions have both an ethical and factual content, containing an imperative quality that selects one of alternative courses of action, guides personnel toward some future state of affairs, and describes that future as ethically acceptable. In many cases, however, choice is certainly narrow.⁹

ADMINISTERING OPERATIONS

To administer policy is to apply it to human beings. Although top policy is accepted as "given," the administrator is not passive. He must expect the unexpected, else "unforeseen diversities" will catch him unprepared. To obtain response and consent is the aim of the more advanced formal organizations, for coercion cannot be used or work well much of the time. Administration cannot operate, but it must coordinate. It must divide and unify by grouping men around an over-all goal, by relating specialities to goals, providing for the accountability for achievement, and making goals known and understood.¹⁰

Coordination requires a mating of authority and responsibility. It does so through follow-up, constantly checking on decisions, and offering suggestions for the next moves forward. Clearly coordination is a continuous process that is to some extent led by liaison individuals; it may be formal and informal or both. Division of labor is chaos unless there is some coordination to unify what is divided.

Personnel Selection. Coordination has been extended to include securing, training, and maintaining personnel. Instead of relying on the older sanctions and social pressure to work, executives today use tests, interviews, forms, references, and employment agencies. Union hiring halls may also have to be consulted. The personnel department is in one sense an advisory service, but it also directly handles certain human problems of coordination. Handling of personnel involves setting up teams and obtaining the right persons for these various teams. The promotion of executives is a problem in coordination as they move up the "executive ladder." As one opening occurs, there are usually moves all the way up the line. Of course, there are also moves out of business, as in mergers, when hundreds of top-flight executives may find themselves out of work.

Management Training. No small part of coordinating jobs is the continuous training of executives required by the incessant changes and demands of production. On-the-job opportunities for growth and advancement are necessary. Job rotation, job progression, and coaching offer such training. Delegation is a form of

training. Through delegation, the manager can extend or multiply his powers. Training may take the form of counseling, talking things over, or of creating a team, and of setting up certain standards employees are expected to meet.

Training is also a way of communicating decisional premises to organization members and of selecting and testing those ready to move up the executive ladder.^{9a} Above all, "training is the leader's job"; it cannot be delegated.¹¹ Training workers is one way of providing for executive succession, since it is concerned with every phase of relationship and specialization and involves nearly every level of management.¹²

SOCIAL CONTROL BY MANAGEMENT

Controls extend over policies, organization, key personnel, wages and salaries, costs, methods, and manpower. They are concerned with capital expenditures, service department efforts, lines of products, research and development and embrace foreign operations and external relations. There are even over-all controls, and controllers who control other controllers. Although many controls are shared with other agencies and groups, management controls have an important life of their own.

Size of Control Groups. The large organization has a problem of controlling its various small groups. Plans have to be made in advance and some provision has to be made for carrying them out. Speed in decision-making is a factor that is now being improved by electronic data processing equipment. Increased speed of communication has also made it possible to enlarge the units of control.

Span of Control and Work Responsibility. A manager's span of responsibility may cover as many as one hundred people. The span of control by direct supervision can go to a dozen or more; beyond this, relations become impersonal and orders are usually conveyed on paper.¹³ If 12 to 15 workers are about the limit of a supervisor's span of control, in a plant of 1,000 workers, there will be three superintendents, 16 or 17 department heads, and about 67 foremen. As the plant grows more spread occurs, and a manager is put in over the superintendents. Then a general manager is added, usually over about four managers.¹⁴ The figures are merely suggestive of the problem; beyond a certain number of people supervision becomes ineffective.

Much depends on the skill of the supervisor, the responsiveness of employees, the stability of operations, and the general production situation. A good deal rests on the type of work and on how much attention executives pay to the plant and the community. Closer

supervision is apparently required in manufacturing than in retailing. A survey of 82 firms employing more than 500,000 persons revealed that retailing executives constituted 11.4 per cent of the labor force while manufacturing executives made up 13.6 per cent.¹⁵ Executive span of supervision has an optimum of 3 to 8 persons, while the operative span of supervision can go to as many as 30 persons. The policy span of supervision is clearly much larger in some instances.¹⁶ The possibilities of control from a distance rest on this span.

In his studies of the time spans and capacities for extended responsibility, Jacques found that executives have longer periods of responsibility than most other employees. Time span capacity increases until middle life and then slows down, but executives tend to make much more use of their time span capacity than do most workers.¹⁷

Flat vs. High Pyramids. Span has to do, too, with height and breadth of organizational structure. A tall pyramid of control has many levels of supervision; a flat one has few.^{18a} A high pyramid of authority is made of many levels of responsibility, e.g., thirteen levels in the Du Pont corporation. Sometimes, it is held, elimination of several levels can improve supervision. Within a single company, some segments have high and others low pyramids. Worthy found this to be the case in Sears, Roebuck and Co. in 1949; he also found that morale was higher in stores using the flatter structure. Slowly a flat structure of some six levels was pushed until some uniformity was reached in its retail division.

Reduction to a single level is not possible so long as large groups continue.¹⁸ Organization can become top-heavy and produce too many generals and too few privates. The higher the pyramid the longer the chain of communication and the greater the chances for misinformation.^{15a} The advantages of working closely with supervisors can, however, be counteracted by autocratic domination. Where the supervisor applies close supervision, the worker is more "boss-oriented." In the flat pyramid the worker has more chance to develop independent conduct, but some coordination and control are sacrificed. The limited span of control often makes for excessive levels of command and greater social distance between personnel and managers.¹⁹

Delegation of Authority. Delegation of authority, one type of management specialization, may help develop promising subordinates without surrendering responsibility. No administrator can delegate such vital functions as investment, personnel, and planning.²⁰

Decentralization is an attempt to attain new and efficient ways of operating despite the increasing size of organization. It is a form of delegation that is used when the span of control and attention has been exceeded. Moves which increase the importance of the subordinate's role make for decentralization while those which reduce it tend to produce centralization.²¹ For the individual manager this is an opportunity to exercise independence, to make his own decisions. Managerial decentralization is, of course, different from geographic dispersion; the one concerns authority, the other place.

Functional decentralization permits integrated units to have maximum responsibility for major and distinct stages in the business process. The units are not independent, however; they do not earn separate profits even though they are largely separate in operation. Federal decentralization is the division of an organization into separate product businesses, each with separate market and profit-and-loss responsibility that tests each section separately.^{15b} General Motors, General Electric, DuPont, and Sears, Roebuck and Co. are said to use federal decentralization. Such an arrangement produces competition among units of the same corporation.²²

General Electric paraphrasing the federal constitution, leaves all authority not expressly reserved to higher management for lower management.^{13a} However, the company head, Ralph Cordiner, has written, "the decision to decentralize General Electric did not mean that it was decided to 'break up the Company' into smaller pieces."²³ In 1957 the company realigned top executives and retained a four-area breakdown. In place of four vice-presidents for each major operating group, there was only one executive vice-president to whom the group heads reported.²⁴ Drucker describes federal decentralization as "strong guidance from the center," which makes the most "autonomous" product business "still not independent." He says "the term 'decentralization' is actually misleading . . . It implies that the center is being weakened; but nothing could be more of a mistake." Even in such a flat-pyramid type of retailing organization as Sears, a major branch "does not do its own buying, its own merchandise development, its own selection of goods. That is done for all stores by the company."^{13b}

Dubin noted, "General Motors, with a highly developed theory of decentralized management, has perfected centralized control in the industrial relations field—even individual job rates negotiated locally must be reviewed and approved in Detroit before becoming effective." Governing by rules, he concluded, means "centralization in decision-making on industrial relations programs."²⁵

Even the "grass-roots" control of the Tennessee Valley Authority

is a sharing of the burdens and responsibility for power rather than of power proper. The actual authority, and to a large extent the organizational machinery, has been retained in the hands of the administering agency.²⁶

Evaluation of Decentralization. Goldhamer and Shils wrote, "concentration of power is not diminished if the power-holder acts through many subordinates, provided he is able to exercise control over them. In fact, however, the utilization of a large subordinate staff is very likely to diffuse power, since the chief power-holder is rarely able to control fully the actions of his subordinates."²⁷ Only some details of operations are shared, not the policy-making. Nor does decentralization of plants mean less concentration of "market power," for "it may result in greater concentration."²⁸ Whatever the geographic dispersion, the development of closed circuit television, electronic calculators, multi-party telephones and automated devices makes for still higher centralization.²⁹

Lower management merely carries out policy. Only when subordinates have reinforced resources for making correct decisions does real decentralization become possible.³⁰ But this is not a relinquishment of power nor a replacement of top managers by lower ones. Financial and policy control remain centralized; physical separation should not be confused with decentralization. Park's rule is that "the function of distribution moves out but control and management move in."³¹ Even classic descriptions of decentralization indicate that it is subject to policy guidance and that formal decentralization is counterbalanced by the specification of central policy on "all major and many minor issues."³²

Baker and France in an extensive study of some four dozen companies found that there was a "discrepancy between the widespread company philosophy of centralization and common practice with respect to delegation of responsibility for specific industrial relations activities."³³ Many industrial relations directors have admitted that decentralization was but a "pious hope" until recently. Others look upon it as a "current fad" or slogan and suggest that decentralization is merely a function of centralization, i.e., that operations are subordinate to centralized policy. Tannenbaum found that progressive and accelerated centralization—not decentralization—has occurred in business, government, and unions in recent years.³⁴

LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT

A distinction between the top and lower levels of management is necessary, for orders from the top do not follow automatically

or axiomatically. There are middle managers who have to interpret the orders and who may block them or see in them things other than those intended by top management.

Top Management. In many cases top management includes a board of directors with a trusteeship function. It also includes general management, which plans and directs; and divisional management, which is operational.³³ Functional specialization begins at the departmental level.^{16c} Assistants to the president fill in various gaps in the levels, attending to details and expediting the flow of orders.

Middle Management. Middle management stands between the departmental executives and the operating supervisors; it may not exist in small companies but is plentiful in large concerns. Top local managers may be at the middle management level in multi-plant firms; their reporting heads in the home offices may also be in this group. This section of executives has lost much ground as top management has improved its communication channels and financial control. They may coordinate functional, regional, or product bases on which operating organization rests.³³

Operating Supervisors. The sphere of operations management is quite different from that of top and middle management; it includes the supervisors of operative employees who are ordinarily called foremen or supervisors, although the "forgotten men" of management is almost as common. Many supervisors are in hybrid jobs; they are more managed than managers, no longer "management to the worker" and aware that the workers know it. In the 1920's a typical supervisor was responsible for some 60 or more people; today he is responsible for half that number and with less control over them. The supervisor's span of managerial responsibility has been shortened and his powers have been decreased. Status and meaning are being taken from his job, as specialization and a centralization of responsibility spread.^{13c}

Staff and Line. Two hard-worked concepts in industrial relations are staff (specialists) and line (operating managers). The staff supposedly gives advice on personnel, legal matters, research, accounting, and selling. It is selected by top management and subordinate to it. The best of staff men may never reach top policy-making posts. They handle special problems for top management, acting as assistants or advisors. Whole staff agencies or staff service departments, not directly tied to production, may be set up. In some companies these staff groups have proliferated. One may distinguish advisory from service and control functions of staff. Many staff men are fact-finders.

F. W. Taylor thought that staff specialists would be integrated directly into the line—that functional organization would combine line and staff.³⁴ Most organizations mix line and staff approaches; the more mechanized the production, the less difference there is between the two. Functional specialists perform their tasks with full responsibility for their work and do not simply advise managers. Although there are some liaison staff men, the unification of authority and responsibility tends to integrate staff and line men. Management committees, now more used than in the past, are examples of this combined functioning.

Foremen. The foreman has a triple role; he must represent management, workers, and himself. Technically the foreman is a manager who reports to a higher manager and directs lower operating employees. He is, however, at the bottom of management. His power to hear grievances and settle them has slipped as personnel departments have grown, yet he is on the front line to receive grievances and complaints from management, workers, and unions.

The rise of unions and personnel departments, the increase in the size of bureaucracy and the number of levels of management, and the rise of relationship specialists have diminished the foreman's position. His old function as a link between worker and top management has been superseded. The Slichter panel of the War Labor Board concluded that "the foreman is more managed than managing, more and more an executor of other men's decisions, less and less a maker of decisions himself."³⁵ Instead of being "fore"-men, they mainly follow orders. Their roles have been decisively subordinated until they do not manage or decide; they have lost most of their former authority.³⁶

What remains of the foreman's position is ambiguous. Roethlisberger said that "again and again he is put in a position of either getting the worker's cooperation and being 'disloyal' to management or of incurring the resentment and overt opposition of his subordinates." Since foremen do not know where they stand, many have sought to turn to unions. The Opinion Research Corp. found that where 73 per cent of foremen thought their relations with management were good in 1950, in 1957 this had slipped to 63 per cent. Some 34 per cent favored having their own union.³⁷

Carl Brown, executive director of the Foreman's Association of America, said, "They're in the same spot today that the production worker was in 20 years ago. They lose seniority rights when they become a supervisor in many cases, can be fired point-blank, and then are on the street or have to start again as hourly-rated without seniority."^{37a} Life is not easy at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy.

archy. Various training programs are being used by companies to improve foremen's identification with management. But while foremen's unions are not recognized as bargaining units under current labor law, so long as foremen's needs are not met, union organization of some type will persist.

SUMMARY

Top executives make policy; middle ones tend to make the day-to-day decisions necessary to carry out that policy; lower managers interpret these decisions for the operating employees. Such administration can be handled only through established practices and procedures, and this requires formal channels of communication and a system of stable expectations. An administrator, then, applies policy to operations; he selects, trains, and coordinates people to carry out the ends of the organization.

As groups grow large, the problems of control multiply despite the considerable improvements in communication. The span of responsibility may reach a hundred people, but the direct supervisorial span of control may go to but a dozen or so. Depending on the industry and the product, there may be many levels of management in a high pyramid of control or few levels in a flat pyramid. The more levels of management there are, the closer will be the supervision, although close supervision has significant disadvantages and, to a degree, prevents a spirit of independence. When the span of control grows enough, authority is delegated. Problems arise, since responsibility commensurate with authority is often not delegated. Contradictions in industrial roles abound and are particularly apparent in the foreman's situation.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is universal and what variable in the functions of the executive?
2. Define policy-making. Distinguish it from decision-making.
3. What is the role of administration?
4. Why cannot people coordinate themselves?
5. How is management running a social control structure?
6. Compare span of responsibility, span of control, and work responsibility.
7. Is a flat pyramid necessarily more efficient or feasible than a high one?
8. Present the pros and cons for close supervision.
9. What is real decentralization? False?
10. Why are not the industrial laity part of management?
11. How do staff and line merge? Separate?
12. Explain the foreman's triple role.

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A THEORY OF THE ELITE

Behind the seemingly clear and visible formal organization and many groups in mass society there is frequently a silent combination of men with control but with little responsibility to the organization's members or to the society. Throughout history these somewhat authoritarian leaders have chosen the name elite. A theory of the elite can explain some rather clouded phases of labor-management-government relations.

Ordinary leadership may be distinguished from elite types, although both can be grounded on a tradition of power in America and its industries. The theory of elites will be married to the command theory of authority to clarify what is sometimes called the logic of hierarchy and at other times the iron law of oligarchy.

LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION

A superior-subordinate relation rests on the superior having responsibility for more work than one man can do directly and therefore directing the work of others.¹ The art of leadership is the ability to have subordinates get the job done; it is above all a function of a particular type of performance. In general, and especially in industry, leaders tend to initiate activity. No business can exist without leadership. This is a controlling function, which makes choices or decisions in line with organizational objectives.²

Symbols of Leadership. Leaders have to symbolize the meanings, values, and norms of the group—thus showing emotional involvement with it. Their wishes to get things done are met by activity in organizations. Power becomes a means for getting others to help in achieving goals at work, although power may be exercised in other than open ways.³ Leaders have to seek cohesiveness if the group is to survive; they must sometimes institute changes and even break the rules, or fall by the wayside. They require

considerable contact with outside groups so as to retain influence in a multiple group world.⁴

There is a complication in the levels of leadership. A government administrative agency or purchasing department may virtually manage a section of industry through placing of large orders, allocation of funds, and control over specifications. While some may call the government agency a "customer," that agency may be a leader-customer combined in a multiple group relation.^{2a}

The Situation of Leadership. In a democratic society the leader operates, not with abstract qualities or traits that work everywhere, but along a tightrope between the consent he has to win and the control he has to exert if he is to remain an executive. Situations change; some are unique; a leader in one situation may fail in another. Moreover, leaders do not lead all the time, unless the situation favors their emergence. They are not so much situation-bound or determined as capable of taking advantage of the leadership possibilities in situations.

Types of Leaders. Positive leaders, as defined by some writers, look on people as desiring to work and on themselves as helping provide opportunities and incentives. Negative leaders accomplish their ends through fear and domination.⁵ But one may classify leaders in other ways, viz., as autocratic, participative, and free-rein. Autocratic leaders centralize authority in themselves, make the final decisions, hold all the responsibility, and tend to be negative. In a way they are not really the leaders of employees, for the group has not selected them; they have selected subordinates.⁶

Participative leaders tend to share power, to permit two-way communication, to prefer group decisions, and to support ideas and suggestions of their followers. The free-rein leader is more a *laissez-faire* type, who permits others to establish goals and work out problems, with the leader playing a very limited role.^{7a} In business the autocratic leader seems to be most common.

The dynamic leader initiates action and change; he pioneers and establishes. The administrative leader continues the work, maintains the group, and in many cases replaces the dynamic leader. More recently the "artist in human relations" has been raised to the category of leader. Any one of these may be parental, i.e., like the dominating father or protective mother, but they are also manipulators. Leaders may produce considerable hostility among the followers whose drives toward independence they short-circuit.

There have been experiments with leaderless groups, but neither group decision-making nor management committees seems to be the answer. Whyte refers to such devices as forms of "intellectual

hypocrisy."⁷ Some believe the solution lies in the leaders, charisma the godlike leadership quality, or in the use of magic and propaganda.

THE ELITE TRADITION

In America the tradition of elites is very old, and is related to the divine right of kings and God's elect in Puritan theology. For ages populations have been ruled by a sort of tyranny of the elite in work-supervisory relations that were thought to be God-ordained. There is a basic similarity in the view of power as a monopoly of kings, of knowledge as a monopoly of the clergy, and of leadership at work as a monopoly of owners and now managers. A secret fear may exist, as Asch held, that various people, given access to education and training, could understand as much of directive processes as most rulers and rule themselves.⁸

Elitism in America. Elitism in industrial government is in a way a continuation of the oft expressed need for great men to rule. Mercantilism produced a fused elite that combined political and economic rulers, a kind of fusion which Mills contends exists in America today.⁹ Ulam once complained of the American tradition that "democracy has an elitist bias." The elitist views of the Puritans and Alexander Hamilton's view of the population as a great beast, unlettered and a prey to demagogues, were written into the original Constitution in that the population had no direct relation to the election of presidents and senators.

Many early Americans were taught that only a "gifted few" could really achieve self-actualization and gratification of various creative impulses.¹⁰ Jefferson, who considered that a natural aristocracy could arise, also held an elite could be developed through education.¹¹ His natural aristocracy was a non-power elite of creative persons, quite different from the rulers of industry. They were, in the words of the novelist James Fenimore Cooper, "extra-legal authorities" to whom others had to defer.^{11a} Continuing Jefferson's thought concerning the natural elite, Sorokin holds that men of genius or exceptional capabilities are the only real elite—a theory that excludes the power elite. However, one may also distinguish the power elite, whose "proud and authoritarian souls" Sorokin has noted as well.¹²

The spread of the idea that adult members of a community must be involved in policy-making is recent. The emphasis of some Americans on great men and heroes may in part stem from their being starved for pomp and ritual.¹³ Heroes may substitute for much of this. This is not yet elitism, for much of it could be Sorokin's

and Giddings' "true elite of intellectual geniuses."^{12a} But the self-made man extolled in sagas of success in American history frequently took on the aura of an elite. It appears clear that Veblen's elite of engineers was not a power elite but an intellectual one. Even though Freud spoke of a "prudent superior class," his elites had power to challenge hierarchy in society.

From Marx to Toynbee. Marx had no theory of an elite; he did not visualize the gaining of power by a "new elite" of self-perpetuating managers.¹⁴ With Lenin power elitism received its modernization. The professional revolutionary was to lead the workers beyond trade union consciousness to socialist consciousness. Boulding declared that the most significant invention of mass society was the full-time organizer, a role which was perhaps Lenin's chief contribution to twentieth century political theory and practice.¹⁵

Ortega y Gasset spoke of the "rulers and the ruled" and their different consciousness, although he thought that somehow the masses would revolt and then rule.¹⁶ Toynbee has conceived of a "creative minority," shades of Robert Michels' "organized minority," a sort of great-man-in-great-group version of history. Toynbee's could be an intellectual elite, but it has a power component since he holds that the creative minority will have to drag the rest of the society along in its advance.¹⁷ Moreover, such an elite turns into a dominant minority when, no longer able to charm the proletariat, it uses a higher religion or new faith to impose its rule.¹⁸

Scientific Management's Elitism. In tune with the social Darwinism of his day, Taylor felt that most workers were stupid and ox-like and had to be trained and led by a more intelligent man. A German follower, Walliche, held that the mass of people is unfit for any intellectual activity, a view startlingly like that of Alexander Hamilton.

Drucker tended to find that this was power elitism. Taylor, Drucker noted, put the "priestly-elite" into modern industrial form, deducing "a God-given right of the planning elite to rule." Of this Drucker observed, "It is no accident that we hear this right to rule described today as the 'prerogative of management'—the term has always been applied to right by divine or priestly anointment." But Drucker also found that this was part of the "elite philosophy that swept the Western World in the generation between Nietzsche and World War I."¹⁹ Elitism has since reached new levels.

Mayo's Elite. Mayo said, "The world over, we are greatly in need of an administrative elite who can assess and handle the concrete difficulties of human collaboration."²⁰ Of all the criticisms

of Mayo, few indicate his careful acceptance and extension of Pareto's pro-elitist orientation, an orientation which led to the use of many of Pareto's ideas by Mussolini and others. Mayo's managerial-administrative elite was to produce both industrial harmony and more output, if it could be trained as Mayo wished.

Meanwhile it should be clear that ideas of a society dominated by managers or by technicians are by no means weakening. Where the deity himself is sometimes conceived of as a "remote General Director of Universe, Inc.," the elitist bias remains exceptionally powerful.²¹

POWER ELITISM

There is rather broad consensus that a "managerial elite" exists.^{10a} Where elites are entrenched or, under the impact of shattering events, have to come out into the open, they often avow that leaders are born to the purple and that others are born to follow. But not all leaders are elitists.

Intellectual Elite. The intellectual elite includes the outstanding geniuses and personalities of any age. This is not a real but a fictitious or nominal grouping. Jefferson described it as an elite of virtue and talent—one which feels its duty is to educate and train the masses to become self-leading. Sorokin says this "real elite" may become part of a power elite. As an example he described rebels who climbed from a persecuted status to a privileged one and whose "souls changed from persecuted and disfranchised 'souls' into the proud and authoritarian souls of the elite."^{12b}

Elitism in Organization. It is not enough to be outstanding to be a power elitist; one has to be authoritarian and set the rules for, but not be responsible to, the rank and file or to the society. "An industrial system is planned, controlled and directed by managers. They must, inevitably, play an important role in setting the rules that determine the structure of the labor force. Thus, the study of the nature of business organizations and of the elites that direct them is central to any full understanding of the labor problem in industrialization."²²

Warner and Abegglen characterized American business leadership as "that powerful, prestigeful, and important occupational elite concentrated at the high levels of business enterprise."²³ They are responsible to an "effective clique of owners." Top policy-makers are included—the inner core being the topmost commanders in corporations, politics, and the military. Mills came to this unified elite in 1956 when he changed from his earlier theory of an eco-

nomic elite."²³ Such a combined politico economic view shunts to the background those theories in which an economic elite of managers leads industry and society.

Economist E. G. Nourse, former head of the Council of Economic Advisers, estimated that one to two per cent of the gainfully employed have decision-making responsibility for the nation's economic life.²⁴ That would be from 1,650,000 to 3,300,000 persons. He, like Barnard, apparently included practically all parts of the hierarchy from middle levels on up in the elite. This appears to be too broad a category, for the middle layers of the hierarchy are usually made up of followers. Among them, however, may be the professional organizers of mass society, who can, if they show talent, become elites.

THE LOGIC OF HIERARCHY AND AUTHORITY

Elites rule the hierarchy of bureaucracy, and they do so in an oligarchic way. "The recruiting of the managers is no longer made from below; the system of labor, unlike political systems, far from becoming democratic is being feudalized."²⁵ The greatest single breach in mass society is between the hierarchy and the laity.

Authority and Power. Elites hold power and exercise authority. Authority may be based on position, knowledge, or character; it exists when a subordinate permits his behavior to be guided by the decision of a superior, without independently examining the merits of the decision.²⁶ Conviction of the rightness of a decision is less important than acceptance of the order, the authority being independent of any judgment of correctness by subordinates.²⁷ In a hierarchical relation, authority is a bundle of rights to make and enforce decisions; it is not a matter of personal privilege. The social relations become as very impersonal. The person in authority represents not himself but the group; he acts in its name. By remaining in his status, he maintains group structure.

Bierstedt wrote, "the supreme test of the organization of an association, in fact, is satisfied when it can sustain a total turnover in personnel."²⁸ Functionally authority enforces the responsibility of subordinates to superiors, secures expertise in making decisions, and permits coordination of activity.²⁹ More than a relationship between persons resting on status, authority involves social control and the willing compliance of subordinates, although actual authority has to be established in social interaction.³⁰

Acceptance and acquiescence by subordinates is preferable to the use of force. The subordinate expects the decisions, expects to obey, and expects to have his conduct determined by decisions, up

to a point. That point is what Simon called a "zone of acceptance" beyond which disobedience will follow. With the appropriate "organization personality" acceptance is made effective.^{2c} Although sanctions are available authority is usually followed because its rejection means rejection of the group and its destruction. A minimum consensus has to be reached for authority to be operative. Barnard has written, "if objective authority is flouted for arbitrary or merely temperamental reasons, if, in other words, there is a deliberate attempt to twist an organization requirement to personal advantage . . . then there is a deliberate attack on the organization itself."^{2d}

While authority and power may be examined as if they were separate, there is actually no separation. Bierstedt noted that "authority is always a power phenomenon. It is power which confers authority upon a command," but a sanctioned and institutionalized power widely accepted by the majority. In industry, however, one may have authority without majority support; the source of such power is at the top. This condition led Lindsay to write, "Industrialism has introduced a new division into society. It is the division between those who manage and take responsibility and those who are managed and have responsibility taken from them. This is a division more important than the division between the rich and poor."³¹ The holders of industrial-political authority constantly seek to make it appear that their rule is legitimate.

Command Theory of Authority. "The command theory of authority holds that decision and direction are exclusively managerial functions, so that in the most general terms the worker's duty is to obey orders."³² Views of the capitalist as the "captain of industry" and of workers as an army are old. More recently "the management cadre itself is being rationalized into military shape." It has borrowed some of its best ideas from the military bureaucrats it was wont to denounce as inefficient, and in many cases military and civilian leadership has been united in the same person.^{24a} Management "does not and cannot govern primarily in the interests of its 'subjects.'" It is "a dictatorship in the sense that power comes from above and employees have no power to replace the managers."³³ Such rule by a minority makes business far more authoritarian than government and very much like the armed forces.³⁴

Authoritarian Flow of Orders. "Many businesses closely resemble the authoritarian state in the sense that all direction, all thinking, all authority tends to flow from the top down." When authority is delegated, it is authority for execution not for policy making. Cooperation is enforced through a monopolistic one-way

flow of command and orders by the controllers of the communication system.³⁵ At one point, anonymous authority replaced the older small groups that could be identified.^{21a} As the giants become more gigantic, however, they become more public.

It is significant that a relatively few do the deciding. Where the over-all tendency is toward more oligarchy, the distance between the elite and the mass grows. The professionals have little or no concern for, or connection with, the lower ranks of their own organizations.

The command theory of authority develops into manipulation, i.e. "invasion of a formed personality," with workers becoming means to ends set by other persons. Individuals are carried along as "subject-parts of a whole" not as citizens and sharers in polity. Management is not so much a category as a relation of rule and order. "Man-Boss relationships" are "one of the basic elements in an organization."³⁶ The command group controls the levers, even if its conceptions of the world and the aims of the firm are utterly different from those of the ruler.³⁷

PROBLEM OF ELITIST AUTHORITY

Elitist authority raises several crucial problems for the enterprise and the society. The climate of rule, which is usually authoritarian, may turn out to be intolerable in a democratic society. Legitimization of that authority is a continuous process, although elites can function without it.

Climate of Rule. Varying climates exist in the rule of men, as though each organization had its own "personality." One may find the friendly office and cold plant, the flexible bureau and the rigid firm. While types may be distinguished—bureaucratic, autocratic, idiocratic and democratic—the autocratic one remains dominant. The laissez-faire type may be spoken of in pious terms but it is not easy to find.

Lacking confidence in the individual, bureaucratic companies stress strict obedience to rules and regulations; they go by the book and insist on strict loyalty of subordinates. Of course, exceptions within a bureaucracy may be permitted as, for instance, when management and unions work closely together on safety matters. But punishment-centered bureaucracy is common and deviations from norms or rules are met by penalties.³⁸ Some idiocratic companies show skill in social relations. They often seek not merely loyal and obedient personnel, but people with personal ambition which makes them easier to manipulate. Concentration on the indi-

vidual employee and not the group may be the most distinctive feature of this type of organization.

There has been a development of seemingly more democratic organization in quite a number of companies.^{14a} The leaders of these consider that their authority emerges from informal group customs and codes—not from rules and regulations. Democratic administration is more diffuse. There are more social activities with subordinates, more sympathy is shown for them, and there is more sharing of information. A study of the U. S. Forestry Service showed some of these tendencies, but few business organizations seem really democratic.

In an autocratic company the administrators are usually arbitrary to lower ranks and obedient to superior ones.³⁹ In a cartoon of a board meeting, the chairman was quoted as saying, "Of course, it's only a suggestion, gentlemen, but let's not forget who's making it."⁴⁰ The really autocratic company does not allow for union or worker influence over "power relations on the job."^{24b} Leadership in government is far less centralized, since checks and balances operate. One can "turn the rascals out" unless they show some responsibility to the public. Dimock and Hyde found the "corresponding powers of the superior officers are more absolute in business" than in government.⁴¹

Benevolent Autocracy. "Democratic management," wrote Dr. Robert N. McMurry, "is practical in only a small minority of companies." Not more than 1 per cent of the business firms today have "top policy-formulating managements which can accept, implement, and use a genuinely humanistic or 'bottom-up' philosophy of management." Democratic management does not work, McMurry found, because many persons will not really contribute to production. Most managements breed a bureaucratic man who fears to take action and who selects even weaker subordinates. Moreover, lower bureaucrats seem to prefer regimentation and passing the buck.

The alternative being followed by most companies is autocracy; but McMurry would seek to create a benevolent type. It would begin by accepting the fact that "top management is by nature autocratic and that much of lower and middle management is composed of insecure bureaucrats." Only strong autocrats can run a benevolent autocracy and provide the security most employees need and seek, according to McMurry. They would have to hold ultimate power in top management, and recognize that most people do not have the desire or capacity for genuine self-improvement or self-direction.

Yet to launch a benevolent autocracy, McMurry suggested, management would have to stress its humanistic, democratic policy so as to convey the impression that it is aware of other philosophies of rule and recognizes that each form has its limitations. The competence of the supervisory force would have to be checked regularly. The leadership responsibilities of the supervisors would have to be "absolutely structured for them" from the top. To eliminate confusion jobs would be defined more carefully so that lower managers could contribute opinions and preferences within the structure laid down for them. Performance reviews would be needed to let supervisors know where they stood with superiors. Periodic (even biennial) employee opinion polls would be used to check morale and prevent tyrannization by executives.

In brief, "benevolent autocracy gets its results because it rigidly structures, routinizes, and controls the relation of the supervisor to his subordinates in such a manner that, in spite of his frequent inherent tendencies to the contrary, he will employ the sound methods which come more naturally to the humanistic or democratic leader."⁴²

McMurry's view and the behavior of many managements have led Selekman to hold that management may be creating the very class society, divided and in open conflict, which Marx predicted. He suggests that the very basis of such a society would be either a class struggle leading to mass revolt "or a division in industry creating an elite which looks down on those who do the daily work." Such elitist rule would mean that many a management stamps a "differential status" on various groups working for it, making all the speeches and communications about free enterprise sound "like the tinkling of hollow brass." Yet all this would be done by corporation executives who are neither elected by a mass vote nor are responsible to the laity under them. Such an elitism denies the moral objectives that business says it is striving to attain.⁴³

Legitimation of Elitist Authority. In older times when the elite could rule from behind the scenes, it could proclaim rights for all while reserving their exercise largely for itself. As elites have been forced to play a more public role they have been forced to attempt legitimation of their rule. Yet Mills held that the power elite has no ideology, no ideas; it manipulates "without attempted justification" in a kind of mindlessness he called "the true higher immorality" and "organized irresponsibility" of our time.⁴⁴ Certainly not all elites conceal their power this well, and few, if any, are so stupid.

MacIver once noted that "power alone has no legitimacy, no

mandate, no office" where authority is "the established *right* within any social order, to determine policies, to pronounce judgments on relevant issues, and to settle controversies."⁴⁴ Perhaps MacIver is echoing the older view of Follett that "every situation in life has its own authority." Both, it would appear, were thinking of power and authority in terms of a far less publicly known elite which could act and hold rights without responsibility. Even in ancient times Aristotle "legitimated" slavery, just as Hamilton in this country "legitimated" monarchy without a king.

There is a growing recognition that "extra-legal authorities" have great power. Weber was concerned with the bases for authority, and Woodworth remarked that "no society can function as a society unless it gives the individual member social status and function, and unless the decisive social power is legitimate power." Drucker has gone even farther in stating that "this question of the legitimacy of management may well be the toughest yet to be answered by the modern industrial society." It has become a matter of legitimating a management which owns little or nothing but is increasingly professional and essentially responsible, in Drucker's words, "to no one."⁴⁵ Especially where fiduciary trusts have become the main owners, the hierarchy has technical control of the apparatus but no property interest.⁴⁶ The problem in gaining legitimacy for authority is not merely one of legalization, it is a problem of making the people feel that what they are being told to do is what they ought to do anyway. Legitimacy is more important than sanctions; managers have to gain acceptance and not merely impose ideas.^{47a} The presence of informal association suggests rejection of management's claim to legitimacy; so does the presence of the union, which Tannenbaum calls the only legitimate organization in mass society.⁴⁷ The feeling that one is obliged or duty bound to obey commands is related to legitimization, but it is not the same thing.^{48a} One obeys the incumbent of an office not the person; one salutes the uniform and not the man.

The new dimension added to this hoary issue of legitimization is the ownership by fiduciary trusts of an increasingly large share of common stocks and pension funds. The problem of legitimacy, which supposedly rested on representing the will of the shareholders, shifted when it became evident that stockholders had little control and that management selection resulted in "an automatic self-perpetuating oligarchy" under a control bloc. The management pyramid is beginning to be balanced by a pyramid of pension trustees, who, lacking property interest in the corporation, are "naked power vehicles." This small group has "the highest concentration

of economic power in recorded history." The power of sonic larger business units "can be thought of only in somewhat the way we have heretofore thought of nations."

Where such power exists, there is a problem of finding a field of responsibility and a field of accountability if the power system is to endure. The constitutional system is in question; a corporation acting as a fictional person may have to be subject to the same restraints as apply to a government agency. A new body of doctrine that will control power and make it legitimate has to be sought.

ELITISM IN MASS SOCIETY

Bringing once passive masses into the broad stream of political life makes for a democratization of society, but the elites take advantage of intellectually backward masses to rule by a "democracy of emotions" and by a monopoly of knowledge and instruments for its dissemination.⁴⁸ E. H. Carr wrote, "the spectacle of an efficient elite maintaining its authority and asserting its will over the mass by the rationally calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most disturbing nightmare of mass democracy."⁴⁹

Fusion at the Top. The important change in the structure of the elite has been the intermingling and virtual fusion of political, military, and business leaders.⁵⁰ Instead of the government being a separate executive committee of the ruling class, as Karl Marx predicted, rulers of various kinds have coalesced. Labor leaders, however, have not generally been included. Much of the fusion has arisen in war and in near-permanent war economies.

A coincidence of interests among top elitists occurs as political and economic affairs become "deeply joined."⁵¹ Douglas McKay, former Secretary of the Interior, said, "We're here in the saddle as an Administration representing business and industry."

Critique of Power Elitism. Several issues can be taken with Mills' view of the power elite. He seems to be talking about a fairly full war situation in which political-military-economic rule is thoroughly fused. Even here he plays down competition between elites, so common in the United States. Mills substitutes power elite for political class, which he calls an economic term, and sunders economic and political rule. This seems both unnecessary and outmoded, but he does recognize that any reason for an economic and political breach is now weak. The more important issue is that for the first time in the United States since colonial mercantilist days, economic, political, and military leaders are ruling jointly, directly, and openly.

Mills traces fusion to World War I, the New Deal joining of

corporate and political leaders, and encouragement by the old NIRA of government-backed cartels. Actually fusion is as old as the mercantilism of 1450-1776. Fusion to Mills means the rise of the corporation's representatives within government and thereby over the economic and political system. This is really the class view that holds the economic element to be dominant. Mills lacks a clear characterization of the emergence of a public economy quite like mercantilism, and of the relevance of a public capitalism run by state orders to a great degree and not simply by corporation representatives. He tends to see one elite; there are several here and abroad. But Mills has issued a warning on how the process may culminate; the weakness in his presentation is that he has not shown how counter-processes are at work.

SUMMARY

Leadership in formal organization is a superior-subordinate relationship, with its own symbols. In a country with a long elitist tradition, most leaders are quite autocratic in work relations. They have an elitist bias. The notion of elitism in industry is now widely acknowledged; indeed, it is rather proudly accepted by many top managers. They may be few in number, but they rule mightily.

Elites follow a logic of hierarchy and authority in a structure they control. Authority is tightly unified and correlated with power. But increasingly elites prefer to gain acceptance rather than to use force, especially in industry. A small group commands the hierarchy following a command theory that the lower ranks have the function of obedience. The relationship is fundamentally authoritarian, as is the flow of orders in a climate of autocracy, benevolent or otherwise.

The more public the elite the more difficult the problem of legitimating its rule becomes, especially in a democratic mass society. The issue is clouded by the separation of ownership from management and, latterly, by the rise of fiduciary trusts as absentee owners who have not yet taken over management. Whether a super-authority can control in this situation is an interesting question. That super-groups try is evident in mass society. Some considerable fusion of top elites from various power spheres occurs, excluding labor leaders. This makes for a sufficient unification of rulers to end a good deal of the old formal separation of economic and political affairs. But non- and anti-elitist forces persist.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is the elitist tradition in America?
2. Contrast intellectual and power elites.
3. What is the size of the elite and command group?

4. How do elites use the logic of hierarchy and authority?
5. Why do authority figures seek group acceptance?
6. Describe the command theory of authority.
7. Compare various climates of rule at work.
8. Present the case for benevolent autocracy.
9. Has elitist authority legitimated itself?
10. Critically evaluate power elitism.

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SECRECY, ELITE CIRCULATION, AND ANTI-ELITISM

Despite their increasingly public role and their attempts to legitimate that role, elites still do much of their work quite privately and even secretly until it is difficult to tell who is ruling whom, from what distance, and by what means. This difficulty is, in part, a reflection of the peculiar invisibility of most social relations. One may discern what has happened and sometimes why by their results, effects, and noticeable activities; but such processes may take years to unravel.

The selection of leaders is closely allied to this secrecy. Decisions concerning Pareto's "circulation of the elite," elite succession, are frequently decided in smoke-filled rooms and thus have an elusive character. A view of anti-elitism is necessary to round out the theory of the elite and to delineate the interrelations of the different levels in the hierarchies of mass society.

SECRECY IN ORGANIZATION

A distinction has to be drawn between efforts at legitimating elites—a public function, although it has private overtones—and the elite activity that is secret. Elites often operate out of darkness, consummate their activities before most people are aware of what has happened, and then pass on to still other non-public forms of achieving gains. Control from a distance may be quite private in character.

Power and Force. Power is latent and, in theory, is never expressed; it becomes manifest as authority. Force is manifest power. Secrecy is related to manipulation, the exercise of power over persons who do not realize they are being influenced. This is in contrast to authority which is explicit power. It is only from the com-

mand posts that one can gain a view of the whole; at lower levels all is shrouded in official secrets.¹ Public capitalism retains much secrecy; even its most public moves have secret machinations connected with them.

Such a view is reminiscent of Adam Smith's combinations of masters whose business, he said, was "always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution . . . never heard of by other people."² Veblen compared the nation to a corporation of which the citizens were the powerless silent stockholders.³ The competition of special interests, usually behind the scenes, makes for "an invisible government that is not orderly, responsible or just."⁴

A bureaucracy may discuss its policies publicly but hold to secrecy concerning its techniques.⁵ Elitist rule in both industrial and governmental bureaucracies is supported by the demands of a war economy for then "great secrecy of plan and intent" is in the interests of national security. Where information was the hallmark of a pluralistic democracy, secrecy is a sign of a war economy. Secret police, secret investigations, and private moves without public responsibility abound. Mills argued that behind the public struggle of various forces, the power elite "silently" consolidates its grip on a war economy.^{1a} Official secrets are then expanded, secret listening in on parts of the hierarchy and on the public is perfected, with the end result that "the very top of modern society is often inaccessible, the very bottom often hidden."^{1b}

Where power is anonymous, manipulation can occur and be more insidious than coercion, because it is "hidden" and there is no recourse. Irresponsibility, a cardinal principle of elitism, is organized into the manipulative system of communication.⁶ One may no longer properly speak of the power behind the throne, when those behind and those in front may be fused. Although the elite is, in some senses, more public now, many of its actions remain mysteries.

There are groups and functions, some sub- and extra-legal, that do not appear on organization master charts. Both corporations and unions have their secret side; neither is completely visible or invisible. Extra-formal organization may be important to production. Companies may use expediters, special leadmen, and special investigation systems. The federal government may use security personnel, particularly in strategic plants, offices, and even in unions. Such groups as the Communist Party are often active. Private relations that are organized against the various invasions of privacy are, of course, another matter. Informal organization may be the last refuge of privacy in many formal settings.⁷

Invisible Social Relations. Barnard said of the "limits of fictions and of circumventions attendant upon the democratic process" that "a silent 'democracy of behavior' determines all systems of government, public or private."⁸ The view that most social relations are invisible goes beyond the simple versions of manipulation from behind the scenes, for the subtlety of group and individual pressures is included.⁹ Asch wrote that much in group action "remains unknown to all of the members." Most social relations "can never be visible";¹⁰ hidden elements and latent culture patterns with hidden premises persist.¹¹

Mass society's authority has fundamentally altered its character. "It is not overt authority, but anonymous, invisible, alienated authority" based on abstract rules, abstract necessities of profit or market, or common sense, or economic necessities, which operates through the mechanism of conformity to rules and regulations.¹² It is no accident that elites control the communication system. "It is a perplexing fact that most executive decisions produce no direct evidence of themselves and that knowledge of them can only be derived from the cumulation of indirect evidence. They must largely be inferred from general results in which they are merely one factor and from symptomatic indications of roundabout character."¹³

These invisible social relations are not unconscious relations. It is a peculiarity of relations that they vanish in the moment of their execution, being intangible. Elites can take advantage of this.

Evidences of Elite Power. For years sociologists have sought out the secret power forces. Hollingshead discussed "behind the scenes control" which resulted in the formulation of conservative policies and election of officials to act for the highest class. Lawyers and public officials act for their clients in ways little known to the public.^{14a} Many a small business may have become an agent of a larger one until manipulation reaches the point where it is a "secret or impersonal exercise of power" with only the elite "knowing who obeys whom, when, and for what reasons."^{14b}

The National Resources Committee found that major elements of social control, all deeply affecting work-supervisory relations, are secret: "Prices can fairly readily be measured" in most cases, "but the threads of control which constitute the control structures are often hidden, ill defined, and difficult to determine." The committee was concerned with the "largely unnoticed" monetary and fiscal controls of government and of a range of corporation controls from those which are "easily traced" to those which are "so indirect that their existence can only be surmised."¹⁵ Rule is indirect only in the sense of being largely invisible; in a power sense invisible rule is

quite direct. Various bureaucracies seek by secret means and their "secret government" functions to increase their hold on the individual.¹⁵

Industrial Secrecy. Secrecy abounds in industry; it is built around status, financial manipulations, silent moves, and new product development. The emphasis on "visible status symbols" should not blind us, Barnard warned, to those codes and control devices which are "not often made explicit" and which "are among the most subtle elements of status systems."¹⁶ The subtle elements are among the most undemocratic features of status.

Much industrial secrecy has to do with the language of highly specialized operations and occupations. The mystery common to the old craft guilds rested on "secret understandings" available only to the initiated.¹⁷ Such private languages actually created serious breakdowns in communication. Secreting of information for various power reasons is also common.¹⁸ Family secrets are handed down in many companies and trades. Government through the patent system encourages private monopolies resting on secret knowledge.

Ford, as Fishwick observed, once developed a spy system: "Service men watched workers, undercover men watched service men, special agents watched undercover men, (Harry) Bennett watched everybody, and Ford himself worked Bennett like a puppet." When the whole system worked well, Ford made what Fishwick thought was the most revealing remark of his career. He said, "It isn't fun any more."¹⁹

Westinghouse has recorded statements of company policy on tape, then let company orders be considered a "secret" so that thousands of workers feeling that they were in on something "eagerly rushed to listen to hortatory talks which at other times might have been received with utter indifference."²⁰

Lasswell has warned that undercover systems in industry are by no means out of date. "Once your eye lights on the Indian who lies in wait behind a tree, you know you are being ambushed. But you may see a modern financier at his desk for hours a day for years and catch no clue to the nature of the security structure which he has set up to ambush investors."²¹

Management looks on informal association as a type of secret and "subversive" activity undermining formal organization. It forces many personal relations to exist as marginal and furtive. An invisible and counter-status system may arise. Management sometimes seeks to formalize the informal or use counselors and interviewers, workers may consider the motives to be ulterior. Most management work in human relations is quite secret.

Deals Between Unions and Management. Deals between unions and management and various levels of each hierarchy occur as well as in ordinary interrelations in the form of racketeering and collusion. During slack periods an employer may, for example, receive wage concessions from workers and "keep the concessions secret from the union."²¹ "Sub rosa" agreements between parts of management and unions, outside the contract, may sometimes be distinguishable.²² Workers are not usually apprised of the real reasons for counseling and interviewing, for testing and measurements, although unions sometimes join with managements in some phases of these activities.

Union Secrecy. Union secrecy rests in good measure on its having been considered a pariah and extra-legal group for so many years. For the first ten years of its life the Knights of Labor, formed in 1869, was a secret society. Its elaborate ritual to avoid detection and destruction is still reflected in some modern unions.²³ Law, too, may encourage some secrecy. An act of 1943 provided for secret votes in war disputes and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 supported secret balloting in selecting an official bargaining agent. AFL efforts to smash the racketeers among New York longshoremen ran into secret organizations as well as forces and feelings that had been "kept secret from outsiders."²⁴

Remote international unions also have their own quite private ways of running local unions, even if much of this is not elitism.

The Principle of Visibility. A new achievement of public economy and of bigness is that much of the old anonymity has disappeared. The size of modern industry and the communications revolution has increased "visibility," so that others are more able to "see what we are doing and, more important, we can see ourselves as we truly are." Selekman found a basic difference between democracy and authoritarianism in "the principle of visibility": "In a democracy," he said, "the maneuvers and the activities of alliances and coalitions are exposed sooner or later to the view of both the opposition and the public."²⁵ Government power in particular is constantly exposed. Still, much remains invisible.

Most private organizations become public to the extent that they have to be socially responsible for the effects of their activities, or more so than in the past.²⁶ If the dream of open covenants openly arrived at has not been realized, nevertheless strong efforts to make the invisible visible and therefore possibly responsible go forward.

SELECTION OF ELITES

Selection of elite personnel is a key task of top management. Circulation of the elite is made necessary by age, mortality, conflict,

and relentless changes. Few managements are capable of looking far enough ahead—at least a generation into the future—to determine the selection, as can a government. While most managements use "ad hoc nomination," selection is made by "hidden moves" and secret deals and behind the scenes control by highest class personnel.²⁷

Elements in Elite Circulation. Much of the selection of leading cadres is private and secret. It is an incessant process, too. Lineage has much to do with rising into the top business elite. "The father of the business elite has typically been a business man."²⁸ Gregory and Neu found that high business and social standing were linked to family background.²⁹ "Men born to the top," averred Warner and Abegglen, "are more likely to succeed and have more advantages than those born further down."³⁰

Lineage fails the elite on several counts, however. Sorokin showed that "in many groups vertical mobility is caused by an insufficient self-perpetuation of the upper strata," so that recruitment from lower layers is necessitated.³¹ In addition, there is no guarantee in heredity that children of the elite may be the fittest to lead; the opposite is often the case. Top caliber personnel then have to be brought in from below.

Mills insists that the criteria of admission and who applies the criteria is far more important than the proportion of descendants of wage workers who rise to higher circles.^{1c} Even if nearly all the elite descended from wage workers, control of the testing, selecting, training, checking, shuffling and reshuffling process would remain in the hands of the elite and this control is what is decisive. The essential point shifts, then, to ascertaining who among the lower classes has made a clear break from his lower social origin and a definite commitment to the value system and way of life of the elite.

One may enter elite layers only if the candidate has skills that meet elitist needs. This requires a coincidence of interests and attitudes. The elite has to be able to say of the new candidate: He belongs to us. Education is a partial and preparatory technique for sorting out the young to match elitist requirements. Social movements also contribute to the formation of the political elite by serving as a training ground.

Democracy in Selection. Whether selection of top leaders is democratic is of greater importance than the class origin of elites. Barnard says, "A small *proportion* of leadership positions is today filled by the democratic process—chiefly major public officials, officers of labor organizations, social organizations; also principal officers of corporations and universities—but as to these classes the process is often nominal."⁹ By and large, enterprise elites are not

democratically selected. On this most delicate problem of selection, the I.L.O. held, "The recruiting of the managers is no longer made from below; the system of labor, unlike political systems, far from becoming democratic is becoming feudalized."³²

Berle wrote that management through manipulation of proxies has reached a position where directors renominate themselves and produce "an automatic self-perpetuating oligarchy." Enterprise does not start out democratic and degenerate into oligarchy; it starts out as an oligarchy. The result, according to Berle, is that "for practical purposes, therefore, the control or power element in most large corporations rests in its group of directors and it is autonomous . . . taken together with a control bloc."

Quite clearly the hierarchy are divided from the laity in elite selection.³³ Such selection may enlarge the social cleavage between workmen and operating executives. Merton noted that "it may produce a sharper *social stratification of industry*." Although he rested his observation on advances in methods of production, he showed that "managers come increasingly to be drawn from social strata remote from those of workers."³⁴

Such a cutting off of the chance of movement upward can create terrible tensions.³⁵ Seeking to rise from a fixed position can be a harsh task, fraught with frustrations that may produce the internal proletariat of Toynbee, or the resisting of the organization by many of its own executives.³⁶ As Sorokin wrote, "the relative scarcity of sensate values generates a relentless and often ferocious struggle" of individuals and groups in a culture of enmity and war.³⁷ This renunciation of achievement as a way of rising is what Mannheim termed "the real threat of contemporary mass society."

In 1956 General Motors Corp. had a 25 per cent turnover of top executives. This may have been a major test of its theory of "management in depth"; most of the executives who moved into higher echelons had been with the company for two dozen years or more. Critics of this strongly organized corporation contended that the company simply had many people and tried various combinations until one clicked.³⁸ Top company leaders on their part said that the only way to tell whether a man can do a job is to give him a chance at it and responsibility to get it done.³⁹

Meanwhile, the prospects for democratic selection remain remote. Barnard felt that "a much wider extension of the democratic process to the formally organized efforts of our society—so far as appointments are concerned—would quickly break down through the inability to secure the much larger quality and the quantity of leaders then necessary."⁴⁰ The proportion of positions filled dem-

eratically has declined in recent years, viz. the extension of the civil service system, the rise of semi-civil service selection in huge corporations, continuous tenure in some organizations, co-optation of career men, and the use of administrative law in government and corporations. Chase found that "individual talent is too sporadic and unpredictable to be allowed any important part in the organization of society." This is the fine line that elitism draws between democracy and itself.

Whatever the selection, no intellectual elite has arisen in industry. The elite can buy knowledge but it has to have competence to rule. No philosopher-kings can be found among the new combined power elite; the brilliant person becomes a consultant or expert, a hired hand. It is in this sense that Mills contends that since the mass public cannot identify itself with the elite, "America is indeed without leaders." The result is that the invisible elite has produced "organized irresponsibility" in selection and in rule.¹⁹

Union Leader Selection. Union leaders fight hard to rise to and stay on top and do so in the main by democratic means.²⁰ The necessary political means and personnel are usually found in all groups.²¹ Unions contribute to the formation of a political elite by training leaders and recruiting intellectuals, but they have not penetrated the top elite in the United States.

Succession is as critical a problem in unions as it is in management. Very old men at the top of most unions are not, it is charged, developing capable successors well, a factor often considered a sign of organizational incompetence. The old radical, socialist, and idealist movements that produced many union leaders are drying up. Unions have become so reliant on government that the old conflict ideology around which leaders were trained has been weakened. Narrower specialization is restricting the training possibilities for new union leaders, although courses in leadership are given regularly. Moreover, the old idealism to which one could cling and around which one could develop has failed many unionists.²²

ANTI-ELITISM

Although elitism has had a long life, people can snap out of the most powerful controls from above. Opportunities for greater participation in civic life develop, and anti-elitist moves are possible. Unfortunately, there is no linear movement upward away from elitism. A gain in literacy is not matched by any real gains in two-way communication at work.

Self-Leadership. An ethical ideal exists of self-expression and self-rule based on drives of human beings for independence and

adulthood.⁴⁰ An orientation by reason and not simply by herding is steadily sought in line with attempts to improve our capacity for objectivity.

Although Edmund Burke held that people had "neither the capacity nor the knowledge to determine the policies of their government," Asch found that the secret fear of elites was that the people would learn what was at issue. Ogle believes the ability of people to make important decisions for themselves and the public good has been underrated.⁴¹ Childs thinks public opinion polls demonstrate the "wisdom of the electorate" to pass on public policy.⁴² No longer is it thought that only the elite can produce works of art and appreciate them.⁴³ The new concern for mass buying power indicates how authority derives from consent to a significant degree.

"Industrial relations by fiat of the boss is anathema to workers who have been raised on stories of American democratic principles."⁴⁴ This is the issue of legitimization again, but it is also part of the basic human desire for independence, for conducting one's own affairs. Employee satisfaction is usually found to be higher where employees can make decisions. People seek genuine participation in ruling themselves.⁴⁵

Fall of Particular Elites. "All is ephemeral—fame and the famous as well," wrote Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*. Selection or the "succession" demonstrates a major breach in elitism. No oligarchy has persisted for too long in history. The successors may not have the qualities of the founders of a regime; but a new elite may rise in its place. Schumpeter pointed out that the capitalist elite fell and collapsed not from failure but from over-success. It became institutionalized and governmentalized, and then was replaced by a political elite.⁴⁶ When business leaders joined the government, there was fusion at the top, not replacement.

In Orwell's words, "All past oligarchies have fallen from power either because they ossified or because they grew soft." External force also operates, although in competition two elites may encourage each other. Sorokin's top group is replaced from below; Toynbee sees competition between an external or exiled elite and a dominant internal minority. American tradition would have a rotating elite, perhaps not too unlike Pareto's circulation of the elite, but civil service has altered much rotation. Richard Crossman, the Fabian socialist, has said that "the main task of socialism today is to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of either industrial management or the state bureaucracy—in brief to distribute responsibility and so to enlarge freedom of choice".⁴⁷

Future of Elites. The dream of throwing off power elites is old, but it is now associated with enhancing the intellectual elite and increased participation on the part of more people. Elites, if they get too powerful and reduce mobility, may encourage violence and revolution.

Kornhauser sees this possibility for the future: "Management and labor power elites of the present will be supplanted and subordinated to a scientific and technical elite" in a society where little human work will be left to be done, leaving other kinds of interest groups to contest for social power.^{22a} Others, like Sorokin, envisage a recurrence of types of social arrangements in which more familialistic interactions will occur, in which "there is no formal domination and subordination, no master and servant, no arbitrary government, and suppressed subjects."^{21a} Marxians have held that the state will wither away, although it shows no signs of doing so. So far the preservation of pluralistic forces appears to be the best hope for anti-elitism.

SUMMARY

While more public in many respects, elites operate secretly to a considerable extent. Invisible social relations cannot be done away with; however, efforts to make the invisible visible and subject it to social responsibility are moving ahead. Secrecy is present in both unions and businesses, and between them as well.

Elite selection is more than an exercise in ascertaining class antecedents. It is a problem of breaking from lower groups and accepting the attitudes and values of the elite. The circulation is forced by the mortality of elites, lack of guarantees that their children are competent, and by vast social changes which make new leaders necessary. However, the selection is by no means democratic.

Anti-elitism rests on moves for independence as part of achieving adulthood, on seeking self-leadership in most of life's situations, on the emergence of pluralist organizations, and on the wisdom of the electorate. The elite itself is non-conformist. Perhaps elitist forms of rule can weaken as work centrality lessens and other social forms become more significant than the present power ones.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How has the phrase "power behind the throne" changed?
2. Present evidence of the power of secret forces.
3. Describe invisible social relations.
4. In what way is secret power irresponsible?

5. Define a necessary step in becoming an elitist.
6. Compare Sorokin, Orwell, and Toynbee on elite persistence.
7. Do union and management elites differ? How?
8. Elaborate an approach to anti-elitism.
9. What are important anti- and non-elitist forces?
10. Is it possible to rid a mass society of elitist rule? Or will elites merely gain even more power?

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THE UNION IN MASS SOCIETY

Although they preceded large-scale secular arrangements in time, unions are preeminently a phenomenon of mass society. In the process of becoming leading power groups, unions have changed greatly, altering their roles and aims. They, however, remain a mechanism if not for sharing power, then for making it more socially responsible. Unions have won wide acceptance and in so doing according to many writers have helped create a new status for workers.

It was by a paradoxical twist that unions materially assisted in the creation and extension of mass society by producing a labor movement, with an ideology and power drive of its own. It has developed a counter-organization to management of considerable appeal to many workers. In the process the union has shifted its aims and changed its emphases, and faced grave dangers to its independent existence.

Relation to Mass Society. The basic idea of unions of grouping workers together in a mass regardless of individual differences, of keeping members fairly equal in pay and in social terms is a herald of mass society and, indeed, one of its bases.¹ The rise of unions was at least in part a result of the repressive measures used by employers and the government, but industry's massing of workers into huge concentrations also contributed. To counteract the dehumanizing effects of such conditions, workers join together in unions. Moreover, unions are an expression by workers of common interests by trades, crafts, and social position.² Such common interest is evidenced by a sense of unity, cohesion and solidarity. That these same feelings exist among unions can be seen in their honoring of picket lines and in their giving financial aid to unions in trouble.³ The presence of the union demonstrates the conclusion of a work force that it dare not, in the future, place its faith either in man-

agement or in the society."² This was what Commons meant in 1918 when he wrote that over three centuries "the wage earner, as a distinct class, has been gradually, even violently, separating himself from the farmer, the merchant, and the employer."³

Through the union the worker gains some control over himself and the employer. A counterbalance to the power of management and government is found.⁴ Even though unions have been accepted and virtually institutionalized, their past "protest movement" keeps unions somewhat outside the pale of fully accepted institutions. Rose held that the next main problem of unions is "to get themselves integrated with the rest of American society,"⁵ although they are undoubtedly "an integral part of modern industry."⁶

Because unions became an institution at the same time that the modern power state and large-scale enterprise arose, they have been forced to fight to remain independent of management and state. It is significant that unions in the United States did not take the separatist political road of much of European labor; they retained a conservatism and a pro-capitalist orientation.

Nature of the Union. The union has a dual character; it is a social group to which workers belong, and it is a politico-economic bargaining force combating management. Both of these elements are bound up in the growth of unions. The union has a real hold on its workingman member. His interest in unions is much higher than in third parties, cooperatives, and most other groups. By overcoming of a long record of defeats, the union has become a symbol of strength, despite severe limits on its social and political aims.^{7*}

Unions have a militancy that, according to Schneider, arises from "a very real clash of interest between management and labor" and a drive to become institutionalized.^{8*} They seek to have a say in decisions directly affecting the welfare and status of workers so that decisions may be made jointly and not unilaterally. Haber believes they are also a "stabilizing" element in many an unstable industry, as in building.⁹

Why Workers Join Unions. Industry brought workers together and then did not provide for them either within industry or externally through legislation.¹⁰ Workers then resorted to unions as a way to handle, reduce, or eliminate complaints and obtain satisfactions. With the union the worker can stand at bay and fight back; he may gain a new sense of importance and "the erect posture of something like a human being."¹¹ This is the worker's main status-achieving device; without it, he is helpless before automatic machinery and forces he cannot control.

Some union joining, two-thirds according to Kuhn, is "voluntary

by compulsion." Still, compulsion can hardly be a chief motive since "compulsory membership would not be tolerated unless the acceptance of unionism was already high."¹¹ It takes more than outside "agitators" to produce a union. But one should not underestimate the influence of union leaders and the power, to a degree compulsory, of unions.¹² Some situations create social pressure for joining unions and some union security clauses make membership a condition of obtaining employment.

Schneider held that workers are little attracted to unions for ideological reasons or for social benefits and have but a vague allegiance. They are, however, concerned about job security, and the union offers a way to modify the formal relations of production so as to assure some security and close the gap between the needs and desires of the worker and the satisfactions offered by industry. The workers thus gain prestige, status, some power expression, opportunities to talk to management on fairly equal terms, higher esteem, a sense of individual achievement, and some control over the direction of their own lives.^{6c} In addition, there is a quality of power gained from being in a union, the worker may feel he is now part of something, even of a movement.

Union Aims. For decades unions have been primarily concerned with improvements and defenses of wages, hours, working conditions, and collective bargaining relations.¹³ As the labor movement has grown, unions have developed extra-economic aims in socio-political affairs. They have fought both monopoly and totalitarianism in the plant and out. They have acted as a fraternal-group for workers set free from ties to land, to enterprise, and frequently to family; and they have developed institutional power for handling problems of labor in the broader community and nation.

The union protects the integrity of the organization, maintains a separate existence, and provides its own reason for continued functioning beside management. The aim is against any one group rule in the plant and in the society, which is one reason union movements have not succumbed to totalitarianism.²⁰ The protest role has been so powerful a part of union activity that, when unions become recognized and have to state their goals more positively, they often run into difficulty. The emphasis on collective bargaining as goal has become too narrow and has had to be broadened to include social issues concerning non-workers as well. Otherwise unions would have been reduced to being extremely narrow pressure groups.²¹

That broadening has increased union strength. It has become evident that they were never interested solely in "pork chops" but

were always concerned with social affairs.¹⁴ They have found a new role in participating in hiring and discharge, in training and contract negotiations, in legislative, political, and educational activities.¹⁵ The UAW plans to build a model community of homes in Detroit for retired workers.¹⁶ It now seeks a profit-sharing plan.¹⁷ Yet far from dominating the society, which no union has done anywhere, the union tends to fill in for the worker functions that other groups are not supplying.¹⁸

Changing Role of the Union. The union has become a socio-political force operating in and out of the office, mine and mill. "Labor organization is in itself a great and permanent social change."¹⁹ The old emphasis on job control as part of the principle of exclusive jurisdiction is still stressed by many unions. Others are run as a business. Many, usually those most infiltrated, are known for their anti-communist emphasis; a tiny few are pro-communist. Unions were largely voluntaristic until the 1930's when they accepted government activity in the economy. A period of pro-government orientation opened in the 1930's and was coupled with government neutrality or encouragement of union organization. The Taft-Hartley Act may however, have inaugurated a stage of "containment" of unions and forced them into greater political action than in the past. Unification of the AFL-CIO, although far from complete, may mark a new stage.

Steadily the old union-run welfare function has become a public welfare operation.²⁰ A possible new development is heightened centralization, encouraged by legislation and the decline of leftwing unionism and by the continued high level of economic production.²¹

THE UNION AS ALTERNATIVE

Management is held to be essential to the economic and social function of a democratic society while "the union is essential to its free spirit."²² Such a view gives the union a permanent "negative" function in the sense that it is viewed as the follower and never the leader. Yet workers choose unions, a positive act, to counter management power and express a basic alternative in the democratic mass society.²³ Many managements that extol competition deny it in its union form. But unions are needed to provide a different view of authority, to move the society beyond one-group arbitrary rule, and extend both informal group power and the communication system.

Union Contrast to Management Authority. Reynolds observed that "the structure of management is quite different from that of a political organization such as the trade-union, where authority flows

from the bottom of the structure toward the top." The union is generally far more democratic than the average factory organization. The presence of the union forces management to alter its traditionally hierarchical and autocratic character.²¹

Union leaders are "not the boss," cannot give orders as can management, and are responsible to those below them to an extent no management is.²² Few unions and even fewer union leaders have the directive powers of managers and where they occur these are in very narrow spheres. A union member may have less freedom to speak than a union official in given circumstances; but both have far more voice than stockholders or lower managers. One union leader said, "I've had a chance to sit on the other side of the fence, too. And let me tell you, it's no pleasure. When management has a conference, they ask if there are any questions but they really don't want any answers. You have to shut up; you can't say what you feel. You never speak your mind. Now it's just the opposite in the union. I feel always that I can say what I want to."²³

Beyond One-Group Rule. The days when one man could run the whole show are over. No modern industrialist can emulate the elder Henry Ford who had no labor unions, small taxes, few government restrictions to contend with. Unions limit management power. They lessen the dependence of a permanent wage-earning class on directive relations and open up some new avenues for advancement in the union hierarchy, an alternative to the management ladder of mobility.

F. W. Taylor held that scientific management would "confer far greater blessings upon the working people than could be brought about by any form of collective bargaining."²⁴ The point Taylor missed was that workers do not wish anyone to confer anything on them; they seek independence. Unions are vehicles through which workers reassert control over their working lives. They act as checks on management's authority and power drives.

Informal Group Power. Workers striving for independent control over their work is a basis for informal association within formal organization; this striving also makes for union organization. Unions are a distinct organization, apart from the company, functioning inside and outside the plant, crossing plant lines, linking various informal groups.²⁵

Steadily they increase their pressure for sharing control, vis., in joint determination of assembly-line speeds, not just to restrict but frequently to stabilize production.²⁶ Myers and Laidler held that a "union is a safety valve" that prevents explosive forces from accumulating; it calls attention to discontent and then provides means

for peaceful adjustments.²⁷ Many an informal group is built around the union, and sometimes within the union against the leadership as in the case of "unauthorized" strikes. Although the union may be just another formal institution for inactive members, it is an informal social group for many active ones, and is an alternative to management for both groups.

Communication and the Union. The presence of the union provides alternative channels of communication; it may provide the only truly two-way communication in most of industry. Among eighteen important businesses checked in one study, nearly every company used unions "in getting ideas across to and reflecting reactions of workers."²⁸

A Princeton University study showed that recognition of the interrelation of management and union communication is needed.²⁹ The Twentieth Century Fund study also held that unions should be integrated "as an effective channel of two-way communication from managers to workers and from workers to management." Of course, the unions have forced management to listen to union communication and are involved in grievance and layoff communication, but they can hardly be integrated without being subordinated. Dubin indeed held that "we must recognize . . . that a union does not exist solely for the purpose of adding another link to the communication chain within a plant."

Where such communication integration occurred, as in the Joint Production Committees of the War Production Board in World War II, unions handled only minor problems and worker-union influence was small.³⁰ Moreover, such integration clashes with different views workers have of their situation. In conflict relations management and union use every communicative device to gain support and loyalty.²⁸ Still, unions may and sometimes do help "put over" management decisions.^{22a}

INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRACY INTO INDUSTRY

By their participation in most modern cultures, unions and the labor movement have helped extend universal suffrage and free public education and have brought to industry and society a greater measure of democracy and representation. Standing between the hierarchies of corporation and government, the union has opened up an area of competition and democracy and has extended that pluralism which remains a great barrier against single authoritarian rule. In a multiple group world one has greater advantages and opportunities for democratic expression than in a completely state-run economy where to be discharged is equivalent to death.³¹

Anti-Monopoly Approach. While sometimes accused of being monopolies, unions have led the struggle against both business monopoly and totalitarian political monopoly. They have worked for the end of monopoly in education, privilege, social position, and have forced recognition of dual organizations within the heart of industry.³² It is unions, Taft held, that are "living testimony to the existence of a democratic society" of diluted and pluralistic power.³³ Such critics as Lindblom have admitted that "industrial democracy is therefore a device for counteracting the arbitrary power exercised by the employer over the worker, which at the same time established the undemocratic arbitrary power of the union over the consumer."

Pluralism in Industry. Ulam has said that, "it is difficult to imagine today a democratic society without trade unions." Tannenbaum went further to find that the union is the real alternative to the authoritarian state and the only true society that industrialism has created. Surely, it is the union that, by producing interstitial, pluralist democracy, has provided an important answer to the iron law of oligarchy within a single organization. Unions have tended to force a distribution of power, to prevent anyone from becoming corrupted by single exercise of it, and to enable the worker to become a free citizen of industry.³⁴

The union became the basis for the democratization of the work process by producing a new "collective bond." It was the "substitution of collective bargaining for an employer's authoritarian control of working conditions" that signified the introduction of democracy into industry. From absolute ruler, management was changed to a constitutional monarch, with the right of appeal. Chamberlain has said of collective bargaining, "it is possible that it represents the next and more difficult stage of the whole democratic revolution of the last two centuries—the merging of the political and industrial revolutions in a manner which preserves the benefits of both."³⁵ Slichter, too, held that collective bargaining introduced civil rights into industry, required management to operate by rule and not arbitrary decision, and also helped produce industrial jurisprudence, a rule-making by joint agreement.³⁶

The entire argument on pluralism is beside the point for those who view unions "as something extraneous, an excrescence upon the structure of industry rather than as an integral part of it." Gardner and Moore pointed out. They declared that "a union can be as much a part of the total structure as an engineering or accounting organization." Union pressures on management serve a "direct function for the workers in enabling them to hold back

against the pressures acting upon them through the management hierarchy." Moreover, the extended union organization brings various influences from the outside world to bear on management.^{22b} Even the celebrated "wage-push" effect of union pressure is generally recognized as a force requiring companies to be more efficient.

Autocracy was wont to confuse loyalty with blind obedience and exclude loyal opposition and therefore any dissent, however productive.²³ Because unions have also fought for the loyalty of workers a system of dual allegiance has been introduced.^{24a} Various studies have shown that workers can be loyal to both unions and companies. Unions probably introduce loyalties quite different from and opposed to those of management.

Dual and Triple Power. Unions are not completely independent but they change the balance of power in a plant. There is a vast proliferation of what some have called private governments within the framework of the political state. Unions have been recognized as "vast governments of their members."

Rembold Niebuhr has said of the union movement, "It has provided that equilibrium of power without which justice is unobtainable" by setting organized power against organized power and, becoming a sovereignty in the process. The union alters the old superordinate-subordinate relations by introducing a dual decision-making instrument. It forces management power elites to meet, discuss, negotiate, and function in the open.²⁵ The hierarchical system at rank is not upset, but it is checked by a bilateral power relation. The union becomes an employer-regulating device in matters affecting workers' welfare. Influences from the outside are brought to bear and may actually push out the old framework of rule and help preserve the "open society."

The union's role is to make for De Tocqueville's "coincidence of a democratic political system with a highly developed organizational life."²⁶ The essence of democracy is found in the correlated existence of "many centers of self-government."²⁷

NEW STATUS OF THE UNION

Unions have reached a high point of social acceptance in America. It is amazing that it was possible for a protest movement to rise to this position in so short a time. Coupled with the impulse unions have given to democracy in industry and society this is a solid achievement.

Acceptance of Unions. Wide acceptance of unions has changed labor-management relations from one of conflict to one of fairly orderly interaction.²⁸ Stages of management neutrality,

and cooperation may be distinguished. A public opinion poll showed that some 72 per cent of the population approved of unions in 1936. By 1957 the proportion had risen to 76 per cent. Lowest approval came from farmers (60 per cent), highest from skilled workers (84 per cent), but approval by professional and business personnel reached 73 per cent, and 77 per cent of the white-collar workers approved.⁴² Such wide acceptance, especially by professional and business persons, may be somewhat akin to Jones' version of a "central morality" of communities approving of unions.

Jones wrote: "The central morality is humanitarian and approves of acts in the interest of human welfare and alleviation of suffering even if they entail the infringement of corporate property. It approves of trade unions, and would like to see a well-led, unified, strong labor movement, but one that refrained from violence."⁴³ That central morality has considerable influence on the attitudes of workers and the actions of unions. More specifically, according to union official George W. Brooks, the changed attitude of employers toward unions has been the most important factor affecting unions.⁴⁴ With abandonment of anti-unionism, labor organizations have entered a new world of regularity and order, of continuous negotiation of industrial jurisprudence.

Even the old cry against injustice has changed, for unions are on the inside and not out. Yet they have a moral position, a "built-in moral compulsion" to lead struggles for equal job opportunities, equal rights for women, improved public housing, extended federal aid for education, equitable tax, as well as public health and social security programs.⁴⁵ In brief, unions have moved beyond seeking simple economic gains to seek socio-economic successes.

The Achievement of New Status. The historical achievement of unions has helped enhance the status of the worker. The entire search for security is a striving for secure status. Such status could have been sought through employers or government, however, since it was largely gained through unions, a possible paternal-feudal industrialism was avoided.⁴⁶ Unions have provided a "new ladder" for rising in what may be the latest version of the self-made man.

Paradoxically by means of unions, workers achieve an improved status mainly through recognition of the collective bargaining contract. Instead of moving from status to contract as Sir Henry Maine and Tönnies and others averred, the workers have moved from contract to status! Great gains in freedom and the right to be self- and group-determining have been won.⁴⁷ Tannenbaum wrote, "the trade

union movement has survived because it satisfied 'the workers' craving for moral status in a recognizable society.'¹⁷

SUMMARY

The organization that set out to improve the condition of the individual worker wound up by helping massify him. Yet unions by creating a labor movement raised the status of workers to new heights by emerging as a significant power group in a world of giants. The old protest character of the union has given way to the negotiational power relation and to the new emphasis on public welfare operations. But workers are impressed by union ability to gain results, if not so much in wages as in human rights and dual power relations with management. The aims have changed as has the union's role, with the union remaining as a main alternative to private rule of individuals at work.

Unions have a democratic nature; they seek to end one-group economic monopoly and oppose one-group political monopoly. They help extend informal group power, although they are formal organizations within which informal associations arise. Unions introduce true two-way communication into industrial relations. In so doing they help create democratic relations within industry, resting their power on pluralist-interstitial dissent. If they have not achieved dual power, they have softened the blow of arbitrary power and, in so doing have obtained justice in labor-management relations. These gains amount to new social acceptance and a wholly new status for workers. But the gains are by no means definitive, glaring weaknesses persist.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How do unions contribute to massification?
2. Describe the labor movement.
3. Present several variant views of the nature of unions.
4. Why do workers join unions?
5. Contrast union aims of the 1950's to their aims of the 1800's.
6. In what way has the role of the union changed in the last century?
7. Contrast union and management authority.
8. Is union power a real alternative to management power?
9. State the case for the union bringing democracy to industry.
10. How could an anti-monopoly force be a monopoly?
11. What is pluralism in industry?
12. Analyze dual power in industry.
13. To what extent has the union improved the workers' status?

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UNION POWER AND WEAKNESS

Unions have reached the point of greatest power in their history; yet their leaders are not part of the national political elite. Though they have made economic and social gains of considerable proportions, they remain peripheral to the main power institutions of the society. Unions have shown that they operate well within the limits of capitalism.

The paradox of the union is that the militant sounds of its past activities are quite subordinate to its current essentially conservative nature. Widespread acceptance of unions, the rise in their status, and longtime prosperity has raised to virtual middle class position much of the working force. There are those who consider that the union is now a political power in the community, directing a "laboristic economy." Such a view does not make clear serious union weaknesses, despite their enlarged membership and gains of the past two decades. Their interlocked role can, however, not be questioned.

SIZE OF UNIONS

Unions in the United States and Canada reached a peak membership of 18,500,000 as of the beginning of 1959. Within their ranks they had one-fourth of the labor force, one-third of the non-farm employment, and possibly 40 per cent of the non-owning and non-professional groups.¹ More persons are within the AFL-CIO and independent unions than within any other non-state bodies in America, with the exception of several church organizations.

Membership in Unions. Slightly more than one million members of the unions are in Canada, leaving about 17,500,000 in the United States, the largest single union force in the western world. From 1955 to 1957 the growth of unions was from about 500,000 to 14,477,190, a rise of three per cent.² Significantly, the AFL-CIO

claims but 15,000,000 members, contending that government figures include retired and unemployed workers; the union count includes only dues-paying members.

In 1897 unions had 447,000 members; by 1900 they had grown to 868,500; in 1910 there were 2,140,500; and by 1920 the figure had grown to 5,047,800. For a long time this was the union peak; despite prosperous economic conditions, union size slumped, during the 1920's in an unfavorable legal environment and as organizational needs of workers changed. By 1929 unions had but 3,442,600 members; they had only 3,392,800 members in 1930. Their low point was 2,973,000 in 1933. There was a great upsurge in union membership during the 1930's, resulting in 6,334,300 members by 1937 and 8,100,000 members in 1940. During World War II unions were raised to a new peak both in size and in the percentage of the labor force organized. These gains continued into the postwar period until 14,119,100 members were enrolled in the United States as of 1947, the year the Labor Management Relations Act was passed.²

Between the time of the AFL-CIO merger in December, 1955 to the end of 1957, unions added another million members. Total membership losses for eighteen unions reached 250,832. Railway unions lost the most. The CIO Textile Workers Union, with a fall of 79,970 members, was the hardest hit individual union, followed by the UAW with 32,604 losses. Some unionists contend, despite the over-all gains, that the effect of the Taft-Hartley Act was to slow the rate of union growth.³ They point to the fall in representation elections won by unions from 1947 to 1957. Unions won 81 per cent of the elections during the 12 years of the Wagner Act and but 70 per cent after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.⁴ Moreover the total number of eligible voters in union representation elections fell from 1.1 million in 1945 to just over 800,000 in 1950 and 400,000 in 1957. Further falls are expected. Still, it is difficult to say whether unions have reached a new leveling off stage of growth and possibly of collective bargaining influence as a result of the Taft-Hartley legislation or as a result of other factors.⁵

Real Membership Rates. In 1900 3.0 per cent of the labor force was organized, compared to 5.6 per cent in 1910 and 12.0 per cent in 1920—the longtime peak. Unions slipped to 6.8 per cent by 1930 and to their lowest proportion since 1902 in the year 1933 when 5.8 per cent were organized. By 1940 the rate had gone up to 14.6 per cent. The World War II peak was also a wholly new situation for unions; 23.0 per cent of the labor force was organized in 1944. In 1947 the rate was 23.5 per cent; this slipped to 22.1 per cent in 1950, rose to 26.8 per cent in 1953, and hovered at about

25 per cent in 1957. The present proportion is double the ratio of 1920.

A far more accurate picture of union strength may be gained from comparing membership to the organizable civilian labor force. Thus, if farmers are excluded, 33 per cent of the labor force is in unions. If owners other than farm are excluded, the figures may go as high as 40 per cent. Moreover, in specific industries, especially heavy industries, unionization is virtually 100 per cent. Approximately 2.5 million white-collar workers, or 15 per cent of the organizable force in those fields, are unionized. Since the industrial labor force may be contracting, as a result of technological factors, union strength in those fields may be halted. A shift to white-collar organization is necessary if unions are to retain their present rates of organization. Increases in governmental unionization beyond the present 900,000 (five per cent of all union members) may also be needed. In recent years some of the larger unions have grown bigger, going from 7.7 million in 1954 to 8 million in 1957; while some traditionally powerful ones, such as the mine workers and railroad workers, have slipped badly.

In many areas union membership has grown faster than the total labor force. As the western states have industrialized more after World War II, there has been a westward shift in union membership. Major organizational targets for unions naturally lie in these newly industrializing areas.⁶

Growth Factors. Bernstein indicated that the growth of unions may be attributed to long-run and short-run factors. Long-run factors include the expansion of the labor force, increased acceptance of unions, less immigration, increased homogeneity of the labor force, and the extension of union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements. In the short run the business cycles have an effect, although their greatest impact came during wartime economic expansion. War enlarged labor's role and prestige and lessened employer hostility. Social unrest during the depression made society more amenable to governmental action in business and to union organization. The test of union organization will have to await a serious economic reversal or major political action against them.

Meanwhile, an important question concerns how far can unions go toward organizing the whole labor force. Bernstein felt that long-run and short-run factors would make for steady growth, with little or no loss in a depression and sharp expansion in a war.⁷ Others have argued that, beyond organizing about 25 per cent of the total labor force, unions by their presence so affect other wages

and working conditions that it is not necessary for additional workers to join. Unions in the United States may never reach the 41 per cent of the labor force organized in Britain.

Sorokin has pointed out that "if a labor union should embrace the whole of mankind, it would cease to be the labor union, because if all employers and employees equally belong to the same union it becomes neither labor nor capitalist but a union of mankind."⁸ Where unions have organized 95 per cent of the labor force, they have become state agencies as in Russia and have lost their independence. At what appears to be their peak size, they have their least strength.

CONSERVATISM OF UNIONS

Unions in the United States are conservative institutions. They reject the ideology of class conflict, oppose communism and fascism, and support democratic government and gradual change. Success and acceptance has made them turn away from the older protest orientation.⁹

Pro-Capitalist Orientation. Despite some socialist sentiments in its early years, the AFL has been a powerful supporter of capitalism. The CIO has always "officially supported capitalism." Indeed, Dankert wrote, "American unions are capitalistic, in the sense that they favor the preservation of the key institutions of capitalism."¹⁰ The American trade union movement is "one of the social inventions of capitalism."¹¹

One study of the UAW holds that its voting activities indicate that it "is not socialistic, not against the present economic system, nor even seriously in favor of establishing a third, 'labor party.' It believes in independent political action carried on within the two-party system—predominantly, of course, through the Democratic Party. It aims not at overthrowing private capitalism or at preventing the exercise of business influence on opinion and government, but at *balancing* and *offsetting* what it judges to be one-sided pressures in these areas."¹² It exposes self-interested groups and works for extension of various welfare gains and aganst communism. This does not mean that the union waits for management to act and then counterbalances management moves; they have greater independence than that. But it does mean that such views as that of Park that labor organizations came into being to carry on strikes and "direct the slow-burning revolution which is gradually transforming the capitalist system" are inaccurate.¹³ The late Philip Murray was closer to the mark when he wrote, "the modern labor union has in many respects become a big business."¹⁴

But unions were not always this business-like. The preamble to the 1881 Declaration of Principles of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, immediate predecessor to the AFL, ran: "A struggle is going on in the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between capital and labor, which must grow in intensity from year to year and work disastrous results to the toiling millions of all nations if not combined for mutual protection and benefit."

By 1938 the CIO, which had left the AFL two years before, said in its preamble that it appealed to the "unorganized" and not merely to the trades and crafts as it had in 1881. It emphasized that organization in "the mass production and basic industries" would bring a "new freedom" to American workers. The objects of the CIO were effective organization, extension of collective bargaining to deal with vast corporations, maintaining responsibility in bargaining, securing legislation to safeguard economic security and social welfare, protecting and extending civil rights and liberties, and "to perpetuate the cherished traditions of our democracy." There was not a word about a struggle going on between the "oppressors and oppressed."

The merged AFL-CIO in 1955 sought fulfillment of working peoples' hopes "through democratic processes within the framework of our constitutional government" to serve responsibly "the interests of all the American people." Gone were the words "struggle," "oppressed," "capitalist," and even "laborer." A good liberal manager could sign the AFL-CIO preamble. Gilman wrote that unions in most cases had become a conservative, pro-capitalist force.¹⁵ Most ideological elements once used to contest basic institutions of capitalism had been shed.¹⁶ Labor leader George W. Brooks explained that unions since the 1930's had acquired "a firm ideological base, a virtually complete acceptance of that set of beliefs which may be roughly described as 'capitalism.'" Moreover, unions had a specific faith in the capacities of American management.¹⁷

Gone entirely were the demands of the early 1900's for socialization and of the early 1920's for the nationalization of railroads. Local federations have openly opposed such ideas for years. Union demands remain well within the American value system.¹⁸ Where unions were anti-state organizations in the past they have emerged as pro-state ones today; they insist that central government take steps to maintain full employment.¹⁹ Gitlow wrote that unions are "essentially conservative," although in creating a great power bloc they pose a "radical threat" of bigness and attempts to control the apparatus of government.²⁰

Union-Management Consensus. It, as Lerner said, there is no single key to the American spirit "but a pattern of polar and often conflicting impulses" this is also the nature of a pluralist and open society that favors agreement to disagree, the freedom of dissent. The polar character of society was nowhere better exemplified than in the profound differences and antagonisms that once existed between unions and management. Unions which once opposed conscription (as the AFL did in 1917) now support conscription. Now unions widely accept corporate property rights.²¹ Generally unions accept management leadership in production and do not seek directly to change employer-employee relationships. Like management, unions support the national government and often request more government action in their interests. The range of consensus is sweeping.

Railroad unions help the companies oppose competition from truckers and the airlines. Seamen's unions support tariff legislation, even if this brings them into conflict with brother unionists. For years miners have supported legislation favored by the industry. In men's and ladies' clothing, unions have helped finance businesses, although this has not occurred in any mass production industry.²² If this consensus is what Henry Simons calls the syndicalism of special group interests it is a joint union-management syndicalism. When speaking of legislation for minimum wages, management leader Heron said, "Today we look back on this as a goal on the part of both labor and management which was basically anti-social."²³

Many a union is a partner with management in production and distribution, in policing and regulating work.²⁴ The union that regulates rather than opposes management is not uncommon.^{25a} However, there are unions which oppose management on many important counts. The unions have come out of a shell to espouse "their interests as a part of a larger group."²⁴ Devotion to the broad interests of the society as a whole has become basic for unions.²⁵

THE LABORISTIC ECONOMY

Emergence of unions to more powerful positions has meant to many that a laboristic society has arisen. The idea takes many forms: unions replace businessmen as community leaders; union leaders are new men of power; labor is a monopoly; in an employee society, labor rules; if not today, in the future unions will be the main organization of society. Proponents of these views express serious doubts concerning their validity. In a way the thesis of

the laboristic economy is a corollary to that of plant community. The one view holds that the worker can find status only in the plant; the other contends that the union and its leaders are finding status in the general community and subordinating the plant.

Role in the Community. Unions are active in community life as never before. Unions have come to recognize that the member is "first and foremost a citizen of his community" and that the union "has a responsibility to his community." "This statement," commented AFL-CIO Vice-President Joseph A. Beirne, "in itself is a departure from the traditional pattern of trade unionism in many countries since it rejects the philosophy of isolationism and class struggle."^{25a} If this was a laboristic economy, it was in co-operation with capitalists and a capitalist government.

In 1955, some 55,000 AFL members were voluntarily serving on committees and executive boards of health, welfare and recreation agencies. Forty-five full time AFL representatives were employed by Community Chests, and unions raised about one-third of Community Chest funds. The CIO in 1955 had 25,000 union counselors in 1900 communities. They were active in community programs for the aged, civil defense, reduction of juvenile delinquency and alcoholism, supplying of food to strikers' families.

The Labor Monopoly Charge. Unions are charged with exercising a labor monopoly over labor supply, market-wide collective bargaining, and legislation concerning labor. Gitlow found that the union reduces the scope of employer competition and control but that employers counter with their own associations. Such so-called monopoly, where successful, may be by both a union and a management against the general public.^{20a} Unions do not have sufficient control over enough job markets to control labor supply. The worst possibility in relation to market-wide collective bargaining would be joint collusion against the consumer. For legislative monopoly to be effective, it would have to protect unions from the antitrust laws, permit strong types of union security, multiemployer collective bargaining, and international union control over local bargaining.^{26a}

Unions contend that employers are not really concerned about monopoly but about unions being stronger than in the past.^{25b} Even the AFL-CIO has no such centralized control over its members; unions simply are not that united. A combination of employees has some restraint on competition but is not illegal restraint under anti-trust acts.^{25c} A so-called restoration of competition would mean simply having a helpless, non-unionized worker face a strong, well-organized employer.^{25d} Union leaders hold that union assets do not begin to match those of corporations, unions lack product control,

and have virtually no influence on price in any direct way. Besides, unions have traditionally been the leading anti-monopoly force.

Employee Society. The United States is sometimes called an "employee society" because the proportion of the labor force working for others has grown so. Dankert believes that "for many years the employee point of view among the bulk of the populace will prevail over the owner point of view."²⁴ Yet the 17.5 million in unions and the 69.1 million in the labor force hardly agree among themselves. That large numbers work for a few others does not characterize any society. Even if 99 per cent worked for one per cent this would not be laboristic control; it might be, as in Russia, labor subjection. In a slave society slaves did not rule; serfs did not rule in feudal society, and wage workers rule almost nothing in the so-called employee society.

Unions in Office. Union leaders in the United States, Britain, and Russia have held central state positions; but Crossman pointed out that while the British welfare state was a compromise with powerful trade unions, these unions have no real decision-making power.²⁵ Russian unions are among the most powerless the world has ever seen; whatever they do in administering welfare programs, they do not rule. In theory one might envisage unions helping rule a totalitarian society or a democratic one, but both prospects appear quite unlikely. Such domination is certainly not likely to be achieved "very soon."

If unions are not in power now, surely, reasoned Reder, they could reach power in an adverse situation, viz., in deep unemployment which would provoke "irresistible" pressure by unions on government to institute a full employment and high wage program. Reder admitted that should this eventuality, with its concomitant forcing up of prices, occur the public would react against inflation and force a political party favorable to labor to give ground or go out of office.²⁶ Labor unions in the United States are hardly this powerful or political; they are not pro-third party movements. Reder has pointed out that there is no guarantee they could stay in office or, given Russian and British experience, even rule while some of their members are in office. Concretely unions are failing to force any revision of industry's perspectives, goals, and techniques.²⁷ While unions are stronger than hitherto, managements and government are even stronger.

John Stuart Mill believed that "if mankind continued to improve, the association that would finally predominate would be associations of workers themselves and not in partnership with capitalists, and these workers would select their managers." Tannenbaum thinks of

the union as the only true society for the worker. If such a society could occur, it would have to rest on a union quite unlike any known in the world today.

Evaluation of Laboristic Economy. It is hard to conceive of pro-capitalist labor leaders ruling a laboristic society, even if one could consider in theory a "trade union capitalism."²⁹ Too many union leaders exercise managerial functions and, in business situations, operate as heads of supervisory hierarchies. Kornhauser said that, at least in theory, one could envisage a time when unions will "become" the predominant power but, he adds, that time is no nearer in fulfillment than is John Stuart Mill's prophecy.

A half dozen years after coining the phrase "new men of power" for labor leaders, C. Wright Mills conceded that not all national leaders had taken up the "posture of the elite" and that management was stronger than unions.³⁰ By 1956 Mills had not dropped the term "new men of power," but he had reversed its meaning and applied it to managerial executives rather than labor leaders who he then thought were powerless and outside the national power elite. He believed that in the 1930's it appeared that unions might become a power-bloc, but that they then declined in power is historically inexact.

As for community power, union leaders have not gained wider community status and "usually cannot feel that they are really becoming successful" in middle class life.³¹ The prospects of upward mobility in the community are bleak, for the union leader "has no social acceptability."³² He is forced to seek to rise within the union proper or not at all.

Hardman wrote, "there was no discernible proof by 1950 of a rising intellectual laborism and a corresponding laborist 'set of values.'"³³ Although unions are more central in the lives of millions of workers than lodges, companies, or political parties, they do not dominate the society.³⁴

Little has changed since Adam Smith wrote that workmen are forced to yield before superior employer power. Ross held that concerns about a "laboristic age" were misconceived because they ignored the fact that the discontent of workers grows out of the master-servant relation and not out of union organization of that protest. He believed that unions were so conservative and that their demands were so compatible with capitalism that they could not ever be held accountable if a laboristic age were to come.³⁵ Unions, after all, share their power with management and government. Kornhauser suggested that industrial conflict itself finds increasing expression outside plants in the socio-political sphere where

socio-psychological approaches are more useful for studying what is happening than strict economic interpretations.^{29c}

In a Detroit study the higher the economic status the more people believed that labor unions were running the city. The better educated groupings were more likely to think that "rich people and businessmen" ran Detroit.³³ Another study showed that 55 per cent of persons interviewed thought that labor unions had more power than big business; 41 per cent thought business was more powerful.^{29d} Among top AFL and CIO leaders, 65 per cent and 81 per cent respectively felt that business was stronger in national affairs, 24 and 14 per cent held that they were about the same in strength, and 11 and 5 per cent felt that unions were stronger.^{10b}

UNIONS AS POLITICAL GROUPS

Treatments of unions as economic bargaining units are fading before recognition of their more developed political character.³⁴ This has been especially marked since the AFL-CIO merger.^{28e} One may say that unions are more political than ever, now that they are seeking gains not only in and through the plant and management but also through government and the society. The "question" of whether unions should go into politics is superfluous; since the days of conspiracy rulings and injunction judges, union actions have been politicalized and governmentalized.^{32a} What cannot be gained from management can be fought for politically and gained from the society. Unions are political groups in their responsiveness to the membership, and in their accountability.

Changed Political Functioning. Unions have achieved a political status before government and the law; the new status is more than recognition or acceptance but involves a commitment to a political action program. In some areas, viz., social security, unions lead the society. Their broadly egalitarian objectives may enlarge the operations of democracy. They have a political function to spread gains of the society as widely as possible.^{32b} Bargaining is politically organized and a more public function than before.

The public economy with its vast proliferation of government agencies throughout the economy has forced unions into motion on a higher scale. Opportunities for large unions to add further strength requires that they become more public and more political in orientation. Leaders "aspire to elite positions of enhanced status and power" for themselves and the union, and this can be achieved only in the political arena.^{12a} A major turning point in this heightened political action came with adoption in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act. It accompanied a general shift of activities from local and

regional to national and international unions. Collective bargaining was too limited a means for achieving broad social purposes.³⁶ Rapidly unions developed lobbying, educational programs, and non-partisan political action to new highs as methods for achieving public policy objectives.

Unions and Government. The doctrine of voluntarism, which held that improvement of the worker's lot was properly a function of the union and could be achieved through collective bargaining, has waned and unions have moved forward to acceptance of government action.³⁷ Until about 1932, fears of government were as strong among unions as among managements. A view that government could be beneficent replaced the old fear. But unions sought to link their interest in public policy to collective bargaining. Nevertheless voluntarism was discarded, and economic action turned out to be insufficient to meet union objectives. Unions had openly become political bodies. The leaders thought they could influence government in a sound direction, even if it meant giving up their traditional control over minimum wages, welfare, unemployment funds, and private power.

Legislation and collective bargaining came to determine hours of work.³⁸ Although the work week and the price of bread has been a matter of public policy for centuries, minimum wage legislation was sought to supplement union activity and to spread the impact of union demands on organized industry.³⁹ Unions supported federal prevailing-wage legislation as in the Bacon-Davis act in construction and the Walsh-Healey act on other government contract work. Support of government aid to the unemployed led to a change in union views about responsibility for social security. When unemployment insurance benefits began to lag, unions promptly shifted some forces to obtaining health, welfare, pension, and supplementary unemployment benefit (SUB) plans. Federal housing for low income groups (and not just union members) was sought, along with public health insurance, and equity in taxation.⁴⁰

Unions have played a historic role in improving the lot of workers and others. James Bryce once wrote, "the apparent paradox that where the humbler classes have differed in opinion from the higher, they have often been proved by the event to have been right and their so-called betters wrong . . . may perhaps be explained by considering that the historical and scientific data on which the solution of a difficult political problem depends are really just as little known to the wealthy as to the poor." Bryce held that from the time of early Christianity on "nearly all great political and social causes have made their way first among the middle or humbler

classes."³⁷ While great thinkers from the higher classes produced most of the inspiring ideas, "the principles and precepts these minds have delivered have waxed strong because the common people received them gladly, while the wealthy and educated classes have frowned on or persecuted them."

Unions remain in the front lines of the battle for shorter work days, better working conditions, improved inspection of food, extension of free public education, free public lands, and other social benefits. Their demands, once bitterly opposed as dangerously revolutionary and disastrous for the society, have rarely produced the calamitous consequences predicted and, instead, have led to great social gains.^{32d} In some cases unions have functioned with employers to realize gains. They have led in gaining government aid toward health and safety measures.

While some union leaders functioned on government boards and millions of members were on joint production councils, as in World War II, they have had little real control of policy.³⁸ They could not halt passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, nor get the law amended or repealed, although they were unable to stave off virtual government control of collective bargaining in wartime.^{32e}

Law and the Unions. Unions have increasingly turned to the use of legislation as they failed to make what they considered appropriate gains by bargaining alone. Legislative programs were evolved dealing with laws affecting workers and unions directly, viz., the Wage-Hour Law and the Taft-Hartley Act; social and economic policy, viz., taxes, housing, health legislation; civil liberties and civil rights; and international affairs.^{35c} Unions have been unable to prevent the law from regulating much of their activities, finances, elections, membership reporting and even their dues and fees in some states. Some unionists hold that adverse state and national laws have slowed organizing.

Supporting Political Parties. Opposition to active union participation in politics has almost completely died. Where in 1924 only the executive council of the AFL endorsed a political party ticket, in 1952 the AFL broke from its "nonpartisan" approach to general elections by endorsing the Democratic candidate for president. Both CIO and AFL leaders when polled were heavily Democratic in affiliation, 51 per cent in the former and 65 per cent in the latter.^{10b}

Union leaders are not able to deliver the labor vote *en bloc*. Lewis failed to get the miners to vote for Wendell Willkie in 1940. In 1952 the leaders failed to get sufficient support to unseat Senator Robert A. Taft from Ohio. Fewer unionists in Detroit voted for

Stevenson in 1952 than for Truman in 1948 (by 89 per cent against 75 per cent).¹² Many union members reject being told for whom to vote and oppose union political collections.^{30a} Yet one study showed that more than 50 per cent of the UAW members who voted were influenced by the union to vote as recommended. The active, interested minority of one-third seems to have considerable influence. However, the myth of labor unity suffers at the polls. Members and their families do not go to the polls, vote, and vote in one direction any more than other persons and groups that register. Despite active political campaigning by the UAW, "the auto workers' degree of political interest and personal involvement in political action can be considered only moderate."^{12b}

What prospects are there for a third, labor party? Meany held that "the American worker would not accept one. He's too independent, and I hope he stays that way."³⁹ Reuther has argued that the open class character of American society makes a third party unnecessary, that such a labor party would split labor from farmers.^{25b} However, Meany has said that "if the action of the two major parties leaves us no alternative in our efforts to safeguard and raise the living standards of the workers, labor will go as far as it must down that political road" to a third party. Meanwhile, he emphasizes the importance of a positive and responsible role in politics at every level.^{39a} Members of unions traditionally look for political expression through groups other than the union.^{30b} The union may be a quite unfamiliar channel for political activity.

Meanwhile, it remains true that union members are but a little less apathetic in public affairs than non-members. The political hold of unions on workers is slight.⁴⁰

Political Weaknesses of Unions. Since neither labor nor industry alone can command sufficient votes to sway Congress, both have to appeal for middle class support. Kornhauser thought that labor had more political strength in 1933 and 1937, management in 1947 and 1953 (and presumably 1956-57), but he recognized that government activity would be the most potent force for dealing with industrial conflict and that the trend is toward more business power.⁴¹ Union economic advances are not matched by their political successes, they suffered a crushing political defeat when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over their objections. Unions have since failed to amend the act in their favor or have it repealed. Their endorsement of a Democratic candidate in 1952 did not mean victory.

Schneider held that "it is difficult to conceive of . . . a situation in which labor dominated existing institutions."⁴² Neither absolute

control nor domination of existing institutions by unions appears likely. The Rosens noted that "the public would seem to have little ground to fear or hope for a 'labor government.'"^{11a} Labor leaders remain outside the national power elite.¹¹ While they have become institutions in our time, unions have emerged when management and government were becoming even more powerful. Schneider, indeed, found that the "more real possibility, at least for the United States, is a society in which industrial management thoroughly dominates all existing institutions" through control of mass media, economic power, vast prestige, and uses of government power.^{11b}

Moreover, the old distinctions between industrial workers and the middle class are rapidly being altered. A salariat had arisen in place of a proletariat. Public acceptance of unions may make them quite middle class as part of a more general conservative trend that lack any deep emotional commitment to unions.^{12c}

SUMMARY

At their peak of power unions, while huge in size and advanced in economic gains, show startling political weakness. Their membership is higher than ever; it includes one-fourth of the total labor force, a third of the non-farm labor force, and possibly 40 per cent of the organizable non-owning labor force. Yet unions are more conservative, pro-capitalist, and "conformist" than ever. The unions' new economic power has not been translated into political strength; union development epitomizes a failure to achieve new status of an enduring sort. This raises a question about the future of unions as their protest function continues to dwindle.

There is no laboristic economy and labor leaders are not becoming new men of power. They are neither replacing businessmen as leaders—although both occupy more public posts—nor do they have any role in the community that is opposed to that of management. As political groups, unions help the operations of democracy and help spread social gains to many segments of the society. But they compose pro-state liberal force at best, not even a critical one in many respects. They remain props of existing parties to a surprising degree and have shown little power to hold back legal pressure on them. Internally unions have such considerable difficulties over structure and unification and democracy in their own ranks that they may well lack the imagined unity of purpose and action that their critics have ascribed to them.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is the absolute size of unions? Their real membership rates?
2. Present several growth factors in membership expansion.

3. Unions are conservative, capitalist institutions. Explain.
4. State the nature of union-management consensus.
5. Critically evaluate the laboristic economy concept.
6. Why are unions termed political groups?
7. Show the relation of unions to government in the past decade.
8. Relate unions to the law, especially in the years since 1947.
9. Has labor changed its traditional approach to supporting political parties?
10. Analyze the political strengths and weaknesses of unions.

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STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN UNIONS

Unions are among the most voluntaristic and political of social groups; yet they face a continuing problem of achieving internal democracy. They are bureaucratic governments of men that have become large, centralized, and multi-industrial.

The internal government of unions seem as equalitarian as appears possible in a stratified society, even though, within the organization, the leader is a strong power figure. The problem of determining whether unions are internally democratic and whether there is an inter-union democracy is bound up with their relations with management and government.

STRUCTURE AND MOVEMENT

A labor movement that expresses the common interests of trades and labor generally cannot be considered apart from modern industry and formal organization. Unions, the most important of labor organizations, bring a sense of unity, cohesion, and solidarity beyond immediate goals and purposes.¹ As they grow the unions develop organizational devices to ensure survival.

Institutionalization of a Movement. In 1940 Dubinsky told a convention of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union: "We derive our moral and spiritual sustenance from being an integral part of the entire labor movement." The union is more than an economic bargaining agency, it is part of a movement. Goldberg contended that this element was of the greatest importance in bringing about the unification of the AFL and CIO. Using Chapin's four-part approach to institutions, unions take on the following characteristics.²

1. The dominant attitudes are a belief in the greater efficiency of

cooperative action over individual moves, and in the right of workmen to advance their goals by organizations of their own. Behavior patterns that reflect these attitudes and functions may be expressed openly in picketing and attending meetings, or in more implicit ways.

2. The *symbolic culture* activities prevalent in unions include initiation rites, probation periods, pledges, secret signs and oaths, passwords and handclasps, typical clothing of the trade (painters' white overalls), and parliamentary form. Many rituals reflect the union's past as an underground and illegal organization.

3. The *utilitarian culture* traits may include physical investment by unions in halls, schools, libraries, credit unions. Whether one can separate the material from the nonmaterial and characterize elements as traits is, however, questionable.

4. *Written or oral codes* specify conduct whether in the form of constitutions and by-laws, in collective bargaining contracts, or in upholding of formal public law. There are unwritten rules concerning the crossing of picket lines, working beside scabs, being a stool pigeon, and working faster (or slower than the group-determined rate. Sanctions of various kinds are applied to violators.

LEVELS OF UNION GOVERNMENT

Ordinarily three levels of union government—federation, national or international, and local—are distinguished.³ More specifically union government is likened to the structure of American federal, with local unions at the bottom. The top governing authority of the AFL-CIO comes from the biennial convention. There was a shift from annual conventions when it was agreed that policy changes would be sufficiently minimal to require no more frequent meetings.¹ⁿ

Between conventions an executive council functions for the federal structure, with a president and secretary-treasurer as regular officers. A general board comprising principal officers of each constituent international union and the executive council, meeting once a year, has policy-making responsibilities. In general, the constitution spells out the responsibilities of each segment of the organization. The core of the federation is the international union, an autonomous affiliate.¹⁰

The Federal Feature. The federation is a self-governing body, not subject to rule by external parties or other forces. Technically the federation is not a union but an association of unions, and individual workers are not members of the AFL-CIO but of individual unions which are members of the federation. Strictly speaking, it

is the UAW, not the AFL-CIO, that negotiates with auto makers. In practice, the federal structure is highly centralized; control over directly affiliated unions is close. Possibly as a result of the Taft-Hartley Act, international unions have broadened their control over local unions.⁴ Some of this centralization is encouraged by extra-constitutional factors such as industry-wide bargaining. The international acts to insure uniformity in negotiations and bargaining. The Typographical Union requires that local agreements be submitted to national headquarters for approval. The UAW's national departments do the primary bargaining with multi-plant firms. The national organization is increasingly setting patterns for locals to follow.⁵

Bureaucratic Structure. Like most other organized groups with a degree of compulsory power, unions have governmental power over their members.⁶ Elections and campaigns make unions highly political.⁷ Federal labor legislation may be the force that encourages elections involving millions of workers each year in a fairly steady round of democratic participation. Surely few other groups in mass society operate under such a continuous democratic procedure.

Much of union government develops out of administrative problems. Strike control requires centralization and a particular kind of leader; benefit plans encourage national control and require different types of leaders. The UAW, for example, may have specialized departments to handle workers in auto, aircraft, and farm equipment. Union membership is so varied that it is not unusual for a grievance committee in the West Virginia mines to be composed of one native "white," one immigrant or first generation American, and one Negro to provide representation to various groupings.^{7a} In many cases officers are elected to provide for geographic representation and for diverse interests.

Blau believes, "the free-enterprise system fosters the development of bureaucracy in the government, in private companies, and in unions."⁸ Even union idealists can become absorbed in bureaucratic power for, as Herberg observed, "without power politics there is no administering or running a union."⁹ But unions have both bureaucratic and democratic elements.¹⁰ They utilize the procedures of democracy far more than business or government and yet are unable to escape the logic of size and of hierarchy. Union bureaucracy may also develop where membership is reasonably satisfied with its gains and therefore participates little in union activity.

Unions, like other bureaucracies, use experts although they have been slow to do so." One may find in unions the facts and figures

staff specialists, the contact expert, and internal communications specialist. Lawyers, economists, and public relations specialists are needed to operate in highly complex situations. In some measure this is part of a drive for respectability, to have experts as "window dressing."¹²

Unification of AFL-CIO. Although the AFL and CIO were formally unified in December 1955, mergers were complete in only 29 states by early 1958.¹³ Included among the 14 states that had not completed mergers were the important industrial states—New York, Illinois, Michigan—that contain two-thirds of the federation's membership. Although the state organizations do not negotiate contracts or vote strikes, they have considerable political voice in state affairs when they are united. But unity in organization, in voting, and in "monopoly" against businesses has not been achieved. The longtime schism is an example of multiple groups at work. The attempt at healing the split is part of a general anticompetitive trend within unions. Even its partial success is virtually unprecedented. On major issues both major federations found that they occupied common ground and could both survive. Both opposed the Communist Party and corruption; both had lost older leaders and had selected new ones who favored unification. Both faced the same pressure of legal acts that they interpreted as hostile to unions.¹⁴

In the midst of moves toward unification certain unions severed relations with others, viz., the National Maritime Union in the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. MEBA charged that the NMU was not respecting and protecting picket lines. Other differences persist. But the International Association of Machinists and the UAW agreed to seek common objectives and even joint bargaining and strike activity in aircrafts and guided missiles.¹⁵ A seven-year jurisdictional dispute between the Brotherhood of Marine Engineers and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association ended with the signing of a no-raiding agreement at the end of 1956. The USW and UAW cooperated to permit a switch of union membership so that laid off steelworkers at Bethlehem Steel Co.'s Lackawanna plant could take temporary jobs at nearby Chevrolet plants in 1958.¹⁶

Unification has not heightened political action by a unified labor movement. Management can unite as well as or better than unions. Managements that deal fairly with unions leave the unions little reason to seek in political arenas what it can gain through cooperation with management. The degree of control unions have in various markets differs considerably, as it does for managements. Interunion rivalries have not ended, and managers are quite capable of organ-

izing "true marketwide bargaining" to balance labor power. Unification has not led to creation of a labor vote.¹⁶

At the topmost level the AFL-CIO is more disunited than are most businesses with which it deals. Twenty-seven vice presidents sit with the AFL-CIO president on the policy-making executive council. Each of these men is chief of a major union and quite powerful in his own right and each is really like the head of a state within the United States.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO CENTRALIZATION

The traditional structure of the AFL and CIO—based on the principles of exclusive jurisdiction, autonomy, and integration has largely been abandoned.¹⁷ In practice this separatist arrangement whereby each major union retained virtual sovereignty has given way to the first real centralization in American labor history. Rights to a territory by a craft union or an industrial union have given ground to multi-industrial bases of new, mixed, and amalgamated types. While the principle of "protection of autonomy, integrity, and jurisdiction," is included in the constitution of the AFL-CIO, it can no longer be followed in any strict sense.

Autonomy and Centralization. The doctrine of autonomy, reaffirmed tirelessly in the constitution of the AFL-CIO with the slight change concerning unions being free of corrupt influences and totalitarian agents, has been called the "key conception" underlying AFL-CIO structure. Autonomy suggests the right of the organizing committees and national councils to manage collective bargaining and international administrative offices without federation direction and is at the heart of the federal structure. Yet the very act of unification was a move toward real central power.

Brooks said, "The great change in American labor unions during the last 20 years has been a general shift in power and control from the members to the leaders," a change that took place "almost wholly without constitutional reform."¹⁸ Before the 1940's strong central tendencies were offset by wide employer anti-unionism and rival unionism, often of a left wing type. One could withdraw to a rival union and employers in no way discouraged such moves. At the same time the unions became truly big, organizing not one-eighth but one-fourth of the total labor force, bigness became a value to members. As large national unions grew in power, local unions and their activities were de-emphasized. Big industry found it simpler to deal with big unions that had a big outlook. Labor leaders became more like mediators between management and their members and local unions tended to wither for lack of things to do.¹⁹

Jurisdiction vs. Government-Determined Bargaining Agent. The key conception, of jurisdiction over job, trade, or industrial territory has suffered before the government-determined employee bargaining unit.¹⁷ Built-in conflicting jurisdictions have plagued the labor movement.¹⁸ The proposal to eliminate conflicting and duplicating organizations and jurisdictions by voluntary agreement has neither ended disputes nor reduced interunion conflict. Jurisdictional conflicts reflect the multiple-group character of unions in the throes of unification. The exclusive jurisdiction approach has led to some incredible situations. Carpenter leader Hutcheson said, "once wood, it is always the right of the carpenter to install it, no matter what the new material is."¹⁹ In practice, where carpenters are strong they install windows whether made of wood or metal. Where Iron Worker or Sheet Metal Worker unions are strong, carpenters are kept from doing such installing.²⁰

The multiplicity of craft unions have long plagued unions with jurisdictional conflicts.²¹ Businesses too are held to have clouded the boundaries between jobs. Technological change and job scarcity have contributed to the confusion about to who was to do what.

Jurisdictional problems reach the stage of raiding when one union seeks to win over workers already represented by another union. Between 1951 and 1953, 1,025 petitions were filed by AFL unions against other AFL unions. These conflicts involved 84,275 persons. There were nearly 50 per cent more petitions within AFL ranks than by AFL unions against CIO ones. Raiding is viewed as a violation of the moves of labor solidarity. The net change concerning 366,470 employees in 1,245 cases involved in AFL versus CIO raiding over a two-year period was but 8,000 workers or two per cent.²² The No-Raiding Agreement of December, 1953 was, in its way, a precursor of unification which came two years later. The agreement, which was temporary, was, in good measure, superseded by unification.

Jurisdictional disputes are conflicts over which union will get the work; representation conflicts concern which union will represent the workers. Dunlop wrote, "the system of exclusive jurisdiction was largely displaced by a combination of two developments in the mid-thirties, the government determination of the election district under the Wagner Act and the growth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations."²³ The older constitutional doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction was "substantially modified if not abandoned" when the AFL-CIO constitution replaced historical jurisdiction with the "established collective bargaining relationship." The combined body had to introduce a new term, "organizing jurisdiction," for

covering workers not yet in any union. The principle of exclusive jurisdiction was inoperative except, mainly, in the building and construction industry where government determination of bargaining units by elections is impractical. To a smaller extent railroad and printing industries retain some of the old jurisdiction principle. As the "established bargaining relationship" became the standard of legitimacy, Dunlop wrote, "the merged federation largely abandoned its previous standard for regulating competition and accepted that of the law of the land, availing itself thereby of effective decisional and enforcement machinery as a last resort."¹⁷

Multi-Industrial Unionism Triumphs. The decline of autonomy and the fall of the principle of jurisdiction were closely related to mass society's new need for multi-industrial unions as opposed to the older craft and industrial ones. An adequate typology of union organization would require delineation of craft and multiple-craft unions, extended craft or trade, quasi-industrial, industrial, multi-industrial, and general labor union.¹⁸ The social welfare body should possibly be included. In the future the government union may be present as well. The longtime ideological struggle between craft and industrial unions has subsided as the combined types have emerged.¹⁹ The nature of technology, the overlapping of industries and product lines, the expanding size of markets, the changing ideas of union management have forced alterations in union structure.

Craft-Type Unions. The craft union, comprising workers of a given occupation or skill, was organized on a horizontal base and cut across industrial lines. Such unions arose before mass production and straight-line assembly processes took hold. When the new giant mass production industry of automobiles rose in the 1920's, the AFL sought to organize it on a craft foundation and failed. Many persist with undiminished fervor to push for further craft organization, but the craft unions are taking on industrial union character and abandoning historic craft and trade ties.²⁰ They had to expand to include industrial groups and take on various intermediate forms or die. The unions of machinists and electricians, among the strongest early AFL opponents of the CIO, became markedly industrial over the years.

Meanwhile the AFL-CIO constitution laid down a principle of equality of craft and industrial unions. Issuance of new charters or certificates was based upon a "strict recognition that both craft and industrial unions are equal and necessary as methods of trade union organization." This declaration, in view of the rise of multi-industrial unions, was of little moment.

Multi-Industrial Unions. The craft-industrial split has founders as the concepts of craft and of industry have shifted, as work

has become increasingly mechanized and specialized, as clerical work has spread, and as it became more difficult to define specialties and industries. Teamsters had to extend their jurisdiction to warehouses in order to include another phase of the process of moving goods. The UAW faced a different problem in the rise of craft differences among engineers, technicians, and others within the industrial union and the need of making special provision for them. However, this is a new "craft," more controlling than the old and yet more tied to vast industrial processes. Kahn has suggested that the bulk of organized labor is tending to fall within the control of a smaller number of national unions of perhaps more than one million members each, with "multi-industrial" scope and a "wide range of occupational groups."

The proportion of national unions that remain purely craft may, Stephansky estimated, have fallen from 21 per cent in 1915 to nine per cent in 1939 and six per cent in 1951. The membership decline has been even greater.²² Strategic alliances between weaker and stronger unions, as between the retail clerks and the teamsters, promote multi-industrial unions. Disparities in power are the basis for these alliances. Two independent unions may also make an agreement; this is an outright alliance.²³ In either case multi-industrial unionism is spread.

One of the advantages of bigness comes in matching management's bigness. Multi-plant firms require multi-industrial unions. Moreover, there has been a rise in "social unionism" which operates not in craft or industrial situations, but in the socio-political world as well.²⁴ The new multi-industrial unionism may have outmoded the older classification into functional types, by business, welfare, revolutionary, predatory, and conservative categories. All of them can be multi-industrial and social as unions become virtually institutionalized.²⁵ The intermediate, amalgamated, or multi-industrial union is now dominant as a structural union form. Of the 172 unions investigated in 1951, 6 per cent were craft, 17 per cent were industrial, and 77 per cent had become multi-industrial. While craft unions slipped from 21 to 6 per cent between 1915 and 1951, industrial unions rose from 4 to 17 per cent of the total. Since 1939, however, they have barely advanced and in the future the only one to grow will probably be the multi-industrial type.

UNION MEMBERS AND DEMOCRACY

A union is not only part of a movement; internally it is a *political* organization. It uses meetings and votes, candidates and campaigns, and these are not simply economic activities.²⁶ Is there democracy within the political organization of the union?

Political Bases of Union Democracy. Where management ordinarily has "centralized and absolute control at the top levels . . . the union is a political organization, and its officials owe an accounting to membership for official action in collective bargaining." Managements historically operate on "authoritarian principles," unions on democratic principles. Mills wrote that "unions are democratic societies. Probably they are the most democratic societies of their size in the world."²⁷ They are "more democratic" than any other economic organization since the sensitivity of their leaders to the members' needs is extraordinary.

Democracy is a formal commitment to membership rights to select leaders and decide policy, to participate in meetings, to speak; it demands responsiveness of officers to members, and respect for human dignity.²⁸ Sayles and Strauss found that only the New England town meeting compared to a union in providing ordinary citizens an opportunity to participate in discussions that vitally affected their lives.²⁹ However, unlike a town meeting, unions are a representative democracy in which members do not "take over" unless organization is weak and leadership is not delivering the goods.³⁰

Unions which are frequently extra-legal and secret in their organizing stages may start out as ultra-democratic bodies that rotate leaders. In their fighting phases they may have quasi-military leadership as part army and part debating society. The important thing is that debate goes on before, during, and after group action. Even in the "army" stage, the union "elects its own general and sergeants, sometimes every one or two years and sometimes during the very course of perilous battle."³¹ In the armed truce stage a union has to respond quickly to members' needs to retain support, each grievance may be a tool for tactical combat.³² Once unions are recognized and relations with management are reduced to a contract, different leadership and a representative government develop.³³ However powerful the new leadership may become, it must still account for its moves and decisions.³⁴

The Union Member. The union member may be as little concerned about union politics as about politics in general. The technical details of union administration are not designed to elicit member interest. Some of the apparent apathy may, however, be based on an incapacity of the union to replace feelings of alienation encouraged by the sheer scale of mass society. Some members may feel that the union is controlling their lives as much as the corporation, others are "paper" members, dues payers but not activists, not really committed to any voluntary association although technically part of several. At best, unionists are part-time members.

Non-attendance at union meetings is common, but this is typical of one's conduct as a citizen. A 13,000 member steelworkers' local may have 50 to 75 persons at typical biweekly membership meetings, or half of one per cent.³² An aircraft union representing more than 10,000 employees could not hold its announced regular meeting for three successive months because the quorum of 75 could not be collected.³³ On the surface, this looks bad, but when a crisis arises union members show up. At election time 50 to 60 per cent may attend; if a written strike ballot is taken as many as 90 per cent may vote.³⁴ Almost no general public election can match this. In the Los Angeles transit strike of 1955 a contract vote brought over-participation. The aircraft union which could not muster a quorum had several thousand members present during contract negotiations.³⁵ Low attendance is not proportionally smaller than attendance at faculty meetings of universities.³⁶

Managements have learned that what is discussed at a night union meeting reaches everyone in the shop the next morning. Moreover, silent or tacit support will continue in the form of dues payments, a plant atmosphere favorable to the union.²⁸ "As long as things are going smoothly, they let the active 5 per cent run the organization."³⁵

Compared to the voicelessness and powerlessness of stockholders the union member often has far more opportunity to speak and vote and act, openly and with candor. The worker can communicate directly with officers; he does not have to go through channels. "Over the long run, the union must function as they want it to, or it will decay and disappear."

The Union Leader. People who consider that unions are not internally democratic are frequently thinking of powerful union leaders who have been in office for years. But many of these men chose the union career because they could not find or did not desire a place in management.³⁶ It is possible to move up the union ladder, even though progress is slow. The UAW, with more than 1,000,000 dues-paying members, had but one salaried official to every 1,250 workers in 1951. However, even becoming a shop steward may give one recognition, prestige, and a kind of mobility denied most assembly line workers.

Union leadership is an alternative status but, "it is not, in ideological or cultural terms, equivalent to foremanship or a successful small business as a way of getting ahead" even for top leaders.³⁷ Only a few union leaders have gained national prestige. Some 21 union presidents earn \$25,000 or more a year and most of them have allowances that raise this by another \$18,000.³⁸ The other

leaders gain their compensations from dedication to a cause, a sense of achievement, knowledge that they are aiding thousands of members.³⁹

MACHINE POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY

Although union leaders have more power than persons in the upper-middle class, their positions can be lost overnight. The status of a union leader is not as stable as that of the corporation executive, who has prestige and authority attached to his office. The union leader is more like the political leader who has to persuade his followers to reelect him or fall.^{40a} Finding a means of maintaining themselves in office sometimes takes the form of building political machines.^{3a} He may act to control the freedom of dissent in a way that can limit democracy in the union.

Iron Law of Oligarchy. Michels wrote: "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandatees, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy."⁴⁰ But unions are centralized to meet the needs of the huge organizations in large-scale mass society, not to expand the power of the leaders. The machine politics of voluntary organizations are quite minor and keep union leaders well outside any ruling power elite as compared with the power of interlocking directorates and secret elitist organizations. Finding a means of maintaining themselves in office sometimes takes the form of building political machines.^{3a}

The workers' representatives are highly responsible to their constituents at lower levels where individual personality is not submerged. Studies of four Michigan local unions showed that three-fourths of the union members interviewed believed that membership as a whole, and not the leadership, holds decisive strike power. The key to membership control, the members felt, was their power to ratify agreements and elect officers.⁴¹

At the top while a union leader is frequently pictured as running a one-man show, the very strongest of leaders is part of a leadership group to which he is responsible. Moreover, he is responsible to the community as well. Where strong leaders seek to rule dictatorially, they have to use force and they do not survive for long.⁴² The union leader is in a public position; he lacks anonymity and can be held responsible for policies. He has to commit himself, and he can lose. Corporation executives do not have to face their "membership" at shop meetings, local union meetings, executive board discussions, conventions, and in public actions and repeated tests of policy and competence.

The Local Leader. At the local union level, the leadership base is elective and directly responsible to both members and the international body. The smaller locals are the reservoir of constantly renewed leadership and responsibility.⁴⁸ All offices are held by regular shop employees. Even international offices are held by persons who have worked in the industry or trade.^{82a}

Local leaders are elected; appointments are made only in exceptional circumstances and usually for short periods. Tenure of office is short, and turnover is quite high. Challenges for office in rather open competition are the rule at the local level.^{25a} Some local officials move to higher jobs or accept managerial posts, but most are moved out by membership action.^{7b} All local leaders are immediately and directly accountable and, hence, easy to take to task. In recent years, however, centralization has led to "a withering away of local unions" and the concentration of power in the international.¹¹ In a report for the Fund for the Republic Clark Kerr proposed that greater local control of union affairs be achieved.

Power of the International. Oligarchy is far more present in the international than in the local unions. National union "tops" tend to have long tenure in office, even to die in harness. Still, the "self-elected for life" official, like Joseph Ryan, of the International Longshoremen's Association, is disappearing. Most of the top union officials have to face regular electoral contests and the conventions. Their public position enables them to be held responsible to an increasing extent, but there has come an increasing control from the top body.

Meanwhile, there is considerable rivalry between international leaders, jurisdictional struggles aside. Rivalry is powerful within single unions and even stronger between them. It may affect collective bargaining, and it may provoke democratic conduct. Leadership competition has some real advantages.^{3b} It may take the form of factions—organized opposition from within by counter-political machines. Reynolds held that "democracy requires only that there be reasonably free competition among rival machines, and that the self-interest of union leaders be canalized in directions beneficial to the membership."⁴⁴ The International Typographical Union has two full political parties which compete for power.⁴² In this oldest of national unions unanimity of opinion was recognized as impossible. The price of democracy in many a union remains factionalism, including even such factions as those of the Communist Party.

Democratic rights may be upheld through appeals and reviews. The AFL Upholsterers Union in Philadelphia has set up a board of experts to which rank and file members may appeal to lodge pro-

tests and obtain protection against unfair treatment by the union's own leadership.⁴⁵ The UAW has an appeal body too. The American Civil Liberties Union has pioneered in preparing and publishing a basic trade union Bill of Rights to prohibit denial of membership, to permit democratic participation, and to protect the worker against arbitrary proceedings.⁴⁶

Good versus Democratic Government. The union structure is a mixture of bureaucratic and democratic elements. But democratic government is not always "good" in the sense of effective. Well-run unions like the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and United Steelworkers have fine records of economic returns to membership, responsibility, financial integrity, excellent community position, but they "cannot be considered democratic" in internal affairs,⁴⁷ although they are more democratic than management. Reynolds even held that "the requirements of *democratic* government are much narrower and simpler than those of *good* government." For him growing centralization is no violation of democracy, nor is bureaucracy.

There are, of course, different conceptions of democracy. The AFL contends, "the closed shop is the essence of democracy, the rule of the majority" against "the absolute authority of the employer."

Local unions may be like town hall democracies but national and internal ones are not. They are more republican. Barbash, nevertheless, believes that "the run-of-the-mill union meets the requirements of working democracy in the context in which the union has to function."^{48a} Moreover, union bureaucracy is likely to develop in precisely those situations in which membership is reasonably well satisfied with gains and not merely where unions get large in size.⁴⁹ There are times when national union control may spread more democratic policies. The top AFL-CIO body has sought democracy in many of the internationals, while increasing certain central powers. Sometimes, however, good relations with management are associated with a decline in democracy, which may operate better in competition and conflict.^{49b}

While members of a union may be highly critical of their leaders and of union policies when discussing these things among themselves, "in a conflict with an outside group they tend to close ranks in support of their leaders and policies."⁵⁰ Unions, in times of crisis such as contract negotiations, are under a powerful obligation to present a solid front. In unions most if not all persons want the same things, the differences are over how and by whom these are to be achieved.

In addition, unions may be deeply affected by the type of management with which they deal; there may be a mirror effect. A management may prefer a strong union leadership which disciplines its members and deals on a business-like basis. There have even been cases in which management preferred a communist-led union that was weak to a democratic one that was strong.

Taft cautioned against facile judgments on union democracy. He found that monetary contributions required of members were usually reasonable, that there was significant freedom for individual judgment and behavior, and that the members had rights to register complaints against leaders. He wrote that "the rights of members and their protection in the union seem on the whole adequate."⁴⁷ Others contended that general suffrage is not enough but that the carrying out of the "interests" of the members is what is vital, along with civil liberties and a judicial system of trial, protection against reprisals, and possibly review.

To all this may be added that the presence of pluralistic power centers may be of more significance than other measures. Political pluralism is possible in a mass society, but it is not easy and may require extraordinary measures. Two factions, as in the typographical union, often simply have to live with each other; else bureaucracy's inherent anti-democratic qualities become predominant.^{42a} The really grave danger is that the union, as it achieves greater recognition and loses what remains of its protest-defense function, will become functionless in the workers' interests. At that point mass society may have to produce some other organization to perform the task.

SUMMARY

Compared to management unions are democratic. Within their own ranks they can be quite bureaucratic at the top; at the bottom they may be the most democratic of voluntary organizations. The more unions are accepted, the more they enter into the bureaucratic structure of mass society. The old protest stage of union development was a highly democratic one. Over the years and especially since the great upsurge of union organization in the 1940's, federal structure has given ground before the forces of centralization; locals have lost power to the national and international organizations.

The principles of exclusive jurisdiction, autonomy, and integrity have in good measure been abandoned in favor of the recognized bargaining unit. Multi-industrial unionism has ended most of the old craft-industrial conflict.

Unions probably hold more meetings and conduct more votes than any other voluntary organizations. Their members may appear to be apathetic but this may be due to contentment. The contentment can, of course, be dangerous if it lasts over the long pull, for critical situations demand activity and not merely silent support. Members, especially at the bottom, feel they have voting power and rights, that they control the leader. He on his part may feel he has to create a political machine to survive. If there is pluralism there can still be democracy, however. But this does not eliminate heavy problems the union faces, as the next chapter shows.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Describe union structure.
2. Differentiate union government.
3. In what ways is a movement institutionalized?
4. Contrast federalism and centralization.
5. How far has the AFL-CIO unification gone?
6. What are the principles of exclusive jurisdiction, autonomy, and integrity?
7. How has the government-determined bargaining unit altered older views of the union structure?
8. What is raiding?
9. Describe the triumph of multi-industrial unionism.
10. What are the political bases of union democracy?
11. Analyze the "apathy" of the union member.
12. Define the position of the union leader.
13. How do leaders move to machine politics?
14. Critically evaluate internal democracy in unions.

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CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Negotiating processes constitute the characteristic activity for taming and directing power. Each negotiator brings power to a discussion, power of a certain type, and moves for a kind of settlement within bounds that either avoid a showdown or minimize possible loss.

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Once collective bargaining is seen as a continuous process, negotiations emerge as a major phase of inter-organizational give and take. Such inter-group functioning involves many things, basic acceptance of bargaining to begin with, use of policy, strategy, and tactics. The types of negotiational situations are as significant as are the requirements for negotiators and the kind of contracts they create. Lately, even the contract's duration has become of considerable significance.

Strategy of Negotiations. The collective bargaining contract emerges as the paper record or symbol of consensus. As such it is no more effective than the acceptance by management of unions as an institution, of collective bargaining as a method and by unions of private ownership and operation. Although the real decisions are sometimes made outside the bargaining situation, most bargaining is very real.

Negotiations are a virtual "ceremonial activity," not the least of whose functions is to help affect social change. But bargaining is not a fixed ritual; much of it is quite private. While it is born out of conflict it has been "tamed down" into a contribution to accommodation by virtue of its rule-making function. Rules are also set up for the working life of the agreement. The rules actually affect

the negotiations proper—size of the negotiational team and the deadlines.

Union-management relations may go through stages of armed truce, working harmony, and union-management cooperation, each with different bargaining characteristics.¹ One can usually distinguish primary bargaining as a contract-making or new contract bargaining stage, the legislative phase of relations. Secondary bargaining is bargaining not over but under the contract, once it is in force; it includes grievance settlement.² In recent years pattern bargaining has won some wide acceptability. Much of it is traceable to the "Little Steel Formula" of World War II. Key bargains may determine the pace and content of bargains made in whole sectors of the economy. The extent of influence of the bargaining may be much wider than union membership and management directly concerned.

The Negotiators. Since collective bargaining is a basic function of union leaders and of many managements as well, leaders are frequently selected with this in mind. In many cases, an elected bargaining committee of members sits along with the officials. A joint board from several locals or representatives of major interests in the union may serve.³ The business agent, national officers, lawyers, and even economists, engineers, insurance consultants, and other highly trained personnel may be present or in the background.⁴ Non-negotiating observers and advisors may be present. Bargaining is sometimes a lawyer-to-lawyer affair, with little room for workers to be present or know what is transpiring until after the agreement has been reached. At other times the agreement is submitted to the rank-and-file. Steadily, international union officials are taking over much of the bargaining.

The owner of a small management may bargain directly or an employers' association may carry on. In a multi-plant firm, national negotiators are present; but this depends on the size of the bargaining unit.

The Contract and Its Duration. The more than 125,000 collective bargaining contracts in effect in the United States each year cover an estimated 18-million workers, and cover the entire range of labor and management issues. The scope of bargaining has steadily broadened to include much more than wages, hours, and working conditions.⁵

The major agreements, covering at least 1,000 workers each, total some 1,700-1,800 contracts and affect approximately nine million workers or half the number working under contracts. Two-thirds of the major agreements are in manufacturing, one-third in non-manufacturing. Fully one-third of the contracts, involving more

than two-fifths of the unionized workers, were negotiated by multi-employer groups; 557 agreements covered four-million workers.

Contracts now endure for longer periods, possibly as a reflection of longterm economic prosperity and also of greater union stability. One year contracts made up 75.4 per cent of contracts checked in one study as of 1948 but composed only 44 per cent by 1957. Two-year contracts rose from 24.3 per cent to 32.2 per cent in the same period; longer contracts grew from 0.3 per cent to 23.8 per cent of the total. Many three-year agreements are written, and there are some "open-end" agreements of indefinite duration. Contract duration depends, in part at least, on strength of the union, traditional management-union relations, and the economic situation. Within a single union, viz., the United Automobile Workers, 82 per cent of the contracts were for more than two years by 1956. Most major unions have a variety of contract termination points.

Since bargaining is fairly continuous, some firms and unions sign supplemental agreements to keep the agreements up-to-date. Most of these supplements require mutual consent of both parties.⁷ A continuous contract without a termination date may foster continuous settlement of differences rather than their accumulation over a long period. Longer bargaining agreements usually make for "built-in" raises. The Department of Labor found that, during 1957-1958, some 5-million workers would receive automatic increases in pay under long-term agreements.

THE UNIT OF BARGAINING

In recent years the area of bargaining has widened to include the entire country, a whole industry, and occasionally a full pattern. Unions and management look on the unit somewhat differently; few unions are limited to one plant but most employers are. Much depends on who is strongest. A union sometimes bargains for a part of a plant or at least gives it special consideration. Government, too, has a role in ascertaining the size of the bargaining area, and this may be local, state, or national government, or all three.

Influences on Size. The bargaining area is a problem of market structure, type of industry, and basic strength. A good deal depends on the economic endowment of a country which sets limits "within which coercive political pressures are operative." Much also depends on union policy, on standard contract clauses, grievance machinery, the uniformity of contract termination dates, and the role of government.^{3a} Just as much depends on the employer and his views and strength.

Union policy is generally part of a traditional attempt to equal-

ize or standardize wage rates and has favored extension of the area of bargaining. The demand for equal pay for equal work also has this effect. However, there are important counteracting influences. Equitable comparison may join many wage bargains into a political system, while consolidation can bring separated bargaining units into a "unitary decision," even if separate bargaining occurred at various points along the way.⁸

The effects of standard contract clauses are to extend this "prevailing" wage, working conditions and hours approach, as both private and public research and publications in the field make for further standardization of provisions.^{3a} Of course, a good deal depends on type of grievance machinery. A local bargaining unit may be administered by an industry-wide umpire; it may be fitted into a broader context regardless of how large the unit of bargaining is. On the other hand, the grievance machinery may be very local even when the unit of bargaining is quite wide. Bargaining may be both single plant and industry-wide simultaneously. Uniform contract termination dates have influenced the extension of the unit of bargaining to make for simultaneous action.

Government plays a crucial role in determining the bargaining area; it is far easier to set down a rule for an industry or region or the whole nation. Various government bodies have set precedents in all of these possible areas, as they have for multiple unit bargaining in war and peace. Industry-wide minima for wages are set by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healey Act, just as fair employment practices are encouraged by federal orders and directives. During the war price adjustments were on an industry-wide basis as were rationing, manpower controls, fact-finding boards, and the decisions of umpires.^{3b} The power of labor law proper is in emphasizing if not compelling a national view of the bargaining unit and area.

Local Unit. Multi-employer bargaining may include two or more employers, be city-wide, metropolitan-wide, regional, industry-wide, or nation-wide. The tendency is for all of these to influence each other, so that a locally reached agreement is usually influenced by extra-local forces.

Where unions function in mainly local markets, local bargaining has been the rule. Craft unions have tended to favor local autonomy, industrial unions seem to back wider bargaining areas. As both have become multi-industrial, multi-industrial bargaining areas have grown. If uniform standards and unified bargaining do not exist, bargaining units appear local, but national influences should not be discounted completely, for comparison and consoli-

dation do take place.⁸ The local group may be within a large organization that takes the issue out of the hands of local officers.⁹ National unions may fear local reversals will injure the whole union.

Multi-Giant Units. Negotiations with General Motors cover many industries, involve several levels of government, affect nearly all business and most union units. As unions and employers grow, the source of "ultimate authority" of each also expands and "pressure is set up for a larger unit, if only for convenience."¹⁰

As many as 35,000 manufacturing plants in the United States are multi-unit organizations; they employ half the labor force in manufacturing. Single employer bargaining in 1950 covered about 67 per cent of the workers under union contract; only 28 per cent of these were in a single plant, while 72 per cent were in multi-plants. Multi-employer bargaining concerned the remaining 33 per cent.¹¹ Put differently, just under 19 per cent of the workers under union contract were under single plant bargaining; all the rest were in multi-plant or multi-employer bargaining relations.

Multi-unit bargaining may refer to several unions and managements in one industry. Local multi-unit bargaining is common in buildings, amusements, retailing. Regional multi-unit bargaining is common in textiles, over-the-road trucking, shipbuilding, longshore work, pulp and paper, lumber, and nonferrous metal. National multi-unit bargaining is sometimes called "industry-wide," although it may not cover a whole industry. Even the United Mine Workers' negotiations do not always cover the coal industry, nor do those of the railroad brotherhoods. In most cases these are forms of multiple-group relations.

Multi-Employer Bargaining. A system-wide bargaining with the Bell telephone system is preferred by the Communication Workers Union because, "the real management decisions are made on the system level."¹² The UAW has pushed for corporation-wide (multi-plant) bargaining, which leaves the union free to play one company against the other. The Bakery Workers Union prefers company-wide bargaining to handle intra-company inequities in various cities. The scope varies but multi-employer bargaining contributes to uniformity, to the ease of enforcement of standards, and to administrative efficiency. A union may prefer individual bargaining because one company may be better able to pay than others. Use of the master-contract and shop card may achieve the equivalent of multi-employer bargaining, as may the use of a pace-setter.

Industry-wide Bargaining. Industry-wide bargaining, once proposed by unions, is now being pushed by management. The Ameri-

can Motors Corp. went on record in 1957 as favoring industry-wide negotiations so as to weaken the UAW's strategy of picking them off "one at a time." Henry Ford II has declared, "I am very much in favor of industry-wide bargaining." UAW leaders in opposing this said, "There is no way they can force us to bargain on an industry-wide basis."¹² The union attitude changed after World War II; one of its key arguments is that negotiations with separate companies indicates that there is no labor monopoly in motors. However, a company-wide bargain is not really separate from industry-wide forces and pressures. Sometimes, in addition, a bargain reached in one industry, viz., automobile, has repercussions in all industry.

Multiple industry-wide bargaining occurs where an employer association and joint unions negotiate, as in the San Francisco metropolitan area or in Hawaii. This is market-wide bargaining.¹³ Bargaining may be interstate especially in decisive sectors of industry. More than a third of the workers in one study of 7,180,000 employees were working under interstate contracts. While multi-employer bargaining appears to have been least important in manufacturing, the nature of manufacturing is not local but is to draw raw materials in from various areas and to sell products on a very wide scale. The 13-state master contract for teamsters that superseded 200 separate contracts and covers 12,000 truck employers and 180,000 drivers and helpers, was designed to reduce conflict between the union and employers so as to enable them jointly to meet competition from railroads and state ton-mile taxes.¹⁴

National Bargaining and the Pattern. In national situations, unions tend to favor national bargaining of the top international unions and employers' associations.¹⁵ Much bargaining is carried on at the top corporate level and with dozens of unions. General Motors negotiates with 17 unions, Union Carbide with 13. American Radiator has 75 separate contracts; Pittsburgh Plate Glass has 225. The giants serve as leaders and pace-setters, setting patterns for other bargains not only in their own industry but for the nation as a whole. There are, however, sharp differences in contracts that indicate that there is no tendency toward a "national master agreement."¹⁶ Unions recognize that they are more respected when a major company deals with "one union, not thirty-nine."¹⁷

Where a strong leader like John L. Lewis is present, local bargaining often disappears. On the other hand, some exceptionally powerful local groups in a few major cities, viz., the onetime AFL Longshoreman head in New York, Joseph Ryan, have held out against international and even federation pressure to control bar-

gains. These struggles and pressures reveal multiple group functioning within union ranks. However wide multi-employer bargaining, the AFL-CIO "tops" do not bargain directly. They set broad policy, such as in the drive for a 35-hour week, a minimum wage above the present \$1.25. Generally, the main unit in bargaining is the international union; the main unit in enforcement is the local union.

The Future of Bargaining Units. The spread of mergers among employers and the rise of the AFL-CIO and the international unions is leading to a situation where fewer companies and few unions are dominant in bargaining. Further centralization and extension of national unit control over local units is coming. Leadership or pattern bargaining is becoming more significant. As technology abolishes old jobs and the fuller effect of the AFL-CIO attempt to eliminate conflicting and duplicating jurisdictions is felt and legal costs mount, pressure for extension of international power in bargaining grows great. Fewer but bigger unions are expected to face fewer but bigger managements; both will cross old boundaries to set up inter-union and inter-management agreements.

HOURS OF WORK

A central concern of collective bargaining is the hours of work, not merely their length but shifts and pay differentials and, where automation enters, the issue of rotating shifts in continuous production. The long-term trend is for hours to fall, but this is complicated by emergency needs and such factors as double jobs, now termed moonlighting.

Shorter Hours. At the beginning of industrialization hours were more than 80 a week; a century and a half later "the fully employed worker now spends more of his time at leisure than at work."¹⁹ In many industries hours are well below 40 a week.²⁰ Indeed, in its revision of definitions the Department of Labor stated, "persons designated as working 'full time' are those who worked 35 hours or more."²¹ While 17,680,000 persons at work in nonagricultural industries put in 41 hours or more, 24,498,000 worked from 35 to 40 hours between February 10 and 16, 1957; the remaining 10,000,-000 put in from 1 to 34 hours. Thus, of 56,209,000 workers checked, well under one-third worked over 40 hours (31.4 per cent) while 68.6 per cent worked under 40 hours.

Unions have continued a century-long struggle to reduce hours. From 1953 to 1956 the International Ladies Garment Workers Union succeeded in obtaining reductions in the work week from 40 to 35 hours for more than 200,000 workers, until 95 per cent of the union's

450,000 members are on a 35-hour week. Printers are on a 37.5 hour week. Within a decade hours are expected to fall to 37 a week for most workers.²² Shortened hours are directly related to income, unit costs, extra time for overtime work. Hours are now being reduced by the growth of paid holidays, paid vacations, and by demands for more leisure. The unions pressured for fewer hours of work in the recession of 1958. A type of reduction could come in the three-month paid vacation for production workers every five years, suggested by the United Steelworkers. On an average, the work week from 1850 to 1950 declined about three hours a decade. A 37.5 hour week appears possible for most workers by 1960 and a possible 27.5 hour-week may arrive by 2000.

Forces Behind Shortening of Hours. Technological, union, legal, and sundry social forces have combined to reduce hours. Textile employment fell from 1,280,000 to 982,000 workers or by almost a full fourth from 1948 to 1955. Other industries had comparable falls, while output rose.²³ Pressure for shorter hours has, accordingly, become acute. Unions have fought for shorter hours both in bargaining and through legislation. Very strong demands for added leisure have been made by workers and even managements.²⁴ The technological revolution has made shorter hours possible as work has been speeded up greatly. Widespread unemployment led to powerful forces making for shorter hours. While hours may rise greatly during war, war's general effect has been to cut hours.²⁵ Shorter hours have not, as many employers thought, led to moral degeneration of the work force.²⁶

Law has an important influence on reducing hours. The century-old acceptance by the federal government of the 10-hour day has had wide repercussions. Individuals can no longer determine their working hours which are now a matter of public policy and collective bargaining.²⁷ The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act brought into being the 5-day, 40-hour week on the widest scale.

Leisure is now more sought after than additional goods and services. Shorter hours are also a symbol of new status, of less subjection to work processes. This is combined with more regular pay, vacations with pay, and other status considerations. Apparently the reduction of the work week has extended the work life span of individuals. Health is improved at the same time that absenteeism is lowered, and the quality of public and family life is improved as is its richness and variety and the range of choices.²⁸

THE WAGE ISSUE

Controversy over wages has hardly halted and collective bargaining shows no signs of diminishing or eliminating disagreement

over wages. Each group has different views of wages, management looking on them as a cost of production to be cut, while workers look on them as a means of living to be raised.²⁴ An increase of 5 cents an hour to an employee means a raise of \$2 a week, but to an employer with 5,000 employees it means a cost increase of \$520,000 a year. The worker is so completely dependent on wages for his existence that it is idle to play down the importance of wages. One study indicated that more than 50 per cent of Americans are dissatisfied with the incomes they have.

But workers are also interested in more than money. Worthy said, "If the only basis management can conceive for employee loyalty and cooperation is the pay envelope and the short work-week, there can never be enough money or short enough hours to do the job."²⁵

Wage Differentials. While unions have historically sought to achieve a kind of non-price competition or wage equality among workers, they have been unable to escape differential wage payments for varying degrees of worker skill, responsibility, experience, and physical or mental effort. Differentials can stem from sex, race, age, physical condition, product differences, location of plant, different working conditions and even hours of work or region or industry.

Unions may have had their greatest effect on wages in the narrowing of differentials.²⁶ Much of the decline of differential wages is traceable to their activities. But the decline also depends on long years of prosperity. Over four decades the spread of wages between skilled and unskilled workers was cut almost in half. But a good deal of the change rests on an increase of skill for all levels of labor. In 1939 the average union scale of pay for journeymen in the building trades was 70 per cent above that for laborers and helpers; by 1952 it had narrowed to 38 per cent or almost half. Minimum wage legislation may have affected the spread. A reduction of geographical differences may arise from contract provisions, as in basic iron and steel.

Skilled craftsmen in the UAW have sought higher differentials and special bargaining rights; a "Society of Skilled Workers" at Flint, Mich., was organized to seek such rights. New consideration for the skilled may be coming. Meanwhile a double standard of wages exists in relation to women. Many male workers may feel that their social position and the "worth" of their jobs is lowered if women earn the same pay. Many an employer may prefer women if he can continue to hire them at lower pay.

Adjustments and Escalators. Wage adjustments may be permissive or automatic or both. A permissive plan permits negotiation

of new wage rates either at agreed on intervals or when, during the life of a contract, major changes in underlying conditions affecting wages can be shown by either side. Sometimes only the union can request reopening. Automatic wage adjustments include "escalator" clauses which make repeated negotiations on wages less necessary. Escalator clauses go back many hundreds of years in history. Current emphasis on them is linked to the annual improvement factor agreed to by the UAW and General Motors as a general device for "adjusting the purchasing power of workers as a group to increased productivity." Escalator clauses became prominent in 1950 and by late 1956 covered 3.5 million workers employed under contracts and another 300,000 unorganized workers, mainly in offices.²⁷

Minimum wage laws have affected both differentials and wage adjustments, compressing the entire range of wages by pushing up from the bottom. Nevertheless, considerable changes have occurred because of such minimum-wage standards as are contained in the Davis-Bacon act of 1931, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Extension of coverage of such acts for an additional 2,500,000 workers has been proposed by the government and by unions. Most opposition has come from retail firms.

Wage Theory. Various wage theories tend to neglect other than monetary considerations, although the economic ones are but a part of the social and political factors involved. Much depends on "the habits and customs of the people," as Ricardo said and not merely on individual output. Minimum wage laws, wage stabilization programs, and other institutional controls over wages can hardly be discounted by strictly economic theories of wages. This would include scientific management's approach to wage determination as a matter of time and motion study.

In an interdependent system, Hiller noted, "all functions are equally necessary," from highest to lowest. A high reward for the one and a subsistence or minimal payment for the other is related to place or station and not to contribution to the collectivity. Many an occupation has high prestige because a medieval valuation has been continued into modern times. Why is a teacher's importance to society not as great as that of a physician? Hiller wrote, "There is no logical nor inherent reason for the present distribution of social wealth among the vocations." Both partial- and general-equilibrium theory in economics are unsatisfactory for analyzing wage relationships in terms of choice, determinants, and effects.²⁸

Status Considerations. The wage is also a symbol of general standing in the community. Pay and prestige go together, however unfair either standard or valuation may be.²⁹ For long years unions fought to equalize pay so as to end feelings of status anxiety, but they have not succeeded; feelings of insecurity reach the fear that the job itself will end. Moreover, in a hierarchical and status-climbing society, many workers may seek out differentials in pay and status as part of their reference group aspirations. Even the prevailing wage concept of wage-setting is a status device which says in effect: we should not be treated any worse than anyone else. The differential approach would add: we should be treated better if we can get away with it.

Powerful emotions are built around the desire for economic security and feelings that various wage measures are not equitable. A good deal of the drive for participation rests on desires to improve status.³⁰ Workers, too, sense that "an increase of wages, unless earned under unwholesome conditions, almost always increases the strength, physical, mental and even moral, of the coming generation."³¹ People are aware that, with better training, they can go farther in life and can earn thousands of dollars more during their working life.

Union Effects on Wages. Controversy over the effects of unions on wages is strong, some feel that unions have a leveling influence in general.³² Nonunionized labor very often gets more money in response to union competition; for unions may force up prevailing scales. In individual companies unions often make gains even when they do not make gains in an industry as a whole. There has been an increased share in income gained by workers; unions have probably had some influence in this connection.

Slichter held that unions have raised wages through bargaining power, although Fellner found that price increases offset the gains. Lester wrote that historically money incomes, which are largely wages, tend to advance faster than output even with no unions present and even where unions accept a wage freeze. Kerr found that "the political test of meeting workers' notions of equity has more of an impact on wage policy than the economist test of income maximization." Many workers prefer improvements in working conditions (and status) to increases in wages which seem to bring an increase in work.

WAGE SUPPLEMENTS

To basic wages unions have sought to add wage supplements which involve payments for time when one does not report for

work, payments for special activities, bonuses, contributions and other payments such as profit sharing for no direct service by employees, protection against various hazards, and other benefits which aid primarily the employee.³³ Wage supplements are very old and are not usually distinguished from other payments by the workers receiving the payments.

Extension of Fringe Benefits. Blocked by various pressures from making direct wage gains, workers have sought to make advances in every other possible way. The fringe benefit movement, accordingly, became significant in the course of World War II's wage stabilization program.³³ The National War Labor Board and Wage Stabilization Board contributed to this shift in the emphasis on ways to obtain gains. Growth of fringes was stimulated by the development of new interest in security and by interpretations of the Taft-Hartley Act. Group insurance programs were held to be within the scope of wage bargaining, as were certain bonuses. Employer competition in a tight labor market had its effect, as did certain tax laws, and the example of fringes offered certain executive and white-collar personnel. That such gains are entitled fringe benefits suggests the older economic views of what is compensation to labor.

Various wage supplements, including old-age and survivors' insurance, unemployment insurance, compensation for injuries, and employer contributions to private pension and welfare funds, grew from a little more than a half billion dollars in 1929 to more than \$11 billion in 1954, or by twenty-two times. Where in 1950 fringes were included in ten per cent of union contracts covering pensions, by 1955 the figure was 45 per cent. Insurance coverage was provided by 30 per cent of contracts in 1950 and 70 per cent in 1955, with vacations and holidays with pay in more than 98 per cent of union contracts. Coal's fringe benefits are estimated at 31 per cent of the industrial payroll. Counting all fringe benefits, one estimate held that cost to employers was \$1.5 billion in 1929 or about one cent an hour per employee and three per cent of the \$50 billion paid out in wages and salaries. By 1955 fringe benefits cost \$36 billion, or 25 cents an hour and 17 per cent of the \$210.3-billion paid out in wages and salaries. By 1975 costs may go to \$120 billion, or \$1 an hour and 30 per cent of a wage and salary bill of \$400-billion.³⁴

Types of Fringes. The range of supplements is broad but pay for time not worked and payments to provide security and financial protection are the most significant. Paid vacations and paid holidays affect just under 80 per cent of the cost involved in employer pay-

ments.³¹ There are various types of time off with pay, premium-pay practices, health and security benefits, and bonuses. Some types are legally required; others are agreed-upon. Supplemental unemployment benefits are a new major fringe benefit.

At General Motors in 1940 vacations for hourly workers were one week and the rate of pay was one dollar an hour; in 1958 vacations lasted three weeks and at an hourly rate of \$2.12.³⁴ Many a business now pays for seven holidays and even provides for a four-day weekend at times. Half a million workers were covered by private health and insurance or pension plans in 1945; the number so covered reached 11,290,000 by early 1954. Unions are seeking a much wider kind of health care today, just as they are extending the movement to increase pensions at retirement.

A minimum amount of reporting or call pay has also been gained by many workers, as has severance or dismissal pay and shift pay. The greatest fringe increases of the future appear to lie in demands for leisure increases. Unions back proposals for increasing all social security benefits by ten per cent. Companies on their part have sought to work out an all-purpose reserve fund to cover most or all fringes.

WORKING RULES

Working rules may cover the skill content of a job, who can touch type or the right to a coffee break. But the rules can also deal with layoffs, recalls, and work-sharing procedures, and did so in 77.5 per cent of the 1,743 agreements studied in one survey.³⁵ The issues are of special importance in times of recession. Unions may consider that they have the right to participate in efforts to stabilize an industry through wage determination, incentive plans, profit-sharing, and the equalizing of the labor costs of competing manufacturers.³⁶ More, unions may insist that their function is not merely to help the economy keep going but to move it forward.

Seniority Rule. Seniority, recognition of time of service, takes many forms, some of them so highly specialized as to seem distinct. Promotion from within a plant is one form, as it is a kind of security, although this is related to merit and not mere time of service.^{7a}

Seniority is supported more by unions than management as a means of layoff control, but it collides with various merit systems for evaluation of employees. Both unions and management find it difficult to establish a basis for determining seniority; time served is not sufficient. How to measure ability or adaptability remains a problem.³⁷ Seniority may be by company, plant, department, occupation, or combinations of them, but it usually refers to working

up a line of progression or ladder of skill and responsibility.³⁶ In times of job shortage unions may narrow seniority districts, so as to lessen internal union conflict.³⁸ Seniority provisions have conflicting effects: some mediocrity is favored and labor mobility may be reduced. Being impersonal and seemingly an inanimate measure, seniority appears to rule out or at least lessen the personal favoritism of employers or union officials. Older workers achieve some protection, but younger ones are annoyed.

Problems of seniority are legion. In seasonal work, seniority by itself is a poor way of deciding on layoffs. Seniority is most easily applied where jobs are interchangeable. As new jobs develop the old view that one has property rights in the job fades; even the idea that a specific union has "collective ownership" over all job opportunities within its scope weakens as jobs and skills and jurisdictions shift. Where some greater employment stability exists, seniority rule tends to become merged with promotional programs.

Reactions to Change. Where technological and other changes are introduced, their effects nearly always go beyond wage and earning problems to issues of displacement, deskilling, and upgrading. Most unions have found some way to accommodate to change, which is usually introduced by management. Unions may seek to obstruct such change, to compete with it, or control it.³⁷ While local union members are quite uneasy about and usually opposed to many changes, the national union may take a different view. A change may include a shift of plant, which can mean real suffering for displaced workers, viz., changes in a railroad community through "death by dieselization." Unions, along with community groups, often seek to block the shift or offer inducements for a company not to move.

Restrictionism. Holding back production, i.e., restrictionism, is not confined to labor, although much attention is devoted to labor "going slow." However, slow ups occur without unions.³⁸ Working rules may appear to be restrictive rather than protective, but Weber held that this merely indicated that workers felt solidarity. There is little difference between union and nonunion workers in output in industries, viz., bricklayers and lathers in building. The level of employment may be far more important than union policy in determining labor efficiency.^{39a} Moreover, restrictionism may be part of a "revolt against work" and not merely its pace. Conspicuous loafing may be a sign of "a tired working class."³⁹ But tired or not, restrictionist or speedy, the American worker remains the most productive in the world.

LIVING WITH THE AGREEMENT

With the law on the side of collective bargaining, the written agreement usually results in the compliance of both parties. Mutual pledges of compliance may be in the agreement, but grievance and arbitration are usually enough to make for carrying out terms. The possible use of force is present, of course.

Grievance Procedure. A signed agreement does not end struggles; grievance procedures are a continuation of the accommodation process of bargaining.⁴⁰ Misunderstanding and differences in interpretation can hardly be avoided. Grievance machinery is the main way of carrying out contract provisions; its procedure becomes the ground rules for both sides, well understood even if not formalized.⁴¹ Grievance machinery serves as a continuous adjustment process. Unions hold that grievance procedure is a protection against arbitrary power. Barbash wrote that "the handling of workers' grievances on the job is perhaps the single most important function of modern unionism." Without the local union functioning as "watch-dog" of the agreement, no contract may mean much. Moreover, the most meaningful participation by workers in democratic relations may be on the union committee handling grievances.⁴²

This "cutting edge of labor-management relations" goes back to 1892 when the local Typographical Union and the Chicago Publishers Association agreed on conciliation and arbitration to settle "all disputes arising out of the interpretation of the contract."⁴³ Union leaders since then have learned that the better they fight the worker's case the more loyalty they gain.⁴⁴ Grievances vary considerably: as employment rises, grievances over promotion may be common. As employment falls, grievances over seniority and layoffs are common. Technological change brings other grievances to the fore. To settle grievances requires a close relation between supervisors and union representatives.⁴⁵ In such cases, problems may be unearthed before they reach the grievance stage.

The Use of Force. Either side may use force to back its arguments. Unions can turn to strikes and picketing, managements to lockouts, discharge, and other methods. But nearly all the 125,000 collective bargaining agreements in the United States are peacefully negotiated and renegotiated. Yet either side may find that some show of force is needed on occasion. Slowdowns, boycotts, "going fishing" are not uncommon. Discharge remains the supreme penalty of the employer.⁴⁶

Arbitration. Arbitration has become significant in labor-relations as a means of reaching a peaceful settlement without loss

of face by either side. Conciliation occurs when a third party merely helps the two disputants to continue discussing. Mediators, in contrast, are called in to supply ideas and suggestions to help reach a settlement. In arbitration, the third party decides or judges. While compulsory arbitration was in effect during World War II, it is not popular. In a way arbitration is a terminal step in grievance procedure in about 90 per cent of the collective bargaining contracts.⁴⁶ Arbitration may be used as well in interunion struggles. The UAW does not permit the arbitration of work load disputes; these are a matter for direct negotiations. The laws or work rules of the typographers are beyond arbitration. Fact-finding may accompany arbitration or be a separate process.

Arbitration does not end disputes, but it helps channel disagreement toward some accommodation for a while. Collective bargaining emerges as a partial instrument for planning even if collective bargaining remains a contest over conflicting interests.

SUMMARY

The content of a negotiational relation comprises the elements of a social contest between power formations. Unions and managements contributed to the enlargement of the bargaining unit, and it is threatening to become even larger. Bargaining over hours and wages has a long history, but more recently the government has come to affect the decisions. The law is now enmeshed in nearly every phase of the *negotiational* process and content. There is little prospect that bargaining can ever again be other than a highly public performance. Bargaining helps give workers and unions added status. The older welfare emphasis of unions has received new emphasis in the concentration on fringe benefits of various types. Unions have helped achieve pensions, paid holidays and vacations, insurance, various social security benefits, seniority, and other gains of interest to workers.

Bargaining gradually becomes a procedure for handling grievances and for devising working rules of conduct for both parties. It affects the efforts of either side to strengthen itself at the other's or the public's expense and helps all involved find means for living with the agreements.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Describe the strategy of negotiations.
2. Explain the role of negotiators.
3. On what basis are contracts supplemented or altered?
4. What is so important about the unit of bargaining?

5. What influence can an economic downturn have on shortening the hours of work?
6. Examine instances of moonlighting. Why does it occur?
7. Why do the different parties look on wages in contrasting ways?
8. How can wage differentials be reconciled with the union doctrine of equal pay?
9. How are wages indicative of status?
10. How do unions affect wages?
11. What forces stand behind wage supplements?
12. Contrast restrictionism and resistance to change.
13. Examine grievances in a labor fact book. Are they real? Imaginary?
14. What does arbitration settle?

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SOCIETY OF SECURITY

Pressure for a universal minimum standard of jobs and income, of a basic guarantee against the hazards of life, and of protection against forces beyond the control of the individuals has led to a new emphasis on security in more public forms. Government operates to put a ceiling on hours and a floor beneath wages, to provide payments to older workers and benefits to the unemployed. Perhaps this is the greatest new change in labor-management relations. Despite considerable opposition, social insurance is generally accepted by management, labor, and the major political parties.

THE SECURITY PROGRAMS

Three major social insurance programs are now in operation: (1) Workmen's compensation insures the worker against industrial injury or disease, (2) Unemployment insurance pays benefits when no work is available, (3) Old Age and Survivors (and now dependents as well) Insurance provides a retirement income for the aged and benefits to dependents, subject to actuarial principles.¹ Labor standards, too, are a form of security program.

Change to Public Welfare Programs. The search for security in modern society has taken a group and public form since the depression days. For years, unions provided for worker security in line with the tradition of private solutions to welfare problems. Like employers, unions objected to public social insurance and employer-sponsored payments or benefits.² But industrialization and economic breakdown of the 1930's changed the previously accepted view that unemployment was an individual's responsibility. In 1932 the AFL reversed its historic policy and supported passage of an unemployment insurance law in Wisconsin, and John L. Lewis endorsed unemployment insurance before the AFL convention. The old voluntarism was over; a new dependence on the government

action was being carved out. The private welfare capitalism of the 1920's had collapsed; so had private union welfare.

Business found a new social responsibility for employees and assimilated "needed welfare measures into the cost structure of doing business."³ The desire for gaining security of property values was involved too.^{1a} With the Social Security Act of 1935 the government launched a program of assuring minimum income for the unemployed, aged, blind, dependent children, and the disabled. Insurance, tax-offsets, grants-in-aid were the cost measures proposed. Maternal and child-health services developed, as did services for crippled children, and child-welfare services.

Unions first arose to reduce haunting insecurity as part of a drive for freedom from want and enslavement to the empty belly. They began as welfare and benefit organizations; they remain vital welfare institutions.⁴

Costs of Security. In 1957 welfare benefit payments by the government reached \$11.7 billion a year. Of this sum \$5.7 billion went for pension and welfare funds; \$3.2 billion for Social Security (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance); \$1.9 billion for unemployment insurance programs of the states; and nearly \$1 billion to workmen's compensation programs for those injured on the job. Some 186,000 blind persons receive \$6.4 million of federal aid, in addition to any OASI benefits. Some 2,250,000 children of 614,000 families receive an average of \$55-million in aid each month. A quarter of a million disabled receive an average of \$14.5 million each month.

In 1929 such benefits cost just under \$500 million; 1956 costs were about 23 times higher, without including private fringe benefits.⁵ By 1940 the payments totaled a little more than \$1 billion.⁶ Payments have to come out of current production and income. Costs are being spread to more groups, although thus far national production has been high enough to meet important war-defense needs and social welfare contributions. The costs have actually been lower than originally anticipated, even though social insurance expenditures moved from \$1.2 billion, or 1.3 per cent of gross national product, in 1939-40, to \$9.9 billion, or 2.7 per cent of the GNP, in 1954-55. During the same period expenditures for public aid fell from 3.8 per cent to 0.8 per cent of GNP, the two sets of programs made up 5.1 per cent of GNP in 1939-40 and 3.5 per cent in 1954-55.⁷

Somers and Somers wrote, "While representing only about 4 per cent of personal income in the United States, the continuous flow of social insurance payments has become as significant economically as its potential counter-cyclical influence. In short, the institution

of social insurance is now being recognized as an instrument of business welfare as well as of individual welfare. It is, in fact, a form of positive investment in a high prosperity economy not unlike other forms of creative financial investment.⁷ Reserves for the program totaled \$25 billion in March, 1952, with two-thirds for OASI and one-third for unemployment insurance. Although employers pay into the funds, they can offset this by holding down wages, introducing wage cuts, or passing on the cost to consumers in the form of higher prices, so that the costs are borne by different groups.

Health and Accident Insurance. In 1950 there were an estimated 15,500 deaths from industrial accidents, 1,600 cases of permanent total disability, 83,300 cases of permanent partial disability, and 1,851,600 temporary total disabilities.⁸ The figures have altered little since. The more than two million industrial accidents a year result in more deaths than all of America's wars to date. The minimum payments fixed by law are generally inadequate, providing a sum equivalent to one year's earnings or less. In 1956 about eleven million workers were covered by state and railroad temporary disability insurance laws, and some \$252 million was paid them for wages lost because of disability.

Since 1915 industrial fatalities have been cut by 65 per cent until in 1954, the best safety year on record, work deaths totaled 14,000 and all work disabling injuries came to 1,860,000. The work place had become safer than the home or highway and the worker's life span became equal to that of the population at large. Much of this gain came from health programs at work, improved industrial medicine and safety programs.

Labor Standards. A vital part of the security problem is labor standards, which include unemployment and old age and disability payments and provisions for minima in wages and hours. The greatest achievement in labor standards may be legitimation of these minima of wages, hours, and working conditions by legislation and by government recognition and enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. These standards are now law-norms. The government was first called in to help protect the individual from the employer's greater economic power; it now acts to maintain good working conditions.

THE PROBLEM OF THE OLDER WORKER

The aged are a rapidly increasing segment of the population and present new problems for labor-management relations and social security programs. It is difficult for them to find and retain jobs, and public and private benefit payments are small.

Old Age. A falling death rate stemming from improved medical care, better public health measures, and superior diet, has made for a lengthening of life expectancy. The human life span was about 22 years at the time of Christ, perhaps 32 years during the American revolution, 40 years in 1850, and 70 years today. Where persons over 65 made up 2.7 per cent of the population in 1860 and 4.3 per cent in 1910, they reached 8.2 per cent by 1950 and are expected to go to 10 per cent by 1970.¹⁰ The median age of the population has almost doubled (from 16.7 years in 1820 to 30.2 years in 1950); the median age of the male work force went up from 33.3 years in 1890 to 38.5 in 1950; it went from 24.3 to 35.9 years for females.¹¹ The 65-and-over population, now at 14.9 million, may go to 17.6 million in 1965 and 19.5 million in 1970.

The age distribution of the labor force has shifted so that where persons 25-64 years of age accounted for 63.7 per cent of the labor force in 1890, they comprised 78.9 per cent in 1955. The great decline came in persons below 25 years of age.¹² Still, the number of 65-and-over persons in the labor force fell from 70 per cent in 1890 to less than 50 per cent in 1940 and to about 30 per cent in the middle 1950's.¹³ The ratio of persons 65 years and up to those in the 20-64 year working brackets has risen. In 1870 there were 63 persons 65 years and over for every 1,000 persons 20-64 years of age; in 1900 the ratio was 79/1,000 and in 1950 140/1,000; in 1953 the proportion was 149/1,000. Some 43 million people were over 45 years of age in the 1950 census, by 1975 the number can reach 63 million and make up more than half the adult population. The 65-and-over group may include 21 million people by 1975.¹⁴ By 1980 half the population will be over 55 years of age.¹⁴

Work careers start later and last longer in modern society. The number of years of non-production, before and after the work career, has grown; but, because of the increased life span, the number of work years has also grown. The work career was about 32 years in 1900 and 42 years in 1950.¹⁵ In 1900 a man averaged about three years of life in retirement, in 1950 he averaged six years in retirement, and by the year 2000 is expected to average nine years.

The Problem. One of the unfortunate problems of modern urban-industrial society is that older people find it difficult to gain employment and must live the latter part of their lives on sharply reduced incomes. Only 25 per cent of the 65-and-over grouping are at work, while another 20 per cent are unemployable, but 55 per cent could work who are not so doing. If only 1.5 million of the employable oldsters were at work they could raise the national income by \$5 billion, but many companies do not wish to hire older workers

and self-employment opportunities have been narrowed by the decline of agricultural functions. The provisions of federal and private pension and old-age plans continue to keep benefit payments low.

Productivity of Oldsters. A substantial proportion of the industries have maximum age limits for hiring. They range from 35 years for women in some occupations to 65 for men in others, with below 45 preferred by many employers.¹⁶ The limits vary with occupation, industry, locality, and general labor market conditions. While 65-and-over personnel constitute but five per cent of total employed persons, they make up 12 per cent of all persons engaged in agriculture, and 10 per cent or more of the clergymen, dentists, lawyers, physicians, real estate agents, locomotive engineers, and some trade and service occupations.¹⁷ Many employers take the view that hiring older workers unduly increases pension costs and that older workers are inferior in output, when the real problem is finding suitable placement and offering both counseling and retraining.¹⁸

As the physical work load lightens, the older worker actually becomes more useful. The output per man-hour shows but slight variations to age 54; the average performance of workers 55-64 years of age did not fall below 90 per cent of the performance of workers in the 35-44 age grouping in a Bureau of Labor Statistics study. Variations in the same age bracket are larger than between age brackets. However, age brings a reduction in reserve physical capacity for extended work making overtime work difficult. Some union agreements prohibit hiring age limits or discrimination because of age. Others use a ratio clause, viz., every fifth journeyman electrician to be 50 years of age or older on jobs using five or more journeymen. A special wage concession or wage adjustment clause may be offered to employers for hiring older men.

A difficulty arises between older and younger workers. The latter may feel they produce more yet lack seniority, and the former may be interested in pensions and retirement rather than current wage gains.^{19a} Surveys show that most old people prefer working; only five per cent of those receiving old age benefits had stopped working voluntarily. Another study showed that workers 45-years-and-over comprised 40 per cent of job seekers in seven areas, yet they obtained only 22 per cent of jobs filled.¹⁹ Workers older than 45 who are laid off generally remain out of work longer than younger men.¹⁹

Retirement. In the past millions of workers died before they could retire. Never before has a society been able to support millions of persons in a non-work condition. Retirement is a major social problem because work has been the organizing principle for

most people's lives. They are often financially and psychically unprepared for the critical change.

The Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance after a series of studies concluded that "beneficiaries prefer to work"; only five per cent of them wish to retire.²⁰ Social security measures are by no means forcing "premature" retirement. For most industrial workers, but not for executives, there is a "deep resistance toward retirement," for work is highly valued as a way of life, of retaining independence, and of improving status. Few industrial workers can afford to retire for lack of sufficient income to maintain long-held living standards. Still, as workers grow older and retirement is inevitable, men make their peace with it to an extent and, in answer to questions about retirement, seem to favor it more with advancing years.^{13b}

Compulsory retirement is a feature of most industrial plans. Such plans, their proponents aver, make for an orderly removal of less desirable employees and open opportunities for the promotion for younger workers. Others complain that the aged suffer serious losses in income and status and that useful workers are lost. It may be a costly and wasteful way of maintaining opportunities for newer entrants into the labor market.²¹ Dr. Richard Young noted, "retirement at 65 is illogical since no consideration is given to personal desires or psychological needs." He contends that some persons can work till they are 80; no magic age and nothing in chronology as such determines when a person has passed his productive prime.

In the face of the emphasis on compulsory retirement, preparation for retirement has become a new consideration for millions. Workers request explanations of pension plans and even counseling in planning for retirement.^{13c} The Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union in Philadelphia sponsors a course on how to retire.

Retirement, a gerontologist reported, "leads to an improvement in health," although many retired persons are in poor health possibly because poor health led to retirement and not the reverse. Still, for those with less than \$1,000 income, retirement was satisfactory to only 38 per cent. For persons with incomes between \$1,000 and \$2,000 retirement was satisfactory to 52 per cent. Among those with incomes over \$5,000, 75 per cent were generally satisfied.

Old Age and Survivors Insurance. OASI, basically a vast insurance device and the nearest approximation to universal coverage is the only aid program that is wholly federally financed. While 9 of 10 jobs are covered, only 50 per cent of the people 65 or over can qualify, although the proportion is expected to reach 86 per cent by 1980.⁷ About eight million people now receive monthly

benefits under the program which in 1955 paid out \$5 billion a month. In 1955 nearly 70 million workers were fully insured; almost 102 million workers had some wage credits under the program, compared to 45 million in 1940.²² OASI is now OASDI (disability is the added word) and is generally held to be the largest insurance system in the world. Although 1 out of 5 persons 65 years and over received payments of one sort or another in 1948, by the end of 1957 more than half of 15 million persons in this age bracket received some form of old age or retirement benefits.²³

Payments in 1957 averaged \$64 a month, with 18 per cent of the recipients receiving between \$90 and the maximum of \$108.50 a month; 16 per cent received at least \$75 a month. Somewhat lower payments go to wives, widows, or parents of former wage earners. A married couple may receive as much as \$125.16 a month. Most payments are considerably below the maximum allowable and are very low in terms of real purchasing power. Retirement income is simply not adequate for many millions of persons. In 1950 every fifth person over 65 was on relief for a total of 2,700,000—about twice as many as were on relief in the depths of the depression.²⁴

Further aid to the retired comes from unions. The UAW has opened a "drop-in center" for retired members, who are thus kept sympathetic to the union's broader social and political programs, learn of aid and measures proposed by geriatricians, and keep feeling they are part of some group. Other unions, such as the upholsterers organization, have sponsored retirement villages or homes for pensioned workers.²⁵

The Struggle for a Productive Function. Society has extended millions of lives physiologically only to cut them off from a productive function socially. To keep people alive only to retire them compulsorily is, assuredly, a peculiar form of waste.²⁶ The premium placed on youth makes society lose the valuable services of millions of experienced persons. Such non-use of the aged is a form of hidden unemployment.²⁷ Yet the 65-year-old of today is in many ways in far better condition than the 45-year-old of 1900.

Out of economic distress political instability is readily woven. The economic wastes of unemployment are considerable; an estimated at a \$200 billion was lost between 1929 and 1937 because of production which did not take place.²⁸ Fully four-and-a-half million persons were unemployed at the beginning of 1958 and possibly another million were partially unemployed. Shorter work weeks were affecting other millions. For various reasons many businesses did not hire new employees as older ones left. Since a total of 750,000 workers enter the labor market each year, new jobs have to

be found for them or mass unemployment results. To provide new jobs, at a cost of about \$10,000 per new job, requires investments of \$17.5 billion a year. By 1961 when the children of World War II marriages finish school, the number of 18-year-olds entering the labor market will be 350,000 instead of the recent average of 100,000.

The incidence of unemployment is greatest among younger workers. They are struck by technological, seasonal, casual, and cyclical unemployment as well as by lack of experience. Older workers also suffer greatly, and endure longer periods of unemployment than most others. Men usually have less unemployment than women, 3.1 per cent of them were unemployed against 4.1 per cent of the women in the last quarter of 1955.²⁷ Unemployment strikes hardest at "non-white" workers who constituted 20 per cent of the jobless but only 10 per cent of the population in 1955.²⁸ The finest collective bargaining relations and a record of peace or of conflict have little bearing on the extent of unemployment for an industry or area.

Unemployment Insurance. About 39 million workers are covered by state unemployment insurance legislation as of 1955.²⁹ In 1940 but 23.1 million were covered. The figure today is just over 40 million, with some 10 million workers in very small firms, on farms, in domestic service, with nonprofit groups and government excluded. While two to three per cent unemployment is fairly constant, this can rise to as much as 25 per cent of the labor force. It reached five per cent in 1958. Unemployment insurance benefits were at \$1.33 billion in 1955 and at about \$2 billion in 1957. Since the system collected more than \$20 billion in payroll taxes from employers, earned more than two billion dollars in interest, and paid out more than \$14 billion in benefits to insured workers from 1936 to June, 1955, present reserves are more than \$8.2 billion.

Government officials and the AFL-CIO have urged an increase in benefit payment to between 50 and 65 per cent of average wages. Payments are held to be too small to make for employment stabilization, and the payments have to be supplemented by fiscal and monetary policy to achieve such a result.³⁰ These benefits, since they rarely last beyond 26 weeks, clearly do not aim at cyclical or mass unemployment but at noncyclical types.³¹ To receive benefits workers must show that they are willing to work in a given area, a feature that reduces mobility.

Supplementary Unemployment Benefits. The low public unemployment insurance benefits have led unions to seek supplements as part of a drive for a guaranteed annual wage which would gear such payments to a long-range anti-depression policy. This would give a more middle class salary status for production workers.³²

The social importance of the guaranteed annual wage may well outweigh its economic value.²⁹ It may be the closest labor has come to a true "right-to-work" law, i.e., a form of job guarantee or at least income guarantee.

Such a stabilization of earning power would help improve employment and sales, unions hold. They contend management has to assume year-round responsibility for labor.³⁰ The alternative is greater government backing for job security; for many employees in cyclical industries this may be the only alternative. Workers want the kind of yearly salary already enjoyed by management.

Unions contend that if employees did not fear working themselves out of jobs, they would have added incentive to work. Employers would have added incentive to stabilize operations, making labor part of the overhead costs and not direct labor costs.³¹ Like automation, the guaranteed annual wage requires continuous production to work well. Some executives look on the worker as "lazy and likely to be corrupted by an annual wage, although the executive is not corrupted by an annual salary."³² Many hold that the onetime socialist Reuther may be seeking the rather un-socialist aim of transforming the American worker into a middle class salaried employee. If labor cost becomes part of overhead cost, the status of labor could well be changed.³³ Employers have argued that GAW would raise fixed costs, force virtual cartelization in many a market, make for more government control, and penalize firms with poor employment and production records.

More than two million workers are under contracts that provide supplementary unemployment benefits but of the persons actually unemployed but 125,000 are receiving such payments.³⁴ Supplementary plans are not effective nationally; private supplements to unemployment insurance benefits are still minor, and most such benefits are in auto, steel, can, rubber, and glass. By 1957 all but four states (Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia) had approved, either by law or by interpretation, the simultaneous payment of insurance benefits and supplementary payments.³⁵

The Ford plan makes employers' contributions a welfare plan cost instead of wages and is nontaxable. It, however, gives little protection to low-seniority men. The income security type plan, evolved in the flat-glass industry, gives each worker a vested interest in a trust fund.³⁶ For supplementary unemployment benefit plans to work, greater intra-plant mobility will be needed within a company so that workers can be moved from job to job.³⁷ This may require the training and retaining of a "flying squadron" or "elite corps" that can perform many tasks. Management may be under great pressure

to diversify product lines. A movement to get workers to think and act along a wide range of functions may be spurred. However, work-supervisory relations will not change.

The supplementary plans have not been financially successful, paying little more than existing or regular plans. From June 1, 1956 to the following July payments totaled more than \$7.7 million or about 5 per cent of contributions. Supplementary benefits may make for a steadier work load for a smaller work force, but union officials will have to press for higher payments. Since the Chrysler strike of mid-summer, 1957, the average supplementary benefit check has amounted to \$12.30. Still, jobless steelworkers, unlike most others, can now draw as much in supplementary payments as they were earning in a 40-hour week ten years ago.³⁶

Since the unemployment of 9 million was reduced only by war production and kept down only by war crisis situations, the problem of providing jobs for an expanding labor force may be what Peterson calls "the basic and major problem of labor economics."³⁷ The underutilization of labor may indicate grave weaknesses in the public capitalism of the 1950's. Since many measures for alleviating unemployment are beyond the power of the individual and the separate firm, the issue becomes one of government policy.³⁸ Of course, unions are acting in concert with management to have unemployment insurance benefits raised and improved.³⁹

HEALTH, WELFARE, AND PENSIONS

Health and welfare programs now cover some 75 million persons or nearly half the population—roughly 29 million workers and 46 million dependents—by providing such protection as accident and sickness payments, medical and surgical benefits, hospitalization, burial expenses, and lump-sum benefits in case of death.⁴⁰ The National Labor Relations Board and court decisions and interpretations of the "wages and conditions of employment" clause of the Taft-Hartley Act have placed the plans within the collective bargaining area. What unions could not get from public sources they sought to obtain from managements, so that a combination of private and public programs is now in effect.⁴¹

Coverage and Types. Private pension and retirement programs covered more than 16 million members as of the beginning of 1958, or nearly one-third the private nonfarm labor force, compared to 7.1 million in 1950 and a half million in 1945.⁴² Pension funds reached \$10.8 billion in 1951, \$21.1 billion in 1955, and \$28.5 billion in 1957.⁴³ Pension reserves may have exceeded \$70 billions in 1957, a ten-fold increase since 1940. They may go to \$100 billion by

1965.⁴² Most unions favor contributions only by employers on the grounds that benefits of this kind are a cost of doing business "comparable to the cost of maintaining and replacing machinery."⁴³ By 1957 employers were contributing in excess of \$4.5 billion a year to the programs; workers put in \$2.3 billion.⁴⁴

In 1947 public pension programs paid out \$4 billion; in 1955 they paid out \$11 billion and by 1965 they may go to \$20 billion annually.⁴⁵ Private pension payments now exceed \$1 billion annually, a threefold increase since 1950.⁴⁶ There is great variety in benefits. A coal miner may receive a pension of \$100 a month at age 60; at 65 he will begin receiving Social Security benefits. If he and his wife draw the maximum, the total pension from government and private welfare fund will be \$262.80 a month. For an auto worker the sum could go to \$252.80 after forty years of service and including Social Security benefits for worker and wife.⁴⁷

Of the more than 23,000 plans, vesting and multi-employer pension credits are the most common. In vesting, workers receive protection of credits earned through a guarantee loan equity in a pension plan should employment halt before eligibility for retirement begins. Vesting assures older workers at least a partial pension; about two-fifths of plans studied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide this. Multi-employer plans allow credits to be transferable between companies.⁴⁸ Either plan prevents employers from discriminating against older workers and relieves the employer of concern over the age distribution of his workers.

Most unions favor having a special fund set aside by employers, either on a level-of-benefit basis without stating the amount of benefits, or by fixed contribution which would be a percentage of the payroll.⁴⁹ Fully two-thirds of funds are held by banks and insurance companies, and about one-third are administered by the insurance companies that invest such funds. The remainder are administered by trustees. About 92 per cent of plans are administered solely by the employer, 7.5 per cent are handled jointly with the union, and one-half of one per cent are managed by unions alone.⁵⁰ Steelworkers prefer employer administration to avoid duplication of an enormous number of clerical personnel, industrial relations personnel, and others. Rubber workers prefer their own administration. Meanwhile the programs have now become quite "neutral," i.e., are capable of being handled outside the contest-conflict area, as part of ordinary business cost.

Problems of Welfare. The rise of welfare programs poses unique problems. The funds are so huge that plans covering them play a steadily rising role in the supply of capital funds. They affect cor-

porate ownership and control, future claims on consumption resources, mobility of workers and executives, and even the relation between private and governmental plans. One of the most serious problems has to do with the erosion of the funds by inflation. Because pensions are of far less interest to younger than to older workers, unions have the problem of convincing workers of different ages and interest to support welfare plans.

Abuses of welfare funds have led to proposals for legislative controls. Unions have supported a proposed bill to require strict disclosure and policing by the Securities Exchange Commission, although management representatives have opposed the proposal.⁴⁰ Government responsibility for ensuring the sound operation of the plans and protecting the equities of the beneficiaries and the public interest are now widely recognized.⁴¹

SUMMARY

Welfare measures, formerly supported by private capitalists and unions, have taken on a more public form and are now conceived of as providing a universal minimum standard of jobs and income as well as some guarantees against various hazards. Major public programs cover compensation for industrial injury or disease, unemployment insurance, and old age and survivors and dependents benefits. The change to public-supported welfare is several decades old. Costs are probably in excess of \$12 billion a year already, although the proportion they make up of gross national product is lower than it was in the past. Welfare is closely linked to collective bargaining for which it is part of the area of contest. Where public welfare provisions are small, private welfare has grown. Welfare also concerns the problem of leisure, to be discussed in a later chapter, and the problem of the aged.

The rising age of the American population and labor force has posed a wholly new problem for labor-management relations. Work careers start later but last longer than they used to. The paradox of the aged is that their lives have been prolonged, but most of the added time cannot be spent productively. Society has cast them out. Retirement, accordingly, has become a central issue of the day, as have old age payments and the struggle for productive roles in life processes. The human problem of unemployment is as difficult. The effects of joblessness are considerable for the persons involved and for the society. Unemployment insurance assists only in the short-run. For longer periods and for mass unemployment, other measures are needed; one of these is supplementary unemployment benefits. The vast health, welfare, and pension programs, both public and

private, involve such huge funds that they pose new problems for control and payment.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is the basis for the new emphasis on security?
2. How do you explain the change from private to public welfare?
3. What are the economic costs of security programs?
4. How are labor standards an element in security?
5. Explain changes in union attitudes toward security over the past century.
6. What are the problems of the older worker?
7. How can a productive function be found for the aged?
8. Describe the effects of retirement on health, income, and social status.
9. Delineate the human consequences of unemployment.
10. How is unemployment insurance a short-run measure?
11. How has SUB worked out since 1956?
12. What is the extent of the current health, welfare, and pension programs?

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AUTOMATION'S EFFECTS ON LABOR RELATIONS

Sufficient experience has been gained with the widespread use of automation to show how it affects work processes and labor-management relations. There have been several dozen studies of part- and fully-automated plants to determine the effects of technological change on labor, management, and government. New problems are created in continuous production, capital investment, and productivity. The employment security issue remains central, both for the short and long run. One enters a new world in automated job processes, one in which the old parameters slip away and new jobs arise. Upgrading, downgrading, and horizontal movement occur. The struggles over promotions, retraining, and morale, remain, but new forms of isolation arise. Wages, hours, and working conditions are affected, as is the worker's status. Even supervisory relations change, though collective bargaining persists.

PLANNING AND INFORMAL ACTIVITY

Automation may well compel managers to revise training and education methods and open up degrees of planning once considered impossible of realization.¹ It requires even more attention to the human element, not less.² Planning will require more use of information and closer relations with the human beings and groups affected, but it can also create its own obstacles in communication.

Planning Process. When the plant becomes a "super machine," all operations must be as tightly organized as is the assembly line. It took fifteen months of planning before an oil refinery could be automated.³ The automatically controlled system rests on a view of the whole as far greater than its parts. Careful and advance planning becomes extremely important in every aspect of the production

process. Changes in design, availability of materials, rate of output, the commercial life of the product, the impact of competition—all these have to be anticipated long in advance. System engineering will include not merely the control system but the plant and all its human components in this closest marriage of management and mechanism.

Information Speed. The ore of automation is the bringing together of materials handling and information handling by tape, punched card, electronic computer and doing so at a speed formerly thought impossible. Business has to put more reliance on reports, records, paper work. Proper records, precise measurement, reduction of error and elimination of "noise" are necessary. When information and materials handling merge, a further drop in human and animal energy occurs and the great achievement of sheer speed of output is opened up. Already a large electronic computer can perform repetitive operations 1,000 times as fast as the average worker, and faster machines are appearing. Problems can now be solved in days, hours, or even minutes.⁴ Maximization of efficiency of a complex operation can now be achieved.

Automation requires more efficient management, if only to handle the electronic devices and the mistakes which if not discovered and corrected can lead to extraordinary error.⁵ Managers have to become experts in communication processes, the new informational powers at their command widen their freedom of choice to plan and select policy. A premium is placed on swift and correct policy. By having more and more up-to-date information on hand, the possibility of making decisions that can have far-reaching national and international effects is greatly increased, inventories can be controlled better.

In industrial relations an added communication load appears, but much of the information is more accurate than in the past. Although some believe that conflicts can be narrowed and reduced as information is improved and work relations simplified, it is also possible that more paper controls over human beings will result.⁶ Keeping human beings in touch with each other in a world that increasingly keeps them apart by more intricate machines becomes a new problem in industrial relations.

Advance Information. To secure acceptance of major technological innovations managements have to inform employees, communities, and unions well in advance. This is needed because of the importance of raising up "work motivations" for the "break-in" periods. One electronics firm found that relations were improved

during automation if fear was lessened by training, personnel adjustments, and simple communication. The Bell System did such advance converting to dial phones three years in advance, postponing retirements, retraining, and transferring displaced operators.⁷ Another company had a bitter strike as a result of installing machinery without advance planning. The responsibility of management begins long before installation of automatic equipment. Union support was gained in a bakery by having the union aware in advance of wage scales, retraining needs, problems of displacement, upgrading, and downgrading, and continuing collective bargaining.¹ A further possibility is to call in the union to see how the machines perform. As a result of involving the union early in the process, union spokesmen in one plant cited the benefits of automation in the form of less seasonal unemployment, safer and less difficult working conditions, retention of seniority, maintenance-of-wages, and training measures.³

CONTINUOUS PRODUCTION AND WHOLE PROCESSES

As an arrangement of human beings and machinery, automation opens the way to continuous production and to a possible fundamental alteration of job breakdowns in favor of new concepts of whole processes. As such automation can cut direct labor costs, increase output, raise productivity, meet a possible labor shortage, and improve quality. Of 17 possible levels of mechanization, few are true automation; most are somewhere along the path of advanced mechanization. The significant new feature is that the factory is becoming "one big machine—a master machine or super machine" that compounds, couples, and integrates production.⁸ But a fraction of the total labor force will probably be directly involved in automation.⁹ Diebold estimated that only about one-tenth of present industries would be automated.¹⁰ Full automation may be quite distant for most workers in most industries for many years to come. But automation will strike at the biggest plants; 65 per cent of plants having more than 1,000 employees use automation.

Continuous Production. Since the parts of the super machine of automation are so interdependent, individual stoppages and halts even of parts may become intolerable. Continuous production, that secret of mass production, remains the central clue to automation. Production "in series" is extended by continuous process mechanisms which now have feedback (self-control) devices built into them. It is no longer possible to halt production at will, since the investment in continuous machine processes is too great.¹² Continuous employment will have to accompany this movement. Plants and machines

will have to be used 24-hours a day except for "down time" for corrections, repairs, and maintenance. The consequences for unusual shifts and disruptions of life patterns will be significant.¹³

Mobile maintenance crews will have to be able to handle any breakdowns. Cutbacks will have to be avoided and the demand curve smoothed out. Seasonal unemployment could be a serious block and an introduction of some new stability in employment and capital investment appears necessary.¹⁴ Fuller social responsibility for employment will have to be assumed by business.¹⁵ While automation can make prosperity possible, it makes economic stability indispensable. Unemployment and insecurity "can destroy freedom more effectively than laws and regulations can." The decision to elect for continuous production can have profound effects on the business cycle; it can affect the formation of new firms and the accumulation of new capital. Good labor relations will have to be maintained to avoid stoppages which can be as disruptive as other shutdowns.¹⁶

Above all the modern industrial structure emerges as a complicated system of "interrelated processes." "Automation is likely to challenge the habits of thought fostered by *discontinuous* and highly specialized methods of production."¹⁷ Clearly, the machine may well have outstripped man and forced on him a species of super machine controls that earlier job alterations did not succeed in reaching.¹⁸

Capital Investment. Automatic control components appear to be increasing in both variety and number. Since their cost is high, to an extent they require greater capital investment. Business management, where it can, elects to choose machines that require less human energy expenditure—that produce greater volume as part of an "alternative equipment" cost system.¹⁹ Capital investment per worker is expected to be larger except for technicians and managers. The highly automated chemical industries invested \$26,000 per worker in 1954, about double the ordinary investment. In electric power generation, which is virtually entirely automated, capital investment per employee exceeded \$106,000.

The relation of these huge investments per worker to labor relations is not hard to see. While per item or by the pound automatic machinery is more expensive than ordinary equipment by 30 per cent to 50 per cent, less of it is needed. It will fit into a smaller building and may be less expensive than an ordinary plant.¹¹ For personnel it means working in smaller buildings, in offices with electronic computers that require less space, and possibly in offices distant from the older power sources and urban centers. It puts an

end to time lost through moving from one process to another, viz., stopping and starting, lack of uniformity and precision, limitations of human skill and frailty.¹⁹

The reduction of manhours from an index base point of 100 in 1880 to 25 in 1955 was accompanied by a corresponding rise in capital investment until the instrument production curve is now rising far ahead of plant investment. To have automated a new modern plant in 1950 would have cost some \$600-million for measuring and control instruments compared to \$67-million actually spent on such instruments.

Rate of Introduction. The sheer speed of development of automation is having momentous consequences. If the changes of the past half century had been compressed into a five-year period, economic and social chaos would have resulted. Yet automation is doing this kind of innovation compressing. But not all persons are convinced that the change to automation will be swift; Cordiner of General Electric holds that technological change will be a gradual process. MacMillan feels that it takes considerable time to design and install new plant and to train technologists and skilled technicians, particularly in electronics.^{19a} Freedlander, a rubber leader, expects that productivity can be ten per cent a year instead of the current two to five per cent.

Unions are seeking some means of controlling the rate of introduction of automation; but Russia, which faces far less resistance to automation, may automate faster and force the United States to do the same. Leontief, the mathematical economist, held that present technology can now advance rapidly. He found that the developmental lag between pure science and engineering application took nearly 100 years in the case of the steam engine and 50 years in the case of electric power. It took only 30 years for the internal combustion engine to be put to use; the vacuum tube was in every home within 15 years of its invention. "Today the interval is much shorter—often only five years and sometimes but one or two." Whitehead's observation may be apt: "In the past," he wrote, "human life was lived in a bullock car; in the future it will be lived in an aeroplane; and the change of speed amounts to a difference in quality," forcing human beings to face situations never found in the past.²⁰ The aeroplane is already outdistanced in speed by missiles and space satellites.

Toynbee noted, "The heart of our difficulty is the difference in pace between the hare-swift movement of the scientific intellect, which can revolutionize our technology within the span of a single life-time and the tortoise-slow movement of the subconscious." The

difference between the two rates of movement constitute the "crux of the statesman's problem."

Fifty years ago 15,000 man-hours were needed to produce a relatively simple motor car that can be produced in 1,000 hours of direct labor today. Automatic piston plants are eliminating the need for unskilled labor. The time in which machines can be used can be increased by 30 per cent and more so that they cost less. The computer's ability to perform at high speed can release human beings for other functions; it can bring the future into the present by solving complicated problems in an incredibly short time. Experimentation never before thought possible can be achieved through the new problem solving devices.⁶

Productivity Change. Productivity can increase considerably. In 1950, Ford produced 1,983,661 car engines while employing an average of 8,253 people throughout the year on direct labor; by 1954, in the new highly automated engine plant, production reached 1,954,049 with a direct labor force of 6,399. A 30 per cent increase in productivity of direct labor for the whole plant or 6.8 per cent per year had been gained. From 1945 to 1952 labor productivity in electronics rose nearly 2.7 times. Doubling of productivity is by no means impossible, at least for some industries.

Output Prospects. Some 90 per cent of companies adopt automation to reduce direct labor costs, 63 per cent use it to increase output without having to build new facilities, and 65 per cent change over to improve quality.¹¹ The combined operation of cutting time, cost, and capital outlay for buildings and direct labor is coupled with the advantages of greater output, improved quality, and even the creation of wholly new products.¹² Automation, coupled with atomic and solar power, may increase material production as much as 100 per cent in the next 10 years. It is the magic genie, escaped from the bottle, the Alladin who has uncapped abundance.²¹

Standardization tends to be encouraged to further reduce costs, to further specialization, and to extend mass production. In a bakery studied, introduction of the automated methods resulted in a 240 per cent increase in output per manhour.³ The market will have to be broadened, which will tend to make the economy more dynamic and reduce inflationary pressures.¹² The economic implications of such technological change bring about an increase in leisure and a shift of productive resources to different functions.¹⁴

EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT

The problem of job security has aroused the most early concern over automation. The fear that automation will displace labor may

be the greatest single obstacle to automation.²³ Workers look on automation as an immediate job threat.²⁴ Pockets of unemployment are expected to result from the extension of automation. A Senate-House subcommittee expressed concern over the hardships that "may well surpass the limits of modern imagination."²⁵

The mathematician Wiener said, "It is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment situation, in comparison with which . . . the depression of the '30s will seem a pleasant joke. This depression will ruin many industries—possibly even the industries that have taken advantage of the new potentialities."²⁶ Doubling of the yearly rate of technological advance, Reuther has contended, could produce a displacement of 3.5-million and more persons a year unless the economy could expand rapidly to absorb these people.

Short-run Effects. Automation's short-run effects on employment have been presented by many analysts. The Ford plant in Cleveland was built in 1952 and is now undergoing modernization because of obsolescence in only a few years. Still it has a one-man-run transfer machine that performs more than 500 machine operations that, by conventional requirements, require 35 to 70 men. Where 400 workers spent 40 minutes to turn out one engine block, with automation, 48 workers complete a block in less than half that time.²⁷ From 1950 to 1954 Ford increased engine production from 1,933,661 to 1,954,049 while the direct labor force fell from 8,253 to 6,399. Motor production workers, as a whole, fell by 3.5 per cent from 1947 to 1956, while information processors increased by 24.3 per cent.²⁸ However, automation is now expected to mean a sharp cut in employment for routine office work.¹⁴

Radio and television industries, have replaced hand-wired circuits with components fed into machines. They turn out complete radio sets with a minimum of direct labor until two workers now produce 1000 radios a day although this took more than 200 workers with conventional methods.²⁹ Although the number of plant production and related workers remained the same, in one oil plant, the octane rating of its gasoline rose from 87 to 97 between 1948 to 1956. While the crude oil charged per day rose by 57 per cent, from 35,000 barrels to 55,000 barrels, direct labor requirements in the new units were about one-third less.³⁰ However, auxiliary operating and mechanical labor personnel expanded to keep total employment relatively stable.

Bright showed that in 12 of 15 plants studied the number of people employed is higher than before automation. Leontief believes machinery adds to jobs over the longer pull. He argued that "the danger of technological unemployment should be even smaller in

the foreseeable future than it was at the end of the nineteenth century, when capital requirements were rising."

Proposals for the Short Run. What is progress for management is considered a serious problem by workers and unions, a reflection of the difference in definition of the situation and in its effects on different persons and groups. The basic value of job security is threatened, as is the job class, job itself, and promotion.^{18a} These implicit threats become explicit in a business downturn, so that some contend the share of labor in automation is not a "fair" one.

The employees not needed on automated processes in an electronics firm were or are being placed in other company jobs.⁷ In one oil refinery reassignment led to some upgrading, some downgrading, and some retention of the same relative positions. Displacement of older men was minimized, and placement in new jobs was made the subject of discussions with the union. The result was that a "more formal system" of progression was set up.³ The requirements for employment were raised to include a high school diploma for workers and, where possible, an engineering degree for supervisors. Should automation create ten million new jobs and cause one million industrial displacees in the next decade, some of the displaced persons will re-adapt by themselves while others will not be able to do so. They will need more training or, if they are getting on in years, may be downgraded. Of a man who is older and in this situation, Silvey wrote, "he's got a problem, and society has a problem with him."²⁸

A policy of "attrition"—not rehiring persons or taking on replacements when, under normal turnover, workers terminate employment—is sometimes proposed to handle the falling off of the number of jobs.^{18a} The voluntary quit rate of some two per cent a month in industry would reduce the labor force. The problem here is that normal advances in productivity eliminate one million jobs a year while additions to population pour 750,000 new workers into the labor force and necessitate the creation of 1,750,000 new jobs each year. If the attrition policy alone were followed, mass unemployment would be serious within one year.

Another proposal is that men be shifted to new jobs with new employers. This, of course, is possible only in an expanding economy. Since automation would have to reduce production costs to be a worthwhile capital investment, less direct labor would have to be used. Although automation will eventually cut labor needs, a larger market can be opened up, the economy can be expanded, more jobs can be made available elsewhere, and working time can be reduced drastically.

Even though transfers can be planned, seniority coverage can be agreed to, and retraining can be organized, certain "social shock absorbers" may be necessary. These could include severance pay, the guaranteed annual wage, higher unemployment insurance benefits, timing of labor-saving innovations to fit business upturns, and increased communication between unions and managements.²⁹ Some devices will have to be adopted to provide for loss of wage receipts while seeking a new job and the loss of equities in the old job in the form of seniority, pension rights, vacation claims. Unions on their part seek more of a voice in the timing of automation introduction and in the "social-minded planning" for major social and economic dislocations.³⁰

Long-Run Displacement and Replacement. Even if automation does not directly affect more than 10 to 20 per cent of the production processes, it is going to make for momentous shifts of millions of people who will have to find jobs outside automated industry. While but eight per cent of the labor force may be directly affected, it is likely to have effects on the society disproportionate to its mere size.³¹

If telephone business continues expansion at the 1954 rate of 4.6 per cent in telephones and 3.8 per cent in telephone calls, 100,000 to 115,000 fewer employees will be working for the Bell System in 1965.³¹ In 1957 W. P. Kennedy, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen held that the nation's railroads would cut payrolls by 200,000 within the next five years and that 1,000,000 jobs had already been lost in an industry which is down to 1,000,000 workers overall.³² From 1948 to 1955 employment rose nationally to record highs; but, in the increasingly automatic oil refining industry, employment fell from 147,000 to 137,000 or seven per cent. Refinery production increased by 22 per cent.^{7b} However, in this case, the number of engineers and technicians increased; there was a shift in skill composition of the labor force employed.

The population is expected to rise by 20 per cent over the next decade, labor by but six per cent so that 20,000,000 more workers will be needed by 1975 if present living standards are to be maintained.³³ Diebold estimated that fully 24,000,000 added workers would be needed, but half that number would be available, and that automation would have to take up the slack from now to 1975.

Critics of this view contended that the rising birth rate since 1939 has already increased the number of 18- and 19-year-olds entering the labor market. Where growth of the labor force was but 698,000 from 1950 to 1955 or 1.1 per cent, it is expected to reach 866,000 from 1955-1960 or 1.2 per cent, and 1,172,000 from 1960-

1965 or 1.6 per cent.³⁴ The rate is showing signs of accelerating.

More generally, the ILO has noted that technological innovations make for overall rises in employment even if decreases occur in some sectors. Much depends on the expansion of the market and the economy. Leontief pointed out that total labor input with a much larger population has been only ten per cent greater in the 1950's than in 1910; immigration has faded and rural population contributions to the industrial labor force have slipped. Bright showed that in 1957 Ford employed about 40 per cent more people than it had had in 1947 when it first setup its "Automation Department."³⁵ New jobs would probably come in service, trade, and other tertiary economic spheres rather than in industry proper which will apparently no longer need an expansion of its labor force.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How may a plant become a super machine?
2. Cite some of the changes informational speed is capable of producing.
3. Continuous production must stabilize employment. Explain.
4. How will capital investment alter under automation?
5. Present the productivity possibilities of automation.
6. What effects has automation produced upon management-labor relations thus far?

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LIFE IN THE AUTOMATIC FACTORY

Automation has produced a remarkable difference in the "job mix"—the relation of the individual to the job, of worker to worker, of job to job, of supervisors to workers. There has been much upgrading, and considerable downgrading, but there are some static situations requiring no real changes in skill or training. Training and promotion have taken on new dimensions, and truly significant alterations are being made in the work group and in the role of the individual. No industrial millennium has arrived; there are continuous struggles over wages, hours, and working conditions, compounded by some strange new psychological problems of isolation and too much quiet. It is also possible to find some improvement in labor's status and certain unusual changes in supervisory relations.

THE JOB MIX

For the worker, the most important element of change is in his job and its relation to other jobs, to supervisors and to work groups. There have been dynamic changes in all of these. Operations have to be seen as process wholes, variety increases but so does dullness and monotony. Some altered relation to the product develops. Certain human limits become apparent and new leadership qualities seem required.

Process Wholes. Old functions called in the main for manual skills in a steel plant, but the new job requires skills of judgment and nerve. It demands a new type of decision-making by the worker. The robot machine does the repetitive work, but the mind is taxed more for greater demands are made on the human personality. One foreman said that the operators have become technicians and not workmen. "Perhaps they should even have some training as process engineers. Mentally they must have both analytical ability and the sixth sense which comes from experience, enabling them to

anticipate what the mill will do and always act before serious trouble develops." New basic skills are demanded. Workers must be alert; they must deduce quickly what has to be done, and act with speed and accuracy. The worker becomes a key operational decision-maker.

Seeing the work as a whole process goes counter to the kind of thinking required by the fine specializations of the assembly line. F. W. Taylor described the old approach as fitting jobs into a narrow structure in which tasks were reduced to the level that a trained gorilla could perform them. Jobs were broken down so finely as to create a morale problem.¹ In some un-automated industries the division of labor has reached virtually ultimate limits. Functions are so divided that the worker can not even comprehend the whole task.²

Scientific management is cracked apart by the "unmanned plant." "Automation is likely to challenge these habits of thought fostered by discontinuous and highly specialized methods of production."³ For automation "requires a new way of thinking . . . that emphasizes continuous movement of work through a total process rather than stop-and-go progress, thought of as the sum of independent operations." In the old days morale was seen to be higher where someone performed a more complete set of tasks, as did salesmen, supervisors, master machinists, but not usually workers.⁴ The theorists have re-discovered the "Zeigarnik effect"—the strong desire to complete a task once begun. Baldamus believes that factors pushing workers almost automatically "toward completing a task" make for an enormous relief from the strain of stop and start operations.⁴

Of course continuity can have its strains as well; but where continuity in flow of work permits some variety within the process, there is a marked decrease in strain. Clearly this is an important problem in continuous production.

Variety vs. Monotony. Full automation often ends monotony at work. Workers on a transfer machine in a semi-automatic factory merely fed cylinder blocks into one end of the line and removed them from the other. When the factory was made fully automatic, the workers became repair men and technicians. It took complete automation to remove the monotony and repetitiveness of these part-tasks. Variety is possible if men are made responsible for a wider range of tasks or job rotation is used. Job rotation, however, often necessitates advanced and specialized study.

Mental and Physical Work Combined. Automation tends to wipe out the distinction between direct or production labor and indirect or service labor as they become consolidated in a continuous

production process. The number of people whose work involves the use of mental abstraction rises sharply. This is more than greater skill; it is a question of new and different skills.⁵ The mental work on the new job is "harder" while physically the functions are easier, for the opening phases at any rate. Difficult and dangerous jobs are done by machines, but the considerable concentration that is required creates tension and anxiety. Even after three years the workers in one steel mill found the mental work was harder though physically the job was easier. This was true even though the mill speed had doubled, and the jobs that had not been mechanized in the automation changeover were harder than they had been before. Other automatic or semi-automatic jobs demanded more nervous and physical energy as the mill ran at a faster pace. However, the men soon lost their fear of the job; they learned that certain manual operations were more efficient than machine operations, that "they were still better than the machines." Even at that, the men retained a feeling that the machines could create unemployment and lessen the chances of promotion to supervisory positions.⁶

The Relation to the Product. In a newly automated steel plant, Walker found that the workers were closer to the product as a whole and that such a relation was a positive factor in arousing personal satisfaction and quality performance.⁷ However, in one automated refinery, a report showed, "weeks can go by without an operator's ever touching any of the products."⁸ How seeing the completed product gives someone deep psychological satisfactions has yet to be demonstrated, but there is a problem in the refinery where "there are no visible moving parts" since the product is manufactured "out of sight." Much depends on the element of visibility, and Walker notes that on the pre-automated assembly line "only a tiny fraction of the 'product' is ever seen or handled by most workers." In the steel tube mill a full association was achieved.

Beyond Human Limits. Automated machinery can do a task no human being could perform or, if he could, not as efficiently.⁹ The degree of uniformity and precision possible is beyond ordinary human capability, especially where very close tolerances are called for.¹⁰ A stage is reached where production need no longer be limited by the "limitations of human faculties and human skill," weaknesses breached by electronic devices. Automatic controls are indispensable where man cannot enter, viz., in radioactive materials, rocket controls, safety devices, incredibly swift computation, and in physical actions that are beyond ordinary human capacities. It is held that the automatic pilot in an airplane is more efficient and

precise, suffers no fatigue, and provides a smoother ride. In such instances not even huge numbers of workers could match a single UNIVAC or other automatic device.⁹ Meanwhile, the machine has its limits; it cannot reason; it must be set, repaired, and maintained by human beings.

Of course, machines lack the capacity for leadership so necessary in automated plants. The foreman has to cruise about the mill observing the flow through each unit and must have all-round ability; he has to be a technical leader and have the confidence of the men.¹⁰ The leadership skill arises from the demands of the role; it requires real decision-making ability and it opens the way to pressure for still more activity in making increasingly important decisions.

TRAINING FOR MOBILITY

In one automated oil refinery a small number of workers were upgraded, almost half retained their grade, and a sizable group were downgraded.¹¹ Upgrading requires additional training. The training is now more closely linked to out-plant education which has a stronger effect on promotional possibilities.

Downgrading. Paradoxically, automation requires both more skill and less skill, pushing to possibly greater extremes requirements of training and retraining. Two kinds of labor may be distinguished in this connection—that of the operators and of maintenance men. Managerial skill is necessary in relation to the workers and to highly complicated machines and whole processes.

Operating labor continues whether the automation makes them machine operators, patrollers, or inspectors. The training requirements for operating labor appear to be less in the automatic factory, for the machines assume most skill requirements. Production systems are easier to run and require less skilled labor than before. Bright observed, "There literally was nothing for the worker to do but 'push a button' or 'monitor' the machines."¹² Dull jobs are made duller as the operator watches a panel of lights or listens to eerie noises.¹³ The robot-like situation of having to watch push buttons can be most irksome and arouse strain.¹⁴

The oil refining industry prefers men with high school educations, finding that "college men tend to get restless, to want to move on to greener fields."¹⁵ Because of the proportion of jobs that are simplified to the proportion that are made more difficult, less training is necessary for the majority of workers in most plants checked. Skill qualifications lessen for most operating employees.

The requirements for maintenance men go up but less than

might have been expected. Bright cited an increase of the maintenance force in one plant from 20 to 40 men out of 600 affected, this doubling hardly affected the ratio of maintenance workers to total work force. One notable alteration is the new skill demanded of plant electricians who have to become real electronic technicians, which requires much retraining.

Under automation maintenance costs in most plants drop. Only a few millwrights, machine repairmen, carpenters, welders, and other craftsmen are needed. Bright noted that "this problem is not so much different as it is quantitatively greater. Here it is more a matter of experience than skill."¹²

The Upgrading Effect. The downgrading and no-change effects of automation are so widespread that the vision of a general upgrading of skills and much additional training and retraining may turn out to be an illusion, at least as a mass phenomenon.⁹ The general impression has been that there will be no workers on the production line but "incredibly large numbers of men will be required behind the scenes in new, highly skilled jobs as machine builders, machine installers, repair men, controllers of the machinery and of its performance, and as 'programmers' to prepare and feed information into the machine."¹³ This approach flies in the face of Bright's studies of several dozen automated plants.

When workers have to think of the plant as a whole, a new concept of labor can emerge. There is less trivialization and overspecialization onto minute tasks as the systematic work component is performed by machine, and the nonsystematic work is reserved for human beings who become distinguished production controllers.¹⁶

Automation promises to halt deskilling, raise skill and status of the entire labor force and leave unskilled tasks (plus many skilled ones) to the machine. Just as the handicraft worker in the first industrial revolution was steadily replaced by the machine tender, the machine operator can become a highly skilled production controller. Boring, routine, and repetitious jobs appear to be slipping in relation to highly skilled ones. In chemicals, where in 1947 there were as many as three production workers to one non-production worker, by 1954 the ratio was two to one.¹⁷ One in 1,100 employees was a scientist, engineer, or technician before the turn of the twentieth century, today one in every 60 employees is so trained.¹⁸ In industry generally in 1890 there was 1 engineer for 290 production workers; in 1948, there was 1 for 75; by 1953 the ratio was 1 to 60. In aircraft and communications the ratio reached 1 to 25; in automatic petroleum and in chemicals it was 1 to 15 and 1 to 12, respectively.¹⁹

The proportion of unskilled labor, now below 20 per cent, is declining, the semiskilled make up about 22 per cent of the labor force, while skilled and professionals make up 42 per cent. The changes over the past indicate the considerable flexibility of the workmen who can pick up vocational training and education. However, skilled labor remains in short supply and as an absolute figure is not increasing, remaining at 8,500,000 from 1951 through 1956. Most of the reason for the figures remaining the same was an increase in skills among workers 24 to 64, while the newer entrants from 14 to 24 years of age declined in skill over the five year period. Skill needs are increasingly critical and may be expected to become more so over the next decade. The non-automated industries are in all probability continuing their long-run tendency to require less skills, while automation offers but a promise to use more highly skilled personnel.²⁰ Unskilled jobs are not disposed of within the automatic factory.

An automated bakery had to reassign many workers, some of whom were downgraded but without wage loss. Workers who could not be retrained to handle more efficient and faster machines were given simpler functions at their old rates of pay. At the opening of the newly automated plant, total employment was 4.4 per cent under the previous level with 8.4 per cent fewer production workers. But very shortly production workers rose beyond the older figure. This is particularly significant, since automation is most useful if it lowers direct production worker requirements. Given an expansion of production, however, it may raise them. Some new job classifications and skill levels were created. The new functions and broader, whole-process tasks were opened. Machine operators in most cases needed but one to two weeks training to adjust to new jobs. Supervisors had to be retrained as well.¹¹

At its opening the automated seamless pipe mill placed half the men on jobs with higher classifications, half on the same or lower jobs. Baldwin and Shultz hold that upgrading is so important that "as a standard for continued employment, 'ability to learn' would gradually replace 'ability to do' the job." They believe some jobs will be duller but others can open up a great intellectual challenge and produce a new job mix that will increase the relative weight of managerial, professional, and skilled to unskilled elements in the job.²²

Upgrading in Office Work. The greatest impact of automation and of upgrading effect is said to be coming in offices. Automation is expected to continue the trend toward an increase in administrative and clerical personnel and in tertiary industries.²¹ The white-collar labor force, now just exceeding the blue-collar contingent,

may expand rapidly. Wholly new occupations are arising, viz., analyst and programmer, more scientific-white-collar than clerical. It is possible that an office machine age has opened in which concentration of numerous offices into a few central ones can occur and office work itself can be automated.²¹ The white collar employee becomes a machine operator in data processing, while routine work is cut sharply.¹⁵ The white collar worker will come under machine "disciplines" that may force a re-evaluation of his position in the world of work and these changes can occur with stunning impact and tremendous speed.²²

Retraining. Where as many as half the personnel retain the same or lesser functions, i.e., are not "promoted," retraining is hardly needed. Retraining is usually necessary only for movement upward, although it is conceivable that one might have to be retrained to perform a lesser role. Both training and retraining are most significant in upgrading, especially if upgrading is viewed not as an initial boost but as a continuous process in which the newly created machines take over unskilled, semi-skilled, and highly skilled functions. Still, retraining is related to handling the displacement of personnel and their steady shift into new tasks on a vast scale, a tribute to the flexibility of American workmen.

Monitoring may require greater knowledge and engineering training and education, or it may require less, as Bright showed.¹² In general, more engineers, technicians, and scientists will be needed all of these being more responsible uses of human beings. But the changes thus far have been surprisingly small. Perhaps this is due to the efficiency of the machinery and careful advanced planning that lessens anticipated labor requirements of all grades. Direct participation in production is in the process of being narrowed still further; continuous production reduces the starter and stopper operations. The functions of the setter and the assembler can go next. The trouble-shooter and repairman remain, for if the machine makes fewer errors than human beings, it still requires human beings to correct it when the machine is in difficulty.

A check of automation in an insurance and in a radio-TV-phonograph company revealed that new jobs were created with brief on-the-job training. Some new skills were required. Hand labor was by no means eliminated. Most computer personnel were hired from present employees.²³ Two studies in the Detroit area indicated that the principal labor change to automation was job enlargement or broadening, job rotation, and the reorganization of job supervision.²⁴ In one plant of the Detroit Edison Co., new combinations of skills were needed and several operations were combined into a single enlarged job. Past distinctions that rested on particular equipment

operated were eliminated. Retraining, as a bakery study showed deeply affects supervisory personnel. In the bakery, a new plant superintendent and assistant had to be brought in, both college trained and familiar with bakery production methods and other industrial production techniques. Of 20 nonworking foremen employed before automation, however, only 10 were successfully retrained; the other 10 had to be replaced, some from within the ranks and some from outside. If relatively new, replaced foremen were laid off. Where foremen had years of service, they were given other jobs at their old rates of pay.¹¹

Education and Promotion. Promotion, the center of increasing difficulties in automated plants, has come to be very closely associated with education. Upgrading in general may be considered a promotion, retaining for the same job or being downgraded a demotion. Promotion for most workers makes up part of job security; its motivational importance can hardly be underestimated in a society that encourages climbing.

Interviews conducted over several years in one plant indicated that as initial wage problems lessened in saliency for workers, sharp awareness of promotional opportunities or limitations developed. Training and retraining played a strategic role, since not everyone could be retrained. Many lacked the educational background to go far into production control. Most workers felt that their promotion chances were worse than before automation. Job classifications were generally lower not higher, even with some upgrading. Jobs were fewer and crew size declined. The net effect was that job progression had narrowed compared to the opportunities in the old mill.¹²

Education now has even more importance than in the past. The automated bakery brought in college trained personnel to operate as plant superintendent and assistant. Of course, when an automated oil refinery did the same, the industry learned that persons with a high school education were preferable as college men would not stay with a job that was not highly technical in the sense that an engineer's or designer's job is technical.¹³ But while one can have "too much" education to remain long in a job requiring but part of one's training, one could also have too little education to qualify for advancement. Workers in the automated steel mill found that lack of education made for a virtually impassable barrier to promotion. Education and promotion were closely tied together. The ladder of promotion in the automated mill was shorter as intermediate rungs were eliminated, but to get onto the ladder one had to open his work career with more education.¹⁴

Much closer university-industry relations may be in the offing.

If the American dream of climbing the ladder of success in industry is to persist, technical graduates will need more practical mill experience than at present and mill workers will require more technical training in and out of the mill. Both moves would have to be associated with opportunities for promotion. Meanwhile the general population is steadily acquiring more advanced education. In 1920 just under three per cent of all 22-year-olds were college graduates; by 1950 the figure was eleven per cent and by 1970 it may be seventeen per cent. More than 20 per cent of these graduates are in engineering and science; the figure may rise as interest in outer space exploration grows.

WAGES, HOURS, WORKING CONDITIONS

No industrial millennium opens with partial or full automation. Struggles over wages, hours, and working conditions go on; they take different forms but hardly scratch the issue of management control of all three variables. However, significant changes have to be recorded, some of them of considerable consequence.

Wages and Incentives. At least three major issues are involved in automation's effects on wages. They involve the equitable distribution of gains from increased productivity and output, the altered nature of incentive systems, and the possible creation of a salariat. Increased productivity provide for wage increases without inflation. Wiener said that unless the benefits of automation were equitably distributed, distribution could become at least for a while "an afterthought of business."²⁶

Much of the work that has gone into incentive systems, especially individual piecework, may have to be altered or thrown out. If it is now difficult to relate an individual's effort to his output, under automation it will be virtually impossible. Moreover, the difficulties in developing practical monetary incentives will generally be compounded when it comes to dealing with incentives for the "indirect" labor of maintenance and service. An entirely different principle or even philosophy of pay by the group or even whole mill may be needed. Walker felt, "the tendency will grow to recognize the co-operative and interrelated character of every man's contribution to production, rather than meticulously to isolate and pay for segments of individual effort."

Setting rates for incentive pay is difficult, for automated production lacks a reasonable degree of stability in process and product; its fluctuations are extreme in output and earnings. A new principle of incentives that rest on dynamic and continual change may have

to be built into the payment systems of financial payment. The use of extended incentive coverage shows a recognition of the interdependence of all worker categories in a partly automated steel mill.²⁶ In part-automation situations, pay for operators was higher than on new or old mills of traditional types, although workers felt that there were serious defects in the incentive plan.²⁷ In an automated electronics firm pay for automated jobs was set at five to 15 per cent above straight-time rates for unskilled assemblers because of differences in working conditions and "increased responsibility."²⁸ Differentials in pay are not eliminated by automation; nor does sufficient experience exist to show whether the gap between levels of skill is narrowing as measured by pay. But workers do not labor for bread alone, and struggles over status can be even more fierce than in non-automated plants.^{10a}

Work Measurement. The wage and incentive problem is immediately linked to the measurement of work. At first in an automated mill the workers' reaction was to do only that work which management could measure; they did not spend time thinking about problems and methods. A time for thinking had not been assigned in previous measures, as if this were "idle time." The very nature of work was being questioned, not to mention the results of time and motion tests.^{29b}

Workers were not challenging the measurement which had failed to include their own thinking within the measurement formulae. One problem was that changes were so rapid that a stable basis for setting rates was hard to find. It is no easy matter to establish how much is paid for skill, effort, seniority, professional or craft experience, education, flexibility, loyalty, and "idle" thinking time.^{29c} Continuous process upsets the breaking of jobs into fine parts and the use of individual or small group incentive systems.³

The first automation strike, at Westinghouse in 1955-56, came over company studies of "day-rate" workers and the attempt to set performance standards for material handlers, repairmen, and sweepers. When the mix of production to non-production workers was altered and the company sought to find and control the costs of the non-production workers by measurement studies of jobs that hitherto had been considered "unmeasurable," the strike broke out.²⁷ Disputes over wages may be intensified under automation and may lead to demands for new controls over measurement.

Hours and Shifts. Shortened work time can raise unique complications. The deliberate decision of Americans has been to reduce hours, now half of what they were when industrialization began,

and to demand leisure in place of more hours. By the year 2050, Dewhurst contends, a worker will produce as much in a seven-hour day as he now does in a 40-hour week anyway.²⁸

The consequences of the twenty-four hour a day working arrangement of continuous production can be momentous. A man on a regular eight-to-four shift follows a cycle of "work, recreation, and sleep"; one on the four-to-twelve shift is on a different schedule of "recreation, work, and sleep"; the night shift man is on a schedule of "sleep, recreation, and work."²⁷ The consequences for ordinary family life and friendship patterns can be serious, although reduction of the working day below eight hours can affect this. The organization of multi-shift work is apparently unavoidable, if continuous production is to be achieved.²⁸

Shift problems have long plagued continuous process industries. Additional moonlighting is likely to appear in those automated plants whose hours are down to six.

Working Conditions. Working conditions become less onerous under automation. Factories become safe, clean, healthy, and in many ways more pleasant. Work is less hazardous, less dirty, hot and disagreeable; improvements come in space, lighting, cleanliness, in safety precautions, and in improved hygiene.²⁹

At the Ford engine plant in Cleveland human beings merely check gauges and operate high overhead cranes which lift the metal mass until, as Bell stated, "thus foundry work, the grimmest of human denigration, has given way to the machine". Ford Vice President D. J. Davis pointed out that an outstanding feature of automatic presses "is that attendants are no longer required to have their arms or hands in the hazardous areas of the press. Nor do they drain their energy through continuous tugging and hauling on heavy, awkward sheets of metal with raw or sharp edges." Davis said "Our records for 1954 show that on the cylinder block machining operations, which were most significantly affected by automation, the frequency of accidents decreased 60 per cent from 1950."³⁰ An 85 per cent reduction in hernia cases was reported when the Ford plant installed automatic machinery.³¹

As the risks to life, limb, and health fall, fatigue too is reduced considerably. Smaller staffs are needed to handle health, safety, and hygiene problems.³² The high capital investment places a premium on keeping workers in excellent health by preventive medicine, by improvements in medical departments and the work environment. Comprehensive medical programs, however costly, are less so than worker absenteeism when continuous production is needed. As work load lightens, more women, the handicapped, and older workers

can be employed, a fitting way of incorporating them into the economic structure.

Living Standards. The decision to elect for more leisure and fewer hours has been made. The new leisure has become part of a process of taking the gains of added productivity in increased living standards here and now.^{10b} The main changes may be in improving working and living conditions that an assistant secretary of labor considered "still are generally low, compared with the promise of modern technology."³⁰ Increased automation helps create new standards of living, with leisure as part of this, and it may be that further automation will help keep living standards moving up.³¹ The creation of abundance in production could come from a joining of automation and atomic energy, if the mistakes of earlier industrial revolutions can be avoided.²⁶ The transition from scarcity economics to abundance raises the issue of distributing abundance.

SUMMARY

Work relations in the automated factory are considerably different from even those of the most modern non-automated plant. The central feature of automation is the new job mix which is much less specialized, emphasizes the process as a whole, and demands skill, judgment, and nerve hitherto not required of most workers. The machines divide functions; human attendants have to operate whole processes, a significant change from older scientific management. Although monotony is not eliminated, at least in the early stages of automation, mental and physical work are so combined as to make work more interesting and to make tenuous any further distinction between blue and white collar workers.

For automation to work at all well mobility has to be built into the structure of the enterprise. During the transition period some employees have to be downgraded, because they cannot be trained for the new work. Upgrading is more common and, in the long run, will possibly be the vehicle whereby enormous distinctions between workers and statuses are reduced. For upgrading to occur, retraining has to be on a considerable scale. Relations between education and promotion have to be probed, for both may have more and not less importance than before.

The contest between workers and managers is not halted by automation. Individual incentive plans may be on their way out, for automation requires a vaster team concept. The new work situation has produced an even more impersonal set of relations. Moreover, hours of work and work shifts have produced new complications, problems of fitting men into continuous production

schedules, and issues of leisure and the entire cycle of work, recreation, and sleep. An unqualified gain for automation is the improvement in working conditions of all kinds. Out of these combined changes can come added productivity and higher living standards.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Describe the job mix.
2. What are process wholes?
3. Compare continuous and discontinuous production and their effects on specialization.
4. Does automation eliminate monotony? Produce variety?
5. How are mental and physical work combined?
6. Analyze the changing relation of the worker to the product under automation in different types of enterprise.
7. How can downgrading be alleviated?
8. What are the social implications of upgrading?
9. What are the main features of retraining?
10. How are education and promotion interlocked under automation?
11. How can automation alter incentive plans?
12. Why do workers sometimes challenge the practice of work measurement?
13. How does automation affect hours and shifts?
14. Does automation improve working conditions? How?

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CONTROLS OF AUTOMATION

The development of automation has introduced the possibility of alterations in groups at work, in groups outside of work processes, and in the control of the process of automation itself. Just as the introduction of the earliest machines produced a revolution, so the introduction of the super machine can well alter the bases for relations in enterprises. These enterprises will, of course, have an impact on the entire society which has to deal with them and purchase their products.

All the varieties of alteration in group relations affect control of automation and do so simultaneously in all probability. The work group proper undergoes a real transformation, in size, alienation, and adjustment to new conditions. Although there are alteration of the foundations of a proletariat, the main power groups are by no means separated from automation. The issue is one that involves the problem of bigness and the public nature of large-scale enterprise. It deeply influences union organization and power and may call for new types of governmental regulation. The human relations of automation can also make for new social problems.

FROM WORK GROUP TO SALARIAT

The team suffers serious alterations in size, alienation, and adjustment to new conditions. Understanding the psychological adjustments made necessary is vital for seeing what happens to morale and old time restrictionism. All the changes may add up to heightened status and the establishment of a salariat in place of a proletariat.

The Work Group in Automation. The impact of leaping technology on the range of human relationships in the world of the work group takes various forms, differing in the partly and fully automated plants. A visitor to either will find them a different

world, if not the "miniature society" of Walker and other system theorists.¹ It is a formally run and to an extent separate world; but one can detect informal and extra-plant arrangements of considerable influences. Even the finest of automated plants is not really a society; it lacks a separate culture, and its continuous production is not for its own use but for sale, just as its labor force and capital materials come from without.

The automated work crews and shifts are small. In an automated refinery "only a handful of technicians are ever visible wandering around the great tangles of pipe."² When special-purpose production machines are replaced by a supermachine controlled by tape or punch-card, "communication among workers, as well as the formation of work groups, becomes more difficult." In a partly automated steel mill crew membership was smaller than in the past. At first the workers felt physically "more isolated," although they recognized as much or more functional interdependence. Talking was cut down, and the limitations on social contacts had serious effects on many men.³

Walker reported that teamwork grew steadily in a partly automated steel mill, with incentive earnings in part being responsible. Men developed a rhythm in working and in-group or team feeling; they lost their fear of the machine, and found new sources of satisfaction during the working day.⁴ An internal social structure within teams arose to make them more cohesive, while friendliness spread. The group provided some economic protection and joint and rhythmic participation in a common task. It set up norms of working behavior and altered the inherited norms. No single and undoubtedly leader arose, but the group steadily modified its organizational and physical environment. The group remained strong and cohesive.

Psychology of the Automated Way of Work. Automation is a whole new way of life at work, involving biosocial values as technological considerations. Living and working habits are changed, educational patterns are altered, retraining is raised to new heights, and new standards of living and health made possible. Alterations occur in noise, in human contact, and in ending some repetitive and monotonous tasks. It is important to remember that the control panel is the center of attention, that it is demanding and that its human operators are not infallible. There are emotional impacts on the worker as he adapts to new circumstances, forms new work teams, becomes concerned over responsibility, and is exposed to dangerous materials and strange new processes that may be even more beyond understanding than assembly lines.⁵

The automated factory is bewildering. Lonely men wander

about the apparently inert and almost noiseless super machine. The thing that strikes one most forcefully is the uncanny silence.⁶ Even when the refinery is operating at capacity, there is no noise, no hustle, no bustle. Engineers soon learned that "about 30 minutes of absolute silence was just about all anyone could stand." Longer periods of silence pronounced adverse psychological effects.⁷

Many workers complain of the tenseness produced by drawn-out mental effort.¹ "Nervous fatigue, from just standing and watching the machine has been substituted" for the old physical exhaustion. One foreman complained, "In the old mill you controlled the machine; now it controls you." Workers get nervous and jumpy. Some feel that too much responsibility is given them and that they cannot handle it. One Ford worker found he could not watch all the time; it was hard on the mind and baffled the workman until he had to take another job at lower pay.⁸

Both part- and full-automation can make dull jobs duller if they do not eliminate them.⁹ The danger of a robot-like situation arising has by no means been avoided; before a push button, a worker can be in as irksome and difficult a task as he is before physically dangerous endeavors.⁵ The automata are singleminded, have no external interests or requirements, pay no attention to results of their work, demand nothing. They are the perfect workmen many managements have sought, what Wiener calls "the precise economic equivalent of slave labor." His point is that "any labor that competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor."¹⁰

Various proposals have been made to handle such problems. Alternative control devices can introduce variety into the watching and listening. Change-overs and breakdowns help, although breakdowns are not as gleefully welcomed as they sometimes were in pre-automation days. Continuous flow has altogether too much stability for some persons, but they may be desperately seeking to get over the great strain of part-tasks. It is not clear that increased satisfactions come from any change in the workers' relation to the product. In a partly automated steel mill there may be a closer relation to the product, in an oil refinery none whatsoever. The product may be as alienated from the worker as other workers, with no visible moving parts or visible moving people. Surely this is a new situation for large-scale production endeavors.

Morale and Restrictionism. Strong desires for job completion and resistance to change are interrelated with the problem of morale and what happens to old-style restrictionism. Certain functions in a partly automated steel plant had such high turnover at first as to

suggest that morale was low.¹ Management either had to alter the job content or take it into account in selecting persons for entering jobs. A considerable problem is in the "break-in period." Incentives may be used, but workers may not understand or like them, may misinterpret or resent new ways of measuring work, or may be disturbed by the presence of fewer jobs or lower rates. They sometimes interpreted these as "a bad thing for the working man, even if they increased production." Over and over again men said that morale could improve if management would listen to them, ask their advice, take their suggestions, and make them feel they were not in a prison.²

Human resistance to change may be strong and demand the use of strong direction. Passive resistance may arise against equipment that appears to destroy the individual's identity and sense of dignity. Men entering a newly automated mill may have an attitude toward output increases that borders on cynicism, if not strong hostility. Much of this can be removed, Walker contends as pressure lightens, production gets rolling at a satisfactory rate, and as the interpersonal tension between supervisors and crews is lessened.

Before automation a worker could govern the machine and slow down the assembly line, or he could work up the line. As a button-pusher he stands outside the work; the control is within the machine which he watches. Karsh found that in such cases, "restricting output . . . becomes a very difficult, if not impossible, thing to do."³ Traditional work group controls over norms of output can give ground. Some kind of "equilibrium" between technological and human forces may be reached for a while only to be upset by new machinery. Management can define and control jobs even more closely.

Status Upgrading. On the surface the new technological environment appears to improve the status of work group members, to give them new dignity, and to raise up factory workers so that they become indistinguishable from office workers.⁴ Heightened skill and the elimination of heavy and dirty work raises status. As it puts an end to the dehumanization of much of labor at work, automation may be said to produce a social and political revolution. Human beings may be better off away from the assembly line, which is sometimes held responsible for much of the psychological unrest and discontent in industry. It may be that division of labor can end and that a division of machine functions replace it.

Proletariat into Salaried? With a smaller direct labor-industrial force, the possibility is that labor can move from being a current-variable cost to a fixed asset and capital resource that cannot be

left unemployed.¹⁰ Under automation, "depreciation rather than labor becomes the major cost."¹¹

Automation can alter the basic composition of the labor force in the direction of a "salarariat" in place of a proletariat, quite in line with the trend toward middle class status contained in upgrading, guaranteed annual wages. Output in the chemical industry rose by more than 50 per cent from 1947 to 1954 while blue collar workers increased by but 1.3 per cent and professional, clerical, and sales personnel rose by 50 per cent. The ratio of production to non-production workers was three to one in 1947 and two to one in 1954.¹²

POWER GROUPS AND AUTOMATION

The possibilities that automation unfolds for increasing the scale and public character of production have considerable ramifications on power group relations. There is concern over bigness and its control, over the effects of overcentralization and the decline of decentralization, as well as over the possible repercussions on the structure of cities. On their part unions play a special, if apparently subordinate role, of watchful policing. Government may face new functions of anti-trust regulation and of controlling the speed of introduction and the general social effects of these revolutionary processes.

Bigness and Management. Automation is expected to have an effect on centralization and decentralization. Localized data processing and local production will continue, but may be more joined than before to centralized data processing and to a few central control points.

Automation can drive the economy into a smaller number of large concentrated units because of the enormous capital needs implicit in this extension of technology.¹³ William White, of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad, believes, "the advent of high-speed processing will definitely cause centralization."¹⁴ Since huge investment sums are necessary probably only large corporations will be able to take advantage of expensive equipment; financial power may join industrial might in a further concentration in a few large companies. International Labor Office economists hold that automation can lead to a greater concentration of production in large or middle-size units, with fewer workers and more output by fewer firms.¹⁵ The huge capital requirements needed for certain industries may make it difficult for new businesses to open.¹⁶

A blow at operational decentralization may have been struck by automation. "With such computers as the IBM machines and

the UNIVACs, the necessity for decentralization of decision-making in business may be ending," operational and not policy decisions. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., a onetime user of "decentralization" with 53 plants, warehouses, and sales offices around the country has decided to concentrate all its accounting activities in one spot. In good measure as a consequence of its IBM computer being in St. Louis where accounting and reporting were centralized, the Monsanto Chemical Co. pulled its divisional vice-presidents into headquarters.

Operations can remain localized, while financial and intelligence centralization could be increased by the use of data computers that extend centralized control. Drucker thinks that automation does not require larger enterprises but conceives of each process and its management as a separate, integrated whole, which a smaller business could do well.¹⁶ His view is that management, far from being reduced to the level of technicians, will have even more responsibilities; both autonomy and flexibility may persist.

The president of the Carnegie Institute of Washington said, "If large manufacturing companies turn to automation in extreme form, they . . . increase their own rigidity and render it more possible for the small industrial unit to prosper by reason of its inherent flexibility."¹⁷ Bright found that the small businessman will have to use a maximum of automation to compete on price with large firms, but that automation cannot be as extensive as in the large plants although exceptions can occur as unique combinations of standard machinery are applied. A certain flexibility remains with the smaller manufacturer, viz., his ability to handle custom work and meet deadlines and rush jobs that require rapid change.¹⁸

A significant local impact of joining automation and atomic power can be the removal of the factory tie to traditional power sources or labor supply. Industry can be placed where desired, and operational decentralization can be furthered for either military as policy reasons. Should such localization of plants occur, the structure of cities may be altered. Plants may go to the fringes of cities, urban, suburban, and even rural distinctions may be further reduced. It may be cheaper to build the automated plant close to the sources of supplies and of markets and possibly far from union and other controls of central cities.¹⁹

Union Role in Automation. In relation to automation the unions clearly leave the initiative to management; the subordinate role of the union in relation to industry could hardly be more clear, although unions are consulted to an extent. Many unions seek to control or have some say in the speed of introduction of tech-

nological changes, and all seek a share in the gains. Automation may force considerable changes on union organization, emphasis, and influence.

Experience with automation in a large bakery indicated that the transition to automation was orderly, did not upset collective bargaining, resulted in greater productivity in the plant and a sharing by workers through wage increases and fringe benefits in that productivity.¹⁹ One manufacturing corporation invited a full union delegation to visit its central office as the changeover to automation was being planned, to watch the machines performing and to ask questions. In another case, union representatives jointly discussed the number of workers required on automated units and worker qualifications. Where this was not done a pre-automation strike ensued.

Perhaps the first "automation" strike in the United States was at a Westinghouse plant in 1955-1956 when the company began time studies of "day-rate" workers so as to set performance standards for material handlers, repairmen, and sweepers. Automation had altered the "mix" of production to non-production workers and "in an effort to control the rising costs of this latter group, Westinghouse began measurement studies of jobs that hitherto had been considered unmeasurable."²⁰ The strike resulted. Other heated and even protracted disputes over measurement of what was hitherto unmeasurable have occasioned difficulties.

Union sharing in benefits of increased productivity has been sought, but such sharing is a broad phenomenon. Union leaders espouse company-financed retraining for displaced workers and expansion of general, vocational, and professional education.²¹ No loss of income is another demand, as is severance pay for the displaced. AFL-CIO President George Meany said, "if automation is going to bring more leisure, then labor wants a share of that leisure . . . under a system by which the purchasing power . . . is maintained."²²

Serious changes in union organization and power are possibly in the offing. Mechanization of a skilled hand operation can end a craft in the union. Unions are also concerned that the need for a direct labor force may fall even further. This awareness may be behind the drive to organize white collar workers. Union leaders are becoming aware, too, that the distinction between white and blue collar workers is fading rapidly and that automation may end most of it.

The content of jobs is already shifting so as to force an adjustment of wage structures and a disturbance of longtime union in-

dictions, viz., unification of mechanical and electrical skills in a new group of "maintenance" workers. A new kind of professional status for very highly skilled workers may be hewn out of present unions. Whole unions may be upgraded, while other unions will probably disappear.

The new professional may escape the minute subdivision of functions that mass production encouraged and emerge as a more integrated workman. In place of craft, industrial, and multi-industrial union organization; new alliances of production controllers and operators may result.¹² Beyond this, unions may have to reorganize their domains on a geographic base. The older occupational divisions, which unions long followed in their organizing, may be increasingly eaten away by automation just as plant and industry divisions are breaking down. Whether the trend of automation is toward more centralization or less, or both simultaneously, union operations are always local.

Should a company be able to move plants away from major cities and nearer markets or sources of raw materials or fuels, as Sylvania has done, small-size plants may be encouraged. What disturbed Bell about such a prospect was that the corporation can have exceptional control over people in smaller plants: "The works manager can know all the men personally, and the social divisions of the small town will recapitulate the social gradations in the plant. Under these conditions a new manorial society may be in the offing."¹³ Workers can become spatially and socially isolated from each other in an automated plant, while the corporation can exercise greater social control over the worker. He held that trade union identification can face serious problems and that a new variety of company town can well be in the offing.¹⁴

Moreover, in industrial relations among large, medium, and small plants automation will necessitate an enlarged communication load. Since management will be in control of the information devices—no union has yet really gone in for computers to run its own affairs—there may be considerable simplification of work relations, greater information on sources of controversies and new means for handling difficulties.¹⁵ This appears to strengthen management's hand and to give it an added machine advantage. Automation can mean the further subjection of human beings to paper controls, paper work, and more controls from a distance by a formal-bureaucratic organization.

Government and Automation. A major role for government in automation is already evident and this is more than holding congressional hearings on possible consequences of leaping technology.

Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell has indicated that his department already does case studies of plants affected by automation. Surveys of community readjustments to reduced employment opportunities are made. Programs are devised to expand skills and study the problems of the older and displaced workers. The department seeks to improve effectiveness of public employment offices and unemployment compensation programs. Labor leaders favor government action beyond these points, to gain more unemployment compensation, a higher federal minimum wage, and government aid to distressed communities. Joint public and private studies have been urged as well.¹⁷ The unions also urge the government to take action on a shorter work day and week and to improve transfer and layoff procedures. Unions are bent on using every governmental device available to mitigate the effects of automation and to make it a central public issue, open to governmental control.

The speed and productivity of automated plants makes for vast human problems, as it raises issues of who is to decide what products are to be made, what is the extent of the market, and who is to control both the speed of introduction of automation and the rapid shifts within automation itself. Automation may already be too big to be private. Continuous production and the possible national and international effects of decisions by leaders of automated plants can hardly be discounted, especially in a semi-war economy. If automation produces the larger firms so many analysts expect, some new kind of anti-trust law or more vigorous enforcement of the old, or both may be required. As a result of international competition, the government may have to stimulate further automation.

HUMAN PROBLEM OF AUTOMATION

Automation presents a multi-dimensional human problem in all work-supervisory relations, except possibly physical health conditions. The problem belongs to management, to workers, to unions, and to the society. It may be ignored for a while, but it cannot be escaped.

Automation's Managers. Automation demands that managers be more highly skilled to handle both more sensitive and more highly educated and trained human beings and to direct the use of much more complicated machinery.¹⁸

Automation's supervisors control a more intricate system, but they have the machine on their side. They may have less interaction with the men, which can lessen their influence, but they may be friendlier and arouse more favorable attitudes.¹⁹ In one automated steel plant, the foreman's function of interpreting and transmitting

workers' needs to management was weakened and the transmission and interpretation of managers' orders strengthened. The ratio of foremen to workers is reduced. One company's partially automated car engine plant had one foremen for 31 workers before the change-over and now has one for 18 workers.

The Worker and the Job. With the labor force becoming much more highly educated, and the number of scientists and engineers rising steadily in relation to other workers, a new kind of labor force is being created. Management controls over a highly skilled and well educated production-controlling labor force may have to undergo enormous changes. Union controls may be reduced in the same way. Social and leadership skills will be required of the operators who have to cruise about the plant and be task leaders.²³

A revolution in sex and age groupings in the labor force may result from the technological changes. The old breakdown of job types may be altered irretrievably. Relative weights of each type of job can shift as the less skilled part of the classification system is pushed upward. Ability to learn may replace ability to do as a standard for continued employment. Promotion may become a serious problem for automation seems to reduce the rates of promotion. The obstacles to participation in automated plants are keenly felt by workers.

The Union Condition. Intimate work relations seem to foster union solidarity, but automation limits interaction in small work groups and physically isolates some persons. The whole issue is one of boundaries between vast organizations; automation may be a battering ram to weaken competing boundaries. The decline in sheer numbers of direct production workers may weaken unions where they have been strongest.

Robotism or Humanism. Will man control automation or will it control most men? If people can survive atomic disaster and machines can tend themselves, perhaps men can tend men. This is the hope. But automation as such offers no resolution of either the world's troubles or of labor problems.²⁴

Perhaps Fromm has posed the broader issues best in relating the possible development of industrial structures. He noted, "the process of automatization and alienation will proceed. Both these systems [of capitalism and communism] are developing . . . automations, who follow without force, who are guided without leaders, who make machines that act like men and produce men who act like machines." He added, "In the nineteenth century the problem was that *God is dead*; in the twentieth century the problem is that *man is dead* . . . The danger of the past was that men became slaves.

The danger of the future is that men may become robots. Robots do not rebel. But given man's nature, robots cannot live and remain sane."²⁵ Thus far only man's gradual ascent from various forms of enslavement, without machines, on assembly lines, and possibly in the super machine, provides a reply.

SUMMARY

Automation in itself is a new kind of social control. It has disrupted the old relations of production control in several important respects. Leaping technology makes for smaller work groups with less control over their pace of work and fewer social contacts, but the new work groups are often more like teams. Automation emerges as perhaps the most highly controlled work environment ever conceived. The earlier struggles over control are not so much eliminated as intensified; resistance and restrictionism may take new forms. But there may be a counterweight in the potential status upgrading that will move toward ending the subjugation of men to machines. The human problem of automation affects all groups concerned with labor-management relations. The manager, as much as the worker, has to learn new skills. A new type of labor force may face a new type of manager, just as unions too will be altered.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What changes in the work group is automation likely to produce?
2. In what way is automation *per se* a species of control?
3. How does automation alter the psychological environment of work?
4. What happens to morale under automation? To restrictionism?
5. Is status upgrading possible under automation? How can it be achieved? Could it end superordinate subordinate relations?
6. Is automation likely to turn the proletariat into a salariat?
7. How does automation further bigness? Decentralization?
8. Give a half dozen features of union relations to automation.
9. What is government's role in automation?
10. State the changes in management required by automation.
11. Can a new kind of labor force arise under automation?
12. How does automation intensify the issue of robotism or humanism?

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LEGITIMATING A WORK-SUPERVISORY SOCIOLOGY

The important elements in work-supervisory sociology admit of broader propositions than can the single factory or work situation studies.¹ The larger approach is concerned with "work organizations or work relationships as well as with multiple groups." The purpose of this chapter is to relate the materials concerning work relations and supervisory relations to the broader theory.

WORK RELATIONS

To study work relations, they must be situated inside and outside the plant, in much the way labor moves in a fairly free labor market. The plant has to rely on the community for its manpower. At the same time, the role of the individual must be recognized, so that he is not lost in a group.

Labor Supply and Role. The professional function is an unstandardized activity that requires great knowledge, permits an intimate relationship with the client, emphasizes technique, and includes some group consciousness.² An ordinary job (and quite a proportion of professional work) lacks these criteria. Activity is standardized, knowledge is low, relations are impersonal, despite the small work groups and informal associations. The groupings crisscross, inter-penetrate, and are complicated by the presence of unions, management associations, and other groups. They are also affected by government practices, regulations, and policies.

For years workers were exposed to the kind of efficiency management which was epitomized in the statement of Henry Ford: "All that we ask of the men is that they do the work which is set before them." The part man playing a part role was all that was required. "Surface attention" requirements left the rest of a man's skills and

ingenuity unused.³ Assembly line workers still have little sense of connection with enterprise and product.

The incredible thing about the individual in modern production and its belief systems is, as Chase wrote, "People do not believe in what they are in fact doing." Unions like management eventually discovered the worker as individual and began thinking about the human factor in production. Workers began to demand dignity on the job. The need for esteem, recognition, and acceptance was taken up by others. Workers began to seek jobs that kept their minds interested.

As the group emphasis of human relations became strong, criticism of the neglect of individual dynamics arose.⁶ McNair in extolling the individual noted, "most great advances are made by individuals. Devoting too much effort in business to trying to keep everybody happy results in conformity, in failure to build individuals. It has become the fashion to decry friction, but friction has its uses. Without friction there are no sparks. The present day emphasis on bringing everybody along can easily lead to a deadly level of mediocrity."⁶ Fromm also observed that the weakness of human relations is that it is essentially inhuman, discussing interminably the human problems of industry when the only issue is the "industrial problem of human beings." He saw that the concept of equality was distorted into the concept of sameness, i.e., McNair's conformity.

In social-psychological terms the issue was that the individual has to continue to move from the dependence of the infant to the independence of the adult. Yet industry encourages passivity, puts the worker in a subordinate position, fails to let him develop his time perspective and decision-making capacities, and neglects permitting him to expand his sense of awareness, self-control, and self-esteem. The individual tends to be looked on as the agent of the organization, his needs subordinate to those of the organization in most cases.⁸

The need for increasing maturity and independence is buttressed by the observations of others who stress that psychological growth is the continuation of learning. The worker needs a clear definition of life, and a spiritual goal. Above all, he needs self-actualization opportunities and this requires ending the artificial separation of work and home, work and fun. The worker has to be allowed responsibility and not treated as a passive instrument of reward and punishment approaches; he must be related to the outside world and the goals of humanity and not merely to the world of work.

The Manager's Role. The manager has wider power and scope, for his role is more dynamic and possessed of initiative. He has gov-

erning power. Even though he is part of a group or board, he often has to act as an individual in setting policy, in relating the plant to the external world, and in guiding the internal life of the plant. Compared to the worker, the individual manager has more opportunity to rise, larger income, and greater mobility and flexibility. His in practice is the realization of much of the promise of industry. Of course, the executive has his frustrations, but he has greater opportunity in most respects.

The most individual of managers is the top executive. His life involves moving at top speed as a survey of 30,000 high-income executives revealed. To be a policy-maker exacts a heavy toll in breakdowns, commuting, moving about, and in mainly solitary forms of diversion. Ceremony and conspicuous consumption have diminished among top executives; taxes take about 40 per cent of top executive salaries. From Norton-Taylor's analysis one gains the impression that the top executive is more guided than in charge of the processes he is tied to, but he is in charge of formal organization, the greatest placing system of history.

SUPERVISORIAL RELATIONS

Gross believes "work structures in our society include governmental staffs, schools, universities, restaurants, farms, business offices, armies, churches, and factories." He has shifted from a narrow industrial sociology to a broad work-supervisory sociology, but Gross would ordinarily not include in work organization families, gangs, social cliques, and similar personal and intimate groups, except as it would seem that they participated in the basic work process, now less personal and familial than before.

To the two sets of relationships that Gross posits within work organization—specialization and authority structure—one has only to add the status-placing system implicit in the second to make of this a useful theory. All of these relationships overlap, permit work groups to arise, assign roles to individuals.

The Relation of Specialization. Work endeavors are interconnected and bound together around specific processes that possess flow. The necessity for specialization increases as the quantity of output is raised until a continuation approaching symbiosis emerges.⁷⁴ This is far less unconscious than theorists of symbiosis have imagined. Task specialization may make what skill is left in a task more important, but it may shorten the workers' time perspective and narrow their attention to minute functions.

Argyris wrote: "The end result may be that the employee is paid

for his *dissatisfaction* while at work and his wages are given to him to gain satisfactions *outside* his immediate work environment."^{8b} The plant is not a community that can meet these needs, even in a company town.

Status-Placing. Within any work organization, status is a formal and informal means for placing people in positions that relate to each other; a parallel but somewhat underrated union status also exists. The status system of informal association involves a roughly equal distribution of positions and functions. That of formal organization is hierarchical with a laity and leaders with differential importance, rank, and prestige. The status system supports the basic authority system of bureaucracy and guides the incentives, placing, and replacing of personnel.^{8c} Within any status level the worker is aware that the boss has greater power to achieve goals and express himself.^{8c} Terrible dissatisfaction can result in a high turn-over rate and in absenteeism. Morale can be raised, on the other hand, but production remain low, indicating the pressure of interests external to the plant organization on the workers.

Leadership Structure. The authority structure is a direct function of the logic of size and of hierarchy. Someone has to direct work activities. Each individual has a position in work endeavors, in the status arrangements, and in the authority structure. The positions overlap and interlock; they may be divisive and disruptive or integrative and solidary, but they are all bound together by the rules of formal organization.² Leadership controls, directs, and coordinates the "parts" toward organizational objectives. It also motivates subordinates to accept control of their behavior while having formal power to compel obedience and increase dependency, passivity, and subordination.^{8d} The evil of this phase of mass society is not merely that it places the individual in dissatisfying and frustrating work situations but that it also uses pressures to bring about conformity; it does not produce social freedom and self-actualization. The majority work; a minority rules. A minor place within a big organization can hardly be personally satisfying.

Formal organization raises to a new pitch of intensity the issue of minority rule, of self-perpetuating bureaucracy, of rigid hierarchy, and even the danger of union and managerial hierarchies coming together.¹⁰ The static analysis of human relations does not see beyond the formal organization of the plant, as if it were a permanent social system. It does not handle the power of secrecy to control and of directive leadership to use "pseudo human relations" to retain and extend rule. Moreover, formal organization contains a central contradiction. To meet the needs of individual self-actualization

it would have to be employee-centered; meeting the needs of the organization may require a non-democratic leadership.⁸

Some personalities may be able to achieve satisfactions of individual and organization needs, but this is rare. Most can only pretend to accomplish both; they manage but do not lead. McNair complained that the "human relations expertise is not a substitute for administrative leadership, and there is a danger in getting young men to think that business administration consists primarily of batteries of experts in operations research, mathematics, theory of games, equipped with UNIVAC, and presided over by a smart human relations man."⁹ The alternative is to avoid influencing the group, to withhold modification by the executives of organization not to violate basic properties of personality of the individual and his dignity, i.e., to decline the role of a managerial elite organizing the disorganized rabble.¹⁰ What may be needed is Argyris' "reality-centered leadership"—leadership fitted to a situation and not possessed of predetermined sets as to the best ways to influence people either by formal organization or human relations programs. Ending the confusion of work sociology with personnel programs, business administration and technical engineering would help.²

Small Groups in Large Organizations. In-plant suggestions may not begin to meet the problem of multi-plant firms in which the local management is but a few drops in a larger sea, in which control from a distance is the rule, and in which formal organization is rigidly bound up with paper relations that control people. The logic of size makes the distant formal organization even larger and more impersonal. Whyte said, "we simply cannot extrapolate conclusions from the small group studies when we are dealing with groups in large organizations" unless a "general framework of theory" is provided.¹¹ One may study a local plant or union but the basic wage and fundamental policy may be determined a thousand miles away, so that in negotiating wage rates international unions may be "taking the issue out of the hands of the local officers."¹² Sociological isolationism of plant or local union can hardly advance analysis.

Tannenbaum said, "The worker and the stockholder are both anonymous, both subject to forces over which they have no control, both made to accept a decision from people whom they do not know."¹³ The invisibility of social relations, the element of secrecy, control from a distance, and inability to relate local to national situations has triumphed over most human relations theory. The locus of power is distant. Blumer put it this way: he said, "the focal point of relationship has been shifted away from the contact between big union organization and management organization" to a "centralized

guidance of labor activities over an industry-wide area" where vast opposing armies meet.¹⁴

External Environment. Whyte has argued that Mayo considered relations outside the factory but found industrial society so disorganized and suffering from such anomie that only the plant offered organization to workers.¹⁵ Other human relations proponents have held that the non-work environment is important but what it signifies still has not been established.¹⁶ A valid theory of organization has to wait on the relating of internal to external environment.¹⁷

Meanwhile environmental influences are largely ignored, viz., comparable jobs, membership in different groups, alterations in group size and membership, location of enterprise. Since good industrial relations are unlikely to develop in certain industries such as coal and maritime, but they nearly always emerge in pulp and paper and garment, "it seems unlikely that leaders with social skills should always be absent in one set of industries and always present in another." It seems likely that "the environment must be the essential determinant," not merely the internal human relations situation. There are types of industrial relations and not just stages; some of them are open to but others are closed to improvement by an alteration in social skills. Improvement would have to come from an alteration of the external environment, an important independent variable.¹⁸

The analytical system of activity, interaction, and sentiments admits of the environment through "activity." But the pressure of ideology, the impact of the business cycle, external associations, seething fluctuations between groups, and power relations in society are neglected.¹⁹ Explanations of cooperation or conflict fail when they deal in terms of what happens inside a plant and avoid inter-industry situations, the different social situations of managers and workers, and the lack of contact between managers and workers outside working hours. Not only do workers and managers have different backgrounds and education—informal homogeneous relations on the job and in the community are almost impossible.

One may joust with the ideas of in-plant environment and external environment on the ground that there are not multiple but single environments, with the work environment being a part of the other. The multiple-group approach indicates how the groups and the environments overlap, operating as a single functioning element in people's lives. The small group is situated in the larger world; the factory is part of society. The need for recognition socially is not tied to only a single plant status and hierarchy; it is tied to all one's anchorage points in reference groups, most of them outside work

relations. No in-plant status can meet the needs of the whole man; a man's work and his community standing are enlaced in a "universal connection."¹⁷ Status is a joint function of the many positions an individual occupies.

Individuals achieve their status not in the plant but in the society of which the plant is but a part. Moreover, the individual requires status satisfactions not merely in work associations, work skills, income, and company, but in non-work activities.

Group Autonomy. Despite all the emphasis on the small work group, management cannot grant them real self-expression. It can hold interviews and give counseling, but it cannot overcome lack of satisfactions at work so long as it reserves to itself all responsibility and all autonomy. Yet management cannot really permit any of these groups to survive by themselves; it has to consider the informal association created by the workers as subversive. In a phrase, the "notion of group responsibility must include the concept of *group autonomy*."¹⁸ This crucial point was denied by Mayo, Taylor, and managerial sociologists. Neither individual nor group autonomy can be granted to the organization man or to the small work group.

A result of this condition is rate-setting by the work team, termed "restrictionism by Mayo" and "rule evasion by Whyte. Allowed to work out their own organization of work and pacing, aircraft engine teams during World War II developed production standards that were higher than those industrial engineers had thought proper. Cohesion or solidarity may have little to do with likes and dislikes or friendship and affection or even frequency of interaction. Siblings or work crew members may interact frequently and yet dislike one another. High morale may exist among scholars, close friends, or lovers who are not interacting frequently. Intensity of interaction and its salience may be more significant than its size. High morale may actually be aroused where people dislike each other. Group solidarity may develop in opposition to something as to the impersonal practices of management.

BEYOND MAYO-ISM

William Foote Whyte once wrote "So much has been done since Mayo's pioneering research that arguments over what he did and thought are out of touch with present-day realities." This may not be true in the sense that much new theory has been developed, but some new steps have been taken.

Hawthorne Today. How has Mayo-ism worked out at the Hawthorne plants of the Western Electric Co. after three decades? Mayo's counseling program, interrupted from 1930 to 1936 and then

resumed, includes thirty full-time interviewers but has produced contradictory results. Some counselors, the Wilenskys reported, are "sincere missionaries" in helping employees solve problems. Other counselors feel that they can do nothing to help employees with their problems and are in effect somehow cheating the employees.¹⁹ Bendix noted that "perhaps the majority of the counselors felt keenly at some time or another the real limitation of dealing merely with the attitudes toward problems rather than with the problems themselves. Apparently, many sensed that the employee might have little to gain and much to lose if he needed real help rather than emotional release."²⁰

A wide range of responses came from supervisors. Some wished for the "good old days" when they told employees what to do, instead of having employees tell management what was bothering them. The pressure for production limited understanding of the human relations approach even among those who were inspired by the ideas behind the counseling program. Production comes first, regardless of psychology. Management, too, had a range of views, and the persons responsible for the counseling program sought to "sell" it to management. They stressed the program's usefulness when an employee was downgraded or laid off. They described the "calling effect" that "talking it over" has on individual employees and the better understanding of company policies that results. While denying that counseling blocked union organization by giving such vent to complaints, the company's Personnel Service Branch training manual explained that counseling "serves to modify excessive demands" and also "dissipates many complaints and grievances before they develop into serious disturbances."^{19a}

On-the-spot executives, some of whom may well have been disturbed by references to a managerial elite of the future, apparently could not wait to reach this lofty eminence and had to develop skill in human relations. Since the interviews were preponderantly job-oriented, the counseling was not primarily engaged in helping eliminate "useless emotional complications" (whatever that means) and the "obsessive thinking" which Mayo imagined existed and had thought counseling would eliminate.²¹

Contributions to Management Practice. General Electric has adopted the philosophy of the human relations movement. The program which costs \$5,000,000 annually is larger than those of hundreds of colleges. Careful training is given in the art of human relations to produce future managers who will motivate and not merely drive their subordinates. The concern is with the attitudes and feelings of workers and managers, with the problem of educating a

managerial elite of successors, with emotional tension and pressures that reduce interest and efficiency, and with the acceptance of individuals, as members of groups who derive satisfaction from the social prestige enjoyed among their fellows.

But many enterprises have not gone this far, nor have the results been what Mayo might have expected. Some special training programs for the future managerial elite have been abandoned. Others have not even been started, as many companies prefer short orientation courses, job experience, and regular promotions to prepare managers. Special training programs that single out a group of men have a disruptive effect on the rest of the organization and a bad effect on the trainees whose role may be given too much importance. Some trainees fail to be productive and testing them is not easy. Besides, the skills of management are only now being learned. They are by no means scientific and are too much subject to sweeping reappraisals.^{20a} An in-plant approach continues along with efforts to use intensive communication to improve cooperation. On the other hand, despite an excellent record of pioneering in low-pyramid organization and adopting "many relations" techniques, Sears, Roebuck & Co., an NLRB order revealed, has used the "workers' council" device in association with a labor consulting group in order to keep unions out or bring "friendly" unions in.²¹

Mayo and Managerial Ideology. The special contribution of Mayo is not to management practice but to managerial ideology, Bendix held in an uncommonly astute analysis that went well beyond such claims as those of Chase that "the new ideas are making astonishing headway."¹⁴ Mayo was anticipated by management itself in the influence of the group on motivation.^{20b} In neglecting trade unions, Mayo stayed well within the lines of the old open shop campaign. Even after management had surrendered much of its "single group" picture of the plant, Mayo-ism looked on plants as separate from and not responsible to the rest of the society. The reality of the public economy with its massive controls over the economy and its contract relations with major producers had made narrow localism obsolete without Mayo being aware of it. Moreover, Mayo's best work was, admittedly, impossible of achievement on the scale of a full plant, since it required alterations in all the conditions prevailing in the shop.²³ F. W. Taylor's scientific management was ahead of Mayoism in its willingness to share the benefits of increased production and to subject management as well as workers to rules.

The National Association of Manufacturers has stressed the importance of "teamwork through better understanding" and two-way

communication. Bendix wrote, "But the teamwork which the Association envisages is a one-sided affair, even though it enjoins employers to seek an understanding of the hopes and aspirations of their workers." As for two-way communication, "subordinates are expected to listen so they may learn, while managers merely receive information which they can use."²⁰ What employees say becomes information that management can use to manipulate the employee. Bendix decried the "apparent hypocrisy" in the mere use of Mayo's language of cooperation.

At General Motors, teamwork and the business family are used as symbols, but these are based on the continued success of the corporation. The success is secured and judged, as the company's handbooks put it, by "sound management." No suggestions exists that orders will be carried out only if employees give consent, tacit or explicit; management retains the authority of pre-Mayo days. Unions are looked on as disruptive of this authority, and foremen are used to re-establish a personal relationship so as to receive personal loyalty of the worker to the team.^{20d} Unlike Mayo's "group man," workers are thought of as individuals who will pursue their own self-interest. Technical "know-how" is stressed over human relations skill.

Mayo-ism succeeded where other views were bypassed, Bendix observed, because Mayo-ism helped enlist the cooperation of the many with the few better than earlier ideologies. A rationale was also needed for those whose careers placed emphasis on the strategies of advancement in large-scale, thoroughly-bureaucratized formal organizations. In practice the elite of the future could not be waited for; managers had to consider themselves the elite—the ones capable of controlling their emotions and acting rationally, and therefore guiding the irrational, emotional, and sentimental workers.

The larger bureaucracies while admitting the advantages of teamwork deplore its cost and the time consumed. As McMurry put it, "benevolent autocracy" is much more suited to modern industry which cannot be democratic on any terms. This is the point where Mayo seems to have come on the historic scene, for he admitted that after several decades of private welfare capitalism, "in some indefinable way all was not well with the human situation in the works."²³ A generation later, notwithstanding all Mayo's activities, neither the human situation nor an industrial sociology had been much improved by the bases Mayo sought to lay down. The great central truth of management remains its own functional rationality and convincing that most important public, the employees, that it is a "good employer."

Fusion Process. Merton's injunctions that no further system-building but partial generalization of "theories of the middle range" are needed has been taken up by Mayo-ites who feel that they had made a contribution in this range. What was weakest about their view was that the theory of the middle range still has to function within the terms of a vaster schema, underlying assumptions about society, the psychology of individuals, and the social psychology of groups. Here several steps beyond Mayo may have been taken, in the light of severe criticism and harsh events.

Beyond teamwork there must be an analysis that weighs factors of change less than it concentrates on "the outline of an unfolding process with laws of growth of its own, in which factors appear not only in great or small degree but also in a necessary order of occurrence."²⁴ A failure to raise productivity may stem as much from management's lessened interest as from workers' views and other situational changes of the workroom and factory, whose laws have yet to be worked out.

Bakke has described the fusion of individual goals with those of the organization as a virtual mating of functional and substantive rationality. In so doing he raises the issue, so central to Mayo-ism—whether the organization's goals are to dominate or to rest on the "consent of the government" or whether a mutual accommodation is to take place.

Of equal importance is the evidence that factories as "social systems" are by no means cultural units but are far more "political equilibria where clashing 'interests' find temporary resolutions." One has to be careful in this regard not to speak of a social system when a subsystem is meant; there is no evidence that the cultural system is or can be included within the factory. Who can say that the factory's operations rest on "common norms," when informal group norms are so powerful as manifestations of substantive rationality and protest. It is admitted that a social system implies or is accompanied by a cultural system, a body of custom and belief with common goals, views, norms, and values. The workers and managers share few if any common goals.^{16a} For that matter there is conflict over goals within management's own ranks, as there is within worker ranks. This is what makes the factory less a cultural or emotional unit, like tribe or church, as Blumer has pointed out.¹⁴

Mayo-ites interpret to mean there should be a move away from management views of individual incentives and other devices for securing managerial-led "social unity" toward "political wisdom and constitutional monarchy."^{16a} This would make the managers practical politicians, instead of elitist chieftains of a reconciliation of

individual and organizational goals. If a socio-cultural system had existed, teamwork would have led to enduring agreement about solutions to problems, but it did not. Values common to both management and workers and deeper than surface agreement on rules of the game should have arisen, but they did not. The five girls in the Bank Wiring Room of the Hawthorne plant reached a sharing of part-goals with management after very long evolution and after many alterations by them and by management: "Even they lost it quickly as soon as it became apparent that management's goals included possibly laying them off in the coming depression."^{16b} The external world and its laws took over, not management's views or even partial agreements between management and the five girls.

Moreover, should fusion or reconciliation of goals occur for a while, even on a part-goal basis, strikes can break out, fission can replace fusion, and dysfunction be substituted for function. Arensberg and Tootell may have come to a realization of the limits of the plant community idea in writing: "Once again we learn that in-plant sociology works within the limits of institutional and organization relationships. There need be no fear that a fusion of goals in a work-room pushes Man to a fusion of goals outside. Plant sociology teaches about Man and Industrial plants, not about Man and Society."^{16c}

SUMMARY

A work sociology considers both individuals and groups at work and in the larger society. The authority figures join human beings to others through the instrumentalities of formal organization and status-placing. Moreover, the local plant is usually but a part of multi-plant firm in a multiple group mass society. Important features of control come from outside; the external environment is, in fact, sufficiently powerful to make it one with the plant environment, so that the plant is a phase of a broader structure. The world of the plant, if it can be so separated, is not an area of group autonomy, not a cultural arrangement, and therefore not as distinct as Mayo supposed.

The processes of reconciling individual goals and organization ones may produce some species of fusion of functional and substantive rationality. If so, the fusion process will have to rest on some view of factories as arenas for political power and clashing interests, lacking common norms and a separate culture, but subject to the power of the external forces that govern the factory and which can create as much fission as fusion.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What are work relations?
2. How can one end a conflict between individual and group goals in production?
3. What happens when moves from dependence to independence are blocked at work?
4. State some limits of the manager's role.
5. What is the logic of size and hierarchy?
6. How is status-placing a formally controlled arrangement?
7. Contrast leadership and management.
8. Why is analysis of a single plant static?
9. Present the view of small groups within large organizations. Why is it dynamic?
10. Could management grant real group or individual autonomy?
11. State three ways of getting beyond Mayo-ism.

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THE MULTIPLE GROUP CONTEST

Plant, work, and supervisory sociologies would be meaningless unless they were carefully ensconced in the reality of contest between multiple groups in mass society. It is a contest that continues in and out of plants, at work and in legislatures, between leaders in the plant and in public power groups. The nature of the multiple group contest depends, in part, on the accommodation process.

At the same time the arguments concerning each of the groups can be extended to certain theoretical limits. How far management can go? What are the limits of union size and power? Where is government heading? Is its influence slackening? The groups are caught up in vast processes of social change. These furnish the raw materials for a consideration of the dynamics involved in a process that creates disequilibrium.

Case studies of local plants, local unions and case studies, on work relations, administration, and formal organization are necessary and useful. They, however, lead to incomplete understanding of the interlocked social issue of work-supervision-groups in the politicalized world of mass society. The approach of multiple power formations is more significant than that of a "laboristic" society or a managerially dominated one. Older approaches to social interaction processes have been limited to describing accommodation, competition, cooperation, and conflict. On occasion, their interrelations have been delineated.

Social interaction and social control processes are present simultaneously, in the nature of polar opposites, and constitute a phase of the contest between forces. These are contending forces. No one "solution" ends the process or the contest; the form may be changed; but the contest persists on some other basis, sometimes higher and sometimes lower. The difficulty with the Marxian view of the class struggle was that it broadened conflict to include every level of life

and that it viewed a new synthesis and resulting new contest as emerging on a higher level. Such a view is linear and narrow. Many a contest has thrown both antagonists back. No single class point of view arrays one entire group against another. Even if Mayo-ism is regarded as a managerial apologia, it has the merit of showing that many a worker thinks like management, that there is no one-way flow from status in the economic order to ideological position. The social contest does not lead to an equilibrium, even if one wishes to use rather loosely such terms as dynamic equilibrium, at least not in work-supervisory-power group relations. Contest appears to be more a phenomenon of disequilibrium, of continuing imbalances, of no millennium, no final resolution of conflict, no eternal peace on anyone's terms.

THE VIEW OF MULTIPLE GROUPS

The failure of the human relations approach rests on the collapse of the theory of a single group underlying it. An inability to recognize other groups, even more significantly, the interrelation of plant to society was central to Mayo-ism. Moreover, the power complex operates in a situation of contest so blithely ignored by social system advocates as to require a delicious exercise in narrowmindedness to fathom.

Which One Group and Why. Mayo-ism begins with the contention that men dislike isolation, being gifted with an instinct for association, and ends with their isolation in a plant community run by the managerial elite. Mayo thought the corporation would bring order out of the chaos of industrialism. Warner looked to the community to do this; Tannenbaum thought it would be the union. Mayo failed to see that managements compete. He also preferred the goals of the managerial elite to those of the individual and the society, benevolent despotism to democracy, and all in the name of consent through counseling. Whyte complained of Mayo and Warner that "they are truer to the medieval spirit in wanting the nobility rather than the serfs to be in charge."¹ Whyte felt that Tannenbaum's picture was preferable, but that it could result in command by a union bureaucracy just as bureaucratic as a business group. What Tannenbaum failed to see was that a union is not a society and that, as it loses its protest function, it may not even be a union.

Fisher and Kerr raise the crucial issue: "Assuming that man dislikes isolation, which to a degree may be quite true, does that necessarily mean that he is happy only when he loses his identity in group life? If he is happy only after having lost his identity in group life,

does it follow that he must lose his identity in only one group rather than several? Finally, if he must lose his identity in only one group, must it be the plant?"²

The Multiple Group Orientation. Various researches operated under management's auspices have the important common feature of seeking to integrate the worker psychologically with the single firm. The change from Taylor's watchword of "discipline" to Mayo's watchword of "morale" hardly produced Barnard's "consent of the governed," however. The stubborn social fact remains that in each worker is also part of larger external collectivities of union, church, family, and state. All of these are important to his status and attitudes, his roles and satisfactions. In addition, he is still an individual. Wishing and counseling cannot make these groups disappear.³ Reference groups operate in such a way that the individual takes the values, standards, and aspirations of other individuals and groups as anchorage points and comparative frames of reference for self-evaluation and appraisal.⁴ The very existence of the union suggests the existence of multiple loyalties. Even within management ranks there are severely divided loyalties at every level, with or without unions.

The Power Situation. Human relations as ordinarily conceived lacks any real connection with cultural or structural relations. Its way of excluding both change and conflict is by adhering to static internal organization. Denying the premise that industrial relations are primarily "direct relations" between people in the plant or factory, Blumer wrote, "industrial relations are becoming increasingly a matter of alignment of organizations."⁵ No longer can relations outside the work group and supervisory setup be ignored. Power in society and the role of group bargaining are central to, not peripheral or outside, human relations, for this is a power situation in which a lesser-powered group is performing tasks imposed and guided by a higher-powered group. Labor problems are not primarily plant or economic but simultaneously legal, political, and psychological.⁶ A valid theory of organization has to admit other organizations, as polar phases of dialectically unified situations in which external and internal environment make a unity of interacting forces.

Any vision of the future has to include unions and government as present in the environment of work. Neither is likely to be eliminated, and surely they are not going to stand still. Elmer noted that "a sociological study of industry, in order to have practical value, must give us the basic principles underlying adjustment as well as the causes of conflict. There has been a tendency to confine research activities of industrial sociology to the provision

of remedial machinery for eruptions, conflict, and class antagonism. Industrial sociology must go further than repairing plaster which continues to fall within the structure."⁷ The search has to be for basic, underlying causes and not merely specific factors in isolated instances.

Out of an environment of harmony can come severe breakdown, viz., the garment strike of 1958 involving 37,000 dressmakers. One union leader said the strike arose because "we have just become too cozy with management." Union leaders and management were old cronies, had similar origins, similar aims, and had become "soft" about enforcing union agreements. Even when the strike ended, management spokesman Nat Boriskin could say, "We in the garment industry are one big happy family."⁸

Can peaceful labor relations be gained in the heavy industries and not merely the light ones, and if so can this be continuous, or do dynamic changes in technology and leadership make for explosions? Kerr and Fisher held that, regardless of human relations programs and no matter how skilled leaders were as relationship specialists, certain industries like coal and maritime are violent and stormy because of their general environment. The internal external environment have to be considered. Strikes can come out of the harmony of the garment industry, as can breakdowns of the union, alteration of its social function, and danger to its separate existence.

Meanwhile it remains clear that demands for democratic treatment, so absent in business, have come into industry from the outside, and that the businessman carries within him a moral contradiction between his requirements as a citizen and the imperatives of formal organization. The central issue remains how a pluralistic power system can be maintained under the present structural conditions of work and supervision.⁹

DEFINITIONS OF THE SITUATION

The employer who expects workmen to be "rational like management" neglects the workers' own definition of the situation and the difference between the functional rationality of the plant and substantive rationality of the individual and the group.¹⁰ Moreover, while minimum agreements are possible, differing views can agitate a board of directors as well as a union leadership or two unions, or unions and management and, if competition is not ignored, management and management. Why competition should be admitted between managements but not between managements and workers remains a mystery.

Differing Assumptions. Chase found that both management and workers could have mistaken and dubious assumptions about each other and still reach agreement on these by semantical changes. Such agreement even within management's own ranks, or labor's for that matter, has not occurred. Yet uniformity, resting on confidence that corrections of communication gaps will solve problems, is equated with industrial peace. Were this possible, as Robers and Roethlisberger have recently imagined, such agreement could prevent needed change and constitute collusion to the disadvantage of consumers, other workers, other managements, and government. It could make for an imposed, authoritarian seeming-sameness.¹¹

If Mayo's original but undeclared assumption that employees were economic men working primarily for individual self-interest been agreed on by all, little progress would have been made in examining work-supervisory relations. In work relations as in broader fields the promise of semantics has not been realized. Wages remain a means of living for workers and a cost to management. The push of the laborer is upward, that of the employer is downward, for this is not wage or cost but wage-cost in a power situation of parataxic logic that one phase semantics cannot plumb or resolve.

Differences in perception are legion. When Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act set forth the right of workers to organize; "the workers took the law seriously; the employers did not."¹² While workers felt that the law was on their side, the Wagner Act which succeeded Section 7a was quite neutral and was aimed at reducing the incidence of strikes. Even if communication were truly two-way and meanings were identical—which would require common cultural understandings, values, and norms so missing in industrial relations—a plant would not become a social system and bureaucracy would not end. Workers in practice lack a "motivation to communicate" within a management-controlled framework. Whatever attractions are added to the job, they do not relieve the frustration of persons denied decision-making expression for their selves.¹³

Each group continues to look at plant operations differently. Workers find that management moves have a personal effect, while to management they have only an institutional effect.^{13a} The purpose of managers is to make a product, that of workers is to earn a wage and carve out a meaningful life. Between the two there is no common bridge or uniting purpose.

Attitudes in Multiple Groups. As a member of many groups the worker is subject to the demands and pressures and views of all of them. People are torn between management power, union

influence, government pressure. The multiple group pulling and pushing can produce internal conflict in individual workers and managers as well as in staffs and teams.

Walter H. Wheeler, Jr., President of Pitney-Bowes, Inc., aware of deep human urges for security, recognition, inner satisfaction, and material gain saw that "many of these urges are in conflict. In the very nature of progress, there must be disappointment in the ability to attain all of them." It is also in the nature of the ego ideal and of reference group aspirations that one has desires and wishes that cannot so much be satisfied as function as guides to improvement and conduct generally. A labor leader's wife may expect him to provide a decent and even middle class standard of living, the union is likely to require long hours, identification and working with employees, and non-striving for personal advancement. The middle-class values of the wife may conflict with working-class values of the husband.¹⁴

Different Role Perceptions. A highly conservative business analyst, Martineau said, "too often the executive plans his strategy on the assumption that all classes have the same outlook, the same attitudes, the same strivings as his own family. Usually they don't. Yet, declared Martineau, the executive "uses symbols to communicate with them (the workers) which may be misunderstood or even completely meaningless. They have different word-comprehension levels and different degrees of ability to handle abstractions and to form imagery from symbols."

Between leaders on either side role, perceptions differ widely. Haire matched 76 members of a central labor council and 108 representatives of management from industrial relations or personnel in the San Francisco Bay area on how they felt about the other party possessing various characteristics. He said, "It seems clear that labor and management are not talking to the same people when they confer with one another." The labor representative who is seen by labor as honest, dependable, and efficient is seen by management as persistent, opinionated, argumentative, and outspoken.

The Strain for Consensus. There is a strain for consensus even by differing groups. Multiple groups share a common membership. Moreover, they agree on certain ultimate values—private property, anti-communism, democracy, a rising standard of living, the value of organization, the necessity for rising, some tariffs, and much social legislation. There may also be some agreement on a middle range of intermediate values with which to implement the others, at least to an extent. Mutuality of interest, the unity of all knowledge, the essential humanity of both sides—none of these

means an end to bias or an end to power groups. Society will have to rest content with the persistence of contest.

THE WINDSOR CASE

A solid view of multiple groups was presented in an analysis of the Ford and Chrysler plants at Windsor. Hart offered something quite different from the Mayo "in-plant" type of research in which the worker is pictured as "a bewildered and frustrated cog in the vast assembly-line type of plant." Hart noted that the worker was "not quite so bewildered nor quite so frustrated as that literature would have us believe. Mayo's 'disordered dust of individuals' is very busy (in Windsor, at least), escaping from its disordered condition and reorganizing itself in very significant and effective ways through its unions."¹⁵

In a situation where the Ford and Chrysler plants dominate industry and 40 per cent of the people are Catholic, Hart takes the first steps toward examining multiple groups. "There is no community worthy of that name in the city of Windsor. There are only power groups, of which we can clearly define at least four, which are, to varying extents and on various issues, in a pretty constant state of competition and at times of open warfare." Big business is represented by Ford and Chrysler. There is the union. The local business group or the "people who have always run this town," i.e., "the best people," are also present. Hart distinguished local from big business because the latter group "has national and international interests rather than local ones."

The Fifth Group. Nevertheless, Windsor is a definite community, the fifth group. Government, the sixth group, is of considerable importance. Many persons are in still other sub-groups and a clustering into groups within the community exists. However, Hart thought that in Windsor the general public should be omitted since "it simply does not exist, even numerically." He found, too, that the absence of the fifth group was largely responsible for tensions and bitterness so noticeable in Windsor in 1949. He fitted the whole population into one of the four groups.

A crucial point is that "membership in these four power groups overlaps. It is possible to be a good Catholic and a good unionist, or a good Catholic and a violent opponent of unions. However there is some crisscrossing of common membership and some resulting conflicts of loyalties. There is a strong area of cooperation-accommodation within the big business group represented by an increase in efficiency. Union expansion did not impinge upon the prerogatives or traditional activities of big business leaders at

least at the time, the logic of the unions was the logic of local power, but the international union had plenty of conflict with the major companies.

The Area of Conflict. While some mutual accommodation occurs on the international level, it is absent on the local level where small business which has traditionally "run the town" feels union competition most keenly.

In a way, Hart noted, "the increase in prestige of the union has to be at the expense of other groups," somewhat in the form of Tannenbaum's "institutional imperialism." Tannenbaum had written, "It is a characteristic of a social institution to seek to encompass the whole life of man," whether in family, church, state, plant, or union, so that inter-institutional conflict over the moral, psychological and political "guidance and governance of the whole man" occurs. But no group succeeds; each shares the common member—each pulls him hither and yon. Large-scale tension between marshalled armies continues, although the leaders are the ones who are marshalled, since the membership is the same. Moreover, power is not stagnant; it can be increased so that more is available; competition for a fixed fund of social power. Had Hart and Tannenbaum continued their analysis they might have indicated that power is shared; that status can be improved for all without downgrading part of a community; and that non-power consensus is also a possibility. Both union and big business power increased rapidly, and government power had grown at least that rapidly. The one-group, in-plant, approach could not explain Windsor's multiple power group situation.

CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION

Just as private capitalism slowly gave way to a more public economy, so the traditional authoritarianism of the workshop was interpenetrated by unions and government regulations. Deep alterations in management's views came at the same time that formal organization became still more impersonal. This is management's contradiction to operate history's most coldly organized and carefully placed systematic grouping of human beings and to humanize it while creating a product.

The Achievement of Growth. Large-scale industry propelled formal organization to the center of the stage as an integrating element in the mass society. The locus of power for managers shifted from local plants and local financing and control at the same time industry lost its central importance in organizing people's lives. One may quarrel with its consequences but the corporation

as a fictitious person did transform a onetime agrarian society. If it is more important than the real persons from whom it requires allegiance as organization men, this too is a unique achievement.

The old boss of private capitalist days has disappeared. In his place at the helm of work-supervisory relations are managers who are institutionalized and professionalized by the requirements of bureaucratic existence. The capitalists turned over the reins of industry to managers, while government was imbedding itself in the heart of mass society under the powerful pressure of war, the depression, and mass needs. Steadily the miracles of large scale raised up an urbanization that tends to be total, a grouping of huge masses in an anonymous and impersonal relation, creating a problem in how to treat human beings humanly under bureaucracy.

Social Responsibility. When the individual was viewed as master of his own destiny (at least in theory), managers had little social responsibility. Private welfare capitalism, whatever its faults, did offer some recognition from roughly 1910 to 1929, of a responsibility to one's workers. The collapse of such paternalism led to an acceptance in the 1930's of a social responsibility new both to the country and to management. The isolation of business from society was gone. As the economy ceased being "separate" and "over" the city, in Polanyi's sense, the paternalistic-familial relations at work shifted. Relations of master-slave, lord-serf, master-servant, and boss-worker gave way to group-to-group interconnections and influence. Management-union interrelationships were based on group power on both sides, with group rights contrasted to individual rights, and the government power in the center of the power system.

As Schumpeter said, management was too successful. By reducing hours, lightening work, and creating masses of products it shifted men's attention away from the factory and office to wider, non-work vistas. Capitalism realized abundance in many spheres, especially in food, in America. Work declined as the central, operating, organizing principle for the first time for millions of people. It may be that management's greatest achievement is to have worked itself out of its old position of the central organizing principle for relating people to reality through directing the work process into a more public function of organizing a production function for the society as a secondary element in man's broadened social activities. The new organizing principle may have to be outside the work-supervisory relations, in some leisure sphere.

The Human Equation. A good part of management may be on its way out of business without knowing it. History may have played a grim joke on industry by steadily removing the worker

from its midst and control. But management is needed; specialized processes cannot run themselves. The logic of size and of hierarchy demand leadership, but since relations have grown more public, public leadership seems required.

Human relations in industry now includes such varied activities as leadership conferences, job relations training, and employee relations training. Not all of this is a "monstrous plot," although every ruling group has used whatever knowledge was available to retain power. But "human relations" techniques are not the last word in personnel techniques. Human relations programs have been unable to fathom individual or group motivations, conceiving of interests of employer and employee as "fundamentally harmonious" and mistaking minor technical changes for an alteration of social relations. Kornhauser wrote, "It is now quite generally accepted that human relations programs are never a substitute for sound economic relationships. Geraniums in the plant windows and a turkey for Christmas do not make up for substandard pay."^{13b}

Personnel administrators have erred assuming that people do not want to work and that work is a kind of "punishment that people must undergo in order to get satisfaction elsewhere." They look on themselves as a relationship specialists, a staff concept that regards managers as production chiefs and not directors of human affairs. In addition, personnel administration has a "stake in trouble," a sort of fire-fighting approach and problem area outlook. If McGregor is right, personnel administration may be the real managers of discontent. But there are other troubles within management. Miller and Form observed that many industrial relations programs of management mask group conflict objectives.

Fused Power Elites. Meanwhile the manager finds himself not in any plant community but a transplant in a political community. Thousands of managers are drawn to Washington, D. C., for government work; hundreds of generals are now plant chiefs. The local manager may be manipulated himself by distant forces of which he is only dimly aware, while certain persons compound the confusion by informing him that he is leader of a community he does not feel and participant in a managerial revolution although he steadily sees his powers reduced to operational moves split off from policy creation.

Do top managers make up a power elite with real social power that transcends the plant and office and penetrates the society and its other groups? Bendix considered that the entrepreneurial classes are willing to compromise, unlike ruling groups in early phases of industrialization. What he missed is that they compromise while

themselves moving out of economic life into the seats of political power, i.e., by becoming direct political rulers or by working more closely with political leaders. Mills held that a power elite has emerged to combine corporation, political, and military chieftains in a new type of power complex. Bendix's explanation could not clarify the Taft-Hartley Act well. Mills' could.

Despite what Mills said about union leaders being "new men of power" in 1948, he later decided that unions, wage workers, all consumers, small property owners, and white collar groups have little power and do not enter the top elitist circles.¹⁶ Unfortunately Mills confused culmination of a trend with a process of fusion that is still going on. It is possible for a managerially dominated society to emerge; it would be no novelty and a state-run monopoly economy could be created; but there are many counter-tendencies, opposing groups, and traditions that would have to be done away with before this could happen.

A unified elite is not new in history; but top elites are far from singleminded and unitary; elites compete nationally and internationally, producing a pluralistic democracy between elites.¹⁷ The unexpected results of elite policies, explosions of history, and the rise of counter-elites frequently undo their power and remove them from their ruling positions. It is a merit to see that a fused power elite is possible; it is no achievement to confuse possible result with ongoing process.

ALTERED UNION FUNCTION

Unions arose to provide some fuller social membership and control than members could gain in other groups and as a counter-force to management's monopolistic vision of a one-group society in an eternal master-servant relation. However, the union meets only some needs of its members; it is changing greatly and may have reached the critical point of its strength. Having changed from the old protest-fighting army function to that of accepted bargaining agent, unions are now in the process of carving out a different community and national status.

The Union as Alternative. In denying that industry is the alternative to social chaos, Hart found that the union is accepted by workmen as a reasonable alternative to Donham's "beautiful plants."¹⁸ Through the union, Hart held, the "victim of the soulless assembly-line" was given back his self-respect rescued from anomie. The union's very presence showed that no firm is a closed social system, as did the interconnection of local plant to national firm and local union to international body.

The union introduces both a competing formal and informal organization; compared to management's authoritarianism it offers a democratic structure, it provides psychological and social benefits; counters and even reduces onesided management authority; raises up allegiance of workers to a second organization, opens new communication lines, and offers potential social and status advances.¹⁸ Much strength stems from a union being an extra-plant phenomenon, linking workers between different companies and regions placing restrictions upon management's authority, and reaching outside the in-plant arrangement into the political world. Of course, the union can become highly formal, especially the big union, it can create dependent relations not unlike those of the company.

Unions give workers the strength to demand improvements and to limit the manipulative power that managements gain in human relations research. While unions lack management's economic power, they can influence public opinion and achieve gains.¹⁹ Whyte has, lately, found a place for the union as part of an effective technique of participation. Unions can be asked to help in decision-making processes, showing that participation is real in that it has a "recognizable impact."²⁰

Workers hardly wait for benefits to fall from managerial policy; instead they join unions, take political action, seek government support, and oppose "permissiveness" as a manipulative technique.²¹ On their part unions have a more educated membership which does not take to oldstyle "bossing" and expects less directive administration.²² Moreover, better educated workers, reared in a democratic political environment, do not readily accept authoritarian rule in business.²³

Stages of Development. Unions alter with changes in social situations and are themselves agents of social change. From welfare agencies in a protest period they became bargaining representatives in a situation of recognition, and then move on to political action on a higher plane. Never merely private, unions interested themselves at an early stage in gaining free public education, universal suffrage without property qualifications, and protection for children. These extensive social changes were opposed by ruling groups in the society. Where the factory had brought human beings together around a production process, unions sought to develop this into an accommodation process by formalizing protests to the new social arrangements in work and supervision. The old struggle for power, much of it bloody and overtly or silently involved with courts and laws, gave way to recognition and armed truce in the 1930's. Mutual recognition of each party's needs has arrived, if only in a situation

marked by government controls and a war economy. A mature relation of working harmony and "industrial peace" has developed in some industries. The new union struggle is for community status, more political voting power, and new forms of control of their own.

A "middle-class industrial working force" may be a contradiction, but it is viewed as a possibility by many. Welfare benefits, yearly salary payments, middle class status, and steadily rising living standards make up this latest drive. National and international unions steadily gain in influence over local unions.

Each stage has marked a shift in goals. The old job-security aims have shifted to power requirements that carry unions into political affairs more and more. Instead of mirroring management, unions go beyond countervailing power theory, as espoused by Galbraith.²⁴ They sometimes agree with management, yet fail to reach any real balance of forces and seek, through legislative gains, what they cannot achieve privately. Fears that unions might become powerful political forces have not materialized in Britain or Russia; unions remain quite slow-changing and even conservative forces.

As a recognized and accepted institution, unions take on policing and regulating functions that alter their old views of goals. Union leaders at the helm of formal organizations "are much like their management counterparts" in seeking success and a good life, in proposing means for continuing prosperity, in needing a measure of labor peace.²⁵ As unions have grown, their gains have become more public, their goals more political, their mass movement a demonstration of public political power.^{18c} Of course, there is no total agreement between union and union, between union and members, between the demands of the group and of the individual, or between the demands raised at different times.

There is a "dearth of labor representation in political office," Peterson found. Labor faces a serious crisis of not filling the role of power and responsibility it seems capable of doing. The existence of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that unions are politically weaker than management. Union leaders suffer from "social ostracism."

As unions become more accepted, there is little left for it or its members to do, a point not at all clarified in studies of peaceful relations. Miller and Form say that "the union promises to extend rather than curtail its functions in the future" so as to achieve a "dominant role," yet union leaders have not upset the Taft-Hartley Act, hold few political posts, and possess no dominant role in any social sphere.²⁶ Sheer size is no sign of strength, for unions may be at the "saturation" point of membership.²⁷ Union election victories in representation unit cases have slipped from 83 per cent of elections

in 1945 to 64 per cent in 1956. Even if all workers were in unions as they are in Russia, and with some cabinet members coming from unions, the unions would remain subordinate in the production machinery of any country. Unions in Britain, America, and Russia are limited organizations that do not run government or society. Beyond a certain size unions become subordinated to public power and policy in social situations of great crisis. Even the claim that unions occupy or will occupy more governmental posts is a sign that unions are shifting to some concentration on these posts because more power is located at these points. The larger the union organization, given the present pro-state orientation of unions, the easier it is for central political states to control the union. It is the sad fate of most reform movements to become non-official agencies of government, to give up the old idealism and the older visions of utopia.

It is possible that a few large unions will become dominant in bargaining; greater power may fall into fewer hands as centralization proceeds; and the struggle to retain worker loyalty should go on. Unions are hardly expected to sit still or to be eliminated, but they will probably become far more bureaucratic as the giant unions assume greater control.

STATE POWER

The tendency in a semi-war situation is for the national political state to dominate the other groups. Many state actions can be dictatorial, especially at such times, and this is not eased by pleas of business and unions for aid from the state.²⁷ Even the foes of government action, like John L. Lewis, have supported the Guffey Coal Act, government provisions for welfare, and coal tariffs. They, too, have been caught up in the public economy of mass society.

War Economy. Since a war economy shows every sign of persisting for years, the various business and union groups have had to operate within the framework of rising central government power. Government has become one of the interlocking groups in what used to be termed "industrial" relations. At high points of war tension a national labor policy emerges; at lower levels a national labor policy may appear absent but in reality it is in the background for the nonce. Government's new role in keeping the economy at a full employment level raises new problems as to how much further it can go in dealing with cyclical unemployment, old age, disability and illness.²⁸ Since underutilization of manpower and natural resources may not be possible for long in a condition of intense inter-

national rivalry, government and economy appear to be "indissolubly wedded."

Small-Scale Versus Large. One may seek ways of living with big government in the war economy of mass society, return to small-scale existence, or move forward to still larger scale. The return to small scale has meant for some, viz., Gandhi, resurrection of a folk society with its agricultural ways. Others have suggested a reduction of size by splitting large units into smaller ones and re-establishing personal and direct relations so that some participation in the direction of affairs could be possible. This involves the decentralization of both population and production units. Williams believes that a return to small-scale production and the limited state is well-nigh impossible.²⁸

There are some who propose still larger size, even nationalization of many industrial processes. Neither profit-sharing nor reduction of hours would not reduce alienation under such conditions, although the gain in leisure would mean more time for personal life. "One world" and other one-group proposals could lead to an extension of conformity to rules and regulations explicitly laid down in formal organizations. The tendency toward overorganization extends mass society's bond of imposed conformity. Only some anarchists oppose the new gods of formal organization; others are caught up in the law that "organization demands further organization" until overorganization is reached. This phase is so impersonal that Seidenberg called it post-historic.²⁹

Sufficient diversity and competition with other national power exists to stave off this trend. A public-military economy leads in the direction of overorganization, but this result is not inevitable. Breakdowns of tightly organized systems have occurred in the past; they may well occur in the future.

SOCIAL CHANGE

State power looms large today, but it is not the final form of rule of work-supervisory relations. Processes of change do not halt in the fast-moving mass society that stresses the normality of technological, economic, and social alterations on a massive scale. The idea of change may be accepted, so long as it can be controlled. The issue of the speed of introduction of change raises up a companion problem of restrictionism. Change is also directly related to disequilibrium.

The Idea of Change. Worthy charged that schools of business and others have done little to prepare businessmen to understand the vast changes in society and to accept change as an essential

characteristic of what we prize as the American way. Yet American business has produced perhaps the first society to have rapid, overwhelming change built into the culture. The sheer speed of technical change demands new social resilience and organization. No industry can stand still; to hold one's own the businessman has to run fast; to make real progress requires a significant spurt. Getting outside the single plant ends the "provincialism" that makes for static analysis, and a check of underlying conditions can be made. Dynamic analysis introduces dating, timing, measuring in terms of sequence, growth, and development.

In the 1930's a basic change in fundamental attitudes and in groups came in a condition of anomie. Mayoism produced a depression-born and depression-influenced theory that the plant and the managerial elite would organize the disorganized. Meanwhile, new groups—unions and state bodies—arose, along with new norms. That "prime mover" of economic and social change, discontent, made for these new groups and new norms. Moore has held that "in every industrial system change is institutionalized."^{13d} Breaches in static harmonies have resulted from built-in change. Management did not ignore change; it merely set out to control it. It found that change lent itself to manipulation; the organization man could be adapted to managerial changes, and the worker could be accommodated to them.¹⁴

Resistance to and Acceptance of Change. Change is resisted by those whose norms are upset and such resistance may become a human relations problem. Management looks on this resistance as restrictionism when it is practiced by workers. F. W. Taylor believed that workers were justified in restricting output so long as increased productivity was not reflected in higher earnings, a more objective view than Mayo was ever to hold. Restrictionism as a social phenomenon both antedates union organization and accompanies it. Whether unionized or not, factory output is pretty much the same even in industries considered to have extensive restrictionism.³¹

Roethlisberger's work indicated that the informal work group set up its own norms but held that restriction was based on a non-logical appraisal of the work situation not on laziness, opposition to management, or poor supervision.³² He felt that management pressure was countered by worker pressure. On this basis was erected an elaborated series of steps for management to follow to "overcome" resistance to "change." The steps involved prevention of unnecessary change, recognition of the effects of change; sharing the benefits of change; diagnosis of the problems of change; careful communication regarding proposed changes, and even more careful timing.^{14a}

The "participation hypothesis" was extolled to produce willing acceptance.

Within the plant, as Riesman observed, "one thing of which most wage workers are deprived is any chance to extend themselves, to go all-out, save in the ultimately self-defeating ingenuity of quota-restriction."³³ What he missed was that this was a show of independent decision-making, important for a group and its norms.

Most unions have accommodated themselves to change. Given good relations with management, a union may reduce resistance to change, but it also seeks to control the speed of the introduction of change. Local unions are more often opposed to technological change, whereas the national union chiefs, distant from the scene, tend to accept these changes.³⁴ In recent years, management and unions have jointly agreed to reduce restrictive practices.^{18b} In 1958 the AFL-CIO approved a resolution to cut out feather-bedding and other restrictionist devices.

But the restrictionism that appears bad to management, may be adaptive for workers. Restrictionism is part of a "revolt against work," wider than simply working at a pace set by management and involving control over one's own movements, actions, and timing. Much restriction is based on fear of working oneself out of a job, but more importantly the workers may be cooperating within the framework of control by their very own norms. The key question is "whether the process of production generates the very hostilities which interfere with its operation." Restriction can be part of a "strategy of independence" directed against dehumanization of work and it may be to the credit of workers to have sought to oppose dehumanization.^{17a}

Not all people resist change. The desire for novelty and new experience means that many changes are welcomed. Unions for years sought to introduce major reforms in society, while management opposed them. Argyris found that in an "unhappy" plant, workers welcomed change if it would get management in trouble. Foremen and lower superintendents may even encourage "restriction of output" to maintain good terms with subordinates, control an empire, etc. Weber found that restrictionism showed solidarity.

Disequilibrium. The managers who seek to restore and maintain group equilibrium, may be riding the bucking bronco of work history to a fall without knowing it. The economic machine today, no less than in Veblen's time, does not run harmoniously without "leak, lag, or friction." Forces more powerful than human relations techniques are operative. A dynamic equilibrium is no static balance, it is a smooth growth condition.

Capital growth has normally outsped population growth. Population size and population desires change drastically and are expected to change even more in the next decades, especially in the super machine factory of automation. Nuclear energy can relieve industry of its dependence on older power sources; it can make for industrial dispersion and the redesigning of cities. Combined, continuous, and super-metropolises can arise to make for new colossi in human aggregations. The subordination of farming to total urbanization as a trend is making for new alignments. A revolution is brewing in distribution and in transportation, not to mention in the life of the housewife. The very rate of growth is expected to surpass anything ever seen in the past. These changes compound and leap forward in crises that place great demands on the group to save itself from dangers as serious as destruction. Crises produce new groups and new norms, and cannot be contained by the policy of a managerial elite.

To socio-economic disequilibrium one has to add organizational and personal disequilibrium, which is not the same as disorganization. An alignment of organizations grouped into vast opposing armies is not a condition of balance.⁵ The bureaucracies of union and management meet and conflict over loyalties. Man is split from the animal unit with nature and incessantly has to find a new unity. His loyalties are divided and confused and even ambivalent. Many an individual has even worse problems. As Whyte wrote of organization man lost in the big corporation, "there is no solution. The conflict between individual and society has always involved dilemma; it always will." Whyte proposes that the individual find the means to fight the organization.^{1b} To do so requires finding a new relatedness on a human basis in a productive orientation; it requires reducing the struggle for status, accepting less than monopolistic victory, and using the human mind in the cause of human growth and integrity.

SUMMARY

One-group theory ignores the social setting so central to sociological analysis; the multiple-group orientation situates the field of study in its larger environment. The longtime private character of employer and labor relations may have obscured, to an extent, their increasingly public character and interlocking nature. They are now part of a power complex in the mass society. This is a unitary environment, not one divided into internal and external phases. Within it each side offers differing definitions of the situation

and rests on different assumptions, perceptions, and attitudes. Both, however, permits some consensus.

The logic of size and hierarchy requires leadership. As organizations grew, management arose to take the place of the old direct owner. But management had no sooner taken office than even larger-scale produced more distant types of control. Social circumstances forced a new social responsibility on management in a new public economy that accepted wide-scale government action.

Unions are more than an alternative to management; they introduce an interstitial democracy and end monopolistic control of supervisory relations. They function both within and outside the plants, they have made for vast changes, which in turn have apparently irreversibly altered them in the direction of more public functioning.

The trend toward the national political state's dominating a national labor policy is strong in a war economy and in the current semi-permanent war situation. But it does not eliminate private forces which remain and operate in a more public way in and through government. Labor-management relations have become more public affairs, without the disequilibrium-contest character of the mass society being eliminated or reduced.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. How do plant, work, supervisory, and multiple-group components dovetail together in the theory of contest?
2. On a half dozen problems, how do management and labor definitions of the situation differ?
3. Describe the achievements of large scale.
4. Indicate how management has gained in social responsibility.
5. Is there an end to power elitism?
6. What is the critical point in union strength?
7. What have been the changes in union goals over the past century?
8. What are the limits of state power in labor-management relations?
9. Is there a road back to small scale? Forward to larger scale?
10. Describe equilibrium; disequilibrium.
11. Can the continuing contest be productive in many social ways? Which ones?

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MASS LEISURE AND ABUNDANCE

The mass society has realized abundance and produced a mass leisure that has altered the work function as an organizing principle for human life. It holds out the promise of reducing or fundamentally transforming the supervisory relations as well. A combined work-leisure function is in the making. The possible joining of automation and atomic energy so widens the area of choice of individuals and groups that the multiple-group complex can be shifted and the contest over distribution of income and power altered in cultural directions outside the structure of work-supervisory relations.

For the first time in recorded history a huge population is concerned with the problem of what kind of life they want to live. The old slavery to the empty belly and fear as a driving force for work may be in the process of disruption and the area and possibility of human choice may well be broadened. Industry's place as an organizing force for the working lives of people may be declining further. Work centrality is already falling. Industrial sociology may have worked itself out of business without knowing it, just as rural sociology has faded with the spread of urbanization.

A THEORY OF ABUNDANCE

A basic feature of the mass society is the development of abundance in place of scarcity. This is virtually an age of plenty for the United States at least in foodstuffs and, with automation and atomic energy, in most other material spheres as well. Abundance is the visible norm in America, as it can well be elsewhere. Greater material wealth has been created in the mass society than ever before, without the society collapsing. Leisure has become a component of that new wealth for many millions of people.

Eating of the Tree of Knowledge. Having eaten of the tree of knowledge, Adam was subjected, according to the third chapter of Genesis, to the bread-and-sweat equation: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." But those who followed Adam, while they were ruled by the empty belly for centuries, not only ate bread but continued to eat of the tree of knowledge until a new vision arose in many lands, a vision of milk and honey and an end to ceaseless toil.

In practice "poverty was part of plenty," and the scarcity of material goods and services relative to the superabundance of human wants was made the very basis for a political economy. Bentham felt that such a condition would always continue, for "in the highest stage of social prosperity the great mass of the citizens will most probably possess few other resources than their daily labor, and consequently will always be near to indigence."¹ Malthus, the most dismal of the scarcity theorists, failed to see that man could produce more than he could reproduce, i.e., that the economic equation was in process of being reversed. It turned out that the more society advanced the easier it was to procure food and universal plenty, in Polanyi's words, "could not help percolate down to the people," for "it was impossible that society should get wealthier and wealthier and the people poorer and poorer."² The industrial revolution was to provide the base and automation the key for leaving scarcity behind as an historic stage.

The Sorcerer's Apprentice. Mass society, resting on urbanization and industrialization, stems from the creation of a sufficient surplus of crops to permit specialization in city life. The economic equation of Genesis was shattered by the steam engine, electricity, and the industrial organization of mass society.

Farm production reached the point that much of the crop was called surplus. In colonial times three farmers could feed four persons; in the 1950's one farmer could feed fourteen people. In 1820, 71.8 per cent of the population was engaged in food production, but by 1950 only 11.6 of the working population could feed itself and the 88.4 per cent was engaged in non-farm activity. The discovery of how to duplicate photosynthesis could well usher in "an era of unlimited abundance." Even without this process, fully \$6.7-billion in farm surpluses are now stored by the federal government.³

From 1820 to 1930 America increased the supply of energy per capita by 40 times. In 1850, 94 per cent of energy used was human and animal energy, by 1955 machine power had replaced muscle power. Men even revised the Biblical injunction by reducing the eating of bread, altering the old constants of diet to gain added nu-

trients which, combined with lightened work and shortened toil, made for a healthier and longer life. Mass poverty has been ended in the United States; new levels of comfort and even luxury, including mass leisure, have been reached. Family income is about two and a half times as high as it was at the opening of the twentieth century, while working hours have fallen from about 60 to 40 hours per week. The gain in leisure has become a principal sign of higher living standards. All the classes that have survived have shared in the increased wealth.

Union demands did not cause any revolutionary transformation for, as Ross declared, "abundant resources and a dynamic technology have made it possible to accommodate the union's minimum demands without altering the essential framework of the economic system in the United States. . . . The period of highest corporate profit and of greatest union strength is one and the same period."⁴

Man can handle scarcity through the price system. How to handle abundance—the paradoxical economic equation—is an as yet unsolved mystery. The usual solutions proffered are to eliminate the abundance and go back to scarcity about which, from long experience, man knows so much. If the abundance we now know was created by pre-atomic means, the atomic-automation era promises a superabundance virtually beyond the imagination of most people.

Does Abundance End Conflict? The "habit of poverty" limited political economy to a conflict theory of wants colliding with scarce resources. The dream of reform movements was that abundance would end other ills of society, that class struggle would end if scarcity could be eliminated. War production helped dethrone scarcity as materials were produced in unprecedented quantities and the way was opened for large-scale economic planning. The achievement of full employment raised a new issue—that hunger and fear of discharge could no longer be the chief pressures for human work and the rationale for remaining on the job until death. The triumph of American capitalism was to remove poverty as the most grinding sanction of them all and raise a new problem of incentives. Abundance does not end important contradictions. Were unlimited abundance in materials goods available, one would still face the necessity of choosing which of alternative ways to distribute it.

The question of choice does not vanish in abundance, and human beings facing choices require values and new meanings to shape their selections. The higher the level of abundance, the more the nature of a "necessity" expands. The definitions of luxury and

necessity have shifted until leisure is conceded to be a vital necessity for all and not a luxury for a few.

Psychology of Abundance. Schlesinger wrote, "As a nation, the richer we grow, the more tense, insecure, and unhappy we seem to become."⁵ Whatever has happened to economic scarcity (of job, meals, clothing, shelter), there remain serious gaps in education, medical care, situation of minorities, slums, individual dignity, and personal fulfillment in and out of work. The "quality" of the psychological satisfactions and the mental health of the society are the issues. Market demand is in large part a demand for material things and less material services, but some basic needs cannot be satisfied in organized markets." Countries with the greatest material wealth have the worst incidence of mental stability and health, the highest incidence of suicide.

The society is not more sane, the individuals not less robotized, the person not less bored, and the work not less routinized in the midst of economic plenty. Whether through the sweat of his brow or in the cooler recesses of his thinking, man lives not by bread alone, and psychological abundance has not come along to match economic abundance. Economic changes are not enough to produce spiritual comforts. Abundance has not permitted man to command himself in production and out of it; it has not ended the power struggles and ceaseless striving.

WORK CENTRALITY COLLAPSES

Toil was the way to salvation, Calvin held. In St. Paul's words, man could "work out his own salvation," a view that became part of the moral imperative for both work and individual responsibility. Freud and Veblen concurred in thinking that work was the organizing principle of all societies, that man had to act on the surroundings.

The incredible became the real when abundance outpaced utopian dreaming and produced a spread of higher living standards that threatened work centrality and the very ideals of a society dedicated to work. Work as a central vehicle for tying together goals and agendas was losing its coordinating function. Mass production destroyed the leisurely pace of life but produced that abundance which made a new type of leisure possible. People can now have both material abundance and leisure.

Humanity is facing the new social situation of superabundance providing a base for a wholly new organizing principle for life. What will be the organizing principle as division of labor changes to a

division of machine functions and work centeredness collapses? What will hold the society together if the super-machine cleanses the work process of human enslavement. A combined work-leisure function is part of the answer science has made thus far.

FROM LEISURE CLASS TO MASS LEISURE

Leisure has meant non-work or post-work and laziness, unless it was leisure for an elite or a power group. This leisure rested on some surplus (abundance) over immediate needs that permitted some persons to pursue non-work functions. No separate work function or distinct leisure operation could be found in earlier societies. Leisure, once derided, has now come into its own and is considered productive.

Controversy Over Leisure. In a surprisingly up-to-date sounding statement the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations, formed in Philadelphia in 1827, raised its demand for leisure:

"The real object of this association is to avert, if possible the desolating evils which must inevitably arise from a depreciation of the intrinsic value of human labor; to raise the mechanical and productive classes to that condition of true independence and equality which their practical skill and ingenuity, their immense utility to the nation and their growing intelligence are beginning imperiously to demand; to promote, equally, the happiness, prosperity and welfare of the whole community—to aid in conferring a due and full proportion of that invaluable promoter of happiness, leisure, upon all its useful members; and to assist, in conjunction with such other institutions of this nature as shall hereafter be formed throughout the union, in establishing a just balance of power, both mental, moral, political and scientific, between all the various classes and individuals which constitute society at large."

Men have had to go through many stages of growth to create the underlying conditions necessary for freeing most of society from drudgery.

"As long as the truly working population is so completely occupied by its necessary labor as to leave it no time for conducting the common affairs of society . . . so long did we necessarily have a special class which, freed from actual labor, looked after these matters." Division of labor was basic to division into classes and to permitting leisure for some. Veblen, too, postulated a special leisure class, which in part led people at work and in other part outside work by its conspicuous consumption. But in 1905 Dickens wrote that the real end Americans set themselves was "accelerating the more-and-more thesis of upward mobility. He wrote that the fast-moving Americans had "contempt for the leisure so much valued by

Europeans. Leisure they feel to be a kind of standing still, the unpardonable sin."

The advances of civilization depend on creation of leisure, and leisure in turn makes possible greater production. "Theoretical insights flourish best when the thinker is apparently wasting time." But the idea of having leisure for its own sake, as part of emergent living, was not widely accepted. Instead, in a work-centered society only a few leisure functions were socially accepted.

Transition to Productive Leisure. The enforced leisure of mass unemployment in the 1930's led to an outpouring of works on what to do with added free time. Unions fought for greater leisure and more equitable sharing of available work, and employers found that more work could be produced in less time. Public opinion, manifesting itself through government legislation and group action, gave new status to the desire for leisure. Leisure had become as significant as work to most people; it was an index of a higher standard of living.

Mass leisure produced a new "leisure industry" and a partial rebirth of craftsmanship in the do-it-yourself movement. In the United States in 1954 almost \$31-billion or twelve per cent of total income after taxes went into leisure activities. Workmen spent more time each day at non-work activities other than sleep than they did at work. Highly useful forms of endeavor such as adult education were sought out by dozens of millions. Colleges placed new emphasis on "the constructive and wholesome use of leisure time" and helped people find means for ending "the wasteful and psychologically unrewarding ways in which leisure time is spent by a large proportion of the population."⁷

In production the new mass leisure had powerful repercussions. Revolt against work took the form not merely of restrictions and of going slow but also of obsessive reveries and "the substitution of the glamor of leisure for the drudgery of work"—all of them silent wars against the demands of production standards. Satisfaction is sought in extra-work leisure pursuits until leisure has become the most important single form taken by the "flight from work." Surrendering a possibility of personalizing and humanizing work, people seek "freedom in play."⁸ By a dialectical quirk of history, hours were so shortened and work so lightened that leisure was possible for workers under capitalism. It is the businessman who puts in long hours and carries his work home with him.

Leisure Becomes Productive. There are those who look on leisure as a positive good, an improvement in living conditions. Halt ing before the edge of the idea that leisure is an opportunity to

make one's choices oneself and to think things through, they think of leisure in part as relief from material anxieties so that one can enjoy the fruits of labor. This is part of the excellent conception that added leisure is not gained at the expense of goods, for "up to a certain point, additional leisure may increase productive efficiency."

Leisure and Choice. The next stage of development of the concept of leisure was to add to it the capacity for a choice or preference over work, an important step to the third and fuller level of a combined work-leisure function. In discussing the marginal utility theory of economies and its averaging out of all human differences, Moore wrote, "leisure is a residual, and not an explicit utility. It ordinarily does not mean cessation of activity, but only cessation of, or freedom from some activities in favor of others." While leisure cannot be made homogeneous or reduced to standardized units—being a quality and not a quantity—Moore pointed out that "various manifestations of the 'utility of leisure'" can be "superficially compared."⁹ The issue was of importance in the light of the older marginal view of whether more leisure or more goods were to be preferred.

The result has been that today leisure is included in the category of human wants, although it does not appear in the market place. A point can be reached in the creation of abundance where men will value more leisure and less work plus more creativeness in work and also in leisure and the combining of work and leisure. Such a thought would hardly have entered the minds of most older economists who felt that work was a dire, basic, unrelenting necessity.

Managers consider increased leisure an important motivation, although in practice they have to put in extra hours and keep leisure in a residual, secondary, and extrinsic relation to work. Workers, now that they can make the choice of allocating time to their own use or to work, may have forced into being a new basis for wage evaluation. The more real wealth there is, the less pressure there is on family members to work longer hours or for less money. Americans are estimated to take from two-thirds to three-quarters of the gains in productivity in the form of higher living standards of the material kind and the remainder in increased leisure for themselves and families. Since 1910 fully a third of the gains of increasing productivity have assumed the form of fewer hours and "increased leisure."

THE WORK-LEISURE FUNCTION

Acceptance of the view that leisure is productive paves the way to seeing that both leisure and production can increase simultaneously.

ously and that leisure can raise production, although this is by no means its function. The next stage in the reconstruction of work relations is a work-leisure function.

Work-Play Combined. "Moralists tended to view life as consisting essentially of work, with only such intervals for rest as are physiologically necessary. Havelock Ellis views life as essentially play, interrupted by the need of a certain minimum of work to secure the necessities of existence." The dance of life, Ellis' noted phrase, would be a leisure-work function, with work quite subordinate and indeed not at all distinct from play if work can be so cut down and made creative. Vital, constructive components of work might well be present in play. The drive would be in the direction of a re-creation of the ancient fusion of work into the central body of life activities, until as Moore showed, no one could distinguish a separate work function.⁹

As work became less burdensome, the dividing line between work and play tended to disappear. Civilized man may yet catch up to the noble savage who had a combined work-play function. Among the non-climbing societies of the Zuni and Samoans, both living on the edge of what Americans would call necessity, there is a feeling of being well-off in the midst of real plenty—the psychological plenty of companionable labor and friendly people, with no scarcity of power positions and no ceaseless climbing to rootless heights from which descent is swift.

The time is near when there can be rejoicing in what used to be called the disutility of labor, of work so transfused with intellectual and moral vision as to be made into joy. The time may have arrived for men to "retire while working" or enjoy leisure and work together. Otherwise, of what human use will automation be? Of what human use will be the impending gain of 50 per cent to 100 per cent per capita more leisure?

Intrinsic Interest of a Whole Man. MacIver has pointed out that integration proceeds well where an intrinsic interest in what one is doing or thinking exists. The artist receives inspiration as he creates. An extrinsic interest is present where one does something, viz., work, so as to make gains useful for expressing oneself in non-economic phases of living, i.e., in finding satisfactions elsewhere. MacIver would instill a direct interest in work and bring to an end the schizoid extrinsic interests, or at least subordinate them. He looks to creativeness for the organizing principle of human existence as work centrality is in the process of falling.

"He seeks to fulfill these deep-lvng needs of his personality in his work role. The worker cannot indefinitely compartmentalize his personality like the hold of a battleship, there cannot be one section

labeled 'work personality' and another labeled 'leisure personality.'"

The Community of Work-Leisure. Integration of work with the personal and direct relations of living is possible in a community of work-leisure. Man has to live his life himself, to cope through reason with the problem of finding meaningful relatedness to other men, to production, and to the whole of living. Above all, people have to do things for themselves to have a self; they cannot be carried up the ladder.¹⁰ An end has to be found to dehumanization of industrial relations, to achieve expression of men's real selves and end "playing" at assumed part-roles that stunt and pervert the human person.

A start is suggested in the elimination of dull and monotonous work. Automation can well displace unskilled workers and help alter the social standing of labor as a result. Here the implication is that the leisure that results can increase the social standing of people acting in their leisure time. Already, many workers have sought to control the pace of the assembly line so as to achieve some independence of management pressures, an affirmation of a kind of self-direction that is a leisure of the spirit.

Frohm has gone on to note that "one cannot separate work activity from political activity, from the use of leisure time and from personal life." Work and non-work both have to be made interesting and leisurely by ending the compartmentalization of living.^{10a} Such an integration might help produce an enlightened citizenry; it would make for mass participation in public life, not to mention the possible improvements in family life.

DANGER AND HOPE OF LEISURE

In his Journal more than a century ago, Thoreau stated that a "broad margin of leisure is as beautiful in a man's life as in a book." Leisure may not end man's conflicts and the processes of contest but it can add beauty and creativeness and joyousness to living. Leisure, like so many other social gains, is no unmixed blessing. Merely extending leisure to more people is a minor gain at best, for mechanization of the leisure mind, alienation of the leisure time, and frantic searching during leisure for consumption-oriented forms of higher status can become Toynbee's "Cree's sty" of satisfactions. While seemingly harmless, they can be dangerous. Yet a choice is possible within choice-laden leisure, between the external excitements and ready-made pleasures of passive creatures and a self-active excellence.

Mechanization of the Leisure Mind. It is still considered rather a frivolity to 'study' leisure when the cult of efficiency demands

that work and leisure be separated and that leisure then be subdivided, like radio or TV program schedules, with the emphasis on mechanical gadgets, assembly-line leisure, and ready-made day-dreams, and not social values and community activities. Leisure can be institutionalized, made as homogeneous and uniform by mass society's massifying processes so that it becomes as destructive of personality as assembly line work, the mechanization of the one mingling with the mechanization of the other.

The "leisure industries" try to make a market product out of leisure and time, measuring the value of fun and creativeness in terms of its market success and not anything beneficial for the person. Instead of Plato's "noble use of leisure" we often have much "ill-spent leisure" in which the individual is played on as if he were an instrument.

Alienated Leisure. At leisure men can become more alienated from control of their own lives than ever before, as leisure can be abstracted and quantified and given quantitative exchange value. It is possible that we have entered an age of deadly boredom, with a new class of manipulative aristocrats who control men at leisure. More total time is spent watching television than in any other single activity except sleep but including making a living, to take a single example of somewhat passive use of leisure. In 1956 some 2.6-billion hours were spent each week watching TV; 1.9 billion hours were spent in all economic pursuits.¹¹ In a four-person family, fully 60 hours a week are spent watching TV compared to 56 hours devoted to work. A mass phenomenon since 1950, TV has, by one of the incredible spurts of mass society, become a central and engaging feature of people's lives.

Even the do-it-yourself movement places the individual in "doing" situations in which he remains "isolated, alone, passive, and quiet" and in a limited intellectual capacity, the same characteristics that job and organization induce in him. Deprived of TV, movies, radios, sports events, and some parts of newspapers, many people cannot "enjoy" life. For some persons a fear of relaxation and leisure is so strong that it is a virtual "week-end neurosis" preventing departure from a working schedule.

Productive Use of Leisure. When people are given leisure without the tradition of leisure, they do not know how to use it on their own; they cannot escape the "doing" mania, are unable to invent new uses for leisure, and are dependent on professionals to supply leisure functions through the commercial market. The swiftness of change has developed leisure time more rapidly than society could provide useful intellectual and non-work pursuits for such time.

When the work load in the rubber industry was reduced and the workers were given more leisure, as many as 40 per cent of them took second jobs, usually non-union jobs and at lower pay. The fear of not having enough money and the desire for more of the good things of life forces these people to give up much leisure. As Swados wrote, "it was the *enforced* leisure of the layoff" and memory of the enforced leisure of the great depression of the 1930's that drove thousands into moonlighting. The problem of additional time can be bigger than the individual who is not taught to use it, bigger than his union and, as the "leisure" of unemployment shows, bigger than the nation as well. The search for more gadgetry can force men to surrender leisure, too. There is a need for a more rationally based leisure that protects human beings from the swelling flood of "entertainment" as the new opiate of the people, that does not entail enforced leisure of unemployment to drive a man to work harder, and liberates him for spontaneous living for himself and his children.¹²

The More-and-More Thesis. Swiftly changing fashions, built-in obsolescence, and the further spread of a psychology of climbing through possession and display of consumption goods can disrupt much of the good that can come from leisure.

The difficulty with the more-and-more thesis is that so long as there is strong economic insecurity and extraordinarily swift and deep-going change in mass society, there is no way out of the constant striving for more. Leisure is still felt to be "a kind of standing still" in a climbing society that puts pressure on people to rise, beyond parents, beyond friends, away from all older levels until society and personality can become disorganized. Leisure time may simply be more time for prestige and status. Where the extrinsic interest is so strong that satisfactions lie outside what one is doing —viz., working for money so that one can satisfy needs outside of work—a vicious circle has opened: "In this circumstance, the satisfaction lies not in the having, but in the having more." Some proper relation between intrinsic and extrinsic interests has to be found to enable people to do without more and more of less and less socially realistic materials. The potentially most vicious of equations, the more-and-more thesis of endless rising over others, has to be shattered.

Hope for Man. There is hope for homo sapiens, man the thinker, and homo faber, man the creator. Some of the world's outstanding creations have been accomplished by artists and scientists provided with leisure by an intellectual specialization that left them free to be the benefactors of society.

The dialectics of work-leisure as function should go beyond the "ripening leisure" of which Wiener spoke to a level where men who are infinitely self-adaptable and self-controlling can end the dangers of dehumanization that their own creations open up for them. The creator need no longer be victim of his creations, whether they be tools or the super machine of automation. The triumph of individuality is the victory of society, for an extension of personality into self-determination is simultaneously an increase in a sense of obligation and responsibility and of liberty and creativeness. Man has the capacity to re-create the primitive fusion of a seamless pattern in a whole life, in which no separate work function and no discrete leisure time can be discerned, and in which the human equation has triumphed over all the others.

SUMMARY

The spread of leisure and the reduction of work have combined to permit a choice between work and leisure to make it possible to break through work-supervisory relations and even to envisage an end to any dichotomy of work and leisure. Man, however, does not know how to handle either abundance or leisure; he now faces a possible superabundance under automation for which he is ill prepared. Moreover, in the midst of economic plenty most men have failed to achieve psychological abundance.

The reality principle for societies in which work was a separate function was tied to work. As work centrality collapsed, the search for a new integrating principle has centered on leisure. The special leisure class has given way to a mass leisure that may be productive.

- Man faces the prospect of making work shorter and less onerous, of combining it with play, and then of making play primary and work secondary. Leisure can be intrinsically satisfying, but the mechanization of leisure is a danger for a people so recently introduced to non-work functioning. The important struggle has become abating the grinding struggle for status and merging leisure into a fuller existence.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What has happened to economic theory grounded on the concept of **scarcity**?
2. Does abundance end conflict? Contest?
3. What is a psychology of abundance as contrasted to the economics of abundance?
4. To what extent has work centrality slipped?
5. Was a special leisure class once needed? Is it still needed? How does this relate to elitism?

6. How does leisure become "productive."
7. The American people elected leisure. Explain.
8. What is a work-leisure function?
9. Is a non-status-climbing society possible?
10. Contrast intrinsic and extrinsic interest.

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